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JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Dennis Pullen, entered a negotiated plea in thecircuit court of Bureau County. Claiming error in the sentencing,defendant filed an amended motion to withdraw the plea. The trialcourt denied defendant's motion. The appellate court reversed (304Ill. App. 3d 294), and the State appeals to this court. The singleissue is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motionto withdraw his negotiated plea. Resolution of this issue requiresus to determine the maximum aggregate sentence whenconsecutive sentences are imposed on a defendant who hascommitted Class 1 or Class 2 felonies but is subject to sentencing"as a Class X offender" (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1994))because of prior criminal convictions.

BACKGROUND

In June 1997 defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty tofive counts of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1 (West 1994)).⁽¹⁾ Althoughburglary is a Class 2 offense (see 720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West1994)), defendant was required to be sentenced as a Class Xoffender (see 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1994)) because of hisprior convictions, which included numerous previous felonyconvictions for burglary and convictions for felony theft, recklesshomicide and driving while license revoked, second offense. By theterms of his plea, defendant was sentenced to 15 years'imprisonment on each of the five counts of burglary in this case.The sentences on counts I and II ran concurrently with each other,as did the sentences on counts III, IV, and V. However, the 15-year terms on counts I and II ran consecutively to the 15-yearterms on counts III, IV, and V, resulting in an aggregate sentenceof 30 years.

In July 1997 defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea.With the assistance of counsel he later filed an amended motion.One of the contentions in the amended motion was that the 30-yearsentence was void because it exceeded the maximum permissibleterm. The trial court denied the motion, and defendant appealed.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order. The courtfound that defendant was subject to a maximum sentence of 28years, and accordingly the 30-year sentence was void. 304 Ill. App.3d 294. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (see177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and now affirm the appellate court.

ANALYSIS

The issue in this case is whether defendant should have beenallowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Leave to withdraw a plea ofguilty is not granted as a matter of right, but as required to correcta manifest injustice under the facts involved. Generally, thedecision whether to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty pleaunder Rule 604(d) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) is left to the discretionof the trial court. In considering such a motion, the court shallevaluate whether the guilty plea was entered through amisapprehension of the facts or of the law, or if there is doubt ofthe guilt of the accused and the ends of justice would better beserved by submitting the case to a trial. See People v. Hillenbrand,121 Ill. 2d 537, 545 (1988). The court's decision is reviewed onlyfor abuse of discretion. See People v. Gosier, 145 Ill. 2d 127, 143(1991); People v. Kidd, 129 Ill. 2d 432, 447 (1989).

Defendant's primary contention is that he should have beenallowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his sentence exceededthe maximum allowable sentence. If correct, this would constitutegrounds for voiding defendant's guilty plea, because entering intoa negotiated plea to serve a greater amount of time than that towhich one could legally be sentenced would constitute a seriousmisapprehension of the law. Indeed, such a sentence would be voidfrom inception. See People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995)(sentence which does not conform to a statutory requirement isvoid).

The determination of the maximum sentence to whichdefendant could properly be subjected turns on our interpretationof several sections of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730ILCS 5/1-1-1 et seq. (West 1994)). As previously noted,defendant committed five counts of burglary, a Class 2 offense. See720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West 1994). At the time of defendant'soffenses, section 5-8-4(c)(2) of the Code provided in relevant partthat "the aggregate of consecutive sentences shall not exceed thesum of the maximum terms authorized under Section 5-8-2 [of theCode] for the 2 most serious felonies involved." 730 ILCS5/5-8-4(c)(2) (West 1994). There is no dispute that section5-8-4(c)(2) applied to defendant. Section 5-8-2 of the Code,referenced in section 5-8-4(c)(2), allows a sentence of up to 60years for a Class X felony, or up to 14 years for a Class 2 felony.730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(2), (a)(4) (West 1994). Another statutoryprovision relevant to this case is section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Code,which provides that:

"When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, isconvicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twicebeen convicted of any Class 2 or greater Class felonies inIllinois, and such charges are separately brought and triedand arise out of different series of acts, such defendantshall be sentenced as a Class X offender. This paragraphshall not apply unless (1) the first felony was committedafter the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1977;and (2) the second felony was committed after convictionon the first; and (3) the third felony was committed afterconviction on the second." 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West1994).

There is no dispute that defendant's prior convictions required himto be sentenced as a Class X offender pursuant to section5-5-3(c)(8).

Our appellate court has reached different conclusions as to themaximum aggregate of consecutive sentences when a defendantcommits multiple Class 1 or Class 2 felonies but must be sentencedas a Class X offender because of prior felonies. The First Districtand, in the case under review, the Third District have held that themaximum aggregate sentence must be based on the sentencespermissible for a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, not a Class X felony.People v. Ritchey, 286 Ill. App. 3d 848 (1997); 304 Ill. App. 3d294. The Fourth District, however, has held that where consecutivesentences are mandatory, a defendant who is subject to sentencingas a Class X offender pursuant to section 5-5-3(c)(8) mayproperly be sentenced to consecutive Class X terms. People v.Stencil, 306 Ill. App. 3d 273 (1999). The Stencil courtacknowledged that its decision "arguably conflicts with the wordsof the statute," but held that "defendant's consecutive sentences inthe Class X sentencing range are the punishments he deserves."Stencil, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 279. See also People v. Perkins, 274 Ill.App. 3d 834, 836-37 (1995) (holding that because attemptedmurder is sentenced as a Class X felony, it is a Class X felony forpurposes of section 5-8-4(a) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a)(West 1994)) even though its offense level is unclassified and theCriminal Code defines unclassified offenses as Class 4 felonies).

In the exercise of statutory construction, our primary task isto ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Ininterpreting a statute we may consider the reason and necessity forthe law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and its ultimate aims.Also, we must assume that the legislature did not intend an absurdor unjust result. However, our inquiry must always begin with thelanguage of the statute, which is the surest and most reliableindicator of legislative intent. The language of the statute must begiven its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the statutorylanguage is clear and unambiguous, we have no occasion to resortto aids of construction. Nor, under the guise of statutoryinterpretation, can we "correct" an apparent legislative oversightby rewriting a statute in a manner inconsistent with its clear andunambiguous language. People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 437(1995); People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 195-99 (1993).

As previously noted, there is no dispute that defendant'smaximum sentence was "the sum of the maximum terms authorizedunder Section 5-8-2 for the 2 most serious felonies involved." Thequestion is whether the maximum permissible sentence was 120years-the sum of the maximum permissible extended-termsentences for two Class X offenses (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(2)(West 1994))-or 28 years-the sum of the maximum permissibleextended-term sentences for two Class 2 offenses (730 ILCS5/5-8-2(a)(4) (West 1994)). However, the two most seriousfelonies involved in this case-indeed, the only felonies-areburglaries. Our criminal code explicitly defines burglary as a Class2 felony. 720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West 1994). This ends the case.Since burglary is a Class 2 felony, the maximum sentence forburglary is 14 years. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(4) (West 1994).Accordingly, the maximum aggregate sentence was 28 years. Sincedefendant was given an aggregate sentence in excess of 28 years,his sentence was void. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 113. Thus, the appellatecourt was correct to vacate defendant's guilty plea. SeeHillenbrand, 121 Ill. 2d at 545 (one ground for reversing trialcourt denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea is the plea havingbeen entered through a misapprehension of the law).

The State urges us to reach a different conclusion based onsection 5-5-3 of the Code, which, again, provides in essence thata defendant convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, who haspreviously twice been convicted of any Class 2 or greater Classfelony in Illinois, must be sentenced "as a Class X offender." 730ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 1994). The State contends that becausedefendant was to be sentenced as a Class X offender, his offensesshould be treated as Class X felonies for purposes of determiningthe maximum permissible aggregate sentence. This argumentignores numerous previous decisions by this court as well as theplain language of section 5-5-3(c)(8), which states that personssubject to its provisions are to be "sentenced as a Class Xoffender," not that, e.g., their offenses are to be "treated as ClassX felonies for sentencing purposes." Accordingly, this court hasrepeatedly held that section 5-5-3(c)(8) does not change thecharacter or classification of the felonies committed. A defendantwho commits a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, even though he is subjectto sentencing as a Class X offender pursuant to section5-5-3(c)(8), still has only committed a Class 1 or Class 2 felony.People v. Olivo, 183 Ill. 2d 339, 340-41 (1998); People v. Thomas,171 Ill. 2d 207, 224 (1996); People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282,290 (1994) ("Under section 5-5-3(c)(8), a defendant's sentence isincreased because of prior felony convictions, but the classificationof offense with which the defendant is charged and convictedremains the same"). In this case, the two most serious feloniesinvolved are two Class 2 felonies of burglary. Section 5-5-3(c)(8)does not change this fact.

The State attempts to distinguish Olivo on the basis that thestatute at issue in that case referred to the most serious felonies ofwhich defendant was "convicted," whereas section 5-8-4(c)(2)mentions the most serious felonies "involved." This argument doesnot address our long-standing construction of section 5-5-3(c)(8)as leaving unaffected the classification of a defendant's offense. Weassume that the State is not advancing the contention that adefendant may be sentenced for felonies of which he was notconvicted. We nevertheless find the argument without merit. Themost serious felonies "involved" in this case are Class 2 burglaries.The fact that defendant was a recidivist does not change thecharacter of the crimes he committed.

In Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, the State also based an argumenton the term "involved" in section 5-8-4(c)(2). There, weconsidered whether the aggregate consecutive sentence limitationapplied to offenses committed at different times. The State arguedthat the only felonies "involved" were those charged as part of asingle transaction. We concluded that the plain language of thestatute did not support this interpretation and held that thelimitation did apply to offenses committed at different times. Werejected the State's argument that this would lead to the "absurdresult of allowing a defendant to escape criminal responsibility,"noting that it was inherent in a limitation on consecutive sentencingthat a defendant might escape punishment for one or moreconvictions. We concluded that as the legislature had seen fit tolimit the total number of consecutive sentences that could beimposed on a defendant, we would not "rewrite the statute underthe guise of statutory interpretation." Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d at 437.The legislature subsequently amended the statute to provide thatthe limitation would not apply "for offenses that were notcommitted as part of a single course of conduct during which therewas no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective."Pub. Act 90-128,