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Docket No. 90850-Agenda 32-September 2001.

SCHILLERSTROM HOMES, INC., Appellant, v. THE CITY OF NAPERVILLE, Appellee.

Opinion filed December 20, 2001.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Schillerstrom Homes, Inc., a suburban realestate development company, filed a complaint against thedefendant, the City of Naperville, alleging that the City willfullyfailed to approve the plaintiff's final subdivision plat within a 60-day period as required by section 11-12-8 of the IllinoisMunicipal Code. See 65 ILCS 5/11-12-8 (West 1998). Theplaintiff sought summary judgment and damages as provided bysection 11-12-8, as well as a writ of mandamus, directing the Cityto approve and record the plat. The City filed a motion to dismissthe plaintiff's complaint. The Du Page County circuit courtgranted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, and theappellate court reversed. No. 2-99-1258 (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23).

The central issue in this case is whether a state statute whichprovides for a damage remedy is superseded by a similar homerule ordinance which does not provide any remedy. We reverse theappellate court, affirm the circuit court, and remand for furtherproceedings.

BACKGROUND

In 1997, the plaintiff purchased a piece of residential propertyin the City of Naperville. The plaintiff planned to raze a house onthe property, subdivide the property into two lots, and construct anew house on each lot. Between January 1997 and May 1999, theplaintiff met with City officials and took various steps towardobtaining approval of its plat. The plaintiff submitted its finalsubdivision plat and supporting documents to City planners, anda month later, the planners recommended that the city councilapprove the plat. On June 15, 1999, the city council consideredand rejected the plat, then recessed its meeting. After theplaintiff's representatives left the meeting, the city councilreconvened to reconsider the plaintiff's plat. The city councilvoted to table reconsideration of the plat until its July 20, 1999,meeting. On July 20, the city council voted again to tablereconsideration of the plat until its August 17, 1999, meeting. OnAugust 9, 1999, the plaintiff notified the City that it would file suitif the City failed to act on the plat within five days. The City didnothing, and on August 17, 1999, the plaintiff filed a three-countcomplaint against the City.⁽¹⁾

In its complaint, the plaintiff described its efforts to obtainplat approval, as well as delays in the approval process attributableto the City. The plaintiff's first count sought a "judgment ofmandamus" directing the city council to approve and record theplat. The plaintiff's second count sought summary judgment undersection 11-12-8 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS5/11-12-8 (West 1998)), and its third count sought damages undersection 11-12-8 for the City's purportedly wilful failure toapprove the plat. In its third count, the plaintiff alleged that theCity adopted Ordinance 99-112 on July 6, 1999, which amendedits municipal code to establish minimum lot sizes larger than thoseproposed by the plaintiff's plat.

The City filed a motion to dismiss. The City asserted that theplaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because the 60-dayperiod for approval had not run because the plaintiff failed tosubmit a "requested site plan" for the plat. The City also assertedthat the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because the Citytook action on the plat at its August 17, 1999, meeting. Theunapproved minutes of this meeting, attached to the City's motionto dismiss, show that the City denied plat approval "because theproposal does not meet the criteria of the Comprehensive Plan tolimit single-family density to 2.5 units per acre, because thepetitioner did not provided [sic] information on the proposedhomes which might have added validity to the petition, andbecause the subdivision did not meet the criteria of Ordinance99-112." The City finally asserted that counts II and III of theplaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because section 7-2-5:6of the Naperville Municipal Code, a valid exercise of the City'shome rule powers, preempts section 11-12-8 of the IllinoisMunicipal Code.

In a written order, the trial court denied the City's motion. Thetrial court specifically found:

"A) Plaintiff provided Defendant with all RequiredDocuments pursuant to Naperville Ordinances as of June10, 1999 and that Documents requested by Napervilleafter June 10, 1999 were not required under theApplicable Zoning Ordinances.

B) That Plaintiff provided Defendant with Proper Five(5) day Notice Pursuant to Applicable State Statutes andthat Naperville Failed to Act upon the SubdivisionApplication prior to the expiration of the Five (5) dayPeriod.

C) That Plaintiff Filed Suit in this Cause at or about12:12pm on August 17, 1999 and by so doing divestedNaperville of the Jurisdiction to rule on the SubdivisionApplication and therefore the City of Naperville's Denialof the Subdivision Application on the evening of August17, 1999 Is a Nullity because under the terms of the StateStatute the City lost Jurisdiction."

On October 6, 1999, the trial court heard the plaintiff'smotion for summary judgment. The court again found that as ofJune 10, 1999, the plaintiff had supplied the City with alldocuments in support of the plat which were required bymunicipal ordinances. The court also found that City authoritiesfailed to act upon the plat within 60 days and that the plaintiff gavefive days' written notice to the City before filing suit. The courtgranted summary judgment to the plaintiff on the 60-day and five-day requirements, reserved ruling on the issues of wilfulness anddamages, and ordered the Du Page County recorder to record theplaintiff's plat. The court included Rule 304(a) language in itsorder, and the City appealed.

The appellate court held that the trial court erred in grantingsummary judgment to the plaintiff under section 11-12-8 of theIllinois Municipal Code. The appellate court stated that theGeneral Assembly, in section 11-12-8, expressed no intention topreempt or exclude home rule over subdivision plat approval:

"Nothing prevented the City from enacting and followingits own ordinance to govern the processing of applicationsfor permission to subdivide or resubdivide property, evenif those ordinances conflict with section 11-12-8 of theMunicipal Code. Whether the City acted correctly underits ordinances is not at issue in this appeal, as thatcontroversy is still pending in the trial court. We holdonly that, because the City Code applies to the exclusionof section [11-12-8], the trial court erred in grantingplaintiff any relief on count II of its complaint."

We granted the plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. See 177Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment should be granted if "there is no genuineissue as to any material fact and *** the moving party is entitledto a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West1998). Summary judgment can aid in the expeditious dispositionof a lawsuit, but it is a drastic measure and should be allowed only"when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt."Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986). Our standard of reviewis de novo. Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35 (2001).

Home rule is predicated upon the assumption that problemsaffecting municipalities and their residents should be met withsolutions tailored to local needs. Kalodimos v. Village of MortonGrove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 502 (1984); see 7 Record of Proceedings,Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1605 (hereinafter cited asProceedings) ("Local governments must be authorized to exercisebroad powers and to undertake creative and extensive projects ifthey are to contribute effectively to solving the immense problemsthat have been created by the increasing urbanization of oursociety"). The home rule provisions of the 1970 IllinoisConstitution drastically altered the relationship between our stateand local governments, giving municipalities more autonomy tochart the course of their own growth. Kanellos v. County of Cook,53 Ill. 2d 161, 166 (1972); see 21 Ill. Jur. Municipal Law