Find Legal Information

Nos. 97231, 97272, 97816 cons.-Agenda 10-September 2004.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
ROBERT E. NORRIS et al., Appellants.-THE VILLAGE OF
FRANKFORT, Appellant, v. RUSSELL JOHNSON et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed January 21, 2005.
 

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Each of the defendants in these consolidated appeals was chargedwith Class A misdemeanor traffic offenses. The State sought to nol-pros the charges, which the circuit court of Will County allowed. TheState later refiled the charges against each defendant. Each defendantmoved to dismiss the new charges, citing Supreme Court Rule 505(166 Ill. 2d R. 505). In each case, the motion was granted, and anappeal followed. In People v. Norris, Nos. 3-02-0841, 3-02-0842,3-02-0843, 3-02-0844, 3-02-0845, 3-02-0846, 3-02-0847,3-02-0848, 3-02-0849, 3-02-0850, 3-02-0851, 3-02-0852,3-02-0853, 3-02-0854, 3-02-0863, 3-02-0964, 3-02-0966,3-02-0967, 3-02-0968, 3-02-0969 cons. (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23), the appellate court reversed the dismissals.In Village of Frankfort v. Johnson, Nos. 3-02-0173, 3-02-0174,3-02-0175, 3-02-0176, 3-02-0177, 3-02-0178 cons. (unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23), the appellate court affirmed thedismissals. We granted leave to appeal in both cases (177 Ill. 2d R.315(a)) and ordered the causes to be consolidated.

BACKGROUND

People v. Norris, Nos. 97231, 97816 cons.

In appeal Nos. 97231, 97816 cons., defendant Robert Norris and18 other defendants were each charged by uniform traffic citation witheither driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(West 2000)) or driving while their licenses were suspended orrevoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303 (West 2000)). None of the defendantsfiled a written notice of either an intention to plead not guilty or torequest a jury trial, but each indicated at his initial appearances that hewanted a jury trial. The causes were continued for various pretrialproceedings. Thereafter, each defendant appeared on the date set fortrial, only to have the State nol-pros the charges because the officerwho issued the citation failed to appear. In four of the cases, thearresting officer had failed to appear on a prior occasion, and thecircuit court had, at that time, granted the State a continuance. In theother cases, the officer failed to appear at the first scheduled trial date.After the State obtained its nolle prosequi on the initial charges, theState subsequently recharged each defendant by information with thesame offense or offenses. Each defendant then filed a motion todismiss the new charges on the basis of Supreme Court Rule 505 (166Ill. 2d R. 505), which the circuit court granted.

A divided appellate court reversed, holding that Rule 505,standing alone, does not explicitly require a trial on the merits at adefendant's first appearance. The court noted that while SupremeCourt Rule 504 (166 Ill. 2d R. 504) requires a trial on the merits ondefendant's first appearance, it does not mean that Rule 505 also sorequires. The court further held that there was no justification forgrafting the requirements of Rule 504 onto Rule 505.

Justice Holdridge specially concurred to point out that, inaddition to reasons articulated in the majority opinion for finding Rule505 inapplicable in this case, the right to counsel implicated by amisdemeanor charge "necessitates a pre-trial procedure different fromthat provided by Rule 505."

Justice Lytton filed a single-sentence dissent "on the basis ofJustice McDade's analysis in her majority opinion in Village ofFrankfort v. Johnson, 3-02-0173 (cons. w/ 174, 175, 176, 177, and178) (2003)."

Village of Frankfort v. Johnson, No. 97272

In appeal No. 97272, the Village of Frankfort (Village) chargeddefendants Russell Johnson and Hall Hanes by uniform citation andcomplaint with various traffic violations. Each defendant appeared athis first scheduled court appearance and entered a plea of not guilty.Each defendant also demanded a jury trial. The circuit court entereda number of continuances for pretrial petitions and proceedings. Ineach case, a trial date of May 15, 2001, was set.

Before the date the trials were to begin, the Village soughtcontinuances because the arresting officers in the cases wereunavailable to testify. The circuit court denied the requests, and on thedate of the trials, the Village sought to nol-pros the charges againsteach defendant, which the court allowed. Subsequently, the Villagefiled a new information against each defendant, alleging the sameoffenses. The defendants moved to dismiss the charges on the basisthat the Village was barred by Rule 505 from reinstating the charges.The circuit court granted the motions.

A divided appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The court heldthat dismissal under these circumstances was proper because it "servesthe essential purpose of Rule 505." The court interpreted Rule 505 asprotecting defendants in traffic cases from multiple court appearancesby ensuring a trial either at the first appearance or a reasonable timethereafter. The court noted that the plain language of the rule does not"clearly rule out a trial on the first appearance date. The defendantwho fails to give prior notice to the clerk may waive his or her rightto trial at that time, but the court is still given discretion by rule toproceed with trial at the first appearance." (Emphases in original.) Thecourt acknowledged that Rule 505 was not "a model of clarity"despite various amendments, but insisted the Village's interpretationwas not supported by "either the letter or the spirit of Rule 505."

Justice Slater dissented. In his view, Rule 505 did not grant adefendant the right to a decision on the merits on the first trial date.Justice Slater noted that the court had improperly grafted languagefrom Rule 504 onto Rule 505.

ANALYSIS

The Village and the State (jointly, the State) argue that Rules 504and 505 (166 Ill. 2d Rs. 504, 505) are inapplicable in these casesbecause the defendants were not charged with petty or businessoffenses, as opposed to misdemeanor, traffic offenses. Defendantscounter that the rules are applicable insofar as they were charged withtraffic offenses by use of a uniform traffic citation. Not surprisingly,defendants urge that the appellate court in Frankfort correctlyinterpreted Rule 505 while the State maintains that the appellatecourt's analysis in Norris is more correct.

Our rules are to be construed in the same manner as statutes (134Ill. 2d R. 2; People v. Fitzgibbbon, 184 Ill. 2d 320, 328 (1998); seealso Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 48 (2004)(setting out rules of construction)), and our review is de novo (Peoplev. Drum, 194 Ill. 2d 485, 488 (2000)).

We note, at the outset of our discussion, that Rules 504 and 505have been amended several times since their 1968 effective date, withthe latest amendment occurring in May 1995. In light of the numerousamendments to the rules, we agree with both panels of the appellatecourt that past decisions addressing previous versions of these rulesprovide very little guidance in addressing the issue before the court.

Rule 504 applies to all traffic offenses defined by Supreme CourtRule 501.⁽¹⁾ Rule 505 applies only to Rule 501 traffic offenses that arecharged by a "Uniform Citation and Complaint," a conservationcomplaint or a "Notice to Appear" in lieu of either. Rule 504, entitled"Appearance Date," provides:

"The date set by the arresting officer or the clerk of thecircuit court for an accused's first appearance in court shallnot be less than 14 days but within 60 days after the date ofthe arrest, whenever practicable. It is the policy of this courtthat, if the arresting agency has been exempted from therequirements of Rule 505, an accused who appears andpleads 'not guilty' to an alleged traffic or conservationoffense punishable by fine only should be granted a trial onthe merits on the appearance date or, if the accused demandsa trial by jury, within a reasonable time thereafter. A failureto appear on the first appearance date by an arresting officershall, in and of itself, not normally be considered good causefor a continuance." 166 Ill. 2d R. 504.

Rule 505, entitled "Notice to Accused," provides:

"When issuing a Uniform Citation and Complaint, aconservation complaint or a Notice to Appear in lieu ofeither, the officer shall also issue a written notice to theaccused in substantially the following form:

AVOID MULTIPLE COURT APPEARANCES

If you intend to plead 'not guilty' to this charge, or if,in addition, you intend to demand a trial by jury, so notifythe clerk of the court at least 10 days (excludingSaturdays, Sundays or holidays) before the day set foryour appearance. A new appearance date will be set, andarrangements will be made to have the arresting officerpresent on that new date. Failure to notify the clerk ofeither your intention to plead 'not guilty' or your intentionto demand a jury trial may result in your having to returnto court, if you plead 'not guilty' on the date originally setfor your court appearance.

Upon timely receipt of notice that the accused intends toplead 'not guilty,' the clerk shall set a new appearance datenot less than 7 days nor more than 60 days after the originalappearance date set by the arresting officer or the clerk of thecircuit court, and notify all parties of the new date and thetime for appearance. If the accused demands a trial by jury,the trial shall be scheduled within a reasonable period. Inorder to invoke the right to a speedy trial, the accused if notin custody must file an appropriate, separate demand, asprovided in section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedureof 1963, as amended (725 ILCS 5/103-5). The properprosecuting attorney shall be served with such separatewritten demand for speedy trial. If the accused fails to notifythe clerk as provided above, the arresting officer's failure toappear on the date originally set for appearance may beconsidered good cause for a continuance. Any state agencyor any unit of local government desiring to be exempt fromthe requirements of this Rule 505 may apply to theConference of Chief Circuit Judges for an exemption." 166Ill. 2d R. 505.⁽²⁾

Rule 504 requires "the arresting officer" or "the clerk of thecircuit court" to set a first appearance date "not less than 14 days butwithin 60 days" after the ticket is issued. With respect to trials, therule encourages, in stating as policy only, that an accused pleading"not guilty" should receive a trial on that first appearance date in somesituations. The rule conditions the policy on two factors: (i) that theoffense be one punishable by a fine only, and (ii) that the "arrestingagency" be exempt from Rule 505.

Rule 505 addresses setting an appearance date different from thatinitially required under Rule 504. By its terms, Rule 505 operates inthree mutually exclusive situations: (i) cases, such as those involvedhere, that are initiated upon "Uniform Citations[s] and Complaint[s],"⁽³⁾(ii) cases initiated upon "conservation complaint[s]," and (iii) casesinitiated upon "Notice[s] to Appear in lieu of either" uniform citationsor conservation complaints. In these three situations, defendants whointend to plead "not guilty," or in addition "intend to demand a jurytrial," are directed to so notify the clerk of the court at least 10 daysbefore the appearance date initially set under Rule 504. Upon receiptof such notice, Rule 505 directs the clerk to set a new date "not lessthan 7 days nor more than 60 days" after the original date set requiredby Rule 504 and to notify all parties of the new date and time. TheRule further provides that if a defendant "fails to notify the clerk asprovided *** the arresting officer's failure to appear on the dateoriginally set for appearance "may be considered good cause for acontinuance."

Rule 505 has dual goals. As the committee comments to the rulemake clear, it was drafted so as to accommodate "the uniquesituation" of "statewide jurisdiction" by the Illinois State Police. ILCSAnn. R. 505, Committee Comments, at 518 (Smith-Hurd 2004). Therule also reflects a policy, as acknowledged by this court, of"provid[ing] a defendant with an early hearing on the merits of histraffic offense and to avoid multiple court appearances, whicheliminates undue hardship on the accused, law enforcement agenciesand the courts." People v. Williams, 158 Ill. 2d 62, 68 (1994).

With respect to trials, Rule 505 requires that if a defendantdemands a jury trial, "the trial shall be scheduled within a reasonableperiod." The rule also references the speedy-trial provisions containedin the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West2000)) and requires a defendant who seeks to invoke the right to aspeedy trial to file an appropriate separate demand. Rule 505 does notchange a traffic defendant's right to have a jury trial commencedwithin the time frames provided in the statute. See 725 ILCS 5/103-5(West 2000).⁽⁴⁾

Both panels of the appellate court in these cases focused onwhether Rule 505 grants defendants the right to a trial on the meritson the first trial date set by the court. As we have explained, however,Rule 505 does not speak in such terms. Rule 505 merely provides theprocedure by which traffic defendants can schedule alternative firstappearance dates. If that procedure is not followed, a defendant maybe subjected to multiple appearances. As for trials by jury, the ruledirects that such trials shall be scheduled within a reasonable periodof time. The scheduling of the jury trial itself is a matter left to thediscretion of the trial judge. The rule provides that this discretion maybe limited by the choice of a defendant who files a speedy-trialdemand, which means that the State must bring him or her to trialwithin 120 days if the defendant is in custody or within 160 days if thedefendant is not in custody.

In addressing one of the motions to dismiss filed in this case, thecircuit court entered a written decision in which it stated thefollowing:

"Although Rule 505 does not contain the disposition on themerits language contained in Rule 504, an interpretation ofthe rule which made the requirement defendant receive a jurytrial within a reasonable period of time directory rather thanmandatory would nullify the rule. *** The reasonablestandard allows trial judges in the various circuits to deal withthe logistical problems created by a jury demand. *** Thereasonable period also allows the trial judge to take intoaccount problems unique to a particular case. But theexercise of discretion must always take place within thestated purpose of the rule: to avoid multiple courtappearances and to afford the defendant a trial at the earliestreasonable date. Once that date is set, unless the case iscontinued by the court for good cause, the defendant isentitled to his trial or a dismissal of the case and anysubsequent refiling of the case."⁽⁵⁾

In the cases involved here, the trial dates were pushed back due toextensive pretrial litigation, resulting in the defendants having had toappear multiple times in court. This is not unusual, particularly in DUIcases. It is also not unusual for DUI trials to be complex, oftentimesrequiring more than the testimony of a single eyewitness. In suchcases, it is common to have witnesses testify as to chemical tests,toxicology reports, and medical examinations. Thus, while our policymay be one of avoiding multiple appearances for defendants, thecomplexity of a case may render that goal unattainable in a practicalsense. It is important to keep in mind that Rules 504 and 505 concernthe setting of first appearance dates and can, in some, but not all,cases be used to accommodate the granting of a trial on that firstappearance date. But, we must stress that nowhere in either Rule 504or Rule 505 is a trial on the merits absolutely guaranteed on the firstappearance date. Even the language contained in Rule 504 thataddresses the more routine, fine-only offenses is couched in terms of"should" as opposed to "shall," thereby connoting something less thanan absolute mandatory obligation. Rule 504 further provides that anarresting officer's failure to appear on the first appearance date shallnot "normally" be considered good cause for a continuance. The word"normally" conditions the "shall not" phrase, thereby indicating that,in some cases, such a failure to appear may, in fact, be consideredgood cause for a continuance. Thus, it is entirely possible under Rule504 that, in some circumstances, a trial judge may deem an officer'sfailure to appear on the first appearance as good cause for acontinuance in even the routine, fine-only offenses. Of course, in sucha case, it would then be impossible for the defendant to receive a trialon the merits on the first appearance date under Rule 504. The use ofsuch conditional language, as opposed to more absolute expressionsof intent, reinforces the notion that what is being set in Rule 504 and505 is the mere "policy" of this court and not an inexorable command.Both rules allow for the trial judge to have complete discretion overwhat should occur in a particular case. Therefore, we believe that if,as Rule 504 explicitly provides, the trial judge may deem an officer'sfailure to appear on the first appearance date set for fine-only cases asgood cause for a continuance, then likewise the same discretion mustbe afforded to trial judges in the more severe cases such as the ClassA misdemeanors involved here.

The record does not reveal, in all of the cases, what reasons wereoffered by the State in the motion to continue and under whatcircumstances the trial judges denied the motions.⁽⁶⁾ To the extent thatany of the continuance motions were denied solely because the judgesfelt they did not have the discretion to do anything else, we hold thatsuch a decision was erroneous. Rule 505 in no way so limits a trialjudge's discretion.

Once the trial judges denied the State's motions for continuancesin these cases, the State moved to nol-pros the charges against eachdefendant and, subsequently, refiled the new charges against eachdefendant. Defendants moved to dismiss the new charges on the basisof Rule 505. Having explained the function of Rule 505, we believethe relevant issue in this case is not whether Rule 505 bars the refiling,but whether the State had the right to refile the charges under thesecircumstances.

A nolle prosequi is the formal entry of record by the prosecutingattorney which denotes that he or she is unwilling to prosecute a case.21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law