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Docket No. 91053-Agenda 15-November 2001.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. MICHAEL MAYO, Appellee.

Opinion filed January 25, 2002.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

After a trial held in the circuit court of Cook County, a juryfound defendant, Michael Mayo, guilty of two counts ofaggravated criminal sexual assault. 720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(2) (West1998). Defendant received a sentence of two consecutive eight-year terms. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the convictions,holding that the State violated the speedy-trial provisions of theCode of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West1998)). No. 1-99-2034 (unpublished order under Supreme CourtRule 23). We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was arrested on February 3, 1998, andsubsequently charged with two counts of aggravated criminalsexual assault and two counts of criminal sexual assault. Afterdefendant's arrest, he remained in custody and was never releasedon bond. On March 11, 1998, the trial court appointed a publicdefender to represent defendant. The public defender entered anot-guilty plea on defendant's behalf.

On July 1, 1998, defendant, through his public defender,expressed his wish to demand trial and proceed pro se. Afteradmonishing defendant of his rights, warning him of the perils ofself-representation, and asking defendant a few general questions,the trial court allowed the public defender to withdraw andcontinued the case to July 9, 1998, on defendant's motion so thatdefendant could answer the State's discovery motion.

On July 9, 1998, defendant appeared in court without ananswer to the State's discovery motion. Defendant stated that heneeded some help and told the court and public defender that hecould not represent himself. Based upon this representation, thetrial court reappointed the public defender.

After a few status dates, defendant appeared in court onNovember 30, 1998, with a different public defender. Defendanttold the court that he wanted trial to be set. The public defenderresponded that if defendant wanted to demand trial, he could trythe case himself. The trial court asked defendant if he wanted torepresent himself or have an attorney. Defendant stated that hewanted an attorney. However, after some discussion between thepublic defender and State's Attorney as to a continuance date ofDecember 21, 1998, defendant interjected and the followingexchange occurred:

"[Defendant]: I would like to take back my-I'm readyat this time. I don't need her [public defender] help. Sheis not helping me.

[Public Defender]: I just got on the case. I'd like therecord to reflect I got on the case two weeks ago andspoken to his wife.

[The Court]: Be back on December 21st. If you stillwant to represent yourself we'll go back at that time andyou'll go to trial by yourself. I don't suggest it because Ithink it's-

[Defendant]: The only reason I suggested that thiswoman talked to my wife, she gave the impression thatshe is not working on my behalf. She told my wife shealready finds no reason to be here. What is she doing forme if she is telling my wife that she shouldn't be here onmy behalf?

[Public Defender]: I didn't tell her that.

[Defendant]: Ask my wife right there.

[Public Defender]: I don't want to get in the middle ofthis. If you want to get a private attorney or do thisyourself you can.

[Assistant State's Attorney]: That's by agreement?

[Public Defender]: Yes."

Defendant appeared in court on December 21, 1998, with adifferent public defender than the one he had on November 30,1998. Defendant informed the court that he wanted to go to trialand represent himself. The trial court did not dismiss the publicdefender. The court stated that it was going to hold the case overuntil December 23, 1998, so that defendant could discussrepresenting himself with the public defender that represented himon November 30, 1998, and that if he continued in his wish torepresent himself at that time, he could do so then. Defendantagain stated that he had made his decision and that he wanted torepresent himself. The trial court still held the matter over untilDecember 23, 1998. The State's Attorney asked if defendant wasgoing to answer its discovery motion to which the trial courtresponded, "he will or he's not calling any witnesses."

On December 23, 1998, defendant again demanded trial,stating his wish to represent himself, and that he had no additionalwitnesses to present. The trial court asked defendant if heremembered his admonishments from the other day and defendantresponded that he did. The trial court then dismissed the publicdefender and defendant thereafter proceeded pro se.

On February 18, 1999, defendant moved to dismiss thecharges on speedy-trial grounds. The court denied the motion onMarch 29, 1999.

On April 12, 1999, the court granted the State's dismissal ofthe two counts of criminal sexual assault and the trial commenced.The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of aggravatedcriminal sexual assault. The court sentenced defendant to eightyears' imprisonment for each count of aggravated criminal sexualassault, to run consecutively.

The court denied defendant's post-trial motion for a new trial.On appeal, defendant argued that his convictions should bereversed because the "speedy trial act was violated, that he wasdenied a fair trial, that the jury heard inadmissable testimony, andthat the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision of Section5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS5/5-8-4(a)) (West 1998) violates his right to due process and trialby jury." No. 1-99-2034 (unpublished order under Supreme CourtRule 23). The appellate court reversed defendant's convictions,finding that the speedy-trial act was violated when the trial courtabused its discretion by attributing a 21-day delay to defendant.We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal and we nowreverse and remand.

ANALYSIS

It is well known in Illinois that a defendant possesses bothconstitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial. U.S. Const.,amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,