People v. Malchow

Case Date: 12/31/1969
Court: Supreme Court
Docket No: 88228 Rel

Docket No. 88228-Agenda 15-May 2000.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 

CARL MALCHOW, Appellant.

Opinion filed September 21, 2000.

JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:

At issue in this appeal is whether defendant has met hisburden of showing that the Sex Offender Registration Act(Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1998)) and theSex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification Law(Notification Law) (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 1998)) areunconstitutional. We hold that he has not.



BACKGROUND

On December 17, 1997, the State indicted defendant, CarlMalchow, with one count of failure to register as a sex offender(730 ILCS 150/10 (West 1998)). The State alleged that defendantwas required to register as a sex offender because of his 1988conviction of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (Ill. Rev. Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 12-16). Defendant moved to declare theRegistration Act and the Notification Law unconstitutional. Thetrial court denied the motion. Following a stipulated bench trial,the court found defendant guilty. The court sentenced him to 18months' conditional discharge and fined him $500. Defendantappealed, and the appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction.The court reaffirmed its earlier holding in People v. Logan, 302 Ill.App. 3d 319 (1998), that the Registration Act and the NotificationLaw are constitutional. 306 Ill. App. 3d 665. The court, however,reversed defendant's sentence because it was illegal and void.Because the trial court failed to sentence defendant to themandatory minimum of seven days' confinement in the countyjail, the appellate court remanded the cause for resentencing. 306Ill. App. 3d 676. We granted defendant's petition for leave toappeal to determine whether the Registration Act and theNotification Law are constitutional.

Defendant argues that the Registration Act and theNotification Law are unconstitutional for the following reasons:(1) they violate the constitutional prohibition against the ex postfacto application of laws; (2) they impose cruel, unusual, anddisproportionate punishment; (3) they impermissibly infringe upona person's right to privacy; (4) they subject a defendant to doublejeopardy; (5) they violate the due process and equal protectionclauses; and (6) Public Act 89-8, which made the Registration Actand Notification Law applicable to defendant, was passed inviolation of the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution(Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,