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Docket No. 90390-Agenda 16-May 2001.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
LEWIS O'BRIEN, Appellee.

Opinion filed July 26, 2001.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

The issue presented in this appeal is whether section 3-707 ofthe Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-707 (West 1998)), whichprohibits the operation of an uninsured motor vehicle, is anabsolute liability offense. We hold that it is.

BACKGROUND

Defendant, Lewis O'Brien, was charged by traffic citationwith violating section 3-707 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (theCode). Section 3-707 provides, in relevant part:

"No person shall operate a motor vehicle unless themotor vehicle is covered by a liability insurance policy inaccordance with Section 7-601 of this Code.

Any person who fails to comply with a request by a lawenforcement officer for display of evidence of insurance,as required under Section 7-602 of this Code, shall bedeemed to be operating an uninsured motor vehicle.

Any operator of a motor vehicle subject to registrationunder this Code who is convicted of violating this Sectionis guilty of a business offense and shall be required to paya fine in excess of $500, but not more than $1,000.However, no person charged with violating this Sectionshall be convicted if such person produces in courtsatisfactory evidence that at the time of the arrest themotor vehicle was covered by a liability insurance policyin accordance with Section 7-601 of this Code." 625ILCS 5/3-707 (West 1998).

The sole witness at defendant's bench trial was OfficerStephen Mechling of the University of Illinois police department.Officer Mechling testified that, on June 10, 1999, he stoppeddefendant's vehicle because the license plate registration stickeron that vehicle had expired. Defendant explained that he hadborrowed the car and therefore did not know that the sticker hadexpired. Officer Mechling then asked defendant whether thevehicle was insured, and defendant stated that he did not know.When defendant was unable to produce proof that the car wasinsured, Officer Mechling issued defendant a citation for operatingan uninsured motor vehicle.

Defendant moved for a directed verdict. In that motion,defendant conceded that, if section 3-707 is an absolute liabilityoffense, the State had established a prima facie case. Defendantargued, however, that section 3-707 is not an absolute liabilityoffense but instead requires proof of a culpable mental state.According to defendant, because the State failed to prove thatdefendant either knew or should have known that the borrowedvehicle was uninsured, the State failed to prove defendant guiltyof violating section 3-707. The trial court denied defendant'smotion, holding that section 3-707 is an absolute liability offense.When no additional evidence was presented, the trial court founddefendant guilty and imposed a fine of $501 plus court costs.

Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed hisconviction (316 Ill. App. 3d 219). In doing so, the appellate courtheld that neither the plain language of nor the public policyunderlying section 3-707 justifies the imposition of absoluteliability. 316 Ill. App. 3d at 222-24. We allowed the State'spetition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

The issue in this case is whether section 3-707 creates anabsolute liability offense. When construing a statute, this court'sprimary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature'sintent. Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill. 2d 230,237 (1996). We begin with the language of the statute, which mustbe given its plain and ordinary meaning. Davis v. ToshibaMachine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184 (1999). Where thelanguage is clear and unambiguous, we will apply the statutewithout resort to further aids of statutory construction. Davis, 186Ill. 2d at 185. One of the fundamental principles of statutoryconstruction is to view all provisions of an enactment as a whole.Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d493, 504 (2000). Words and phrases should not be construed inisolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevantprovisions of the statute. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill.2d at 504. The standard of review on questions of statutoryinterpretation is de novo. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill.2d at 503.

Turning to section 3-707, we begin our analysis with theguidelines set forth by the legislature in section 4-9 of theCriminal Code of 1961 (the Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/4-9(West 1998)). Section 4-9 states:

"A person may be guilty of an offense without having,as to each element thereof, one of the mental statesdescribed in Sections 4-4 through 4-7 if the offense is amisdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration orby a fine exceeding $500, or the statute defining theoffense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to imposeabsolute liability for the conduct described." 720 ILCS5/4-9 (West 1998).

This section applies to all criminal penalty provisions, includingthose outside the Criminal Code of 1961. People v. Gean, 143 Ill.2d 281, 285 (1991).

As we noted in Gean, the committee comments to section 4-9reveal that the legislature intended to limit the scope of absoluteliability. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d at 285-86. Those comments read, inrelevant part:

"This section is intended to establish, as an expressionof general legislative intent, rather strict limitations uponthe interpretation that mental state is not an element of anoffense, although the express language of the provisiondefining the offense fails to describe such an element. ***

* * *

In addition to permitting a construction requiringabsolute liability in offenses punishable by incarcerationor by a fine of not more than $500, the second part ofsection 4-9 expresses the policy that in other offenses notincluding a mental state in the definition only a clearlyindicated legislative intent to create absolute liabilityshould be recognized, and in all other instances, amental-state requirement should be implied as anapplication of the general rule that an offense consists ofan act accompanied by a culpable mental state ***." 720ILCS Ann. 5/4-9, Committee Comments-1961, at 169-72(Smith-Hurd 1993).

Consistent with the committee comments,"[a]bsent either a clearindication that the legislature intended to impose absolute liabilityor an important public policy favoring it, this court has beenunwilling to interpret a statute as creating an absolute liabilityoffense." People v. Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d 113, 120 (1989). Instead, ifat all possible, the court will infer the existence of a culpablemental state, even where the statute itself appears to imposeabsolute liability. See, e.g., People v. Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d 397, 401(1992); Gean, 143 Ill. 2d at 288; Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d at 123; Peoplev. Nunn, 77 Ill. 2d 243, 252 (1979).

The parties agree that, on its face, section 3-707 does notrequire a culpable mental state. Likewise, the parties agree that aviolation of section 3-707 is punishable by a fine exceeding $500.The critical question therefore is whether section 3-707 "clearlyindicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for theconduct described." 720 ILCS 5/4-9 (West 1998). We hold that itdoes.

The legislature's clear intent to impose absolute liability canbe gleaned from several sources. First, and most importantly, theplain language of section 3-707 unquestionably provides forabsolute liability. Indeed, the language could not be clearer: "Noperson shall operate a motor vehicle unless the motor vehicle iscovered by a liability insurance policy in accordance with Section7-601 of this Code" (emphasis added) (625 ILCS 5/3-707 (West1998)). Section 7-601, in turn, provides that "[n]o person shalloperate *** a motor vehicle designed to be used on a publichighway unless the motor vehicle is covered by a liabilityinsurance policy." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/7-601 (West1998). Neither statute makes any exception for any class ofoperators, and both statutes employ the word "shall," which thiscourt has construed as a clear expression of legislative intent toimpose a mandatory obligation. See, e.g., Village of Winfield v.Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 176 Ill. 2d 54, 64 (1997);People v. Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d 207, 222 (1996). In Thomas, forexample, this court specifically held that the use of the word"shall," in the absence of any statutory exceptions, "expresse[d]a clear legislative intent" to make Class X sentencing mandatoryfor certain repeat offenders. (Emphasis added.) Thomas, 171 Ill. 2dat 222.

Second, the relatively minor penalty that attaches to aviolation of section 3-707 weighs heavily in favor of a legislativepurpose to impose absolute liability. As we observed in Gean:

"The possible punishment which can be imposed for aviolation of a statute is an important factor in determiningwhether it is an absolute liability offense. [Citations.] 'Itwould be unthinkable to subject a person to a long term ofimprisonment for an offense he might commitunknowingly.' [Citation.] Therefore, 'where thepunishment is great, it is less likely that the legislatureintended to create an absolute liability offense.'[Citations.]" Gean, 143 Ill. 2d at 287.

In this case, defendant was never facing either great punishmentor "a long term of imprisonment." On the contrary, the crimeestablished by section 3-707 is a "business offense," which bydefinition is not punishable by incarceration. See 730 ILCS5/5-5-1(d), 5-5-2(c), 5-5-3(c)(5) (West 1998). Moreover, thepenalty for violating section 3-707 (a $501 to $1,000 fine) onlyslightly exceeds the $500 statutory maximum for per se absoluteliability offenses. See 720 ILCS 5/4-9 (West 1998). Gean teachesthat, where the penalty is severe, the likelihood of a legislativeintent to impose absolute liability is reduced. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d at287. The converse also is true. Where, as here, the penalty is notsevere, the likelihood of a legislative intent to impose absoluteliability is enhanced.

Finally, we can discern a clear legislative purpose to imposeabsolute liability by reading section 3-707 in the context of relatedprovisions of the Code. On this point, the analysis set forth in Inre K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542 (1999), is instructive. In K.C., this courtwas asked to decide whether sections 4-102(a)(1) and 4-102(a)(2)of the Code (625 ILCS 4-102(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998)) areabsolute liability offenses. In holding that they are, this courtcompared section 4-102(a)(2) with section 21-2 of the CriminalCode (720 ILCS 5/21-2 (West 1998)). Both statutes punish theunlawful trespass to a vehicle, but section 21-2 contains aculpable mental state while section 4-102(a)(2) does not. Inholding that the absence of a culpable mental state in section4-102(a)(2) was evidence of the legislature's intent to imposeabsolute liability, we noted that "by employing certain language inone instance and wholly different language in another, thelegislature indicates that different results were intended." K.C.,186 Ill. 2d at 549-50. We further noted that, "were we to hold thatsection 4-102 implicitly requires proof of a culpable mental state,the 'knowingly' language of section 21-2 would be rendered'meaningless surplusage.' " K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 550. Accordingly,this court declined to adopt such a reading. K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at550.

Turning now to section 3-707, we find that chapter 3, articleVII, of the Code is replete with penal statutes containing aculpable mental state. For example, section 3-701(1) provides that"no person shall operate, nor shall an owner knowingly permit tobe operated" a vehicle that lacks proper evidence of registration.(Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/3-701(1) (West 1998). Likewise,section 3-702(a)(1) provides that "[n]o person shall operate, norshall an owner knowingly permit to be operated" a vehicle forwhich the registration has been cancelled, suspended, or revoked.(Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/3-702(a)(1) (West 1998). Section3-702(b) provides that "[n]o person shall use, nor shall any owneruse or knowingly permit the use of" any vehicle registration thathas been cancelled, suspended, or revoked. (Emphasis added.) 625ILCS 5/3-702(b) (West 1998). Section 3-703 provides that "[n]operson shall *** knowingly permit the use of any [evidence ofvehicle registration] by one not entitled thereto." (Emphasisadded.) 625 ILCS 5/3-703 (West 1998). Finally, section 3-710provides that "[n]o person shall display evidence of insurance toa law enforcement officer, court, or officer of the court, knowingthere is no valid insurance in effect on the motor vehicle ***."(Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/3-710 (West 1998).

In accordance with K.C., we must presume that, byspecifically including a culpable mental state in the numerousstatutes identified above, the legislature's omission of a culpablemental state in section 3-707 "indicates that different results wereintended." See K.C., 186 Ill. 2d at 550. Moreover, were we to holdthat section 3-707 implicitly requires proof of a culpable mentalstate, the specific knowledge requirements of sections 3-701,3-702(a)(1), 3-702(b), 3-703, and 3-710 would be rendered"meaningless surplusage." As in K.C., we will not adopt such areading.

CONCLUSION

In sum, we hold that, both on its face and in the context ofrelated provisions of the Code, the plain language of section 3-707clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability.We therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate court andaffirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE McMORROW, specially concurring:

At a bench trial, the State introduced evidence establishingthat defendant, during a traffic stop, was unable to producedocumentation to show that the borrowed vehicle he was drivingwas insured. For this reason, defendant was charged with violatingsection 3-707 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-707(West 2000)) for operating an uninsured motor vehicle. Defendantpresented no evidence in his defense. Instead, he sought a directedverdict, arguing that the State had not proved a culpable mentalstate and, therefore, had not proved him guilty beyond areasonable doubt. The trial court found defendant guilty, but theappellate court reversed and held that, "To show a violation ofsection 3-707 of the Code, the prosecution must prove that theaccused knew that the vehicle he was driving was uninsured." 316Ill. App. 3d at 224.

In reversing the appellate court decision, this court todayholds that section 3-707 of the Code is an absolute liabilityoffense. While I agree with this result, I write separately becausemy conclusion is drawn from considerations other than thoserelied on by the majority.

There is no dispute that section 3-707 contains no mens reaand thus the statute, on its face, imposes absolute liability. It isalso agreed, however, that pursuant to section 4-9 of the CriminalCode of 1961, even when express language regarding mental stateis lacking, absolute liability may not be presumed unless: (1) theoffense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarcerationor a fine exceeding $500, or (2) the legislative intent to imposeabsolute liability is clear. See 720 ILCS 5/4-9 (West 2000).Because a violation of section 3-707 is punishable by a finegreater than $500, the majority concedes that the existence of aculpable mental state should be inferred unless there is a clearindication that the legislature intended to impose absolute liability.See People v.; Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d 15 (1992); People v. Sevilla,132 Ill. 2d 113, 120 (1989).

The majority attempts to discern legislative intent by focusingon the word "shall" in the provision, "No person shall operate amotor vehicle ***". (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/3-707 (West1998). The majority finds the word shall to be "a clear expressionof legislative intent to impose a mandatory obligation." Slip op. at4-5. But this observation is not particularly relevant. There is noquestion that the legislature intended to impose a mandatoryobligation to insure motor vehicles. We know that insurance ismandatory pursuant to section 7-601 of the Code (625 ILCS5/7-601 (West 1998)). The question to be resolved in this appeal,however, is whether a violation of this mandatory obligation, to beproved, must be accompanied by evidence of a culpable mentalstate. In other words, the question in this appeal is whether thelegislature intended that the State, in order to convict someone foroperating an uninsured vehicle, must prove that the driver hadknowledge that the vehicle was uninsured. Focusing on the word"shall" in the provision fails to resolve the issue.

I believe that a legislative intent to impose absolute liabilityis discernable from the legislative scheme created in section3-707. When viewing the statute in its entirety, as we must (Statev. Mikusch, 138 Ill. 2d 242, 247 (1990) (in seeking to ascertainlegislative intent, courts should consider the statute in its entirety,noting the subject being addressed and the legislature's apparentobjective in enacting the statute)), a statutory scheme is revealed,which makes clear that the legislature's omission of a mens rearequirement was not an oversight.

Section 3-707, in addition to barring all persons fromoperating uninsured motor vehicles, states:

"Any person who fails to comply with a request by alaw enforcement officer for display of evidence ofinsurance, as required by Section 7-602 of this Code,shall be deemed to be operating an uninsured motorvehicle.

*** However, no person charged with violating thisSection shall be convicted if such person produces incourt satisfactory evidence that at the time of the arrest themotor vehicle was covered by a liability insurance policyin accordance with Section 7-601 of this Code." 625ILCS 5/3-707 (West 2000).

This places all operators of motor vehicles on notice that theymust have proof of insurance readily available. By including thisrequirement, and by creating the rebuttable presumption that thevehicle is uninsured if the driver is unable to produce evidence ofinsurance, the legislature has equated the failure to possess aninsurance card with knowledge that the motor vehicle is uninsured.Clearly, the onus is placed on the person operating the motorvehicle to ascertain the insured status of the vehicle, as evidencedby the insurance card, prior to operating a vehicle on the roads ofthis state.

I also find it significant that the presumption of a violation,created by the inability to produce evidence of insurance ondemand, can be rebutted only by satisfactory proof in a court oflaw, that the motor vehicle was actually covered by a liabilityinsurance policy at the time the violation was charged. Byproviding one means of avoiding liability, it may be inferred thatthe legislature intended to exclude all others. See State v. Mikusch,138 Ill. 2d 242 (1990). Unknowing or unintentional violations arenot recognized or acceptable excuses. Thus, the scheme created bythe legislature in section 3-707 reinforces the notion that theomission of a mens rea requirement was not inadvertent and thatthe operation of an uninsured motor vehicle was intended to be anabsolute liability offense.

In addition to the statutory scheme, I find public policysupport for the conclusion that section 3-707 was intended to bean absolute liability offense, something the majority fails toaddress. As we have noted in the past, when a statute does notexpressly state whether absolute liability will or will not apply, itis appropriate to look to sources beyond the statutory language toascertain the intent of the legislature and decide whether thestatute indicates a clear legislative purpose to impose absoluteliability. See Sevilla, 132 Ill. 2d at 118-19. Factors to beconsidered are "the reason and necessity for the law, the evilssought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved." Stewartv. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Ill. 2d 337, 341 (1987).

Section 3-707 is the penalty provision for violation of themandatory insurance provisions of the Code. See 625 ILCS5/7-601, 7-602 (West 2000). The purpose to be achieved, then, isenforcement of the mandatory insurance requirement, which wasinstituted for the protection of the public (see State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 285Ill. App. 3d 115, 120-21 (1996)), and to promote public safety andfinancial responsibility (see 625 ILCS 5/7-100 through 7-708(West 2000) ("Illinois Safety and Family Financial ResponsibilityLaw")). In the legislature's words, "the State has a compellinginterest in ensuring that drivers *** demonstrate financialresponsibility, including family financial responsibility, *** inorder to safely own and operate a motor vehicle." See 625 ILCS5/7-701 (West 2000). Thus, the legislature, in its wisdom, hasdetermined that important public interests are served byeliminating uninsured vehicles from the roads of this state. Itmakes sense, then, that they should place an absolute obligation onthe operators, who are directly responsible for placing a motorvehicle on the road, to ascertain the insured status of the motorvehicle or suffer the consequences. Thus, section 3-707, whichdefines the penalty for a violation of the mandatory insurancerequirements set forth in sections 7-601 of the Code, isappropriately read as imposing absolute liability and expressingthe public policy of Illinois.

It is for these reasons that I would reverse the appellate courtdecision and find that the defendant was properly convicted of aviolation of section 3-707 of the Code.