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Docket No. 89262-Agenda 5-January 2001.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. BRIAN K. SORENSON, Appellant.

Opinion filed June 21, 2001.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Brian K. Sorenson, was charged with onecount of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS570/402(c) (West 1996)), after police discovered cocaine in one ofhis unlaced hiking boots during a pat-down search following atraffic stop. The circuit court of Sangamon County denied thedefendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the boot,finding that the search was valid because, under the totality of thecircumstances, the officer had a reasonable belief that the searchwas necessary to protect himself from harm. Following astipulated bench trial, the defendant was convicted of the chargedoffense and sentenced to two years of probation. The defendantappealed to the appellate court, and the appellate court affirmedthe circuit court's denial of the motion to suppress, along with thedefendant's conviction and sentence. No. 4-98-0684 (unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23). For the reasons that follow,we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

At the suppression hearing, Springfield police officer JimCordery testified that on the evening of September 16, 1997,around 9:10 p.m., he was conducting a surveillance from hispolice vehicle of a "known drug house" located at 1524 E. MoffatStreet, in Springfield, Illinois. Cordery explained that he lived inthe area and that he had been told by numerous neighbors andother sources that the occupants of the house were dealing drugsat the location. He also had been informed that there was anextremely high amount of foot, bicycle and car traffic coming tothe house, which involved the visitors staying for two or threeminutes and then leaving. Cordery noted that the police hadpreviously arrested the occupants of the house for dealingnarcotics.

Officer Cordery stated that while he was parked outside thehouse, a vehicle pulled up with three persons inside. Thedefendant, a white male with red hair, was the sole backseatpassenger. Cordery watched the defendant exit the vehicle and goinside the house. The defendant remained inside the house forabout three or four minutes before returning to the same vehicle.Cordery suspected that a drug transaction had taken place in thehouse so he decided to follow the vehicle when it pulled away.After the driver failed to signal his intention to turn left at anintersection, the officer stopped the car. When asked if he feltparticularly threatened at the time he made the traffic stop,Cordery responded affirmatively, stating, "I did feel uneasy, yessir." He noted that his concern arose out of the location of the stop,that it was a dark road, that there were three persons in the vehicle,and that in his experience, persons involved in drugs are known tocarry weapons. Cordery acknowledged that the occupants of thevehicle had not made any menacing or threatening gestures towardhim, but he further stated, "[a]nytime you are on a dark road withthree people in a vehicle *** there is a threat to my safety[;][o]fficers die all the time from situations like that."

Officer Cordery further testified that after he approached thevehicle, the driver produced his driver's license and proof ofinsurance. Cordery then asked him if he had "any weapons, drugs,needles." At that point, the driver consented to a pat-down search,which did not reveal any weapons or contraband.

Cordery stated that following the pat-down of the driver, heturned his attention toward the defendant because the defendantwas on his side of the vehicle and therefore would be the "quickestthreat" to the officer. Cordery asked the defendant if he had anyweapons, drugs, needles or anything on him that could hurt theofficer. The defendant responded that he did not. According toCordery, the defendant then gave his permission to be searched.The defendant stepped out of the vehicle and placed his hands onthe trunk of the car. Cordery then conducted a frisk of thedefendant. During the course of the frisk, Cordery asked thedefendant to remove his boots and kick them to the side. Corderynoted that he asked the defendant to remove his boots because theywere unlaced. The officer added that, in his experience, any timeboot laces are untied there is a very strong possibility that aweapon may be located inside and that it allows quick access. Hefurther noted that knives, razors and small caliber handguns fit inboots. After the defendant removed his boots, Cordery observeda white, rock-like substance in one of the boots. The officerrecognized the substance as possibly being cocaine, and itsubsequently tested positive for the presence of cocaine.

The defendant was the only other witness to testify at thesuppression hearing. The defendant testified that on the evening inquestion, he went inside the house located at 1524 East MoffatStreet for about 5 or 10 minutes. When he left the house, he gotinto a vehicle with two of his friends. He stated that he thought theofficer pulled the vehicle over because the driver had activated hissignal late into the turn. The officer pulled the vehicle over aboutone block from the house the defendant had left. When the officerfinished searching the driver, he told the driver to sit back downin the car. According to the defendant, the officer then told thedefendant to "step out of the vehicle" and put his hands on thetrunk. The defendant complied with the officer's instructions. Theofficer then conducted a pat-down search of the defendant. Whenthe officer finished the pat-down, he noticed that the defendant'sboots were unlaced. The officer then asked the defendant toremove his boots. The defendant described his boots as steel-toedhiking boots that came above his ankles.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied thedefendant's motion to suppress. It found that the State had failedto meet its burden of proof as to whether the defendant consentedto the search, but it further found that the search of the defendantwas valid under the standards enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). In its writtenorder denying the defendant's motion to reconsider, the trial courtnoted the following objective circumstances surrounding the stop,in concluding that Officer Cordery possessed a reasonable beliefthat the search was necessary to protect himself from harm:

"[T]he officer testified that he observed the defendantexit a known drug house, that he stopped the vehicle on adark street, that [the defendant] was in closest proximityto the officer after the driver exited the vehicle, that he istrained to suspect that drug purchasers are armed withgreater frequency than the norm, that his training instructshim that weapons are often carried in boots and that thefact that the boots were unlaced induced him to searchthose boots for weapons."

The cause subsequently proceeded to a stipulated bench trial.The defendant agreed to the stipulation presented by theprosecutor, with one notable exception. In that regard, defensecounsel told the trial court that the defendant had "previouslytestified that consent was not volunteered, and that is the issue thatwill be appealed, along with some other issues along with thesearch." The trial court accepted the stipulation and found thedefendant guilty of unlawful possession of a controlled substance.

The appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction andthe trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. Wegranted the defendant leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

The defendant challenges the propriety of the trial court'sdenial of his motion to suppress. Traditionally, this court hasstated that when a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppressevidence involves factual determinations and credibilityassessments, the ultimate ruling will not be disturbed on appealunless it is manifestly erroneous. See People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d144, 204 (1999); People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 411-12(1998). This deferential standard of review is grounded in thereality that the trial court is in a superior position to determine andweigh the credibility of witnesses, observe the witnesses'demeanor, and resolve conflicts in the witnesses' testimony.Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d at 412. Most recently, however, this courthas applied the de novo standard of review to the ultimate rulingon a motion to suppress, relying on the Supreme Court's decisionin Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116S. Ct. 1657 (1996). See In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 46-50 (2000).In Ornelas, the Court held that when an appellate court reviews aruling on a motion to suppress involving a question of probablecause or reasonable suspicion, the reviewing court should reviewde novo the ultimate finding with respect to probable cause orreasonable suspicion. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d at920, 116 S. Ct. at 1663. The Court cautioned, however, thatfindings of historical fact should be reviewed only for clear errorand that reviewing courts must give due weight to inferencesdrawn from those facts by the fact finder. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at699, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 116 S. Ct. at 1663; In re G.O., 191 Ill.2d at 47-48. Accordingly, we will accord great deference to thetrial court's factual findings, and we will reverse those findingsonly if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence;however, we will review de novo the ultimate question of thedefendant's legal challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress.In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 50.

The defendant argues that Officer Cordery lacked a reasonablebelief that the defendant posed a danger necessary to justify a patdown search under Terry. The defendant further argues that theofficer exceeded the bounds of a valid Terry frisk for weaponswhen he directed the defendant to remove his boots.

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitutionguarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches andseizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV. Reasonableness under thefourth amendment generally requires a warrant supported byprobable cause. People v. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d 257, 262 (1997).One exception to the warrant requirement was recognized by theSupreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88S. Ct. 1868 (1968), which held that " 'where a police officerobserves unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to concludein light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot ...,'the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make'reasonable inquiries' aimed at confirming or dispelling hissuspicions." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372-73, 124L. Ed. 2d 334, 344, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 (1993), quoting Terry,392 U.S. at 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 911, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. Terryfurther held that when an officer is justified in believing that theindividual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at closerange is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or others, theofficer may conduct a pat-down search to determine whether theperson is in fact carrying a weapon. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508U.S. at 373, 124 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 113 S. Ct. at 2136; Terry, 392U.S. at 24, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 908, 88 S. Ct. at 1881. The solejustification for the search allowed by the Terry exception is theprotection of the police officer and others in the vicinity, not togather evidence. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 263. If the protectivesearch goes beyond what is necessary to determine if a suspect isarmed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will besuppressed. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373, 124 L. Ed.2d at 344, 113 S. Ct. at 2136.

The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individualis armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in thecircumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety orthat of others was in danger. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d at909, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. In determining whether the officer actedreasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given to thespecific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw fromthe facts in light of his experience. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 20 L. Ed.2d at 909, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. The Terry principles have now beencodified in our Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. See 725ILCS 5/107-14, 108-1.01 (West 1996).

The defendant does not challenge the stop in this case. Thestop of the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger wasjustified based on Officer Cordery's observation of a trafficviolation. See Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d at 413. Furthermore, it is wellestablished that following a lawful traffic stop, police may, as amatter of course, order the driver and any passengers out of thevehicle pending completion of the stop without violating theprotections of the fourth amendment. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d at 413-14. The question of whether the investigatory stop was valid,however, is a separate question from whether the search forweapons was valid. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 263. The fact that anofficer has reason to stop a person does not automatically justifythe further intrusion of a search for weapons. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2dat 263. The officer may subject the person to a limited search forweapons, commonly referred to as a "frisk," only if the officerreasonably believes that the person is armed and dangerous.Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 262.

Turning to the question of whether the frisk was valid, weinitially note that the defendant claims that he is not contesting thefacts relating to that issue, while at the same time arguing that therecord does not support the trial court's finding that he left aknown drug house prior to the stop or that he might have beeninvolved in any illegal activity. The trial court determined that thedefendant had left a known drug house and implicitly found thatthe officer had good reason to suspect that the defendant had beeninvolved in purchasing illegal drugs. The trial court's findingswere supported by Officer Cordery's testimony that numeroussources had informed him that the occupants of the house weredealing drugs from that location and that they had been arrested ona prior occasion for dealing narcotics. The defendant's behaviorwhen he visited the house for three or four minutes beforereturning to his vehicle was consistent with a drug purchase andwith similar suspicious activity that was routinely occurring at thehouse. The officer specifically testified that he believed a drugtransaction may have taken place. Given the appropriate deferenceto the facts found and the inferences drawn by the trial court, wefind that its factual determinations were well supported by therecord and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The defendant also maintains that the record indicates that theofficer was not so much concerned with his safety as he was insearching for illegal drugs. That notion, however, is belied by therecord. Officer Cordery specifically testified that he turned hisattention toward the defendant during the course of the stopbecause the defendant was on his side of the vehicle and was the"quickest threat" to the officer. The remainder of the officer'stestimony indicates that he clearly was primarily concerned withthe possibility that the defendant possessed a weapon. The fact thatthe officer may have also believed that the defendant possessedillegal drugs did not negate the officer's concern for his safety.Here, the trial court's findings indicated that Officer Corderyconducted the search for the discovery of weapons, and we notethat that finding was not against the manifest weight of theevidence.

Relying on this courts decisions in People v. Flowers, 179 Ill.2d 257 (1997), and People v. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d 153 (1989), thedefendant argues that Officer Cordery improperly based hisdecision to search the defendant not on any specific concerns forhis safety but rather on a series of general suppositions which weretantamount to a policy or procedure of searching every personduring a routine traffic stop. The defendant further argues thatthere is not a sufficient nexus between illegal drug activity and areasonable belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous.

In Flowers, police received a report at 1:22 a.m. from ananonymous caller that a black male wearing a white T-shirt wasriding a bicycle in a certain location where the caller heard whatsounded like glass breaking. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 260. Threepolice officers responded to the report. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 260.They investigated and found no evidence that a possible crime hadbeen committed or attempted. One of the officers then saw thedefendant, who matched the description given by the caller.Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 260. The officer stopped the defendant, andwas joined by another officer. The first officer then conducted apat-down search of the suspect and discovered a small amount ofcocaine. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 260-61. At the suppressionhearing, the officer who conducted the pat-down expresslytestified that he had no reason to believe that the defendant had aweapon, but that he frisked the defendant simply because it washis routine practice to frisk persons stopped for investigatoryquestioning. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 264-66.

This court upheld the trial court's suppression of evidence inFlowers, finding that its ruling was not manifestly erroneous.Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 270. In so doing, this court relied on thefact that the officer candidly admitted that he had no reasonablebelief that the defendant was armed. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 264-65. The court found that while the officer's subjective belief wasnot dispositive of the validity of the frisk, it was probative.Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 264-65. The court found it mostproblematic that the officer frisked the defendant simply becauseof a routine practice and not because of any particular suspicionthat the defendant was armed. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 266. Finally,the court in Flowers relied upon Galvin, which declined to adopta legal presumption that every possible burglary suspect is armedand dangerous, so as to justify a search for weapons under theTerry exception. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 269-70. Flowers notedthat the Galvin court emphasized that the reasonableness of thesearch must be judged by all the particular facts and circumstancessurrounding it. Flowers, 179 Ill. 2d at 270, citing Galvin, 127 Ill.2d at 173.

In Galvin, the police followed a burglary suspect for two orthree miles out of an area where a number of recent burglaries hadtaken place, and effectuated a stop of the defendant's vehicle anda frisk of his person. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 160. A total of threesquad cars and five police officers were present at the scene of thestop. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 160-61. Three of the officers had theirguns drawn. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 168. The officer who conductedthe frisk testified that he did not believe that the defendant wasarmed and dangerous. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 166. The trial courtgranted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized asa result of the frisk. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 166.

This court upheld the suppression of evidence in Galvin,concluding that the trial court's ruling that the frisk was invalidwas not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Galvin, 127Ill. 2d at 174. The court relied on all the circumstancessurrounding the frisk to support its holding, noting in particularthat multiple armed officers were present at the scene of the frisk,the stop was far removed from the location where the defendant'sactivities gave rise to the police officers' suspicions, and theofficer who conducted the frisk did not believe that the defendantwas armed. Galvin, 127 Ill. 2d at 164-74.

We believe that a comparison of the Flowers and Galvin caseswith the present case supports the notion that the frisk was properhere. Flowers and Galvin are distinguishable from the present caseon several key points. By the time of the frisk in Flowers, theofficers had already investigated the report of a possible crime andhad determined that no crime had occurred, whereas the presentdefendant was still suspected of purchasing drugs when the officerstopped the vehicle he was riding in to investigate a trafficviolation. More importantly, however, Officer Cordery, unlike theofficers in Flowers and Galvin, did not testify that he did notbelieve the defendant was armed. Instead, the officer testified thathe felt particularly threatened at the time he made the traffic stop.The officer noted that his concern for his safety arose out of thelocation of the stop-that it was a dark road, that he was alonefacing three persons in a vehicle who had come from a knowndrug house, and that, in his experience, persons involved withillegal drugs are known to carry weapons. In contrast, in bothFlowers and Galvin, multiple officers were present at the time ofthe frisks, and, therefore, the officers did not have the sameconcern for their safety as did Officer Cordery, who was alone ona dark road. The possible sources of harm to officers is increasedby the presence of passengers, and this is particularly true wherean officer is alone in conducting a traffic stop. See Gonzalez, 184Ill. 2d at 416, 420.

Additionally, the record did not show that Officer Corderyhad a routine policy of frisking persons stopped for investigatoryquestioning, as did the officer in Flowers. Instead, the evidenceshowed that the officer feared for his safety in this case based onthe combination of all the factors that confronted him at the timeof the stop. We find no merit to the defendant's contention that theofficer's reliance on the cited factors for the search amounted to apolicy of searching every person pursuant to a routine traffic stop.

The defendant relies on People v. Wright, 183 Ill. 2d 16(1998), for his contention that we should reject any nexus betweenillegal drug activity and a reasonable belief that a suspect is armedand dangerous. The defendant's reliance on Wright, however, ismisplaced. Wright involved the standard necessary to entersomeone's home unannounced, and we do not find it applicable tothe propriety of a Terry frisk in conjunction with a traffic stop.Instead, we note that it has been held that when a police officerpossesses a reasonable articulable suspicion that automobileoccupants were dealing drugs just prior to the stop, the officer'sbelief that the suspects were armed and dangerous was reasonablebecause weapons and violence frequently are associated with drugtransactions. United States v. Brown, 913 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir.1990).

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238, 100 S. Ct.338 (1979), also relied upon by the defendant, is distinguishable.In Ybarra, police officers had a search warrant authorizing themto search a tavern and the person of the bartender. Ybarra, 444U.S. at 88, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 243, 100 S. Ct. at 340. One of theofficers, however, proceeded beyond the scope of the warrant andconducted a pat-down search of all the patrons at the bar. Ybarra,444 U.S. at 88, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 244, 100 S. Ct. at 341. The pat-down searches revealed that one of the patrons had a packet ofillegal narcotics in his pants pocket. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 89, 62 L.Ed. 2d at 244, 100 S. Ct. at 341. The Supreme Court held that thefrisk of the patron was invalid under Terry because there was no"reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to befrisked," even though that person happened to be on the premisesof the tavern. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 94, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 247, 100 S.Ct. at 343.

Ybarra does not control the present case because here OfficerCordery's suspicions were specifically directed at the defendant.Moreover, the officer was alone on a dark roadside, conducting avalid investigative stop involving a vehicle with several occupants.Thus, Ybarra is not factually similar to the present case.

We point out that Officer Cordery did not need to beabsolutely certain that the defendant was armed in order to conducta frisk under the Terry exception. Rather, the question is whethera reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would bewarranted in the belief that his safety was in danger. Under thetotality of the circumstances presented here, we find that OfficerCordery was warranted in his belief that his safety was in danger.Accordingly, we find that the frisk of the defendant was proper inthis case.

We next must address the defendant's argument that OfficerCordery exceeded the bounds of a permissible Terry frisk forweapons when he directed the defendant to remove his hikingboots. The defendant maintains that the limited exception for afrisk for weapons permits a pat-down only of a person's outerclothing, citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 911, 88S. Ct. at 1884-85, and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65, 20 L.Ed. 2d 917, 936, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1904 (1968).

The defendant is mistaken in his assertion that the scope of aTerry search is always limited to a pat-down of a person's outerclothing. See 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure