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Docket No. 87104-Agenda 7-January 2000.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

 RUSSELL STACEY, Appellant.

Opinion filed September 21, 2000.

JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Russell Stacey, was convicted in the circuit courtof Cook County by two separate juries of aggravated criminalsexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West 1994)) and criminalsexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-15(a)(1) (West 1994)), which aroseout of separate acts in which defendant grabbed the breasts of twoteenage girls. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 25 years'imprisonment for the aggravated criminal sexual abuse convictionand 25 years' imprisonment for the criminal sexual abuseconviction, with the sentences to run consecutively. Defendantappealed to the appellate court challenging his sentences as beingexcessive. The appellate court affirmed defendant's convictionsand sentences. No. 1-98-0307 (unpublished order under SupremeCourt Rule 23). We allowed defendant's petition for leave toappeal, which raises only the issue relating to the excessiveness ofthe sentences. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons that follow, wereverse the judgment of the appellate court, and affirm but modifythe judgment of the circuit court to impose consecutive six-yearterms of imprisonment.

FACTS

The record of defendant's first trial established that, on May30, 1995, the then 15-year-old victim, Susy S., was walking toschool with her friend, Jillian G., who was 14 years old at thetime. Defendant, who was 33 years old at the time, appeared froman alley and began walking toward them, staring at them. Whenthe girls tried to move to one side, defendant moved to the sameside. When defendant approached the victim, he forced his handbetween her crossed arms and grabbed her breast for a fewseconds, until she knocked his arm away. As defendant walkedaway, he blew her a kiss. The victim proceeded to her friend'shouse and contacted her mother and the police. Later, the victimwent to school and gave a description of defendant to a schoolpolice officer. On June 2, 1995, the victim identified defendant atthe police station as the man who attacked her.

Defendant testified on his own behalf and denied grabbingSusy S.'s breast. After considering the evidence, the jury founddefendant guilty of the aggravated criminal sexual abuse of SusyS.

The record of defendant's second trial established that, onJune 2, 1995, the victim, Lisa G., who was 18 years old at the timeand attended the same high school as Susy S., was walking byherself to school. As she approached school, defendant walkedtoward her and stared at her. Defendant then stepped in front ofher, blocked her path, grabbed her breast, and squeezed it. Afterthe victim pushed his hand away, defendant blew her a kiss. As thevictim turned to get a good look at defendant, he said, "Don't eventry it or I will knock the shit out of you." Shortly thereafter,defendant yelled, "Suck my dick," and grabbed his genitals in anobscene manner. The victim proceeded to school, informed asecurity officer of what had happened, and described defendant.That same day, the victim identified defendant as the offenderafter he was detained near school during an investigation of theearlier offense.

The record also included the testimony of Monica A. for thelimited purpose of presenting evidence of defendant'sidentification, intent, modus operandi, and absence of accident. InFebruary of 1992, Monica A., who was age 12, was walking toschool with her 9-year-old sister when defendant approached herand tried to grab her breast. Monica crossed her arms over herchest and leaned away from defendant. However, when defendantwalked along side of her, he grabbed her buttocks for a fewseconds and commented that she had a nice "ass." As Monica andher sister walked away, defendant unzipped his pants, pulled outhis penis and said, "[H]ey, girls, suck on this." Monicasubsequently identified defendant as her attacker in a lineup.

The second jury found defendant guilty of the criminal sexualabuse of Lisa G.

At the sentencing hearing on both convictions, the Statepresented evidence in aggravation. Chicago police officer ThomasLynch testified that, on September 8, 1990, he interviewed BetsyC., who was then 11 years old, and Renell G., who was then 27years old, regarding an investigation of a sexual attack. Theystated that, while they were walking down the street, defendantapproached them and grabbed Betsy C.'s buttocks. As they triedto walk away, defendant grabbed Renell G.'s breasts. Both BetsyC. and Renell G. subsequently identified defendant as theirattacker.

Chicago police officer Walter Siudut testified that, on March11, 1991, he spoke to 15-year-old Tina S. She indicated to himthat, as she was walking to school that morning, a man walked upbehind her and grabbed her buttocks. Tina S. later identifieddefendant's photograph from a photo array.

The State also introduced victim impact statements from SusyS. and Lisa G. Both girls expressed their fears resulting from theirencounter with defendant. Susy S. stated that she is afraid to goanywhere alone and is never at ease. Lisa G. indicated that shedoes not walk anywhere alone, no longer feels safe, and does nottrust anyone.

The presentence investigation report, which was presented tothe court, set forth defendant's prior convictions for aggravatedcriminal sexual abuse (1993); assault (1991); criminal sexualabuse (1991); attempted burglary (1990); burglary (1985); retailtheft (1983); possession of a stolen motor vehicle (1980); andburglary (1979).

Defense counsel did not present any mitigating witnesses, butargued in mitigation that the nature of defendant's actions did notdeserve severe punishment.

After considering the aggravating and mitigating factors, thetrial court initially ruled that defendant would be sentenced as aClass X offender in light of his prior felony burglary convictions.The court then indicated that defendant's criminal history showeda propensity to commit the same offense despite attempts by thecriminal justice system to deter him from committing such crimes.More specifically, the court referred to the fact that defendant'sprior sentences have included counseling, probation, andimprisonment. The court therefore sentenced defendant to 25-yearterms of imprisonment for each offense. The court further orderedthat such sentences run consecutively so as to protect the publicfrom further criminal conduct by defendant.

Defendant appealed his sentences to the appellate court,where he argued that his sentences were excessive. The appellatecourt rejected defendant's argument and determined that the trialcourt did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant.

ANALYSIS

Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the trial courtabused its discretion by sentencing defendant to consecutive 25-year prison terms. According to defendant, his 50-year sentence isexcessive given the nature of the crime.

The State responds that the trial court properly exercised itsdiscretion in sentencing defendant where the sentences werewithin the statutory limits, were based on defendant's extensivecriminal background, and were required to protect the public fromfurther criminal activity by defendant.

It is well settled that the trial court has broad discretionarypowers in imposing a sentence (People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53(1999)), and the trial court's sentencing decision is entitled to greatdeference (People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977)). Thetrial court is granted such deference because the trial court isgenerally in a better position than the reviewing court to determinethe appropriate sentence. The trial judge has the opportunity toweigh such factors as the defendant's credibility, demeanor,general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, andage. People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991); Perruquet, 68 Ill.2d at 154. Consequently, the reviewing court must not substituteits judgment for that of the trial court merely because it wouldhave weighed these factors differently. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d at 19.

Although the trial court is vested with wide discretion insentencing, such discretion is not without limitation. SupremeCourt Rule 615(b)(4) grants the reviewing court the power toreduce the sentence imposed by the trial court. 134 Ill. 2d R.615(b)(4). The rule itself, however, does not set forth the scope ofthis power or the circumstances under which it should beexercised. Rather, decisions of this court have established that,absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, the sentence maynot be altered on review. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d at 19; Perroquet, 68 Ill.2d at 153. For example, a sentence within statutory limits will bedeemed excessive and the result of an abuse of discretion by thetrial court where the sentence is greatly at variance with the spiritand purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to thenature of the offense. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 54.

Applying these principles to the instant case, we hold that thetrial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to 25-yearprison terms. Parenthetically, we note that defendant's convictionfor aggravated criminal sexual abuse is a Class 2 felony (see 720ILCS 5/12-16(g) (West 1994)), and defendant's conviction forcriminal sexual abuse is elevated to a Class 2 felony because of hisprior conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse (see 720ILCS 5/12-15(d) (West 1994)). Moreover, because of defendant'stwo prior Class 2 felony burglary convictions, defendant is eligibleto be sentenced as a Class X offender on each conviction. See 730ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1994). A Class X felony carries astatutory sentence of not less than 6 years and not more than 30years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1994). Consequently, thetrial court's 25-year sentence for each offense is within statutorylimits.

Nevertheless, we find that the sentence is manifestlydisproportionate to the nature of the offenses. In these separateoffenses, defendant momentarily grabbed the breasts of two younggirls, who were fully clothed at the time, and he made lewdcomments and gestures. Although such behavior is appalling andharmful, it is not severe enough to warrant a 25-year sentence.Given the nature of the crimes, the 25-year sentences imposed areexcessive and an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.In so holding, we are not reweighing any aggravating or mitigatingfactors. In fact, defendant does not contend that the trial judgeconsidered any improper factors in imposing sentence. Moreover,we do not condone defendant's actions. We acknowledge thatdefendant's conduct is reprehensible. Nevertheless, we mustadhere to our constitution's mandate that penalties be determinedaccording to the seriousness of the offense. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,