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Docket No. 92287-Agenda 14-September 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
MICHAEL STEHMAN, Appellee.

Opinion filed December 19, 2002.

JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Michael Stehman, was arrested for unlawfulpossession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5(a) (West1998)). His motion to suppress evidence and quash arrest wasgranted by the circuit court of De Kalb County and the Stateappealed. 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). The appellate court affirmed,with one justice concurring in part and dissenting in part. 324 Ill.App. 3d 54. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal.177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidenceand quash arrest, defendant testified that, on January 13, 2000, hewas working at Genoa Pizza in Sandwich, Illinois. Defendant wasreturning to the restaurant at around 5 p.m. after making pizzadeliveries when, as he pulled his vehicle into the employee parkinglot, he saw a police squad car sitting in a parking lot across thestreet. Defendant stated that he parked his vehicle, exited carryingthe pizza delivery bags and began to walk towards the restaurant.Defendant testified that he left his car keys and the money bag forhis deliveries in the vehicle, which was parked 7 to 10 feet fromthe restaurant's entrance with the windows rolled up and thedriver's door closed. As defendant reached the restaurant'sentrance, he heard someone call his name and, when he turnedaround, saw that it was a uniformed officer. Defendant alsonoticed that the officer's squad car was parked right behinddefendant's vehicle. Defendant approached the officer afterhanding the delivery bags to his brother, Ron Stehman, who alsoworked for the restaurant and was standing just outside the door.The officer asked defendant if his name was Michael Stehman,and when defendant said yes, the officer told defendant that he hada warrant to arrest defendant for his failure to appear in court. Atthe hearing, defendant admitted that he had failed to appear on ascheduled court date, but stated that he did not remember why hewas required to appear.

Defendant further testified that, after arresting him, the officerperformed a pat-down search of defendant, placed him inhandcuffs, and put him in the back seat of the squad car.Defendant stated that the officer got into the front seat, talked onthe radio and was "writing down stuff' for several minutes. Theofficer then got out of the squad car and walked towarddefendant's vehicle. Defendant testified that he never gave theofficer permission to search his vehicle and, when the officer wasthree to four feet from the squad car, defendant yelled from theback seat that he did not want the officer searching his vehicle.Defendant stated that, because all the doors and windows in thesquad car were closed, he believed the officer could not hear him.Defendant then told his brother, Ron, who was now standing in theparking lot, to tell the officer that he could not search defendant'svehicle. Defendant saw Ron approach and speak to the officer, andsaw the officer respond. The officer motioned for Ron to go insidethe restaurant. Defendant then saw the officer proceed to searchdefendant's vehicle. After searching a few minutes, the officerfound a pipe and held it up, showing it to defendant, then put itback down and closed the car door. Defendant testified that he wasarrested for possession of drug paraphernalia, the pipe, when hearrived at the police station.

Ron Stehman testified in general accord with defendant. Ronstated that when defendant was in the squad car, he approached tohear what defendant was yelling. Defendant told Ron that theofficer did not have permission to search defendant's vehicle. Ronthen relayed this message to the officer, who replied: "I don't givea fuck what he has to say." At this point, the officer told Ron to getaway from the squad car, and Ron went and stood on the sidewalk.

Officer Thomas Richardson, a Sandwich police officer,testified that, at around 8 p.m. on January 13, 2000, he was onduty when he received information over his mobile data terminalof an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest. The dispatcherinformed Officer Richardson of where defendant worked, the typeof vehicle defendant drove and its license plate number. OfficerRichardson then drove to Genoa Pizza, parked across the streetand waited for defendant. Officer Richardson stated that afterseeing a vehicle matching the dispatcher's description enter therestaurant's parking lot, he pulled his squad car in behinddefendant while defendant was still in his vehicle. Both defendantand Officer Richardson exited their automobiles at the same time.Officer Richardson stated that he verified defendant's identity andthen placed him under arrest.

Officer Richardson further testified that the only reason heapproached defendant was to arrest him on the outstanding warrantfor failure to appear in court. There were no other warrants andOfficer Richardson had no knowledge that defendant hadcommitted any other offense. Officer Richardson admitted that hedid not have a warrant to search defendant's vehicle and that henever asked defendant for permission to search his vehicle. OfficerRichardson testified that he searched defendant's vehicle incidentto defendant's arrest and also as an inventory search pursuant tothe police department's tow policy. At the time Officer Richardsonentered defendant's vehicle, he intended to have it towed, but laterdefendant convinced him to release the vehicle to his brother. Nodocuments were produced evidencing the department's tow policy,and Officer Richardson stated that because the vehicle was nottowed, his report reflected only that the vehicle was searchedincident to arrest.

Officer Richardson testified that he did not see a weapon orany item of contraband in plain view from outside defendant'svehicle, and he did not discover the item of drug paraphernaliauntil he had entered and searched the vehicle. Officer Richardsonfurther stated that he suspected there was something in defendant'svehicle because defendant's brother was objecting to the search soadamantly. Officer Richardson testified that he did not believedefendant could escape, as defendant was secured in the back ofthe squad car, but Richardson had some concern for his safetybecause defendant's brother was being "mouthy." OfficerRichardson admitted that defendant's brother never threatened himin any way.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial courtfirst found Officer Richardson's testimony relating to a concernfor his safety to be incredible, stating: "When you come here andstart making up stories-well, your thought your safety and all, thatis absolutely nonsense. There's nothing about this that gives anyindication of any safety issues." The trial court further foundincredible Officer Richardson's testimony that the search wasbased on the department's tow policy, noting: "You looked in thatvehicle having nothing to do with towing and you come here andyou want to testify in this court that this had something to do withtowing and then you say, well, I don't even know what the towingpolicy is." The trial court then held Officer Richardson's beliefthat he had the right to search incident to arrest was erroneous andthat the search was invalid, reasoning as follows:

"This is a case where you didn't stop this vehicle. Thisvehicle was already stopped. This defendant was walkingacross a parking lot when you first put him under arrest.That was his testimony. That was his brother's testimonyand you don't know. You do know that he was out of thecar but you know this individual had nothing to do withthe car at the time you arrested him on a failure to appearin court, other than he had parked his car there. ***There's nothing about a failure to appear in court that hasanything to do with the car. *** I think you suspectedsomething might be [in the car] *** but the searchincidental to arrest is not a wide open situation whereevery time an officer makes an arrest that gives him theright to then invade other property that belongs tosomebody just to see what the officer can find and that'swhat happened here."

Accordingly, the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppressevidence and quash arrest.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling, holdingthat the search of defendant's vehicle was not a search incident toarrest pursuant to either New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L.Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981), or Chimel v. California, 395U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969). 324 Ill. App. 3dat 63-64. In a partial dissent, Justice Bowman argued that Beltonwas applicable and that the determination of whether the searchwas proper incident to arrest was controlled by People v. Bosnak,262 Ill. App. 3d 122 (1994). 324 Ill. App. 3d at 64 (Bowman, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bowmanconcurred in the majority's further holding that the search ofdefendant's vehicle could not be justified as an inventory searchincident to the vehicle being towed (324 Ill. App. 3d at 64(Bowman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)), and theState does not seek review of that issue here. For the reasons thatfollow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppressevidence is subject to reversal only if manifestly erroneous. Peoplev. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195, 201 (1996). This deferential standardof review applies where the suppression motion turns uponfindings of fact and is grounded in the reality that the trial court isin a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of thewitnesses, observe their demeanor, and resolve conflicts in theirtestimony. People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 412 (1998). In thecase at bar, after hearing the testimony and observing thedemeanor of the witnesses during the hearing on defendant'smotion to suppress, the trial court determined, inter alia, thatOfficer Richardson was not a credible witness, that the officer wasnot in danger when the search was conducted, and that defendanthad stopped his car and was walking across the parking lot whenhe was arrested. Upon review of the record, we agree with theappellate court that "these findings of fact were not manifestlyerroneous." 324 Ill. App. 3d at 58. Accordingly, we now conducta de novo review of the State's legal challenge based upon the trialcourt's findings of fact. See Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d at 412.

The State contends that the appellate court's holding that thesearch of defendant's vehicle was not a lawful search incident toarrest "is contrary to Illinois precedent and contravenes thepurpose of the bright-line rule stated in Belton." We disagree.

Both the United States Constitution and the IllinoisConstitution protect every person from unreasonable searches andseizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,