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Docket No. 89947-Agenda 23-March 2001.

LESLEE C. PETERSEN, Appellee, v. STANLEY J. WALLACH, Appellant.

Opinion filed January 25, 2002.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the Court:

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether theexception to the six-year statute of repose for attorney malpracticeactions under sections 13-214.3(c) and (d) of the Code of CivilProcedure (the Limitations Act) (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(c), (d)(West 1994)) applies only in cases where the assets of thedeceased pass by way of the Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act orAct) (755 ILCS 5/11a-1 et seq. (West 1994)). Plaintiff Leslee C.Petersen, the sole beneficiary of her mother's inter vivos trust,brought this action against defendant Stanley J. Wallach, allegingWallach negligently rendered estate planning advice to her mother.The circuit court of Cook County dismissed the complaint astime-barred.

Petersen appealed and the appellate court reversed. 314 Ill.App. 3d 823. We now affirm and hold that section 13-214.3(d)(735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(d) (West 1994)) applies in all attorneymalpractice cases when the injury occurs upon the death of theperson for whom services were rendered, regardless of the mannerused to distribute the decedent's assets.

BACKGROUND

Petersen filed her complaint on November 9, 1998. Thecomplaint alleged that in 1989 Petersen's mother engaged theservices of defendant both to handle the administration of herhusband's estate and to recommend estate planning advice thatwould minimize estate taxes. While providing these services,defendant allegedly recommended that plaintiff's mother makesubstantial taxable inter vivos gifts to plaintiff. In 1990 and 1991,plaintiff's mother made such gifts, totaling approximately$580,000. According to plaintiff, upon her mother's death onNovember 10, 1996, these gifts were "added back" into hermother's estate for purposes of determining taxes, resulting in anincrease of $238,000 in tax liability.

Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint as time-barred, alleging that the claim was not initiated within the six-yearstatute of repose found in section 13-214.3(c). Specifically,defendant argued that the services were rendered between 1989and 1991 and the suit was not filed until November 9, 1998. Inresponse, plaintiff countered that the section 13-214.3(d)exception to the statute of repose should apply to her claimbecause she filed suit within two years of her mother's death onNovember 10, 1996. The provisions of the Limitations Act atissue here provide, in relevant part, as follows:

"(b) An action for damages based on tort, contract, orotherwise (i) against an attorney arising out of an act oromission in the performance of professional services ***must be commenced within 2 years from the time theperson bringing the action knew or reasonably shouldhave known of the injury for which damages are sought.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (d), an actiondescribed in subsection (b) may not be commenced in anyevent more than 6 years after the date on which the act oromission occurred.

(d) When the injury caused by the act or omission doesnot occur until the death of the person for whom theprofessional services were rendered, the action may becommenced within 2 years after the date of the person'sdeath unless letters of office are issued or the person'swill is admitted to probate within that 2 year period, inwhich case the action must be commenced within the timefor filing claims against the estate or a petition contestingthe validity of the will of the deceased person, whicheveris later, as provided in the Probate Act of 1975." 735ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 1994).⁽¹⁾

Under this statutory framework, the trial court granteddefendant's motion to dismiss, specifically relying on Zelenka v.Krone, 294 Ill. App. 3d 248 (1997). In Zelenka, the AppellateCourt, Third District, held that the exception to the six-year statuteof repose created by section 13-214.3(d) is applicable only whenthe assets of a deceased are distributed under the Probate Act andnot when the assets pass via an inter vivos trust. Zelenka, 294 Ill.App. 3d at 252. The Zelenka court focused on the language insection 13-214.3(d) limiting legal malpractice actions to the timeperiod for filing claims against the estate or to the time period forfiling a petition to contest the validity of the will. According to theZelenka court, that language indicates section 13-214.3(d) appliesonly to legal malpractice actions related to claims involving assetsthat pass under the Probate Act and not to claims involving assetspassing independent of the Act. Zelenka, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 252.

In the instant case, plaintiff appealed, arguing that the plainlanguage of section 13-214.3(d) indicated that the exceptionapplied to her claim because the section does not draw adistinction between probate and nonprobate distributions. Thus,according to plaintiff, her action was timely, even though she didnot file it within the six-year statute of repose embodied withinsection 13-214.3(c) (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(c) (West 1994)). TheAppellate Court, First District, agreed and reversed, stating:

"The primary inquiry in determining whether section13-214.3(d) is applicable is whether the injury caused bythe act or omission occurred upon the death of the personfor whom services were rendered, not the manner inwhich assets were distributed. Accordingly, where anyinjury caused by an act or omission does not occur untilthe death of the person for whom professional serviceswere rendered, section 13-214.3(d) is applicableregardless of whether the assets are subject to distributionthrough probate proceedings, an inter vivos trust, or someother mechanism." 314 Ill. App. 3d at 827.

In order to resolve the conflict between this case and Zelenka,we granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.315. On appeal to this court, defendant argues that we shouldfollow Zelenka for three reasons: (1) by tracking the language ofthe limitations periods applicable under the Probate Act, section13-214.3(d) indicates that it only applies to claims arising out ofthe distribution of assets under the Probate Act; (2) the legislativehistory of section 13-214.3(d) indicates that the General Assemblyintended solely to address probate distributions; and (3)application of section 13-214.3(d)'s limitation period to assetspassing by way of an inter vivos trust could lead to an absurd orunjust result. We decline to follow Zelenka and affirm the decisionof the appellate court below.

ANALYSIS

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, subject tode novo review. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103(2001). The fundamental principle of statutory construction is todetermine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In reEstate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 331 (2000). The best means ofdetermining legislative intent is through the statutory language. Inre Application of the County Collector of Du Page County forJudgment for Delinquent Taxes for the Year 1992, 181 Ill. 2d 237,244 (1998). When the meaning of a statute is not clearly expressedin the statutory language, a court may look beyond the languageemployed and consider the purpose behind the law and the evilsthe law was designed to remedy. Solich v. George & Anna PortesCancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81(1994). When the language of an enactment is clear, it will begiven effect without resort to other interpretative aids. MichiganAvenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504(2000); Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181,184-85 (1999); Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill. 2d370, 375-76 (1997), quoting Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill.2d 378, 389 (1996).

We believe the language of section 13-214.3(d)unambiguously supports its application to all cases when thealleged injury caused by the attorney's act or omission does notoccur until the death of the person for whom the professionalservices were rendered. There is no language limiting such actionsto those that involve assets distributed through probateproceedings or excluding actions that involve nonprobatedistributions of assets. Therefore, under the statute a plaintiff hastwo years to file a claim unless letters of office are issued or thewill is admitted to probate. 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(d) (West 1994).

If one of these two events occur during the two-year periodfollowing the death of the client, any action must then becommenced in accordance with time limitations set out in theProbate Act. Specifically, the applicable time limit is no later thanthe time for filing claims against the estate (see 755 ILCS 5/18-3(West 1994)) or the time for filing a petition contesting the validityof the will (see 755 ILCS 5/8-1(a) (West 1994)). A claim againstthe estate may be filed on or before the date stated in thepublication notice. 755 ILCS 5/18-3 (West 1994). That date shallnot be less than six months from the date of the first publication orthree months from the date of mailing or delivery of the notice.755 ILCS 5/18-3 (West 1994). Alternatively, a petition contestingthe validity of a will must be filed within six months of itsadmission to probate. 755 ILCS 5/8-1(a) (West 1994).

Conversely, if neither of these events occur within the two-year period, a plaintiff has the full two years from the date of thedeath of the client to file her claim. 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(d) (West1994). Thus, the lone inquiry made by a court when determiningwhether section 13-214.3(d) is applicable is simply whether theinjury caused by the malpractice occurred upon the death of theclient. The manner of distributing the decedent's assets is of noconsequence.

If the legislature intended to limit the application of section13-214.3(d) as defendant asserts, it certainly could have expresslylimited the Act to probate distributions or by expressly excludingnonprobate distributions. We are not at liberty to depart from theplain language and meaning of the statute by reading into itexceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did notexpress. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990).Moreover, because the language of section 13-214.3(d) isunambiguous, it was improvident for the appellate court to lookbeyond the language of the statute to the legislative history. SeeMichigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504; Davis, 186 Ill.2d at 184-85; Epstein, 178 Ill. 2d at 375-76. Accordingly, we neednot and do not address defendant's argument concerning thelegislative history.

Finally, defendant argues that applying section 13-214.3(d)to all attorney malpractice cases, irrespective of the means ofdistributing decedent's assets, could lead to an absurd or unjustresult. He contends that the limitation period will actually beshortened in some cases by application of the section 13-214.3(d)exception to the statute of repose. We cannot, however, ignore theplain language of a statute based on conjecture. The possibility ofan unjust or absurd result is generally not enough to avoid theapplication of a clearly worded statute. We apply the rule ofconstruction urged by defendant when an ambiguity exists in thestatute's language. No ambiguity exists here. As we stated inCounty of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d546 (1999):

" 'Where the words employed in a legislative enactmentare free from ambiguity or doubt, they must be giveneffect by the courts even though the consequences may beharsh, unjust, absurd or unwise. [Citations.] Suchconsequences can be avoided only by a change of the law,not by judicial construction.' " County of Knox ex rel.Masterson v. Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 557(1999), quoting People ex rel. Pauling v. Misevic, 32 Ill.2d 11, 15 (1964).

CONCLUSION

It is the dominion of the legislature to enact laws and it is theprovince of the courts to construe those laws. We can neitherrestrict nor enlarge the meaning of an unambiguous statute.Section 13-214.3(d) unambiguously applies in all cases when thealleged injury caused by the malpractice does not occur until thedeath of the client, regardless of whether the deceased client'sassets are distributed by probate, inter vivos trust, or some othermechanism. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellatecourt.

Affirmed.

1. ¹Public Act 89-7 (Pub. Act 89-7, eff. March 9, 1995) partiallyamended section 13-214.3 by repealing subsection (d). The public actwas held unconstitutional in its entirety by this court in Best v. TaylorMachine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997). As of this writing, however, theGeneral Assembly has not addressed our holding in Best with regard tosection 13-214.3 and the text of that section remains in its form prior toour decision in Best.