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Docket No. 93970-Agenda 4-September 2003.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. MARIUSZ SIENKIEWICZ, Appellee.

Filed December 4, 2003

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, who was indicted for reckless homicide (720 ILCS5/9-3 (West 2000)), moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that itarose from the same facts that were the basis for a previous convictionfor reckless driving (625 ILCS 5/11-503 (West 2000)). The trial courtdenied the motion to dismiss, finding that the charges for each offensearose from separate and distinct acts committed by defendant. Onappeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(f) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(f)),the appellate court reversed, holding that double jeopardy precludedthe State from prosecuting the reckless homicide charge. 331 Ill. App.3d 70. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2dR. 315) and now affirm.

BACKGROUND

On July 16, 2000, while on his motorcycle, defendant collidedwith another vehicle on the off-ramp from Interstate 94 into Gurnee,Illinois. Defendant's passenger, Anna Jaruga, suffered head injuriesand died. Defendant received a traffic citation for reckless driving.According to the ticket, defendant's violation consisted of "improperstopping in traffic, failure to signal when required, improper laneusage, [and] traveling at 80 m.p.h. plus in a 55 m.p.h. zone." Theticket described the location of the offense as northbound Interstate94 between mile markers 61 and 70. Defendant subsequently pleadedguilty to reckless driving and was sentenced to six months' probationand fined $250.

On September 6, 2000, defendant was indicted for recklesshomicide, stemming from the death of Jaruga. The indictment allegedthat, on July 16, 2000, the defendant:

"while acting in a reckless manner, performed acts likely tocause the death of some individual, in that he operated a ***motorcycle on the off-ramp from northbound I-94 towestbound Route 132 in Gurnee *** at a speed which wasgreater than the posted speed limit and which was greaterthan was reasonable and proper with regard to the existingtraffic conditions and the safety of persons properly upon theroadway, and he left the roadway, causing his motorcycle tostrike a 1987 Ford Econoline van, thereby causing the deathof Anna Jaruga, who was a passenger of said defendant'smotorcycle."

Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardygrounds, arguing that the charge arose from the same facts that werethe basis of his reckless driving conviction. Defendant also argued thatthe State should be estopped from prosecuting the indictment becauseit had entered into a plea agreement with him on the reckless drivingcharge. The trial court denied the motion, rejecting both ofdefendant's arguments. He appealed pursuant to Rule 604(f) (188 Ill.2d R. 604(f)).

The appellate court reversed, holding that defendant's speedingwas the basis for both charges and that his conduct could not bedivided into separate and discrete physical acts. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 74.Having determined that there was only a single act, the appellate courtwent on to conclude that reckless driving was a lesser included offenseof reckless homicide for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. 331 Ill.App. 3d at 76. The appellate court reasoned that both offensesrequired proof that defendant operated his vehicle in a manner thatthreatened the safety of others. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 76. The onlydifference between the two offenses is that reckless homicide requiresthat a death result from the defendant's conduct, while recklessdriving does not require that outcome. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 76.

By leave of this court, the State now appeals (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).

ANALYSIS

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, madeapplicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, providesthat no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice putin jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV. The sameprotection is afforded to the citizens of this state by the IllinoisConstitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,