Find Legal Information

Docket Nos. 93615, 93774 cons.-Agenda 15-November 2002.

BARBARA SAICHEK, Appellee, v. MALGORZATA LUPA et 
al. (Malgorzata Lupa, Appellant).

Opinion filed March 20, 2003.

JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:

The sole issue in this appeal is whether a plaintiff who hasbrought an action against two defendants to recover damages fora single, indivisible set of injuries arising from concurrent butindependent acts of negligence may continue with her claimagainst the first of the defendants after being awarded and paid thefull amount of damages she proved following entry of a defaultjudgment in her favor against the second defendant. The circuitcourt held that she could not and dismissed her claim against thefirst defendant pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)). The appellate courtreversed and remanded for further proceedings. 329 Ill. App. 3d1059. We granted the first defendant's petition for leave to appeal.177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons that follow, we now reverse thejudgment of the appellate court.

The pertinent facts are not in dispute. In October of 1998,plaintiff, Barbara Saichek, was the passenger in a taxicab operatedby Valentin N. Zdunkevich. While the cab was stopped andwaiting to make a turn at an intersection in the Village ofNorthbrook, it was rear-ended by an automobile driven byMargaret Lupa. As a result of the collision, plaintiff sufferedsevere and permanent personal injuries. In addition, some of herpersonal property was lost or damaged.

Plaintiff subsequently filed a two-count complaint in thecircuit court of Cook County to recover damages from Lupa (countI) and, "in the alternative," from Zdunkevich (count II) based ontheir alleged negligence. Lupa answered the complaint andparticipated in the litigation. Zdunkevich did not. After beingserved with process, Zdunkevich failed to enter an appearance, filepleadings or make any other response to plaintiff's complaint.⁽¹⁾Plaintiff therefore moved for entry of a default judgment againsthim pursuant to section 2-1301 of the Code of Civil Procedure(735 ILCS 5/2-1301 (West 2000)). That motion was granted. Anorder of default was entered in favor of plaintiff and againstZdunkevich, and Zdunkevich was duly notified of the default asrequired by statute. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1302 (West 2000).

Following entry of the default order, a "prove up" hearing washeld at which plaintiff presented testimony and documentaryevidence to substantiate the loss she had suffered. Based on thatevidence, the circuit court assessed plaintiff's damages at $40,792.The court thereupon entered judgment in favor of plaintiff andagainst Zdunkevich in that amount. It also awarded plaintiff hercosts.

Once she obtained the default judgment against Zdunkevich,plaintiff initiated nonwage garnishment proceedings against hisinsurer, American Country Insurance Company (AmericanCountry), in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Codeof Civil Procedure. See 735 ILCS 5/12-701 et seq. (West 2000).American Country appeared and answered, indicating that itprovided insurance coverage for Zdunkevich and had no objectionto the garnishment. Based on American Country's stipulation, thecircuit court entered judgment against the company for$43,681.73, representing the amount of plaintiff's judgmentagainst Zdunkevich in the underlying action plus costs and accruedinterest.

American Country paid plaintiff the full amount due. At thecompany's request, plaintiff, through her attorney, executed adocument entitled "Satisfaction Release of Judgment." Thedocument recited that "having received full satisfaction andpayment," plaintiff, by her attorney, was releasing the judgmentagainst "only *** Zdunkevich and American Country Insurance."The document further recited that in accordance with section12-183(h) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-183(h)(West 2000)), the judgment in favor of plaintiff was vacated andher cause of action dismissed, but "only as to *** Zdunkevich and*** American Country Insurance Co." A parenthetical added thatthe "cause remains pending as to defendant Malgorzata Lupa."⁽²⁾

After that document was executed and filed, Lupa moved todismiss plaintiff's complaint against her pursuant to section 2-619of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)).As grounds for her motion, Lupa argued that plaintiff hadsustained a single, indivisible set of injuries for which there wasa single, indivisible set of damages and that plaintiff was thereforeentitled to but one opportunity to prove what her damages were.In Lupa's view, plaintiff could have deferred that opportunity untilafter she had presented her case against Lupa. Instead, she electedto substantiate her damages at the "prove up" hearing followingZdunkevich's default. Based on the evidence plaintiff presented atthat hearing, the trial court determined that plaintiff's damagesamounted to $40,792 and entered judgment for her in that amount.Plaintiff collected the judgment in full, plus interest and costs.Lupa contended that the total amount of damages is not subject torelitigation before a different trier of fact and that plaintiff hastherefore already received all that she would ever be entitled toreceive. Further litigation would accomplish nothing.

The circuit court agreed. It distinguished this case fromsituations involving the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (740ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 2000)) where a plaintiff who hassettled with one defendant is allowed to proceed to trial againstone or more remaining defendants, subject to the nonsettlingdefendants' right to a setoff for the amount of the settlement. Here,there was no settlement. The amounts recovered by plaintiff werethe product of a judicial determination. The court held that onceplaintiff elected to obtain such a judicial determination, she couldnot seek additional amounts in a subsequent proceeding. Thedamage award assessed by the court at the "prove up" hearingserved as a cap on the total amount of damages plaintiff couldrecover. Because plaintiff had accepted payment for the fullamount of the judgment, the court held, there was nothing left forher to recover. No uncompensated injuries remained. Accordingly,the court granted Lupa's motion and dismissed plaintiff's claimagainst her.⁽³⁾

The appellate court reversed, relying on Holman v. Simborg,152 Ill. App. 3d 453 (1987). In Holman, the plaintiff had filed atwo-count complaint to recover damages for injuries he sustainedwhile working on the roof of a building owned and managed bydefendants. Count I sounded in negligence. Count II asserted aclaim under the Structural Work Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48,par. 60 et seq.) At trial, the court directed a verdict for defendantson the Structural Work Act claim. The negligence count, however,proceeded to trial before a jury. The jury found in favor of plaintiffand against defendants on that count. It assessed plaintiff'sdamages at $116,371, but found that he was 65% at fault andreduced his damages by a corresponding amount to $40,730.

The appellate court subsequently reversed the directed verdictand remanded for a new trial on the Structural Work Act claim. Inso doing, it specified that damages were fixed at the $116,371amount awarded by the jury. Prior to the new trial, plaintiffaccepted payment of $40,730 plus interest in satisfaction of thejudgment on the negligence claim, a sum which corresponded tothe amount he would have received after application of thereduction based on his comparative fault. The trial court issued anorder releasing the original judgment against defendants. Thematter then proceeded to trial on the Structural Work Act claim.At that trial, plaintiff prevailed on the Structural Work Act causeof action and was awarded $75,641, the difference between theoriginal jury verdict of $116,371 and the $40,730 whichdefendants had previously paid to plaintiff.

The judgment for plaintiff triggered a second appeal, this timeby defendants. Defendants argued that the payment they made onthe negligence claim satisfied all claims plaintiff could assertagainst them based on the injury at issue in the case, including herStructural Work Act claim. Accordingly, they argued that plaintiffshould not have been permitted to obtain a second judgment afterretrial on the Structural Work Act count.

In rejecting defendants' argument, the appellate court focusedon what the parties had intended when defendants offered andplaintiff accepted the $40,730 payment prior to the retrial.Viewing the language used in the circuit court's order ofsatisfaction and release in light of the circumstances existing at thetime of the transaction, the court concluded that plaintiff'sacceptance of the initial $40,730 payment was not intended toserve as full satisfaction of plaintiff's injury claim. Accordingly,it affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

The appellate court in the case before us found this precedentto be decisive. Following the approach taken in Holman, it lookedto the intention of the parties. The court observed that the"Satisfaction Release of Judgment" executed by plaintiff followingentry of judgment in her favor in the garnishment proceedingsstated that it pertained only to the judgment against Zdunkevichand his insurer and that "the cause remains pending as todefendant *** Lupa." Comparing the situation to Holman, thecourt held that the qualifying language contained in the"Satisfaction Release of Judgment" when considered

"in light of the parties' knowledge that plaintiff's claimalleged one count of negligence against Lupa and onecount of negligence against Zdunkevich, demonstratesthat plaintiff did not intend for the $40,792 payment toconstitute full satisfaction of her injury claim." 329 Ill.App. 3d at 1062.

Finding no evidence in the record that would support acontrary view of plaintiff's intent, the appellate court concludedthat the "Satisfaction Release of Judgment" executed by plaintiffdoes not bar her from pursuing her claim against Lupa. Theappellate court further held, based on principles applicable tosettlements involving joint tortfeasors, that any recovery obtainedby plaintiff from Lupa would be reduced by the amount plaintiffwas awarded on her claim against Zdunkevich, thereby eliminating"the possibility that plaintiff will recover double damages for herinjury." 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1063. The appellate court thereforereversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the cause forfurther proceedings.

We granted Lupa's petition for leave to appeal, and the matteris now before us for review. In undertaking that review, we beginby reiterating that the matter arose in the context of an order by thecircuit court granting Lupa's motion to dismiss pursuant to section2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West2000)). The questions a court must consider where a section 2-619dismissal is challenged on appeal are whether a genuine issue ofmaterial fact exists and whether the defendant is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197Ill. 2d 381, 389 (2001). Our review of a dismissal under section2-619 is de novo. Arteman v. Clinton Community Unit SchoolDistrict No. 15, 198 Ill. 2d 475, 479 (2002).

In assailing the appellate court's disposition of this case, Lupafirst argues that the court should not have relied on Holman. Weagree. At issue in Holman was how an accord and satisfactionentered with respect to one claim in a lawsuit affected a secondclaim in the suit involving the same set of parties. An accord andsatisfaction is a contractual method of discharging a debt or claim.To constitute an accord and satisfaction there must be: (1) a bonafide dispute, (2) an unliquidated sum, (3) consideration, (4) ashared and mutual intent to compromise the claim, and (5)execution of the agreement. See Solomon v. American NationalBank & Trust Co., 243 Ill. App. 3d 132, 134 (1993) The "accord"itself is the actual agreement between the parties while the"satisfaction" is its execution or performance. See Fremarek v.John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 1067,1071 (1995). It is grounded in contract law. See Emrick v. FirstNational Bank of Jonesboro, 324 Ill. App. 3d 1109, 1116 (2001).Because of this contractual nature, the intent of the parties is ofcentral importance. See Solomon v. American National Bank &Trust Co., 243 Ill. App. 3d at 134-35. That is why the focus inHolman was on the parties' intent.

This case is similar to Holman in that the plaintiff in each caseadvanced two different claims and received payment for the firstclaim before litigation on the second was complete. In markeddistinction to Holman, however, the claims in the case before usare not asserted against the same defendants. Each of the twocounts of plaintiff's complaint seeks recovery from a differentdefendant. The defendants are independent of one another. Lupa,the second defendant, played no role in the litigation betweenplaintiff and Zdunkevich, the first defendant, and the liability ofthe two defendants is premised on separate acts or omissions.

Because of the differences between the parties involved incounts I and II, resolution of this case cannot turn on the parties'intentions as it did in Holman. Whatever plaintiff and Zdunkevichmay have intended when Zdunkevich paid and plaintiff acceptedfull payment of the judgment entered against Zdunkevich on countI, those intentions are not binding on Lupa. Lupa could not be saidto have agreed to the transaction between Zdunkevich and plaintiffbecause she was not a party to it. The only way to reach a contraryresult would be by holding that plaintiff's intentions when sheconcluded her litigation against Zdunkevich could somehow beimputed to Lupa. Given that the parties are independent of oneanother and that plaintiff's causes of action are distinct, such aholding would have no basis in the law. As the Holman courtcorrectly noted, "accord and satisfaction" requires a shared andmutual intent to compromise the claim. No such mutuality ispresent with respect to Lupa.

The doctrine of accord and satisfaction is inapplicable to thiscase for another reason as well. Accord and satisfactionpresuppose that the parties disputed the amount due but agreed togive and accept something other than that which they thought wasdue in order to settle a claim. See Collection Professionals, Inc. v.Logan, 296 Ill. App. 3d 959, 963 (1998). No such disagreement orcompromise were present here. The "Satisfaction Release ofJudgment" signed by Zdunkevich and plaintiff was executed in thenonwage garnishment proceedings filed after Zdunkevich's defaultin plaintiff's personal injury action. When that document wassigned, there was no dispute regarding the amount Zdunkevichowed. The judgment amount was specific and certain, and plaintiffdid not have to accept less than that sum. The "SatisfactionRelease of Judgment" recited that plaintiff received full payment.That she did, in fact, receive payment of the judgment in full isconceded.

As a general rule, obtaining judgment against one personliable for a loss does not bar the plaintiff from prosecuting claimsagainst any other person who may also be liable for that loss. See,e.g., Restatement (Second) of Judgments