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Docket No. 93319-Agenda 34-September 2002.

LARRY REICHERT, Appellant, v. THE COURT OF CLAIMS 
OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed February 21, 2003.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court: This case comes before us on the petition for writ of certiorariof plaintiff Larry Reichert. He filed his petition in the circuit courtof Pope County, seeking review of a ruling on damages made bythe Court of Claims in his personal injury action against the Boardof Trustees of the University of Illinois (University). The circuitcourt denied motions of the University and the Court of Claims fortransfer of venue to Sangamon County. The appellate courtreversed. 327 Ill. App. 3d 390. We granted Reichert's petition forleave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

BACKGROUND

In May 1998, Reichert filed an action in the Court of Claimsagainst the University for personal injuries allegedly sufferedwhen his clothing became entangled in a power take-off drivebeing powered by a tractor owned and operated by the University.Reichert's injuries occurred in Pope County. Section 8(d) of theCourt of Claims Act (Act) (705 ILCS 505/8(d) (West 2000)) limitsdamages in a tort case to $100,000. This limitation does not apply,however, where the action arises out of the operation by a stateemployee of a vehicle owned, leased, or controlled by the state.Reichert claimed that operation of the tractor constituted operationof a state vehicle and he sought damages in excess of $100,000.The University filed a motion to strike the claim for damages. TheCourt of Claims granted the motion, holding that Reichert'sinjuries did not arise out of the University's operation of a vehicleas defined in section 8(d).

Reichert filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuitcourt of Pope County, naming the Court of Claims as respondent.The petition alleged that the Court of Claims' decision that thetractor was not a vehicle was against the manifest weight of theevidence and deprived Reichert of a protected property rightguaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. The circuit courtordered summons to issue, requiring the clerk of the Court ofClaims to prepare a certified copy of the official record of theproceedings in Reichert's action against the University and toreturn the record to the circuit court within 30 days. The Court ofClaims filed a motion in the circuit court, seeking to transfer venueto Sangamon County. The Court of Claims argued that itsprincipal offices are in Sangamon County and Cook County andthat all pleadings were filed and hearings held in SangamonCounty. The Court of Claims further argued that the factsunderlying Reichert's injuries in Pope County were irrelevant tothe certiorari action, which involved a dispute over statutoryinterpretation, a question of law. The Court of Claims furthernoted that venue in an action against a state agency is proper onlyin a county where the agency has its principal office or where thetransaction or any part thereof occurred giving rise to the cause ofaction. The circuit court denied the motion. The circuit courtgranted the University's petition for leave to intervene in thecertiorari action and denied the University's subsequent motionto transfer venue to Sangamon County.

The University filed a petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2dR. 306), which the appellate court granted. The court reversed thedecision of the circuit court and transferred venue to SangamonCounty. The court determined that, while certiorari is a reviewprocedure, it is also a new cause of action filed against the Courtof Claims. In a certiorari proceeding, review is limited to aninspection of the record of the inferior tribunal and the court maynot consider any matter not appearing on that record. Thus, noneof the issues in Reichert's underlying action against the Universitywere involved in the certiorari action. The transaction that gaverise to Reichert's certiorari action occurred in Sangamon County,where all proceedings in the Court of Claims took place.Therefore, venue was proper only in Sangamon County. 327 Ill.App. 3d at 397-98.

ANALYSIS

The common law writ of certiorari provides a means wherebya party who has no avenue of appeal or direct review may obtainlimited review over action by a court or other tribunal exercisingquasi-judicial functions. Subject matter jurisdiction over certiorariactions lies in the circuit court. The purpose of certiorari reviewis to have the entire record of the inferior tribunal brought beforethe court to determine, from the record alone, whether the tribunalproceeded according to applicable law. Stratton v. WenonaCommunity Unit District No. 1, 133 Ill. 2d 413, 427 (1990). Thus,the circuit court acts as a court of review with respect to certiorariactions. The Act provides no method of review of decisions of theCourt of Claims. This court has held that certiorari is available toaddress alleged deprivations of due process by the Court ofClaims. Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of Claims, 109 Ill. 2d72, 79 (1985). However, certiorari may not be used to review thecorrectness of a decision by the Court of Claims based upon themerits of the case before it. See Klopfer v. Court of Claims, 286Ill. App. 3d 499, 503 (1997). Requirements of due process are metby conducting an orderly proceeding in which a party receivesadequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Reyes v. Courtof Claims, 299 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1104 (1998). Due process is notabridged where a tribunal misconstrues the law or otherwisecommits an error for which its judgment should be reversed. SeeReyes, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 1105.

Neither party here has raised the issue of the jurisdiction ofthe circuit court to entertain Reichert's certiorari petition.Nonetheless, it is our duty to consider this question. See Easternv. Canty, 75 Ill. 2d 566, 570 (1979). Generally, certiorari will notlie until a final judgment has been entered by the tribunal whosedecision is sought to be reviewed. In People ex rel. Stead v.Superior Court, this court stated:

"In Hyslop v. Finch, 99 Ill. 171, it was said: 'A commonlaw certiorari will lie, first, whenever it is shown that theinferior court [of] jurisdiction has exceeded itsjurisdiction; second, whenever it is shown that the inferiorcourt [of] jurisdiction has proceeded illegally and noappeal or writ of error will lie.'

'This writ was issuable at common law before theproceedings instituted had culminated in a trial, order orjudgment, and was based on the absence or the excess orusurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the tribunal fromwhich the proceedings were removed.' [Citation.] Where,as in the case at bar, the tribunal whose proceedings areattacked acted without jurisdiction and made an order orentered a judgment prejudic[i]al to the party complaining,the writ may issue without awaiting a final judgment ororder in the proceeding. Where, however, the tribunalpossesses jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause thewrit will not issue until the proceeding has terminated,and then only if it appear that the tribunal has entered anillegal judgment or order." People ex rel. Stead v.Superior Court, 234 Ill. 186, 203-04 (1908).

Roberts v. Romick, 146 Ill. App. 16 (1908),⁽¹⁾ involved ajudgment of the circuit court quashing, on certiorari, the record ofthe commissioners of highways of the town of St. Marys. Thepetition for the writ alleged that the commissioners had vacated acertain road. The appellate court held that the writ of certiorariwas prematurely issued because the transcript of the record of thecommissioners did not disclose that any final order had beenentered vacating the road. By law, the commissioners wererequired to make a formal order and file a copy with the townclerk within five days following the decision to vacate the road.Until that was accomplished, the proceedings were not final. Theappellate court, citing this court's decision in Stead, noted thatonly where a tribunal usurps jurisdiction or acts in the absence orexcess of jurisdiction will certiorari lie to review the proceedingsof the tribunal prior to the entry of a final order or judgment. As noquestion existed as to the jurisdiction of the highwaycommissioners to vacate the road, the circuit court should not haveissued the writ. Roberts, 146 Ill. App. at 18.

In the instant case, Reichert has not contended that the Courtof Claims lacked jurisdiction to hear his case or that it exceeded itsjurisdiction in making its ruling on his damages claim. Reichert'sunderlying personal injury action is against the Board of Trusteesof the University. Section 8(d) of the Act specifically vestsjurisdiction in the Court of Claims over any claim against theBoard for damages sounding in tort if a like cause of action wouldlie against a private person or corporation in a civil suit. 705 ILCS505/8(d) (West 2000).

The University's petition to intervene in Reichert's certiorariaction is contained in the record before us. That petition, filed inFebruary 2001, sets forth the procedural posture of Reichert'saction in the Court of Claims as it existed at the time of the filingof the University's petition. The petition states that Reichert filedhis original complaint in the Court of Claims in May 1998. InAugust 1999, the Court of Claims granted the University's motionto strike Reichert's prayer for damages in excess of $100,000. InDecember 1999, the Court of Claims denied Reichert's petition forrehearing and granted Reichert leave to amend his complaintwithin 30 days. In January 2000, Reichert filed his first amendedcomplaint, which again contained a prayer for damages in excessof $100,000. In March 2000, the University filed a motion todismiss Reichert's first amended complaint or, in the alternative,to strike the prayer for damages. According to the petition tointervene, that motion was then pending in the Court of Claims.We note that Reichert filed his petition for writ of certiorari onApril 18, 2000. The record demonstrates, therefore, that, as of thetime Reichert filed his petition for writ of certiorari, no finaljudgment had been rendered by the Court of Claims. In fact, theproceedings were still in the preliminary stages. Thus, Reichert'scertiorari petition was prematurely filed and the circuit court, asa court of review, should not have considered the petition.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we vacate the judgment of theappellate court and remand to the circuit court with directions todismiss the petition for writ of certiorari.

Appellate court judgment vacated;

cause remanded.

1. ¹We note that appellate court decisions issued prior to 1935 arepersuasive authority only. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc.,174 Ill. 2d 77, 95 (1996).