Find Legal Information

Docket No. 94374-Agenda 13-March 2003.
MATTHEW REXROAD et al., Appellants, v. THE CITY OF 
SPRINGFIELD et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed August 21, 2003.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Matthew Rexroad and Harold Rexroad, filed anegligence complaint against defendants, the City of Springfieldand the Board of Education of Springfield School District No. 186.Plaintiffs sought to recover damages for injuries Matthew sufferedwhen he fell in an area under excavation in a parking lot locatedadjacent to a high school football field. The trial court grantedsummary judgment in favor of the City and the school board,finding that the immunity of section 3-106 of the LocalGovernmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act(Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West 1994)) precludedliability. The appellate court affirmed, with one justice dissenting.331 Ill. App. 3d 545. We subsequently allowed plaintiffs' petitionfor leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). We have also allowedthe Illinois Association of School Boards, the IllinoisGovernmental Association of Pools, the Park District RiskManagement Agency, and the Board of Education of the City ofChicago, to file an amicus curiae brief in support of defendants.

BACKGROUND

On August 12, 1995, Matthew was working as a manager forthe Springfield Lanphier High School football team during itspreseason summer practice sessions. At some point duringpractice, a coach told Matthew to leave the practice field to get ahelmet from the locker room for one of the players. The lockerroom was in the gymnasium to the north of the practice field. Matthew exited the practice field using the north gate, "gate B." This was the most direct route to the locker room and did not leadnear to the vicinity of the hole.. After retrieving the helmet,however, Matthew found that "gate B" had been locked, so heheaded through the parking lot toward the west gate, "gate A." Hewas focusing his attention on the player who needed the helmet,when he stepped into a hole in the parking lot between gates A andB and broke his ankle. Matthew had noticed the hole in theparking lot earlier that day. The parking lot was located north andwest of the practice field, between the gym and practice field. Theparking lot served the entire school complex, with the freshman-sophomore doors located west of the lot.

The hole Matthew fell in was about 64 square feet in size, 4inches deep, and was filled with sand. It was created by theremoval of a fire hydrant. City workers placed barricades and anorange ribbon around the hole following the excavation, and thebarricades were to remain in place until the City filled the hole andpaved it to make it level with the parking lot. However, thebarricades were not in place at the time of Matthew's fall; instead,they were lined up against a fence behind the hole.

Shirley Laurik testified in her deposition that she went to allof the Springfield Lanphier High School football practices in 1995because her son, Russell Laurik, was a manager for the team.Matthew testified in his deposition that Shirley always watched theteam practice and that when he fell on the day in question, she wasseated in a chair near the hole in the parking lot, but did not seehim fall.

Plaintiffs filed a negligence suit against the City and theschool board. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment,contending that the site of Matthew's injury was "intended orpermitted to be used for recreational purposes" under section3-106 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West1994)) and defendants were therefore immune from an ordinarynegligence claim. Defendants' summary judgment motion furtheralleged that they owed no duty to Matthew because the hole wasan open and obvious condition on the premises. The trial courtgranted summary judgment for defendants, finding that they wereimmune from suit under section 3-106 of the Act. The trial courtdid not address the question of whether the hole was open andobvious.

The appellate court affirmed, relying primarily on this court'sdecision in Sylvester v. Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500(1997) (section 3-106 immunity applied where plaintiff wasinjured in a public parking lot across the street from Soldier Field).331 Ill. App. 3d at 549-53. The appellate court noted that thelocker room and the practice field are recreational facilities. It thenfound that, "[l]ooking at the property as a whole, the parking lotis integral to the football recreational facility because it connectsthe locker room and football practice field. Accordingly, theparking lot increases the usefulness of the football practice fieldthat is permitted to be used for recreational purposes ***." 331 Ill.App. 3d at 552.

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, affidavits,depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, viewed in the lightmost favorable to the nonmovant, demonstrate that there is nogenuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000);Sollami v. Eaton, 201 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (2002). The purpose of summaryjudgment is not to try a question of fact, but is instead to determinewhether one exists. Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d353, 358 (1995). We review de novo an order granting summaryjudgment. Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit SchoolDistrict No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 470-71 (2001).

The first issue presented on appeal is whether section 3-106of the Tort Immunity Act is applicable to the school parking lotwhere plaintiff was injured, thereby immunizing defendants fromliability. Section 3-106 of the Act provides as follows:

"Neither a local public entity nor a public employee isliable for an injury where the liability is based on theexistence of a condition of any public property intendedor permitted to be used for recreational purposes,including but not limited to parks, playgrounds, openareas, buildings or other enclosed recreational facilities,unless such local entity or public employee is guilty ofwillful and wanton conduct proximately causing suchinjury." (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West1994).

Section 3-106 provides a public entity with an affirmativedefense, which, if properly raised and proved, bars a plaintiff'sright to recovery. Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill.2d 372, 378 (1995). By providing immunity in section 3-106, thelegislature sought to prevent the diversion of public funds fromtheir intended purpose to the payment of damage claims. Bubb,167 Ill. 2d at 378. In 1986, the legislature expanded the scope ofimmunity because local public entities began facing difficulty inaffording liability insurance. Sylvester, 179 Ill. 2d at 509. Prior toits amendment in 1986, section 3-106 applied only to publicproperty "intended or permitted to be used as a park, playgroundor open area for recreational purposes." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 85,par. 3-106. The General Assembly amended the statute to itscurrent language, applying to "any public property intended orpermitted to be used for recreational purposes, including but notlimited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings or otherenclosed recreational facilities." Pub. Act 84-1431, art. 1,