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Docket Nos. 83921, 83922 cons.-Agenda 1-January 2000.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

PATRICK PAGE, Appellant.

Opinion filed August 10, 2000.

JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Patrick Page, was charged in the circuit court ofCook County with two separate murders and various otheroffenses. Defendant was first tried for the May 1987 murder ofJohn Goodman. The jury found defendant guilty of murder, armedrobbery, and home invasion. The jury then found that defendantwas eligible for the death penalty (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38,pars. 9-1(b)(3), (b)(6)), and that there were no mitigating factorssufficient to preclude a sentence of death. The trial court thereforesentenced defendant to death for the murder conviction. The trialcourt imposed concurrent 60-year terms of imprisonment fordefendant's remaining convictions. On direct appeal, this courtaffirmed defendant's convictions and sentences. People v. Page,155 Ill. 2d 232 (1993) (Goodman case).

Defendant was next tried for the fall 1985 murder of CharlesHowell. The jury found defendant guilty of murder and armedrobbery. The jury also found that defendant was eligible for thedeath penalty (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(b)(3),(b)(6)), and that there were no mitigating factors sufficient topreclude a death sentence. The trial court sentenced defendant todeath for the murder conviction and to an extended 60-year termof imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction. This courtaffirmed defendant's convictions and sentences on direct appeal.People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258 (1993) (Howell case).

Defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition in theGoodman case. Appointed counsel filed a post-conviction petitionin the Howell case. Appointed counsel later filed a supplementalpost-conviction petition that consolidated the issues in both cases.The State filed a motion to dismiss the post-conviction petition ineach case. Appointed counsel subsequently filed a consolidatedamended post-conviction petition that superseded all prior post-conviction petitions but refers to exhibits attached to those earlierpetitions. The State filed a motion to dismiss the consolidatedamended post-conviction petition (post-conviction petition). Afterhearing arguments on the State's motion, the trial court dismisseddefendant's post-conviction petition without an evidentiaryhearing.

Defendant now appeals from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm thetrial court's dismissal of defendant's post-conviction petition.

BACKGROUND

The facts relating to defendant's trials are set forth in thiscourt's opinions on direct appeal. Because an understanding ofsome of the trial evidence is necessary to evaluate defendant'sarguments in this post-conviction proceeding, we present asummary of that evidence.

Defendant has been convicted of three murders, the Goodmanand Howell murders at issue in this case, as well as the murder ofDale Andrew Devine. On May 16, 1987, defendant was arrestedby the Olympia Fields police department as part of theinvestigation into Goodman's murder. Over the next several days,defendant gave law enforcement authorities several statementsadmitting his involvement in the three murders. On two occasionsduring that time, defendant led Olympia Fields police officers onan unsuccessful search of the area in Wisconsin where defendantclaimed that he buried Goodman's body.

On May 19, 1987, defendant gave a court-reported statementin which he confessed to the three murders. Defendant revealedthat, during the fall of 1985, defendant, Kenneth Cheney, andGerald Feinberg murdered Devine. Devine and Cheney becameinvolved in a drug deal in which Devine apparently "ripped off"Cheney. Devine was residing with defendant at this time.Defendant contacted Feinberg and told him that Devine was at hishouse. Feinberg came to defendant's house, and defendant andFeinberg tied up Devine with an extension cord. Defendant thencalled Cheney and told him that Devine was at his house. Cheneycame over and, using a hypodermic needle, injected Devine withbarbiturates. Defendant took approximately $100 from Devine'spocket and gave it to Cheney.

Defendant, Feinberg, and Cheney then transported Devine toa wooded area near Wilmington, Illinois. Cheney asked Devinehow he wanted to die, either by being stabbed with a knife or bybeing injected with a hypodermic needle. Devine indicated that hepreferred the injection. Cheney attempted to inject an air bubbleinto Devine's bloodstream. When this did not kill Devine, Cheneyslit Devine's throat with the knife. Cheney then directed defendantand Feinberg to stab Devine, which they did. After the murder,defendant, Cheney, and Feinberg drove to Cheney's home, wherethey drank alcohol and smoked marijuana. Two days later,defendant and Cheney returned to the murder scene, and Cheneypoured gasoline on Devine's body and set it on fire. Defendantwas convicted in the circuit court of Will County of the murder ofDevine, and was sentenced to a 60-year term of imprisonment. Theappellate court affirmed defendant's murder conviction andsentence. People v. Page, 196 Ill. App. 3d 285 (1990) (Devinecase).

Defendant also confessed to the fall 1985 murder of CharlesHowell. Defendant stated that he and Feinberg killed Howellbecause Howell had been a roommate of Devine, and Devine'sdisappearance would make Howell suspicious. Defendant andFeinberg decided to murder Howell and bury him in a forestpreserve in Park Forest, Illinois. Defendant and Feinberg plannedthe murder in advance by drawing a map of the area where theywould bury Howell, taking shovels from defendant's home andfrom the home of a neighbor, going to the planned burial site inadvance to dig a hole, and luring Howell to the site under thepretense of having a party and engaging in a drug transaction there.Defendant stabbed Howell, and Feinberg hit him in the head witha large stick. Defendant and Feinberg laid Howell in the hole thatthey had dug, covered him with dirt and branches, and started afire over the grave with lighter fluid. Feinberg, who had takenHowell's car keys from the pocket of Howell's jeans prior toburying him, gave the keys to defendant as they were leaving theforest preserve. Defendant stated that he wanted the keys becauseHowell's car was parked in front of defendant's house. After themurder, defendant and Feinberg went to defendant's house,smoked marijuana, and drove around in Howell's car. A few dayslater, defendant sold Howell's car to a junkyard.

Defendant's statement also included a confession to themurder of John Goodman. Defendant stated that, on May 6, 1987,he and Feinberg made plans to rob and kill Goodman. Defendantoriginated the plan because he had a grudge against Goodman. OnThursday, May 7, 1987, defendant and Feinberg visitedGoodman's home in Olympia Fields. When Goodman was inanother room, defendant displayed a knife to Feinberg. Defendantthen approached Goodman and asked Goodman about somephotographs that Goodman had taken of defendant. WhenGoodman began to laugh, defendant stabbed him in the chest fourtimes. Defendant said that Goodman had not touched him prior tothat.

Defendant and Feinberg then put Goodman's body in thebathtub while they wiped the house clean of their fingerprints.They stole credit cards and cash from Goodman's wallet. Theywrapped Goodman's body in a sheet and a rug and placed the bodyin the trunk of Goodman's car. Defendant and Feinberg obtaineda shovel and a can of gasoline and left in Goodman's car. Afterstopping at a tavern in southeastern Wisconsin to eat and playpool, they drove to a rural area in Wisconsin, dug a hole, andburied Goodman's body. They then burned the sheet and rug overthe grave.

Defendant further stated that, on May 9, 1987, he and a friendtransported some electronic equipment from Goodman's house todefendant's father's house. Defendant described his and hisfriends' use of Goodman's credit cards during the weekendfollowing the murder. Defendant and Feinberg abandonedGoodman's car at a commuter station the following Tuesday orWednesday.

As discussed, defendant was convicted of all three murdersand received the death penalty for the murders of Goodman andHowell. This appeal follows the dismissal of defendant's post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing in the Goodmanand Howell cases. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that thetrial court properly dismissed defendant's post-conviction petitionwithout an evidentiary hearing. We therefore affirm the judgmentof the trial court.

ANALYSIS

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.(West 1998)) provides a remedy to criminal defendants who claimthat substantial violations of their federal or state constitutionalrights occurred in their trial or sentencing hearing. People v.Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). A post-conviction action,however, is a collateral proceeding, not an appeal from theunderlying judgment. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 502. The purpose of thepost-conviction proceeding is to allow inquiry into constitutionalissues involved in the conviction and sentence that have not been,and could not have been, adjudicated previously on direct appeal.Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 502. The doctrine of res judicata barsconsideration of issues that were raised and decided on directappeal. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 502; People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65,73 (1997). Issues that could have been presented on direct appeal,but were not, are waived. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 503; Griffin, 178Ill. 2d at 73.

A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition as a matter of right. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill.2d 404, 427-28 (1998). Rather, an evidentiary hearing is warrantedonly where the allegations of the post-conviction petition,supported where appropriate by the trial record or accompanyingaffidavits, make a substantial showing that the defendant'sconstitutional rights have been violated. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 428;Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 503. In determining whether to grant anevidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and inany accompanying affidavits are taken as true. Towns, 182 Ill. 2dat 503. Assertions that are nonfactual and nonspecific and thatmerely amount to conclusions are not sufficient to require anevidentiary hearing. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381(1998). A trial court's determination regarding the sufficiency ofthe allegations contained in a post-conviction petition is reviewedde novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 388-89. With these principles inmind, we review de novo the trial court's dismissal of defendant'spost-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant first raises a series of challenges to theeffectiveness of his counsel during trial, sentencing, and on directappeal.

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, adefendant must first show that counsel's performance wasdeficient in that it fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88,80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). In satisfyingthis prong, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption thatthe challenged action or inaction of counsel was the product ofsound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at694-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.

A defendant must also establish prejudice by proving thatthere is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficientperformance, the result of the proceeding would have beendifferent. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient toundermine confidence in the outcome; namely, that counsel'sdeficient performance either rendered the result of the trialunreliable or rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair.Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at2068. When challenging a death sentence, a defendant must provethat there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel'sdeficient performance, the sentencer would have concluded thatthe balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did notwarrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698,104 S. Ct. at 2069.

A defendant must establish both prongs of the Strickland testto prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. A court,however, may resolve an ineffectiveness claim by reaching onlythe prejudice prong, as lack of prejudice renders irrelevant theissue of counsel's alleged deficient performance. See Strickland,466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

A. Failure to Present Sufficient Evidence of a Voluntary

Manslaughter Defense

Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective during theGoodman trial for failing to present sufficient evidence to supportdefendant's voluntary manslaughter theory of defense. At the timeof the offense, the homicide statute provided that a personcommits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing heeither had an actual but unreasonable belief regarding the need forself-defense, or was acting under a sudden and intense passionresulting from serious provocation. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.9-2.⁽¹⁾ Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intensepassion in a reasonable person. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.9-2. This court has recognized the following categories ofprovocation: substantial physical injury or substantial physicalassault; mutual quarrel or combat; illegal arrest; and adultery withthe offender's spouse. People v. Garcia, 165 Ill. 2d 409, 429(1995); People v. Chevalier, 131 Ill. 2d 66, 71 (1989).

During the opening argument in the Goodman trial, defensecounsel told the jury that defendant had committed the homicidecharged, but maintained that defendant was guilty of voluntarymanslaughter rather than murder. Later, however, the trial courtdenied defendant's request that the jury be instructed on voluntarymanslaughter, finding that the evidence was not sufficient tosupport the instruction. The trial court also directed defensecounsel not to argue the theory of voluntary manslaughter insummation.

On direct appeal in the Goodman case, defendant argued thathis trial counsel was ineffective for presenting the voluntarymanslaughter theory of defense. Defendant argued that this theorywas not supported by either the law or the facts of the case. Thiscourt noted that trial counsel sought to demonstrate that defendantkilled Goodman while defendant was acting under a sudden andintense passion resulting from serious provocation. Page, 155 Ill.2d at 261. Trial counsel sought to establish the provocation formof the offense by showing evidence of mutual combat betweendefendant and Goodman. Page, 155 Ill. 2d at 261. Althoughdefendant did not testify, trial counsel was able to elicit evidence,during cross-examination of one of the prosecution witnesses,about an altercation between defendant and Goodman. Trialcounsel asked the witness about an inculpatory statement made bydefendant prior to his formal confession. In that statement,defendant said that he and Goodman argued for 10 to 15 minutesover some photographs that Goodman refused to surrender.According to defendant, Goodman had taken photographs ofdefendant and Goodman having a homosexual relationship.Defendant said that he punched and stabbed Goodman whenGoodman refused to move from the bathroom doorway, where thetwo were standing. In addition to this evidence, defendant, in hisformal statement, said that he stabbed Goodman after Goodmanbegan laughing at his request for the photographs. See Page, 155Ill. 2d at 261.

This court rejected defendant's argument that trial counselwas ineffective for arguing voluntary manslaughter. We held thattrial counsel's decision to present the voluntary manslaughterdefense was a matter of trial strategy, and that the record showedthat defendant expressly consented to this strategy. Page, 155 Ill.2d at 262-63. We found that, in light of the overwhelmingevidence of defendant's involvement in Goodman's murder,defense counsel might reasonably have considered a voluntarymanslaughter theory to be the only reasonable course of defense.Page, 155 Ill. 2d at 262. We then recounted the overwhelmingevidence of defendant's guilt. Defendant confessed in detail to thecrimes. An eyewitness saw defendant at Goodman's house shortlybefore Goodman disappeared. Other witnesses established thatdefendant was in possession of property belonging to Goodman,including his car and credit cards. Another witness testified thatdefendant had access to Goodman's house shortly after hedisappeared. See Page, 155 Ill. 2d at 266.

In these post-conviction proceedings, defendant now arguesthat his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to presentsufficient evidence to support the voluntary manslaughter defense.Defendant has waived review of this argument by failing to raiseit on direct appeal. See People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 503(1998). Indeed, this argument is directly contrary to the argumentdefendant did raise on direct appeal, i.e., that trial counsel wasineffective for presenting the voluntary manslaughter defense.

Defendant, however, appears to argue that his claim is notwaived because it is based on evidence outside the original trialrecord. This exception to the waiver rule in post-convictionappeals refers to those claims that the reviewing court on directappeal could not have considered because the claim's evidentiarybasis was de hors the record. See People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d355, 372 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds, People v.Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366 (1998). Defendant argues that there wasevidence available to trial counsel to substantiate defendant'svoluntary manslaughter defense. Defendant claims that he has now"submitted police reports and evidence of other statements, fromnumerous individuals, substantiating and establishing themanslaughter defense, including: evidence that the pictures beingargued over were evidence of a homosexual attack perpetrated bythe victim and his friends; evidence that such tendencies andsimilar photographs were discovered concerning the victim (aswell as additional material involving the defendants); and evidencethat in addition to an altercation over the pictures, the victimattempted homosexual contact with the defendant."

The evidence that defendant cites in support of his argumentis as follows. Defendant provides his own affidavit which statesthat "John Goodman had pictures of Gerald Feinberg. Cheyney[sic] told Gerald that if he helped Cheyney get Andy and Chuck,Cheyney would help Gerald get Goodman for what he had done tohim. John Goodman and his friend had drugged Feinberg andperformed unnatural sex acts on him. Feinberg was very upsetabout this, and wanted to get them back."

Defendant attaches the affidavit of Edward Torres, aninvestigator from the Capital Litigation Division. Torresinterviewed Kenneth Berksen, who was once Gerald Feinberg'scellmate at the Cook County jail. According to Torres' affidavit,Berksen stated that Feinberg told him that, on the night ofGoodman's murder, Goodman made a sexual advance towarddefendant, which enraged defendant and caused defendant to stabGoodman. In this regard, defendant also provides a report from theOlympia Fields police department which relates that Greg Wilson,a friend of Goodman, spoke to a man named John Dixon, whospoke to Feinberg, who said that "Goodman tried to make out withPat Page, and then they stabbed him."

Defendant also cites numerous other reports from the OlympiaFields police department which discuss relations among defendant,Goodman, and Feinberg. One report recounts that a certainnewspaper reporter gave the Olympia Fields police department aphotograph of Goodman and defendant. The reporter received thephotograph from a third party who had received it from thephotographer. The reporter advised police that the source hadstated that the photograph was taken one week before Goodman'smurder while on a weekend fishing trip in Illinois. Another reportdiscusses information received from Greg Wilson. According toWilson, defendant had been to Goodman's home and had beenvideotaped in one of Goodman's "home movies."

An additional report from the Olympia Fields policedepartment describes an interview with Glen Rogers, a friend ofGoodman. Rogers stated that he led a homosexual lifestyle whichincluded a relationship with Feinberg, and that approximately onemonth prior to the interview, Goodman told Rogers that Goodmanand Feinberg had a sexual encounter the previous weekend. Onereport discusses Goodman's homosexual lifestyle and the policedepartment's possession of photographs of Goodman with GlenRogers and an unidentified nude male. Another report describes atelephone call that the police department received from anindividual named Bill Davis. Davis "wanted to know why theS&M angle of this homicide has not been followed up on in thenews media." According to Davis, Goodman "used to hang out"at a Chicago bar "frequented by 'male hustlers' with homosexualand S&M tendencies." Davis recognized defendant and Feinbergas being patrons of this bar.

The other evidence that defendant cites in support of hiscurrent argument references personal details of Goodman'slifestyle. Defendant has attached an affidavit from AppolonBeaudouin, Jr., an investigator for the Capital Litigation Division.This affidavit references Beaudouin's interview with MichelleKury, defendant's former girlfriend. According to Beaudouin,Kury stated that "Patrick told her that Goodman was into sexvideos." Defendant further cites a report from the Olympia Fieldspolice department that lists property recovered from Goodman'shome. The list of property references "pornographic homosexualassorted photos" and a "copy of Gay Chicago Magazine forJanuary, 87."

Defendant argues that, had trial counsel presented thisevidence, he would have been entitled to a jury instruction onvoluntary manslaughter. We hold that defendant has failed tomake a substantial showing that he was prejudiced by trialcounsel's failure to present this evidence.

Defendant's argument is that this evidence would havesupported a defense that he killed Goodman while acting under asudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation.Defendant's theory of provocation appears to be that Goodmanmade unwanted sexual advances toward him on the night of themurder. The only evidence that could have supported this theoryis (1) the affidavit from the Capital Litigation Divisioninvestigator which recounts that a former cellmate of Feinbergstated that Feinberg told him that, on the night of Goodman'smurder, Goodman made a sexual advance toward defendant whichenraged defendant and caused defendant to stab Goodman; and (2)the police report which relates that Greg Wilson spoke to a mannamed John Dixon, who spoke to Feinberg, who said that"Goodman tried to make out with Pat Page, and then they stabbedhim." The remaining evidence is simply not evidence thatGoodman made an unwanted sexual advance toward defendant onthe night of the murder. Indeed, defendant's own affidavit statesthat Goodman performed unwanted sexual acts on Feinberg, noton defendant.

Even focusing on the evidence that could have supporteddefendant's theory of provocation, and accepting all of thisevidence as true, we hold that defendant has failed to make asubstantial showing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing topresent this alleged evidence of voluntary manslaughter. Initially,we note that this evidence is hearsay and would likely not havebeen admissible at defendant's trial. Defendant has failed toprovide an affidavit from Feinberg attesting to the informationwhich has been attributed to him, and stating that he would havebeen willing to testify to this information at defendant's trial. Inany event, defendant's theory is that he killed Goodman while hewas acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting fromserious provocation. Defendant argues that the provocation here isthat Goodman made sexual advances toward him. This is not oneof the categories of provocation that this court has recognized. SeeGarcia, 165 Ill. 2d at 429; Chevalier, 131 Ill. 2d at 71. Thus, evenif evidence that Goodman made a sexual advance towarddefendant on the night of the murder had been admitted at trial,this evidence would not have entitled defendant to a voluntarymanslaughter instruction.

Defendant, however, argues that, in People v. Saldivar, 113Ill. 2d 256 (1986), and in People v. Lenser, 102 Ill. App. 3d 214(1981), the defendants received jury instructions for voluntarymanslaughter in cases similar to defendant's case. AlthoughSaldivar and Lenser involved fact scenarios where the victimmade a homosexual advance toward the defendants, the questionof whether the evidence was sufficient to entitle the defendants toa voluntary manslaughter instruction was not at issue. Also, inSaldivar, the stipulated evidence revealed that the defendant statedthat, after the victim made the sexual advance, "a struggleensued," and the defendant stabbed the victim with a kitchenknife. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d at 260-61. Thus, it appears that thedefendant received the voluntary manslaughter instruction on thebasis of mutual combat, not the sexual advance.

Defendant cites additional cases which he contends "discusswhat could be termed the 'homosexual panic' defense anddemonstrate the accepted use of this 'defense' to obtain amanslaughter instruction." While these cases likewise involve factscenarios where the victims made homosexual advances towardthe defendants, the defendants' theories of voluntary manslaughterwere based on the unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense,not on serious provocation, which is the theory advanced bydefendant in this case. See, e.g., People v. Henne, 23 Ill. App. 3d567 (1974); People v. Barnes, 23 Ill. App. 3d 390 (1974). Thesecases, therefore, are inapposite.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that defendant has failedto make a substantial showing that trial counsel was ineffective forfailing to present the alleged evidence of voluntary manslaughter.

B. Failure to Adequately Present Defendant's Motion to

Suppress His Confession

Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in both theGoodman and Howell cases in presenting defendant's motion tosuppress his confession. We note that defendant was representedby the same two attorneys in both the Goodman and Howell cases.The facts relevant to this issue are outlined extensively in ouropinions on direct appeal. See People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258,284-85 (1993) (Howell case); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 246-59 (1993) (Goodman case). We review those facts necessary toaddress defendant's argument in this appeal.

Defendant was arrested around 10 p.m. on Saturday, May 16,1987, and remained in police custody, in Cook County, until May20, when he was taken before a judge for a bond hearing.Defendant gave law enforcement officers numerous statementswith respect to the Goodman murder on May 16, 17, 18, and 19.On May 19, defendant also gave authorities formal statementsregarding the murder of Andrew Devine, committed in WillCounty, and the murder of Charles Howell, committed in CookCounty.

The first case to go to trial was the Will County prosecutionfor Devine's murder. In that proceeding, defendant moved tosuppress his statements. Defendant's motion did not specify whichstatements were being challenged. In his motion, defendant arguedthat the interrogating officers made unfulfilled promises ofleniency; that defendant was led to believe that the only courtproceedings in which his statements would be used would be thosein which the promises of leniency would be enforced; that theofficers did not honor his wishes to consult with an attorney; andthat the officers threatened to charge defendant's father with theoffenses in the Goodman case.

The Will County trial court held a hearing at which the partiesintroduced testimony regarding the entire time period duringwhich defendant was in custody. The State presented the testimonyof three members of the Olympia Fields police department, theassistant State's Attorney who had questioned defendant in allthree cases, and the court reporter who had transcribed defendant'sformal statements to the Devine and Howell murders. Thesewitnesses testified that defendant received Miranda warnings andwaived these rights prior to each session of questioning, and thatdefendant was not mistreated while in custody. These witnessesfurther denied that any promises of leniency were made todefendant or that he or his family members were threatened in anyway.

Defendant testified at the suppression hearing. Defendantstated that, shortly after he was taken into custody, the policeshowed defendant a booking photograph of his father and tolddefendant that his father would be charged in the Goodman caseif defendant did not confess. We note that defendant's father hadbeen arrested when police learned that property belonging toGoodman was in defendant's father's home. Defendant's fatherwas released soon after defendant's arrest. At the suppressionhearing, defendant also testified that the police refused defendant'srequest to contact an attorney or a family member. Defendantfurther testified that, prior to making the statements regarding theDevine and Howell cases, the assistant State's Attorney promiseddefendant that he would receive only a 20-year sentence for thoseoffenses if he confessed to the crimes.

Defendant's mother and sister testified on behalf of defendantat the suppression hearing. They stated that during the weekend ofdefendant's arrest, they repeatedly called the Olympia Fieldspolice department, and their requests to speak with defendant weredenied. The defense also presented the testimony of LeilaNaszkiewicz, the mother of Michael Naszkiewicz, who had alsobeen arrested in connection with the Goodman murder. LeilaNaszkiewicz testified that she too encountered difficulty inattempting to contact her son while he was in police custody.

Following the suppression hearing, the Will County trial courtdenied defendant's motion to suppress his statements. The trialcourt held that defendant had given his statements voluntarily. Thetrial court did not distinguish among the different statements madeby defendant.

Subsequently, in both the Cook County Howell and Goodmancases, defendant moved to suppress his statements. The trial courtin both cases granted the State's motion to strike defendant'smotion to suppress. The trial court in both cases held that the WillCounty trial court had already resolved the admissibility ofdefendant's statements, and that defendant was thereforecollaterally estopped from challenging that determination.

On direct appeal in the Goodman case, this court extensivelyreviewed this issue and concluded that the Will County trial court,in rejecting defendant's claims, "necessarily determined issuespertinent to all three sets of statements made by the defendantwhile in police custody." Page, 155 Ill. 2d at 254. This court statedthat "we have carefully examined the evidence and argumentspresented at the Will County suppression hearing. Our analysisleads us to conclude that the Will County judge's ruling on theadmissibility of the Devine statements resolved as well factualissues pertinent to the Goodman and Howell statements." Page,155 Ill. 2d at 257. Likewise, on direct appeal in the Howell case,this court stated that "[w]e have carefully examined the record ofthe Will County proceedings and the record in the instant case andhave found nothing to dissuade us from our earlier conclusion" inthe Goodman case that defendant is collaterally estopped fromchallenging the admissibility of his statements. Page, 156 Ill. 2dat 285.

Defendant argues in these post-conviction proceedings thattrial counsel was ineffective in both the Goodman and Howellcases in presenting the motions to suppress defendant'sstatements. Defendant contends that he has made a substantialshowing that, had trial counsel presented certain other evidence,the trial court would not have held that defendant was collaterallyestopped from challenging the admissibility of his statements.Defendant suggests that this new evidence includes "the extensivesearches and cooperation with authorities in searching for theGoodman and Howell bodies; their promises relating to thesesearches; and the additional conversations on these outings."

We review the evidence that defendant now cites in supportof his argument that trial counsel was ineffective in presenting hismotion to suppress his statements in Cook County. Defendantattaches his own affidavit in which he repeats allegations to whichhe testified at the suppression hearing. In this affidavit, defendantalso states that he rehearsed his statements both before and afterthe court reporter arrived. Defendant states that, before the courtreporter arrived, the assistant State's Attorney reminded defendantthat he would help defendant "get 20 [years] or less." However,the assistant State's Attorney told defendant that "since he couldnot promise me anything, [h]e would have to ask me if there wasa promise, that I would have to say no." Defendant further allegesthat he "found that Michael Naszkiewicz and Michelle Kuryrepeatedly asked for attorneys and Michael's mother tried to get anattorney, but the police would not let her." Finally, defendantstates that he "was told that my family and I would be killed if Idid not take the rap."

Defendant also references an affidavit from the investigatorfor the Capital Litigation Division, who interviewed MichelleKury on June 13, 1997. During this interview, Kury stated that shewas in the Village of Matteson jail for four days and could not getan attorney or talk to her family for that period of time.

Defendant further cites a report from the Olympia Fieldspolice department which discusses a May 15, 1987, meetingbetween a police officer and Leila Naszkiewicz, whose sonMichael was in custody at the time. Naszkiewicz apparentlyrequested that she be notified when her son had a bond hearing,and requested information regarding representation for her son bythe public defender's office. Naszkiewicz was advised that her sonwas being held on burglary charges but that the charges couldchange as the investigation progressed.

In this regard, defendant attaches an affidavit from his brother.His brother states that when defendant "was in the Richton Parkjail, my mother and I tried to see him and the police almostarrested me for sitting in the parking lot. They held Pat [defendant]for at least 72 hours, and told me that he had not been charged, hedid not need a lawyer and did not need to see anyone."

Defendant also attaches an affidavit from his father. His fatherrelates that defendant told him that he confessed to the crimesbecause the police showed him a picture of his father in a jail cell.Finally, defendant cites two Olympia Fields police departmentreports which recount that defendant was transported to Wisconsinto search for Goodman's body. These reports also state thatdefendant voluntarily gave statements after being advised of hisMiranda rights.

Defendant fails to explain how any of this evidence wouldhave resulted in a holding by the trial court that defendant was notcollaterally estopped from challenging the admissibility of hisstatements. Most of this evidence is cumulative of the evidencethat the trial court considered, and which this court reviewed, indetermining that defendant was collaterally estopped fromrelitigating his motion to suppress his statements. The otherevidence, namely, the circumstances surrounding the arrests ofMichelle Kury and Michael Naszkiewicz, is simply not relevant toa determination of the voluntariness of defendant's statements.

We therefore hold that defendant has failed to make asubstantial showing that, had trial counsel presented this evidence,there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would not haveheld that defendant was collaterally estopped from challenging theadmissibility of his statements.

We note that defendant also suggests in this regard that trialcounsel in the Howell and Goodman cases were ineffective forfailing to ensure that appellate counsel in the Devine casechallenged the admissibility of defendant's statements. In theDevine case, defendant did not receive the death penalty. Thus,defendant's appeal in that case was heard by the appellate court.See People v. Page, 196 Ill. App. 3d 285 (1990). Appellatecounsel in the Devine case did not challenge the admissibility ofdefendant's statements. Defendant now argues that trial counsel inthe Goodman and Howell cases "failed to insure that some levelof appellate review was had of these statements," and that as aresult of this "failure," the issue of the admissibility of defendant'sstatements was never reviewed. This, of course, is an improperargument, as we are not reviewing the Devine case. Furthermore,defendant fails to offer any argument to support the notion that achallenge to the admissibility of his statements would have beensuccessful.

As a final matter, defendant suggests that trial counsel wereineffective for failing to adequately present defendant's motion toquash his arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant attaches policereports regarding the taking of defendant into custody, and theobtainment of permission from defendant's mother to search herhouse.

The Will County trial court denied defendant's motion toquash his arrest and suppress evidence. On direct appeal in theGoodman case, we noted that the trial court in the Goodman casegranted the State's motion to strike defendant's motion to quashhis arrest and suppress evidence on the basis that defendant wascollaterally estopped from challenging the Will County trialcourt's prior determination. See People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232,248 (1993) (Goodman case). We further noted that the CookCounty trial court's disposition of defendant's motion to quash hisarrest and suppress evidence was not at issue in the appeal. Page,155 Ill. 2d at 248.

Defendant offers no argument to support his suggestion thattrial counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately presentdefendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Wetherefore hold that defendant has waived any argument in thisregard. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7) (stating that an appellant'sbrief must include an argument, "which shall contain thecontentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor").

C. Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence

Defendant argues that he has made a substantial showing thattrial counsel was ineffective at sentencing in both the Goodmanand Howell cases for failing to present certain mitigating evidence.The alleged mitigating evidence to which defendant cites includesinformation regarding defendant's involvement in a cult and theinterplay of that cult involvement with defendant's psychiatrichistory. Defendant contends that, had trial counsel presented thisevidence at the sentencing hearings, there is a reasonableprobability that the jurors would have concluded that the balanceof aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.

The following is the evidence that was presented in mitigationat defendant's sentencing hearings in the Goodman and Howellcases. In the Goodman case, Arlene Messner-Peters, a socialworker, testified regarding a mitigation report that she prepared atthe request of trial counsel. She interviewed defendant's familymembers, reviewed material from the Department of Corrections,and reviewed defendant's confessions. Messner-Peters testifiedthat defendant's childhood was unstable. Defendant's parents wereoften involved in physical altercations with each other.Defendant's father was an alcoholic and would become abusivetoward his wife and children.

Messner-Peters also testified regarding defendant'sdifficulties in school, both academically and socially. Defendantsuffered from a learning disability. Also, a congenital conditionaffecting defendant's eye muscles had caused defendant's eyes todrift apart and to cross. The children at school teased defendantbecause of this condition. Defendant also had a history of usingmarijuana and LSD.

Dr. Gerard Girdaukas, a licensed clinical psychologist,testified that he administered psychological tests to defendant anddiagnosed him with a learning disability and with a "non-specificpersonality disorder." Defendant exhibited symptoms ofdepression, paranoia, delusional thinking, and organic brainimpairment. Dr. Girdaukas concluded that defendant was underthe influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of theGoodman murder. Dr. Girdaukas recommended that defendanttake antipsychotic medication and attend support groups, and herecommended further testing.

Defendant's parents, Paul and Patricia Page, and defendant'ssister, Grace Page, testified on defendant's behalf. Their testimonyreiterated the evidence regarding defendant's academic and socialproblems. The testimony also revealed that defendant's parentsseparated when defendant was eight years old. Defendant livedwith each parent at various times in his childhood. The testimonyfurther described defendant's father's alcoholism, abusivebehavior, and infidelity.

A neighbor also testified regarding her relationship withdefendant's family, and about defendant's good nature. Further, aclergyman, who had visited defendant while he was an inmate atthe Cook County jail, testified about defendant's interest inreligion and his desire to be baptized.

At the sentencing hearing in the Howell case, defendantpresented almost all of the same mitigating evidence that waspresented at the Goodman sentencing hearing. However,defendant's mother, sister, and neighbor did not testify at thissentencing hearing.

Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failingto investigate and present evidence regarding defendant'sinvolvement in a cult. According to defendant, this evidenceshowed that defendant's involvement in a cult was "so extremethat it was labeled by numerous mental health professionals, yearsbefore the murders, as evidencing delusional thought processesand psychotic behavior." Defendant argues that this evidencewould have helped to explain to the jurors "how he was associatedwith these murders (and how others were more culpable) and howhe came to be able to be involved in such acts."

Defendant attached to his post-conviction petition a 1981psychiatric summary report from the Psychiatric Institute of CookCounty regarding defendant's fitness for trial of the pendingburglary charge against him. The psychiatrist who examineddefendant concluded that defendant was fit for trial, stating thatdefendant "does not display any psychotic behavior nor show anypsychotic symptoms." The psychiatrist reported that defendant"relates an interest in the occult [and] talks about getting togetherwith other young men to have some sort of seances involving'black magic.' " Defendant insisted that "being sent to jail is notright and he needs to be in a hospital for his 'problem.' "According to the psychiatrist, defendant appeared "quitemanipulative."

Defendant also attached a 1981 psychological examinationfrom the Psychiatric Institute which recounts defendant'sstatements that he has "gone pretty far into the occult" and that hesaw devils in inkblots. Defendant next referenced a psychologicalsummary that was conducted by a psychologist who concludedthat defendant was not fit for trial on his pending burglary case.Defendant reported to the psychologist that he was experiencinghallucinations and paranoid delusions, and expressed concernabout his involvement in witchcraft. Specifically, defendant statedthat he was engrossed in the study of black magic, and that he andseveral friends, led by a 24-year-old warlock, held services,conjured demons, and cast spells. The psychologist concluded that,although defendant's request for psychiatric treatment seemedgenuine, defendant "is shrewd enough to seek treatment as apossible alternative to incarceration."

Defendant also provided a May 17, 1987, report from theOlympia Fields police department. The report states that Feinbergtold police officers that "there are people who believe that Mr.Patrick Page is the anti-Christ, and that Page derived a power fromthe location where Chuck Howell's body was buried." The reportfurther recounts that Feinberg "indicated that Patrick Page was theleader of a Satanic cult." Another report from the Olympia Fieldspolice department describes a call that the reporting officerreceived from Marty Carson, who identified himself as a friend ofdefendant. Carson stated that he had accompanied defendant to acampfire site where defendant would "party," and from wheredefendant stated he derived a "special power." Defendant furtherprovided some unattributed notes regarding defendant'sinvolvement in black magic, rituals, and sacrifices.

Defendant attached his own affidavit, which states that "I wasinvolved in certain practices from a young age, and am still in fearof individuals who were involved and may still be involved inthese practices." Defendant likewise attached affidavits from hisfather and brother. These affidavits relate that, when defendantwas 16 years old, he was involved in "some kind of cult or devilworship."

Finally, defendant provided reports from a physician and apsychologist regarding the workings of cults. These doctorsessentially reviewed the information we have just discussed andpostulated that defendant was under the influence of a cult leaderat the time he committed the murders at issue. These doctors alsogenerally described the mind-control techniques used by leadersof cults.

After reviewing this allegedly mitigating evidence, we holdthat there is no reasonable probability that, had counsel presentedthis evidence at the sentencing hearings, the juries would haveconcluded that the mitigating factors were sufficient to precludethe death sentence. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,695, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069 (1984).Contrary to defendant's argument, the jurors likely would haveviewed this evidence of cult involvement as aggravating evidence.This evidence describes defendant's involvement in devil worshipand ritualistic sacrifices. Even worse, some of this evidence showsthat defendant was the leader of the cult engaged in thesepractices. Significantly, the evidence also shows that the doctorsto whom defendant mentioned his cult involvement suggested thatdefendant was manipulative and might be trying to avoid prison byrelying on his cult involvement. In any event, defendant fails toexplain how any of this evidence showed a "cult connection to themurders" of Howell and Goodman.

Furthermore, the aggravating evidence in this case faroutweighs the mitigating evidence. The State presenteddefendant's confession to the murders of Devine, Howell, andGoodman. Defendant, Feinberg, and Kenneth Cheney murderedDevine because Devine "ripped off" Cheney in a drug deal. Theytied up Devine with an extension cord and transported him to awooded area, where they stabbed him to death. After the murder,defendant, Cheney, and Feinberg drove to Cheney's home, wherethey drank alcohol and smoked marijuana.

Defendant and Feinberg later murdered Howell because theywere worried that Devine's disappearance would make Howellsuspicious. Defendant and Feinberg planned the murder inadvance. They drew a map of the area where they would buryHowell, went to the planned burial site and dug a hole, and luredHowell to the site under the pretense of having a party there.Defendant stabbed Howell, and Feinberg hit him over the headwith a large stick. They buried Howell and set his grave on fire.After the murder, defendant and Feinberg went to defendant'shouse, smoked marijuana, and drove around in Howell's car.

A year and a half later, defendant originated the plan tomurder Goodman because defendant held a grudge againstGoodman. Defendant stabbed Goodman in the chest four times.Defendant and Feinberg stole credit cards and cash fromGoodman's wallet before wrapping Goodman's body in a sheetand a rug and placing it in the trunk of Goodman's car. Afterstopping at a tavern in southeastern Wisconsin to eat and playpool, defendant and Feinberg drove to a rural area in Wisconsin,dug a hole, and buried Goodman's body. They then burned thesheet and the rug over the grave.

The State also presented details of defendant's criminalhistory. The State introduced certified copies of defendant'sconviction following a guilty plea on May 11, 1982, to sevencharges of burglary. Defendant was sentenced to five years'imprisonment for the offenses. After defendant had served aportion of this prison sentence, he was assigned to a prereleasecenter. Residents were allowed to leave the center during the dayto work, but were required to return each night. A supervisor fromthe center testified that defendant signed out on the morning ofDecember 5, 1983, and did not come back until January 2, 1984.Defendant said that he did not return on December 5 because hehad gotten drunk and fallen asleep. Because defendant knew thathe was on escape status anyway, he decided to stay out for theholidays. Consequently, defendant was returned to the custody ofthe Illinois Department of Corrections.

A case work supervisor from the Logan Correctional Centertestified that defendant was incarcerated at Logan beginning inSeptember 1982, and remained there until May 1983, when he wasassigned to the prerelease center. Defendant was returned to Loganin February 1984, and was released on parole two months later.Defendant received 27 disciplinary tickets while an inmate atLogan. Defendant received these tickets for physical or verbalaltercations with other inmates, insulting behavior toward the staff,possession of contraband, and failing to go to school.

Captain Robert Maeyama of the Park Forest policedepartment also testified regarding various contacts he had withdefendant while defendant was a juvenile. Captain Maeyamastated that he apprehended defendant in connection with severaldifferent charges during a period from June 1977 to October 1980.These charges included three batteries or aggravated batteries, twoburglaries, a theft, a car theft, and disorderly conduct.

A review of this aggravating evidence shows that defendantis a domineering and remorseless murderer. Given defendant'sextensive criminal history, as well as the heinous nature of thecrimes in this case, defendant has failed to establish the requisiteprejudice under Strickland. There is no reasonable probability thatthe outcome of defendant's sentencing hearings would have beendifferent had the alleged mitigating evidence at issue beenpresented.

As a final matter, defendant requests this court to order alimited remand so that he may have a complete neurologicalexamination conducted. Defendant initially filed a motion forfunds so that defendant could retain a neurological expert toperform "full neurological testing" of defendant. Defendant arguedthat the limited evaluation conducted by Dr. Girdaukas showedpossible brain damage or neurological disorders. Defendant soughtfunds to retain an expert to conduct this testing. The trial courtdenied defendant's motion. In accordance with our precedingdiscussion, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretionin denying this motion.

Defendant, in his reply brief in this court, states that theCapital Litigation Division now has sufficient funds to pay for therequested neurological testing. Defendant, therefore, requests alimited remand "for the purpose of conducting the NeurologicalAssessment and the Cult-related Psycho-Social investigation."

We decline to order a limited remand in this case. Defendantpresented the testimony of Dr. Girdaukas, a licensed clinicalpsychologist, at both sentencing hearings. Dr. Girdaukasadministered numerous psychological tests to defendant andpresented his findings to the jurors. There is no reasonableprobability that the outcome of defendant's sentencing hearingswould have been different had evidence of defendant's cultinvolvement been presented. We therefore decline to remand thiscase for the testing defendant now seeks.

D. Failure to Challenge Proportionality of Defendant'sSentence

Defendant argues that appellate counsel was ineffective forfailing to challenge the proportionality of defendant's deathsentences to the natural life sentences of his codefendant,Feinberg. On direct appeal in the Howell case, appellate counselargued that the trial court improperly precluded defendant frompresenting to the jury, at the second stage of the sentencinghearing, nonstatutory mitigation evidence that his codefendant,Gerald Feinberg, had pled guilty and was sentenced to natural lifeimprisonment for the murder of Howell. See People v. Page, 156Ill. 2d 258, 270 (1993). We noted that defendant was notrequesting "that this court undertake a review of theproportionality of his sentence." Page, 156 Ill. 2d at 271. Rather,defendant was arguing "that his codefendant's sentence andrelative degree of participation in the murder should have beenconsidered by the jury at the second stage of his sentencinghearing." Page, 156 Ill. 2d at 271. We rejected this argument andheld that defendant's request to have the jury consider evidence ofa codefendant's sentence is neither constitutionally required norrelevant to the jury's examination of the individual defendant'scharacteristics and the circumstances of his offense. Page, 156 Ill.2d at 270-72.

Defendant now contends that appellate counsel in the Howellcase should have instead argued that defendant's death sentence isdisproportionate to the natural life sentence of his codefendantFeinberg. Defendant also suggests that appellate counsel in theGoodman case was likewise ineffective for failing to challenge theproportionality of defendant's death sentence to the natural lifesentence of Feinberg.

Comparative proportionality review in death penalty cases isnot required by either the United States Constitution (see Pulley v.Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984)) or theIllinois death penalty statute (see People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d465, 491 (1994)). This court has, however, considered whether asentence of death in a particular case is disproportionately harsh incomparison with a less severe sanction imposed on a codefendantconvicted of the same crime. See, e.g., People v. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d49, 80-81 (1995); People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 294-96 (1992);People v. St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 513 (1992); People v. Bean,137 Ill. 2d 65, 134 (1990). Such judicial review acknowledges thenecessity to avoid arbitrary or capricious death sentences byinsuring that the cases in which death is imposed are rationallydistinguished from those in which it is not imposed. St. Pierre,146 Ill. 2d at 513. The focus of this review is on the particulardefendant's involvement in the crime, the nature of the crime, thecharacter and background of the defendant, including any criminalrecord, and the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. See Burt,168 Ill. 2d at 80; Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 294.

The record reveals the following relevant informationregarding defendant's involvement in the crimes. In the Goodmancase, it was defendant who originated the plan to rob and killGoodman because defendant held a grudge against Goodman.Defendant stabbed Goodman in the chest four times; Feinberg didnot inflict any injuries on Goodman. In the Howell case, defendantstabbed Howell in the chest, and Feinberg hit Howell in the headwith a stick.

Moreover, defendant had a substantial criminal history whileFeinberg had no criminal convictions. Details of defendant'scriminal history were introduced at the sentencing hearings in theGoodman and Howell cases. As we have previously discussed, thiscriminal history includes defendant's conviction for burglary, andhis escape from the prerelease center where he was serving aportion of his sentence for this conviction. Additionally, defendantreceived 27 disciplinary tickets while an inmate at LoganCorrectional Center. These disciplinary tickets were for physicalor verbal altercations with other inmates, insulting behaviortoward the staff, possession of contraband, and failing to go toschool. Furthermore, defendant was charged with numerousoffenses while a juvenile, including three batteries or aggravatedbatteries, two burglaries, a theft, a car theft, and disorderlyconduct.

Given defendant's role as the leader in the crimes in this case,defendant's criminal background, and defendant's lack of potentialfor rehabilitation, defendant's death sentences were notdisproportionate to Feinberg's natural life imprisonmentsentences. Defendant, therefore, has failed to make a substantialshowing that he received ineffective assistance of appellatecounsel in this regard.

II. Perjured Testimony

Defendant next argues that his constitutional right to dueprocess was violated at trial because the State failed to correctfalse testimony.

The State's knowing use of perjured testimony to obtain acriminal conviction constitutes a violation of due process of law.People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 223 (1995). A convictionobtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony must be setaside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimonycould have affected the jury's verdict. People v. Olinger, 176 Ill.2d 326, 345 (1997), citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,678-80, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 492, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3381-82 (1985).

These principles likewise apply where the State, although notsoliciting the false testimony, allows it to go uncorrected. Olinger,176 Ill. 2d at 345, citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 3 L.Ed. 2d 1217, 1221, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 1177 (1959). This is so evenwhere the witness' false testimony goes only to that witness'credibility. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d at 345, citing Napue, 360 U.S. at269, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 1221, 79 S. Ct. at 1177.

Defendant's claim revolves around the testimony of GlenRogers and Greg Wilson, who testified at the Goodman murdertrial. Glen Rogers and Greg Wilson testified that on Monday, May11, 1987, they went to Goodman's house and looked in thewindows. They noticed that a television set and stereo equipmentwere missing. They then called the Olympia Fields policedepartment. Goodman had been murdered the preceding Thursday.

Defendant references the cross-examination of thesewitnesses. Rogers denied that he had sexual relations withFeinberg at Goodman's house, and also denied that he had anysexual relations with Feinberg other than one time at his ownhouse. Wilson denied that there was any relationship involvingcocaine or homosexual conduct between himself and Goodman.

Defendant now argues that the testimony by Rogers andWilson was false, and that the State should have corrected thetestimony. In support of this claim, he attaches a May 14, 1987,report from the Olympia Fields police department. This reportdescribes the reporting officer's meeting with Rogers. Rogersstated that he had two or three sexual encounters with Feinbergduring the past two months and three or four sexual encounterswith Feinberg during the past year. Defendant also attaches a pageof a May 17, 1987, Olympia Fields police department report whichrecounts that Wilson told the officer that Feinberg had just calledWilson and asked to speak to Rogers, who lived with Wilson.Feinberg wanted to know if Rogers had any cocaine.

Defendant argues that this alleged "homosexual and drug-related conduct went directly to the heart of the [voluntary]manslaughter defense, and it also served to impeach the State'switnesses." As we have discussed, defendant's theory of defenseat the Goodman trial was that he killed Goodman while actingunder a sudden and intense passion resulting from seriousprovocation, and therefore committed voluntary manslaughter. Thealleged provocation is that Goodman made a sexual advancetoward him. The number of sexual encounters between Rogers andFeinberg, and their involvement in possessing or using cocaine, isnot relevant to defendant's establishing a voluntary manslaughterdefense based on Goodman's alleged sexual overture to defendant.

Furthermore, even if Rogers and Wilson had been impeachedat trial with the evidence defendant cites, there is no reasonablelikelihood that their testimony could have affected the jury'sverdict. The testimony of Rogers and Wilson played a minor rolein the State's case, and, as this court stated on direct appeal in theGoodman case, the evidence of defendant's guilt wasoverwhelming. See People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 262 (1993). Inparticular, defendant confessed in detail to the crime, and aneyewitness saw defendant at Goodman's house shortly beforeGoodman disappeared. Thus, defendant has failed to make asubstantial showing of a constitutional violation in this regard.

III. Brady Violation

Defendant also contends that the State violated his right todue process by failing to disclose to the defense all exculpatoryevidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed.2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). Defendant argues that the Stateviolated the Brady rule by failing to disclose evidence regardingthe victim Goodman's past homosexual conduct and evidenceregarding defendant's involvement in cult activities.

To establish a Brady violation, the suppressed evidence mustbe both favorable to the accused and material. Favorable evidenceis material in this context " 'only if there is a reasonableprobability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " Peoplev. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 432-33 (1998), quoting United Statesv. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494, 105 S. Ct.3375, 3383 (1985). A " 'reasonable probability' " of a differentresult is a " 'probability sufficient to undermine confidence in theoutcome.' " Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 433, quoting Bagley, 473 U.S.at 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 494, 105 S. Ct. at 3383. To determinewhether evidence is material, a court must consider the cumulativeeffect of all suppressed evidence favorable to the defense. Hobley,182 Ill. 2d at 433, 435. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot escapeits duty under Brady by contending that the suppressed evidencewas known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutors.Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 433, citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,438, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 508-09, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1568 (1995).

The allegedly suppressed evidence to which defendant refersis the evidence of defendant's involvement in a cult, which wepreviously discussed in addressing defendant's claim that his trialcounsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence.Defendant also references allegedly suppressed evidence ofGoodman's "homosexual conduct and contacts with thedefendants." This is the evidence that we previously discussed inaddressing defendant's claims that trial counsel was ineffective forfailing to present sufficient evidence of a voluntary manslaughterdefense, and that the State failed to correct perjured testimony.

Defendant has failed to offer any argument as to how there isa reasonable probability that this allegedly suppressed evidencewould have changed the result of the proceedings. Moreover, ourresolution of defendant's other arguments which reference theallegedly suppressed evidence demonstrates that there is noreasonable probability that this evidence would have changed theresult of the proceedings. We therefore hold that defendant hasfailed to make a substantial showing of a Brady violation.

We also note that defendant offers no basis upon which toconclude that his trial counsel did not in fact possess these policereports. In this regard, however, defendant argues that the post-conviction trial court abused its discretion in denying his motionto depose trial counsel. We hold that the trial court did not abuseits discretion in denying defendant's motion to depose his trialcounsel. Because this allegedly suppressed evidence is notmaterial within the meaning of Brady, there is no need to inquireof defense counsel whether they possessed it.

IV. Death Penalty Instructions

Defendant argues that the instructions given to the jury at hissentencing hearings are confusing, misleading, and violate hisconstitutional rights. Defendant has waived this issue by failing toraise it on direct appeal. See People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 503(1998). Defendant, however, argues that this argument is notwaived because its evidentiary basis was de hors the trial record.See People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 372 (1996), overruledin part on other grounds, People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366(1998).

Defendant relies on the studies of Professor Hans Zeisel andProfessor Shari Diamond in arguing that we should remand thecause for an evidentiary hearing on the fairness of the instructions.Both the Zeisel and Diamond studies purported to test the abilityof potential jurors to comprehend certain Illinois death penaltyinstructions. The 1990 Zeisel study, which concluded that theinstructions resulted in misunderstanding and confusion, formedthe basis for a federal district court's holding that the death penaltyinstructions were constitutionally infirm. See United States ex rel.Free v. Peters, 806 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Ill. 1992). The Court ofAppeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the districtcourt's holding. United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700(7th Cir. 1993); see also Gacy v. Wellborn, 994 F.2d 305 (7th Cir.1993). This court has agreed that the Zeisel study does notestablish that the Illinois death penalty instructions areunconstitutional. See People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 93 (1998);People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 55-56 (1996).

Defendant, however, cites the study by Professor Diamond,which was conducted after the Zeisel study. The Diamond studywas designed to address two primary objections to the Zeiselstudy: (1) that the Zeisel study did not use a control group todetermine whether revised jury instructions would improveperformance and (2) that the Zeisel study did not take into accountjury deliberations. The results of the Diamond study confirmed theconclusion of the Zeisel study that the death penalty instructionswere confusing.

This court has already rejected the argument that the Diamondstudy provides a basis for invalidating the Illinois death penaltyinstructions. See People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 518-19 (1998);Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d at 93; People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 467-70 (1998); Brown, 172 Ill. 2d at 55-57. Specifically, in Brown, westated:

"[A]lthough the Diamond study claims to correct twodeficiencies in the Zeisel study, there still remain moregeneralized problems with the research. Perhaps the mostfundamental objection is the 'lack of comparabilitybetween the test setting and the sentencing hearing.' SeeFree, 12 F.3d at 705. There is no reason to suppose thatactual jurors who have sat through trial and a sentencinghearing would respond to the sentencing instructions inthe same way as the test subjects who simply listened toan audiotaped description of the evidence presented in thecase and an audiotape of the instructions, as was done inthe Diamond study." Brown, 172 Ill. 2d at 57.

We adhere to our prior holdings and hold that an evidentiaryhearing is not warranted on defendant's claim that the deathpenalty instructions are unconstitutional.

In this regard, defendant also argues that the post-convictiontrial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's request forproduction of the juror cards for the 12 jurors who sat at the guiltand sentencing proceedings in the Goodman case. Defendant seeksto locate and interview the jurors so that he may "support theclaim that the instructions used in the instant case were confusingor misled the jury."

This court in People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 467-70(1998), addressed a related issue. In Hobley, the defendantlikewise argued that the death penalty instructions areunconstitutional. In addition to citing the Zeisel and Diamondstudies, the defendant submitted affidavits from the jurors in hiscase. Some of the jurors stated that they found the instructions tobe confusing; that they felt obligated to impose the death penaltyas a result of their guilty verdict; and that they believed that thedefendant could be released on parole if they did not impose thedeath penalty. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 470. This court held that thisinformation pertains to the method, motive, or process by whichthe jurors reached their verdict and therefore, may not be used toimpeach the jury's verdict. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 470.

Accordingly, the information defendant seeks pursuant to hismotion for production of the juror cards may not be used tosupport his current argument. Thus, we hold that the trial court didnot abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request forproduction of the juror cards.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court ofCook County dismissing defendant's post-conviction petitionwithout an evidentiary hearing is affirmed. We direct the clerk ofthis court to enter an order setting Tuesday, November 14, 2000,as the date on which the sentence of death, entered by the circuitcourt of Cook County, shall be carried out. Defendant shall beexecuted in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West1998). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of themandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, the warden ofTamms Correctional Center, and the warden of the institutionwhere defendant is confined.

Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part anddissenting in part:

I agree that Page's convictions should not be disturbed. In myview, however, his sentence of death cannot be allowed to stand.For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partialdissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois deathpenalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to theUnited States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) andarticle I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.I,