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Docket No. 88530-Agenda 14-May 2000.

SAM SARKISSIAN, As Parent and Guardian of Sonya Sarkissian,a Minor, Appellee, v. THE CHICAGO BOARD OF

EDUCATION, Appellant.

Opinion filed January 29, 2001.

JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Sam Sarkissian, as parent and guardian of SonyaSarkissian, a minor, obtained a default judgment against thedefendant, the Chicago Board of Education, in the circuit court ofCook County after the Board failed to appear in this personalinjury action. The circuit court later vacated the default judgmentas void, finding that the Board had not been properly served withsummons. The appellate court reversed, holding that service wasproper. 308 Ill. App. 3d 137. We allowed the Board's petition forleave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now reverse thejudgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of thecircuit court.

The procedural history of this case requires only a briefrecitation. Sam Sarkissian, as parent and guardian of SonyaSarkissian, a minor, commenced the present action on January 26,1988, by filing a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County.The complaint alleged that Sonya sustained injuries while astudent at a Chicago public school on September 24, 1985, whenschool authorities failed to promptly summon or renderappropriate medical assistance after Sonya had an epilepticseizure. According to the complaint, the Board and its agents wereaware, prior to that time, that Sonya had epilepsy. A copy of theplaintiff's complaint was left with the receptionist for the Board'sattorney on February 1, 1988. The Board never answered thecomplaint or otherwise entered an appearance, however, and adefault judgment was entered against it on April 17, 1990,awarding the plaintiff $10 million in damages.

After a lengthy and unexplained delay, the plaintiff moved torevive the default judgment on August 25, 1997. See 735 ILCS5/12-108(a) (West 1998) (requiring plaintiff to file petition torevive judgment that is more than seven years old). It appears thatthe Board did not receive notice of the default judgment untilSeptember 2, 1997, when it received a copy of the plaintiff'srevival petition. The Board then moved to vacate the defaultjudgment as void. The Board argued that the circuit court lackedjurisdiction in this case because the Board had never been properlyserved with summons. Section 2-211 of the Code of CivilProcedure required that, with respect to an entity like the Board,summons be served on "the president, clerk, or officercorresponding thereto." In the present case, the summons was notaddressed to any specific individual, and apparently it was leftwith a receptionist in the Board's law department. The Boardcontended that service did not comply with the requirements ofsection 2-211, and that the circuit court therefore never acquiredjurisdiction over it.

The circuit court agreed with the Board, concluding thatservice in this case was not in compliance with the statute. In thealternative, the plaintiff argued that the Board was equitablyestopped from challenging service in this case because of theBoard's frequent acceptance of service at its law department in thepast. The circuit judge rejected this contention as well. In an orderentered July 21, 1998, the court vacated the default judgmentpreviously entered against the Board. At the same time, the courtauthorized the issuance of an alias summons to the Board. Thatsummons, addressed to the president of the Board, was apparentlyserved the following week.

The plaintiff appealed from the order of the circuit courtvacating the default judgment. As a preliminary matter, theappellate court rejected the Board's objection that the court lackedjurisdiction over the appeal; unlike the Board, the appellate courtbelieved that the order vacating the default judgment was a final,appealable order. On the merits of the case, the appellate courtheld that the Board had been properly served under section 2-211of the Code of Civil Procedure. Finding the statute to beambiguous, the appellate court analyzed the position and duties ofthe Board's attorney and concluded that the attorney qualified asa person who could be served under that provision. The appellatecourt further believed that the attorney could delegate to thereceptionist for the law department the duty of receiving process.308 Ill. App. 3d at 151-52. The appellate court therefore reversedthe circuit court order vacating the default judgment and remandedthe cause for further proceedings. We allowed the Board's petitionfor leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). We granted leave to theIllinois Association of School Boards, the Illinois Association ofPark Districts, the Illinois Library Association, and the IllinoisGovernmental Association of Pools to submit a joint brief as amicicuriae in support of the Board. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.

We are met at the outset with a challenge to our jurisdictionin this appeal. The Board renews here its argument that the orderof the circuit court vacating the default judgment was not a final,appealable order. In support of its jurisdictional objection, theBoard observes that the plaintiff's complaint was still pending inthe circuit court at the time the plaintiff purported to appeal fromthe adverse order. In the proceedings below, the circuit judgeentered an order on July 21, 1998, vacating the default judgmentas void. At the same time, the judge authorized the issuance of analias summons, and one addressed to the Board presidentapparently was left with an employee of the Board on July 28,1998. After that, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on August17, 1998, under Rule 303 (155 Ill. 2d R. 303). Thus, at the sametime the plaintiff filed the appeal from the circuit court ordervacating the default judgment, the plaintiff's action was pendingin the circuit court. For these reasons, the Board contends that theorder entered by the circuit court vacating the default judgmentshould not in this case be considered a final, appealable order.

Cases from the appellate court are divided on this question.Some decisions of the appellate court have ruled that an ordervacating a default judgment on grounds of improper service is afinal, appealable order. See Cavanaugh v. Lansing MunicipalAirport, 288 Ill. App. 3d 239 (1997); DiNardo v. Lamela, 183 Ill.App. 3d 1098 (1989); In re Marriage of Kelso, 173 Ill. App. 3d746 (1988); Connaughton v. Burke, 46 Ill. App. 3d 602 (1977).Other decisions, however, have reached the opposite conclusion.See Nelson v. United Airlines, Inc., 243 Ill. App. 3d 795 (1993);Stankowicz v. Gonzalez, 103 Ill. App. 3d 828 (1981); Mares v.Metzler, 87 Ill. App. 3d 881 (1980). The appellate court belowcited the decision in Cavanaugh in support of its conclusion thatit had jurisdiction over the present appeal. 308 Ill. App. 3d at 147-48.

Cavanaugh in turn relied on this court's opinion in BrauerMachine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569 (1943),and it is that precedent that the plaintiff cites for the contentionthat the order of the circuit court vacating the default judgmentwas a final, appealable order. In Brauer, this court consideredwhether an order quashing service of summons on a foreigncorporation was a final, appealable order. The court concluded thatthe order was final and appealable, explaining:

"It is true, the order, in form, was only an orderquashing the service of the summons. It was not an orderdismissing the suit, nor was it in the form of a finaljudgment on the merits. Regardless of its form, however,it was a complete and final disposition of the case, basedupon the conclusion the court had reached that appelleewas not amenable to the service of process in the mannerin which the summons was served. On that issue it wasnot only as effectual and conclusive but it was as final asany decision upon the merits. The result was the same.

If it should be held that an order of this character is notappealable, then there would be no method by which aplaintiff could obtain a review of an order of the trialcourt quashing the service of process." Brauer, 383 Ill. at577-78.

The Board argues that Brauer is distinguishable from thepresent case, however, because in Brauer the defendant was notamenable to service of process, and the case was effectively at anend. The court stated:

"If an order quashing the service of process is not anappealable order, then the cause would be left on thedocket of the trial court, undisposed of in form only,when, as a matter of fact, to all intents and purposes thecause was, in fact, finally disposed of. The plaintiff couldnot proceed further, except by obtaining service in someother manner. The facts alleged in this case, which mustbe accepted as true, show that service could not beobtained in any other manner. The order quashing theservice was, therefore, as final and conclusive as anyorder which could have been entered. It was a decision onan issue which effectively barred any further proceedingsby the plaintiff against the sole defendant in the cause. Itwas the only order the court was authorized to enter. Tohold that no appeal would lie from such an order wouldbe to leave appellant in the position of having its suitfinally disposed of and deny to it the right to have thatorder reviewed." Brauer, 383 Ill. at 578.

In the present case, in contrast, the order entered by the circuitcourt was not a final disposition of the matter. Here, the onlyimpediment to proper service, and obtaining jurisdiction over thedefendant, was the identity of the person who received thesummons. The Board of Education is amenable to service, and thecircuit court in the present case authorized the issuance of an aliassummons to the Board.

We do not interpret Brauer as establishing a rule that anyorder quashing service is a final, appealable order. Rather, webelieve that the character of an order depends on the circumstancesof the case. In some instances, as in Brauer, it is properlycharacterized as final and appealable. In other cases, however, itis not. The circuit court's action here left the entire case at issue,and it manifested the judge's intent to retain jurisdiction over thematter. See Nelson v. United Airlines, Inc., 243 Ill. App. 3d 795,800 (1993). For these reasons, we do not believe that the ordervacating the default judgment in this case may properly becharacterized as a final, appealable order.

Contrary to the view expressed by Chief Justice Harrison inhis dissent, the Board's motion challenging the default judgmentwas not based on section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure.735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 1998). That provision was not availableto the Board as a remedy in this case. Although the Board refers tosection 2-1401 in its motion and its brief, it does so only todistinguish the provision from the remedy it is pursuing here. SeeR.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 304,309-10 (1986); 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 1998) ("Nothingcontained in this Section affects any existing right to relief from avoid order or judgment, or to employ any existing method toprocure that relief"). A petition for relief from judgment undersection 2-1401 must be filed within two years after entry of thejudgment being challenged. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) (West 1998).In the present case, the Board was attacking a judgment that wasmore than seven years old, and therefore it could not haveproceeded under section 2-1401. A void judgment may bechallenged at any time, however, and the Board properly did so bymotion. See State Bank v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308-09 (1986);Cavanaugh v. Lansing Municipal Airport, 288 Ill. App. 3d 239,246 (1997); In re Marriage of Parks, 122 Ill. App. 3d 905, 909(1984). Because the Board was not proceeding under section2-1401, the appeals rule cited by Chief Justice Harrison in hisdissent, Rule 304(b)(3) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(3)), could not havebeen used in this case.

Although we have found that the circuit court order vacatingthe default judgment was not a final, appealable order, andtherefore appellate jurisdiction is lacking, the defendant urges usto address the merits of the case. The defendant contends that adecision on the merits is appropriate here because of thesubstantial amount of time that has passed since the inception ofthe litigation, and because of the likelihood that the issue regardingproper service will be raised again on appeal if the present case isreturned, unresolved, to the circuit court. We agree with the Boardthat our consideration of the appeal on its merits is appropriate inthese circumstances (see Crane Paper Stock Co. v. Chicago &Northwestern Ry. Co., 63 Ill. 2d 61, 67-68 (1976)), and we nowturn to that issue.

Section 2-211 of the Code of Civil Procedure, regardingservice of summons on public entities, provides:

"In actions against public, municipal, governmental orquasi-municipal corporations, summons may be served byleaving a copy with the chairperson of the county board orcounty clerk in the case of a county, with the mayor orcity clerk in the case of a city, with the president of theboard of trustees or village clerk in the case of a village,with the supervisor or town clerk in the case of a town,and with the president or clerk or other officercorresponding thereto in the case of any other public,municipal, governmental or quasi-municipal corporationor body." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-211 (nowcodified at 735 ILCS 5/2-211 (West 1998)).

In this case, the summons was delivered to the receptionist forthe Board's legal department. The plaintiff argues, and theappellate court agreed, that this was sufficient under section2-211. The appellate court found the statute to be ambiguous butreasoned that the Board's counsel fit within the category of "otherofficer corresponding thereto." The court also believed that serviceon the law department's receptionist was proper because theBoard's attorney could delegate that task to the receptionist. 308Ill. App. 3d at 151-52. Challenging the appellate court'sdetermination, the Board argues that its attorney, though holdingan office for purposes of certain provisions of the School Code, isnot an officer corresponding to a president or clerk under section2-211 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore does notqualify as a person who may be served.

The question before us is one of statutory interpretation. Thefundamental tenet of construction is to ascertain and give effect tothe intention of the legislature. Varelis v. Northwestern MemorialHospital, 167 Ill. 2d 449, 454 (1995); Business & ProfessionalPeople for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 146Ill. 2d 175, 207 (1991). In performing that task, a court shouldlook first to the words of the statute (Metropolitan Life InsuranceCo. v. Washburn, 112 Ill. 2d 486, 492 (1986)), for the languageused by the legislature is the best indication of legislative intent(Kirwan v. Welch, 133 Ill. 2d 163, 165 (1989); County of Du Pagev. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151(1985)). When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous,no resort is necessary to other interpretive tools. Henry v. St.John's Hospital, 138 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1990).

We find no ambiguity in the requirements of section 2-211.See Cavanaugh v. Lansing Municipal Airport, 288 Ill. App. 3d239, 245 (1997); Miller v. Town of Cicero, 225 Ill. App. 3d 105,113-14 (1992). Under the terms of the statute, proper service isachieved on a county by leaving the summons with the chairpersonof the county board or with the county clerk. In the case of a city,service is proper on the mayor or city clerk. For a village, servicemay be effected on the president of the village board of trustees orthe village clerk. For a town, service is proper on the townsupervisor or town clerk. For any other entity subject to the statute,service is proper on "the president or clerk or other officercorresponding thereto."

The Board has a president, but it does not have a clerk. TheBoard contends that its secretary is properly considered the "otherofficer corresponding thereto" under the language of section2-211. We agree. The statute expresses the unambiguous intent toauthorize service on either the head of the particular entity or onthe person who performs clerical and record-keeping functions forthe entity. Clearly, the latter person, in the case of an entity thatdoes not have a designated clerk, would be the secretary. TheBoard has a secretary (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 34-19(now codified at 105 ILCS 5/34-19 (West 1998)), and we believethat it is that person who, in the language of section 2-211,corresponds to the position of clerk.

In support of the appellate court's result in this case, theplaintiff cites section 34-11 of the School Code, which specifiesthe functions and duties of the Board's attorney. Ill. Rev. Stat.1987, ch. 122, par. 34-11 (now codified at 105 ILCS 5/34-11(West 1998)). Section 34-11 provides:

"The board by a majority vote of its full membershipshall appoint an attorney who shall have charge andcontrol, subject to the approval of the board, of the lawdepartment and of all litigation, legal questions and suchother legal matters as may be referred to the departmentby the board or by the general superintendent of schools.Appointments, promotions and discharge of assistantattorneys shall be made by a majority of the board uponrecommendation of the attorney or by a majority vote ofthe full membership of the board. The attorney shall holdthis office for an indefinite term subject to removal by amajority vote of the full membership of the board."

In essence, the plaintiff argues that the Board's attorney is an"officer corresponding thereto" under section 2-211 because theattorney holds an office and is in charge of the Board's legalaffairs. We do not agree.

In the case of the Board, section 2-211 requires that theperson receiving the summons be "the president or clerk or otherofficer corresponding thereto." Although the Board's counselmight properly be characterized as holding an office, at least insome of the provisions of the School Code, we do not believe thatcounsel can be said to be an officer "corresponding" to either apresident or a clerk, for purposes of receiving summons undersection 2-211 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Counsel clearly isnot the president of the Board. Moreover, counsel's law-relatedduties do not match, or correspond to, the clerical and record-keeping functions associated with a clerk-or with a secretary.

Finally, we note that section 34-3(b) of the School Coderefers to the Board's secretary as an "employee." 105 ILCS5/34-3(b) (West 1998). The appellate court below apparently tookthis as evidence that the secretary is not an officer of the Board, forpurposes of receiving summons under section 2-211. 308 Ill. App.3d at 151. The cited provision states, "The secretary of the Boardshall be selected by the Board and shall be an employee of theBoard rather than a member of the Board, notwithstandingsubsection (d) of Section 34-3.3." 105 ILCS 5/34-3(b) (West1998). Section 34-3.3(d) refers to the appointment of a new boardupon the expiration of the terms of office of a reform board oftrustees. 105 ILCS 5/34-3.3(d) (West 1998). We do not construesection 34-3(b) of the School Code as affecting the secretary'sstatus as one designated to receive service of summons undersection 2-211 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 34-3(b)merely provides that the secretary is chosen by the Board and maynot be a member of the Board; in that sense the secretary is anemployee of the Board. By the same reasoning, however, theBoard's attorney must also be deemed an employee of the Board,for that person is similarly selected by the Board.

Given our result in this case, we need not consider theadditional question whether, if service on the Board's attorney isproper under section 2-211, service on the attorney's receptionistwould also be proper. Also, the plaintiff had previously arguedthat the Board was estopped from challenging the sufficiency ofservice in this case because of the Board's past practice ofaccepting service on its legal department. The plaintiff has electednot to pursue that issue before this court, however, and thereforewe do not address that question, either. We note, however, that theBoard's appearances in other cases, after being served withsummons in the manner attempted here, do not by themselvesexcuse the plaintiff's lack of compliance with the statute in thiscase." ' "The principle is too elementary to need discussion that acourt can only acquire jurisdiction of a party, where there is noappearance, by the service of process in the manner prescribed bylaw." ' " Miller v. Town of Cicero, 225 Ill. App. 3d 105, 110(1992), quoting Amy v. City of Watertown, 130 U.S. 301, 317, 32L. Ed. 946, 952, 9 S. Ct. 530, 536 (1889).

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court isreversed, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County isaffirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of CookCounty for further proceedings.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed;

cause remanded.

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:

In addressing the appellate court's jurisdiction, the majoritysuggests that our court has the authority to overlook jurisdictionalbarriers on an ad hoc basis whenever we deem it appropriate. Thecourt has taken this view before in both civil (In re Marriage ofSkahan, 178 Ill. 2d 577 (1998)) and criminal (People v. Ruiz, No.87204 (October 26, 2000)) cases, and I continue to believe that itis contrary to law. Although our constitution confers on this courtthe power to define when interlocutory appeals may be taken, itdoes not authorize us to proceed on a case-by-case basis. The rightto appeal must be established by rule.

The terms of the 1970 Illinois Constitution are clear. Underarticle VI, section 6, final judgments may be appealed as a matterof right from the circuit court to the appellate court, but there is nocorresponding constitutional right to appeal from interlocutoryorders of the circuit court. Rather, the constitution vests this courtwith the authority to provide for such appeals by rule. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI,