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Docket No. 98329-Agenda 13-January 2005.
PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Appellee.
Opinion filed April 21, 2005.

JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the opinion of the court:

Ronald Abbinante delivered pizzas for Casale Pizza, Inc. Whileusing his mother's minivan to make a delivery, Abbinante struck andinjured a pedestrian. The issue in this case is whether ProgressiveUniversal Insurance Company of Illinois (Progressive), which issuedthe motor vehicle liability insurance policy on Abbinante's mother'svan, had a duty to defend and indemnify him in a personal injuryaction subsequently filed by the injured pedestrian and the pedestrian'swife. In a declaratory judgment action filed by Progressive, the circuitcourt of Du Page County held that because of a provision in the policyexcluding coverage for bodily injury or property damage arising outof the use of the vehicle to carry persons or property forcompensation or a fee, including food delivery, the company owed nosuch duty. The appellate court reversed, finding the exclusion to bevoid and unenforceable under this state's law mandating liabilitycoverage for permissive users of a vehicle. 347 Ill. App. 3d 411. Wegranted Progressive's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.For the reasons that follow, we now reverse the judgment of theappellate court.

The facts are undisputed. Shirley Abbinante owned a minivanwhich she insured through Progressive. On August 25, 2000, Mrs.Abbinante allowed her son Ronald to use the van to deliver pizzas forCasale Pizza, Inc. The company gave Ronald money for gas and paidhim $1.25 for each pizza he delivered. While driving his mother's vanin the course of delivering a pizza for the company, Ronald struck apedestrian named Mikhail Lavit. Lavit and his wife sued Ronald andCasale Pizza to obtain damages for personal injuries, including brainand spinal cord injuries, sustained as a result of the accident.

Progressive began defending Ronald in the personal injury actionunder a reservation of rights. While that action was underway, theLavits sought and obtained a payment of $100,000 from their owninsurer, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual).That payment represented the limits of the uninsured-motoristcoverage provided by their Liberty Mutual motor vehicle policy.

After paying the policy limits to the Lavits, Liberty Mutualdemanded reimbursement of that sum from Progressive. Progressiveresponded by bringing this action in the circuit court of Du PageCounty to obtain a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defendor indemnify Ronald in the Lavits' personal injury action. LibertyMutual, in turn, asserted a counterclaim against Progressive seekingreimbursement of the sums it had paid to the Lavits under theuninsured-motorist provisions of their policy.

Progressive moved for summary judgment pursuant to section2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West2000)) arguing that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Ronaldbecause his conduct fell within the terms of an exclusion set forth inthe policy it issued to Ronald's mother. That exclusion stated thatcoverage under the policy, including Progressive's duty to defend, didnot apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out of

"the ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle while beingused to carry persons or property for compensation or a fee,including, but not limited to, delivery of *** food, or anyother products."

Liberty Mutual countered with a cross-motion for summary judgment,arguing that Progressive could not avoid its contractual obligationsbased on this exclusion because the exclusion was not onlyambiguous, but contrary to public policy.

Following a hearing, the circuit court granted the motion forsummary judgment filed by Progressive and denied the cross-motionfor summary judgment filed by Liberty Mutual. In the court's view,the food delivery exclusion in the policy was both unambiguous andvalid. Progressive therefore had no duty, as a matter of law, to defendor indemnify Ronald. Absent such a duty, Liberty Mutual had no basisfor obtaining reimbursement from Progressive.

The circuit court's summary judgment order contained an expresswritten finding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R.304(a)) that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement orappeal or both.⁽¹⁾ Liberty Mutual appealed. Ronald, his mother, CasalePizza, and the Lavits, who were also named as defendants in the case,did not contest the circuit court's judgment and are no longer involvedin these proceedings.

In its appeal, Liberty Mutual argued, as it had in the circuit court,that the food delivery exclusion in the policy issued to Ronald'smother was ambiguous and contrary to public policy. The appellatecourt agreed with the circuit court that the claim of ambiguity wasmeritless. Viewing the exclusion with reference to the particular factsof this case, the appellate court held that the exclusion was completelyunambiguous and that Ronald's conduct fell squarely within its terms.The policy excluded coverage where the vehicle was being used todeliver food for a fee or compensation, and, the appellate courtobserved, that was precisely what Ronald was doing at the time he hitMr. Lavit. He was using the van to deliver food, namely, pizza, andwas being paid compensation or a fee, $1.25 per delivery plus gasmoney, to do so. 347 Ill. App. 3d at 415.

While the appellate court found no ambiguity in the policy's fooddelivery exclusion as applied to this case, it agreed with LibertyMutual's additional claim that the exclusion violated public policy.Relying on this court's recent decision in State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d 369 (2001), theappellate court held that the exclusion was void and unenforceablebecause it conflicted with section 7-317(b)(2) of the Illinois Safetyand Family Financial Responsibility Law (625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2)(West 2000)), which provides that a motor vehicle owner's policy ofliability insurance

"[s]hall insure the person named therein and any otherperson using or responsible for the use of such motor vehicleor vehicles with the express or implied permission of theinsured[.]"

Because Ronald was using the vehicle with his mother's expresspermission at the time he struck and injured Lavit, the court held thatsection 7-317(b)(2) required Progressive to defend and indemnifyRonald in the personal injury action brought against him by the Lavits.In the appellate court's view, giving effect to the food deliveryexclusion in the mother's policy would conflict with this statutoryrequirement and contravene the goal of Illinois' mandatory motorvehicle liability insurance law. Accordingly, the appellate courtreversed the circuit court's entry of summary judgment in favor ofProgressive and entered summary judgment in favor of LibertyMutual. 347 Ill. App. 3d at 416-18. This appeal by Progressivefollowed.

In the proceedings before our court, no issue is raised as to theclarity of the food delivery exclusion in the mother's insurance policy.It is conceded to be unambiguous. The sole question presented for ourreview is whether the appellate court erred in holding that LibertyMutual was entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that thepolicy exclusion was void and unenforceable.

The standards applicable to this inquiry are well established.Summary judgment is proper where, when viewed in the light mostfavorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions,admissions, and affidavits on file reveal that there is no genuine issueas to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law. Whether the entry of summary judgmentwas appropriate is a matter we review de novo. General CasualtyInsurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill. 2d 281, 284 (2002). De novo reviewis also appropriate because resolution of this appeal turns on questionsof statutory interpretation. Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers,204 Ill. 2d 314, 319 (2003).

Section 7-601(a) of the Illinois Safety and Family FinancialResponsibility Law (625 ILCS 5/7-601(a) (West 2000)) mandatesliability insurance coverage for automobiles and other motor vehiclesdesigned to be used on a public highway. Under the statute, no personis permitted to operate, register or maintain registration of such amotor vehicle unless the vehicle is covered by a liability insurancepolicy. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197Ill. 2d at 373. Certain types of vehicles are exempt from thisrequirement. See 625 ILCS 5/7-601(b) (West 2000). None of thoseexemptions, however, is applicable here.

The liability insurance mandated by section 7-601(a) must meetcertain requirements. One of those requirements is set forth in section7-317(b)(2) of the Illinois Safety and Family Financial ResponsibilityLaw (625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2) (West 2000)). As indicated earlier inthis opinion, section 7-317(b)(2) provides that a motor vehicleowner's policy of liability insurance

"[s]hall insure the person named therein and any otherperson using or responsible for the use of such motor vehicleor vehicles with the express or implied permission of theinsured[.]" 625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2) (West 2000).

Provisions such as this, which extend liability coverage to personswho use the named insured's vehicle with his or her permission, arecommonly referred to as "omnibus clauses." Where, as in Illinois, anomnibus clause is required by statute to be included in motor vehicleliability policies, our court has held that such a clause must be readinto every such policy. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.v. Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d 240, 243-44 (1998).

The principal purpose of this state's mandatory liability insurancerequirement is to protect the public by securing payment of theirdamages. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197Ill. 2d at 376. It is axiomatic that a statute that exists for protection ofthe public cannot be rewritten through a private limiting agreement.One reason for that rule is that "the members of the public to beprotected are not and, of course, could not be made parties to anysuch contract." American Country Insurance Co. v. Wilcoxon, 127 Ill.2d 230, 241 (1989). In accordance with these principles, a statute'srequirements cannot be avoided through contractual provisions.Where liability coverage is mandated by the state's financialresponsibility law, a provision in an insurance policy that conflicts withthe law will be deemed void. The statute will continue to control.American Country Insurance Co. v. Wilcoxon, 127 Ill. 2d at 241.

In evaluating whether statutory provisions override contractualterms, courts must remain mindful of principles of freedom ofcontract. The freedom of parties to make their own agreements, onthe one hand, and their obligation to honor statutory requirements, onthe other, may sometimes conflict. These values, however, are notantithetical. Both serve the interests of the public. Just as public policydemands adherence to statutory requirements, it is in the public'sinterest that persons not be unnecessarily restricted in their freedomto make their own contracts. The power to declare a private contractvoid as against public policy is therefore exercised sparingly. FirstNational Bank of Springfield v. Malpractice Research, Inc., 179 Ill.2d 353, 359 (1997). An agreement will not be invalidated on publicpolicy grounds unless it is clearly contrary to what the constitution,the statutes or the decisions of the courts have declared to be thepublic policy or unless it is manifestly injurious to the public welfare.Whether an agreement is contrary to public policy depends on theparticular facts and circumstances of the case. H&M CommercialDriver Leasing, Inc. v. Fox Valley Containers, Inc., 209 Ill. 2d 52, 57(2004).
Liberty Mutual's public policy challenge to the food deliveryexclusion at issue in this case relies primarily on our decision in StateFarm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d 369(2001). In that case, a man named Maurice Barnes drove to a casinowith a companion, Ruby Smith, in a car owned by Barnes and insuredby State Farm. Barnes left the subject vehicle with a parking valetemployed by the casino while he and Smith went in to gamble. Whenthe two were ready to leave, the valet retrieved the vehicle. As Smithattempted to enter the car on the passenger's side, the vehicle rolledbackwards, striking her and knocking her to the ground.

Smith subsequently filed a negligence action against Barnes, theparking valet, and the casino. The valet and the casino tendered theirdefense to State Farm. State Farm refused the tender and brought anaction to obtain a declaratory judgment that it owed no duty to defendor indemnify the valet and the casino. As grounds for its claim, StateFarm relied on an exclusion in the vehicle's insurance policy whichspecified that no coverage would be provided when the subject vehiclewas " 'BEING REPAIRED, SERVICED OR USED BY ANYPERSON EMPLOYED OR ENGAGED IN ANY WAY IN A CARBUSINESS.' " (Emphases in original.) State Farm Mutual AutomobileInsurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d at 372-73.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court ruledin favor of State Farm and against the valet and casino, holding thatthe policy exclusion was applicable and that State Farm therefore hadno duty to provide a defense or indemnification. The appellate courtreversed, concluding that State Farm could not avail itself of the carbusiness exclusion to avoid its obligations under the policy. StateFarm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Fisher, 315 Ill. App. 3d1159 (2000). We granted State Farm's petition for leave to appeal andaffirmed the appellate court.

The appellate court advanced two basic grounds in support of itsdecision. First, it held that the exclusion was unenforceable becauseit conflicted with the mandatory language of the omnibus clauseprovision set forth in section 7-317(b)(2) of the Illinois Safety andFamily Financial Responsibility Law (625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2) (West2000)) and the policy of this state's mandatory automobile insurancelegislation. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Fisher,315 Ill. App. 3d at 1163-65. Second, it ruled that the exclusion wasinapplicable because the valet parking service furnished by the casinodid not constitute a "car business" within the meaning of the policy.State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Fisher, 315 Ill. App.3d at 1166.

Our opinion affirming the appellate court's judgment relied ononly the first of these grounds. We noted that when a vehicle ownergives his vehicle to a person engaged in a car business,

"the owner is also giving that person the express or impliedpermission to use the vehicle. Therefore, a provision writteninto an insurance policy that excludes coverage for personsengaged in an automobile business necessarily excludescoverage for persons who are using an insured's vehicle withthe insured's express or implied permission." State FarmMutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d at374.

Citing our opinion in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.v. Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d 240 (1998), and theclear language of section 7-317(b)(2) of the Illinois Safety and FamilyFinancial Responsibility Law, we wrote that the statute mandatesliability coverage for permissive users of motor vehicles. We thereforeconcluded, as the appellate court had, that the because the policyexcluded from coverage persons using the vehicle with the insured'spermission, it violated section 7-317(b)(2) and was void. As a result,the exclusion could not be relied upon by State Farm to deny therequest by the valet and the casino to defend and indemnify them.State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d at374.

State Farm opposed this conclusion, arguing that if the exclusionhere were unenforceable, virtually every other possible exclusion thatan insurer might include in a liability policy would likewise beprohibited. Without addressing the merits of State Farm's argument,we held simply that our decision was limited to the particularexclusion at issue in the case. "The permissibility of other possiblepolicy exclusions is not before us today," we wrote, "and we expressno opinion as to any other exclusion." State Farm Mutual AutomobileInsurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d at 379.

Although we expressly limited the reach of our decision in StateFarm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d 369(2001), Liberty Mutual argued to the appellate court in this case thatthe reasoning of Smith applied with equal force to the food deliveryexclusion at issue here. The appellate court found Liberty Mutual'sargument to be meritorious and concluded that the food deliveryexclusion was void and unenforceable for the same reason we foundthe car business exclusion in Smith to be void and unenforceable,namely, that it conflicted with section 7-317(b)(2). 347 Ill. App. 3dat 417.

The appellate court's reliance on Smith is understandable. Thatcase is similar, in many respects, to the matter before us here. Assuggested earlier in this opinion, however, whether a contractualagreement is void as against public policy ultimately depends on theparticular facts and circumstances of each case. Our examination ofSmith discloses a significant factual distinction between the carbusiness exclusion at issue there and the food delivery exclusion inRonald's mother's policy.

The car business exclusion in Smith applied only to permissiveusers. Unlike the exclusion in this case, it was inapplicable to thenamed insured or his spouse, or any agent, employee or partner of theinsured, his spouse and certain others. The named insured, his spouse,and the others were expressly exempted from the exclusion.Admittedly, we did not specifically discuss that fact in our opinion. Aswe have just indicated, however, we took care to limit our opinion tothe particular provision at issue in the case (State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d at 379), and theexemption from the exclusion was clearly described in the appellatecourt's opinion (see State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.Fisher, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1159, 1161 (2000)).

The exemption from the exclusion in Smith meant that conductwhich would be covered if undertaken by the insured would not becovered if undertaken by someone who was using the vehicle with theinsured's permission. Barnes, the insured, was free to engage in a "carbusiness" without compromising his liability coverage. It was onlyothers to whom Barnes entrusted the vehicle who were not coveredfor "car business" activities. This disparity was plainly inconsistentwith section 7-317(b)(2)'s requirement that liability insurance policiescover not only the insured but also "any other person using orresponsible for the use of such motor vehicle or vehicles with theexpress or implied permission of the insured." 625 ILCS5/7-317(b)(2) (West 2000).

No similar disparity is present in the policy issued by Progressiveto Ronald's mother in the present case. Under the clear andunambiguous terms of that policy, no one is exempt from the fooddelivery exclusion. The exclusion applies with equal force to Ronald'smother, who is the named insured, and to anyone using her van withher permission. Accordingly, if Ronald's mother used the van todeliver pizzas, she would have no more right to insist that Progressivedefend and indemnify her than Ronald has. The policy would provideno coverage.

Because the exclusion in Progressive's policy does notdifferentiate between the insured and those using the vehicle with theinsured's permission, there is no possibility, as there was in Smith, thatliability insurance coverage afforded the insured would also not beextended to permissive users of the vehicle. Section 7-317(b)(2)'srequirement that liability insurance policies cover not only the insuredbut also "any other person using or responsible for the use of suchmotor vehicle or vehicles with the express or implied permission of theinsured" (625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2) (West 2000)) is therefore notimperiled. As a result, the food delivery exclusion does not conflictwith the statute and cannot be said to be void as against public policy.

This conclusion is supported by basic rules of statutoryinterpretation. The cardinal rule of statutory construction, and the oneto which all other canons and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain andgive effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. CountryMutual Insurance Co. v. Teachers Insurance Co., 195 Ill. 2d 322, 330(2001). In undertaking that responsibility, we must presume that whenthe legislature enacted a law, it did not intend to produce absurd,inconvenient or unjust results. Sun Choi v. Industrial Comm'n, 182Ill. 2d 387, 396 (1998). Such results, however, would be an inevitableconsequence of the interpretation of section 7-317(b)(2) urged byLiberty Mutual in this case.

If section 7-317(b)(2) operated to invalidate the food deliveryexclusion with respect to permissive users such as Ronald, as LibertyMutual argues it does, Progressive would be obliged to defend andindemnify permissive users for conduct that would clearly not becovered if undertaken by the actual named insured. Recognizing thatobligation, named insureds could readily evade the policy's restrictionsmerely by lending their vehicles to one another. After making thetemporary swap, the insureds would be mere permissive users of oneanother's vehicles and, as such, would enjoy liability coverage forconduct where no coverage would lie if the insureds drove their ownvehicles.

Insurance companies make underwriting decisions and calculatepolicy premiums based on the characteristics of a policyholder, therisks the policyholder presents, and the contractual terms andlimitations by which the policyholder agrees to be bound. Ifpolicyholders were allowed to avoid the limitations in their policiesand obligate the insurance companies to pay damages by swappingvehicles whenever they wanted to engage in conduct that wouldotherwise be excluded from coverage, the criteria employed byinsurance companies in issuing policies would be fundamentallyeroded. Through the simple act of loaning his or her vehicle to others,a policyholder could subject an insurer to risks the insurance companyhad no way to foresee and which the parties to the insurance contracthad expressly agreed to exclude. The insurance company would bedenied the benefit of its bargain, and the insured would receive awindfall in the form of coverage for which it did not pay.

Liberty Mutual responds to the problems that would flow fromdisparate application of the food delivery exclusion by arguing thatunder the law, the exclusion is not only void and unenforceable as topermissive users, it is also void and unenforceable as to the namedinsured. Indeed, Liberty Mutual contends that Illinois' mandatoryliability insurance requirement nullifies virtually any exclusion thatwould allow an insurer to avoid providing less than the minimumliability coverage required by law.⁽²⁾ The only valid exclusions, inLiberty Mutual's view, are those authorized by the legislature.

We find this contention untenable. Illinois law prohibits personsfrom operating, registering or maintaining registration of a motorvehicle designed to be used on a public highway unless the vehicle iscovered by a liability insurance policy. 625 ILCS 5/7-601(a) (West2000). By its terms, this prohibition runs to the operators and ownersof motor vehicles, not their insurance carriers. Merely because personscannot operate or own vehicles without the required insurance doesnot mean that insurance carriers are required to cover, withoutexclusion, every loss operators and owners sustain.

Because the requirement to maintain liability insurance isstatutory in origin, any restrictions on the insurance required tocomply with the law must also emanate from our statutes. Thepertinent statutes here specify minimum coverage amounts (625 ILCS5/7-203, 7-601(a), 7-317(b)(3) (West 2000)) and impose variousother requirements, including a requirement that a policy's liabilitycoverage apply to losses that occur in Canada as well as thecontinental limits of the United States. 625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(3) (West2000). Nowhere, however, does the law expressly forbid parties to aninsurance contract from excluding certain risks from liability coverage.

Contrary to Liberty Mutual's view, section 7-317(b)(2) of theIllinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law contains nosuch prohibition. As discussed earlier in this opinion, it simply requiresthat a motor vehicle liability policy insure not only the person namedtherein, but also "any other person using or responsible for the use ofsuch motor vehicle or vehicles with the express or implied permissionof the insured." 625 ILCS 5/7-317(b)(2) (West 2000).

That permissive users must be covered along with the namedinsured in no way compels the conclusion that exclusions are neverpermissible. Inclusion of permissive users goes to the issue of whomust be covered. It says nothing of what risks must be covered. Tohold that requiring coverage for permissive users means that insurersare forbidden from excluding certain types of risks from coveragerequires a leap in reasoning that neither the language of the statute northe rules of statutory construction will support. It is a non sequitur.

A more reasonable interpretation of section 7-317(b)(2), and theone we adopt, is that the legislature merely intended to insure that thecommon and often unavoidable practice of entrusting one's vehicle tosomeone else does not foreclose an injured party from obtainingpayment for otherwise covered losses resulting from operation of thevehicle. The scope of coverage is unaffected by the law. The statutesimply eliminates from coverage determinations the happenstance thata vehicle was operated by a permissive user rather than the actualowner. If a loss is covered by the policy, the fact that the vehicle wasoperated by a permissive user will not excuse the insurer from itsobligation to pay. The loss will continue to be covered. Conversely,if a loss is excluded from coverage by the policy, the fact that thevehicle was operated by a permissive user will not trigger anobligation to pay that would not have existed had the vehicle beenoperated by its actual owner. The loss will continue to be excluded.

Had the General Assembly wished to bar insurers from excludingcertain risks from motor vehicle liability policies, it could easily haveso provided in the pertinent statutes. It did not do so. To the contrary,the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law clearlycontemplates that exclusions may be included in policies and thatthose exclusions will be upheld. That is why section 7-602 of thestatute (625 ILCS 5/7-602 (West 2000)) requires insurance cards tocontain a disclaimer admonishing policyholders to "[e]xamine policyexclusions carefully."

In urging us to adopt the view that section 7-317(b)(2) forbidsexclusions such as the food delivery exclusion involved in this case,Liberty Mutual directs our attention to decisions from various foreignjurisdictions, including Salamon v. Progressive Classic Insurance Co.,379 Md. 301, 841 A.2d 858 (2004). In that case, the Court of Appealsof Maryland held that the same exclusion at issue here wasunenforceable. In so holding, the court noted that it "consistently hasdeclared invalid insurance policy exclusions that excuse or reduce theinsured parties' coverage below the statutory minimum level whereexclusions are not authorized explicitly by the General Assembly."Salamon, 379 Md. at 311, 841 A.2d at 865. The court chronicled itslong history of nullifying insurance provisions in cases where theprovisions were not authorized by statute. Salamon, 379 Md. at 311-16, 841 A.2d at 865-68. Because the Maryland General Assembly hadneither explicitly nor implicitly authorized insurers to add an exclusionsuch as the "pizza exclusion" to insurance contracts, the court heldthat Maryland's compulsory insurance law rendered the exclusion voidand against public policy.

The litigation before us today is governed by the law of Illinois,not Maryland. Unlike Maryland courts, our court has never requiredthat insurance exclusions be deemed invalid if those exclusions havenot been authorized explicitly by our General Assembly. Rather, ourpolicy is to enforce exclusions not explicitly provided for by law basedon principles of contract interpretation. Due to this difference, we arenot persuaded by the rationale utilized in Salamon. We are likewiseunpersuaded by Stanfel v. Shelton, 563 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 1990),and St. Paul v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 18 P.2d 854 (Colo. App.2001). Those decisions, which Liberty Mutual also cites, fail toaddress the dichotomy, explained in this opinion, between exclusionsbased on the acts involved and those based on status of the personswho performed the acts.

In further support of its view that section 7-317(b)(2) prohibitsinsurers from excluding risks from liability coverage, Liberty Mutualcontends that allowing such exclusions would be inherentlyinconsistent with the public policy of protecting the public by securingthe payment of its damages. This argument must also fail. Althoughexclusions, where applicable, will shield the particular company whichissued the policy from financial responsibility, that does not mean thatno insurer will be liable.

Under the mandatory insurance law enacted by our GeneralAssembly, the effects of policy exclusions are substantially offset bythe requirement of uninsured-motorist coverage. See 625 ILCS5/7-601(a) (West 2000); 215 ILCS 5/143a, 143a-2 (West 2000). Ifa driver causes an accident which inflicts bodily injury on someoneelse and the injury is not covered by the driver's motor vehicle liabilitypolicy because of an exclusion in the policy, the driver will be not beconsidered an insured motorist and his automobile will not beregarded as an insured vehicle. The injured party will therefore not beable to avail himself of the driver's liability coverage. He will,however, be entitled to seek payment under the uninsured-motoristprovisions of his own motor vehicle policy. See Smiley v. Estate ofToney, 44 Ill. 2d 127, 130-31 (1969); Barnes v. Powell, 49 Ill. 2d 449,454 (1971). That is precisely what occurred in this case. For thepurposes of the motor vehicle policy it issued to the Lavits, LibertyMutual conceded that Progressive's decision to disclaim liability underthe food delivery exclusion in Ronald's mother's policy made Ronaldan uninsured motorist. Ronald's status as an uninsured motorist, inturn, entitled the Lavits to obtain payment under the uninsured-motorist provisions of their policy with Liberty Mutual. In this way,the goal of protecting the public by securing the payment of itsdamages was fully achieved.⁽³⁾

For the foregoing reasons, the food delivery exclusion in thepolicy issued by Progressive to Ronald's mother was not void andunenforceable under this state's mandatory insurance law. The circuitcourt's entry of summary judgment in favor of Progressive and againstLiberty Mutual was therefore correct and should not have beendisturbed by the appellate court. Accordingly, the judgment of theappellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court isaffirmed.

Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting:

The majority concludes the food delivery ("pizza") exclusion inProgressive's policy was not void and does not violate this state'smandatory liability insurance law. Slip op. at 14. Accordingly,Progressive may enforce its exclusion even as applied to themandatory minimum $20,000/40,000 coverage required by section7-203 of the Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS 5/7-601 (West 2000). I believethis holding contravenes the clear public policy underlying themandatory insurance law and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.

Section 7-601 of the Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part:"No person shall operate *** a motor vehicle designed to be used ona public highway unless the motor vehicle is covered by a liabilityinsurance policy." (Emphasis added.) The statute further provides:"The insurance policy shall be issued in amounts no less than theminimum amounts set for bodily injury or death and for destruction ofproperty under Section 7-203 of this Code ***." 625 ILCS5//7-601(a) (West 2000).

The majority acknowledges our holding in State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co. v. Smith, 197 Ill. 2d 369, 376 (2001), thatthe "principal purpose [of this state's mandatory liability insurancerequirement] is to protect the public by securing payment of theirdamages." Slip op. at 5. Yet the majority's holding subverts thispurpose by allowing mandatory minimum coverage to be defeated bya contractual exclusion not explicitly authorized by the legislature.Although section 7-601 exempts certain categories of vehicles suchas government vehicles and implements of husbandry from itsapplication, no statutory language authorizes any contractualexclusion from coverage, including the so-called "pizza exclusion."The majority contends the Illinois Safety and Family FinancialResponsibility Law clearly contemplates policies may containenforceable exclusions because section 7-602 of the statute (625ILCS 5/7-602 (West 2000)) requires insurance cards to contain adisclaimer admonishing policy holders to "[e]xamine policy exclusionscarefully." Slip op. at 13. It is not disputed that coverage exclusionsmay be enforced above the statutorily required minimum limits.Hence, the warning in section 7-602 is appropriate and is not inconflict with the express requirement that all vehicles shall be coveredfor bodily injury and property damage in minimum amounts.

The result reached by the majority increases the likelihoodtortiously caused vehicular accidents will go uncompensated becauseno insurance coverage will be available from the tortfeasor. Althoughthe majority recognizes this possibility, it holds this result is offset bythe statutory requirement of uninsured-motorist coverage. Slip op. at13. The unfortunate possibility remains, however, that innocentinjured parties, such as pedestrians, entitled to recovery may not havetheir own uninsured-motorist coverage and may, thus, be totallyunprotected. The majority asserts in a footnote that such gaps incoverage present questions for the legislature, rather than this tribunal.Slip op. at 14 n.3. I disagree. A plain reading of section 7-601compels the conclusion that the legislature intended to mandateliability coverage for all automobiles operated in Illinois with statutoryminimum limits of liability. Contractual coverage exclusions are simplyincompatible with that intention. With the validation of the "pizzaexclusion"in this case, the vehicle driven by Robin Abbinante was not"covered" as expressly required by the statute.

Other jurisdictions considering this issue have concludedmandatory insurance statutes render policy exclusions unenforceableto the extent of required minimum limits as a matter of public policy.In Salamon v. Progressive Classic Insurance Co., 379 Md. 301, 841A.2d 858 (2004), the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that state'shighest tribunal, considered whether a commercial use exclusion,identical to the exclusion in the case before us, could be applied todefeat coverage. Progressive moved for summary judgment, arguingthe policy unambiguously excused it from both coverage and the dutyto defend. Salamon countered that Progressive's exclusioncontravenes Maryland public policy and, as a result, is invalid andunenforceable. Salamon, 379 Md. at 305, 841 A.2d at 861. The trialcourt granted Progressive's motion, Salamon appealed, and thereviewing court reversed. The court noted the Maryland GeneralAssembly had enacted a " 'comprehensive law that, among otherthings, inaugurated compulsory insurance or other required security,established [the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund] as an insurerof last resort, prohibited the arbitrary cancellation and non-renewal ofmotor vehicle insurance policies, and required policies to containcollision and [personal injury protection] coverage.' " Salamon, 379Md. at 310, 841 A.2d at 864, quoting Maryland AutomobileInsurance Fund v. Perry, 356 Md. 668, 674, 741 A.2d 1114, 1117(1999).

Thus, the Maryland statutory scheme, while not identical, issubstantially similar to our own. As in State Farm, the Maryland courthad earlier held Maryland's statute was intended to "make certain thatthose who own and operate motor vehicles in this State are financiallyresponsible." Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co.v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 154, 416 A.2d 734, 736 (1980). TheGartelman court further noted that "[t]his legislative policy has theoverall remedial purpose of protecting the public by assuring thatoperators and owners of motor vehicles are financially able to paycompensation for damages resulting from motor vehicle accidents."Gartelman, 288 Md. at 154, 416 A.2d at 736. The Salamon courtreviewed a series of cases over a 30-year period consistently declaringinvalid insurance policy exclusions excusing or reducing the insured'scoverage below the statutory minimum when such exclusions were notexplicitly authorized by the General Assembly. Salamon, 379 Md. at311-14, 841 A.2d at 864-67. The court concluded the "pizzaexclusion" was not expressly authorized by the legislature and was,therefore, invalid. Salamon, 379 Md. at 316-17, 841 A.2d at 868. Thecourt rejected Progressive's argument, also made in the case beforeus, that a distinction should be drawn between policy exclusions" 'pertaining to classes of insureds, as opposed to exclusionspertaining to acts of individual insureds.' " (Emphases in original.)Salamon, 379 Md. at 314, 841 A.2d at 866.

New York's highest reviewing court reached a similar conclusionin Matter of Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hogan, 82 N.Y.2d 57,623 N.E.2d 536, 603 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1993). In that case, LibertyMutual sought to enforce its "livery exclusion" in an uninsured-motorist endorsement to a personal automobile liability policy. Theexclusion applied if the insured vehicle was used to carry persons orproperty for a fee. Passengers in the insured's car demandedarbitration, and Liberty Mutual petitioned for a stay. The trial courtdenied the stay, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed. TheCourt of Appeals affirmed, noting New York's mandatory uninsured-motorist statute did not provide for exclusions. The court reasonedthat "[t]he exclusion is inconsistent with the sound public policy ofthis State of ensuring that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidentsare compensated for their injuries and losses." Liberty Mutual, 82N.Y.2d at 61, 623 N.E.2d at 539, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 412. Intermediateappellate courts in Louisiana and Colorado have also reached similarresults. See Stanfel v. Shelton, 563 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 1990); St.Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 18P.3d 854 (Colo. App. 2001).

The majority acknowledges other jurisdictions, including theMaryland court in Salamon, have found policy coverage exclusionsincompatible with mandatory minimum coverage laws. The majoritydeclines to rely on the reasoning of those cases because "[t]helitigation is governed by the law of Illinois, not Maryland." Slip op. at13. Under Illinois law, however, a court must give an unambiguousstatute effect as written, without reading into it exceptions, limitationsor conditions that the legislature did not express. In re D.L., 191 Ill.2d 1, 9 (2000). The majority's holding ignores this rule by construingthe statute to allow operation of a vehicle on a public highway whenthe vehicle is not "covered" by a policy of liability insurance. Thus,according to the majority, "covered" does not necessarily meancovered. This is the non sequitur.

The reasoning of the Maryland and New York courts ispersuasive, and our appellate court used a similar rationale. I agreewith the appellate court that the "impetus behind mandatoryautomobile liability insurance is to protect the public by assuring thatits damages will be paid [citation], and Progressive's food deliveryexclusion contravenes that goal." 347 Ill. App. 3d at 416-18. Like theappellate court, I find no indication the legislature intended to permitsuch an exclusion. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of theappellate court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

1. The circuit court included that finding because its summary judgmentorder did not fully resolve all of the claims of all of the parties. A third-partyclaim by Liberty Mutual against Badger Mutual Insurance Company, CasalePizza