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Docket No. 91522-Agenda 12-January 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ROBERT S. LIDSTER, Appellee.

Opinion filed October 18, 2002.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Du Page Countyconvicted defendant of driving under the influence of alcohol (625ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 1996)). The appellate court found thatthe roadblock where the police arrested defendant did not complywith the constitutional standards set forth in City of Indianapolisv. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000).Accordingly, the appellate court reversed defendant's conviction.319 Ill. App. 3d 825. We granted the State's petition for leave toappeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and allowed the Illinois Associationof Chiefs of Police to file an amicus curiae brief in support of theState. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of theappellate court.

BACKGROUND

On August 30, 1997, the Lombard police department set up aroadblock on North Avenue in Lombard, Illinois. A police officerstopped defendant at the roadblock and directed him to a sidestreet where another police officer had defendant perform severalfield-sobriety tests. Defendant failed a number of the tests and wastaken into custody.

Defendant was subsequently charged with the offense ofdriving under the influence of alcohol. He filed a motion to quashhis arrest and suppress evidence. At the hearing on the motion,Detective Ray Vasil testified that Lieutenant Glennon, third incommand at the Lombard police department, authorized theroadblock. The purpose of the roadblock was to obtain informationfrom motorists regarding a hit-and-run accident that took place oneweek earlier, at the same location, and at the same time of day. Inparticular, the police wanted information regarding a Ford Broncoor full-sized pickup truck implicated in the accident.

The Lombard police department has a general order regardingthe use of roadblocks. The order, however, does not containguidelines regarding the use of roadblocks to obtain informationfrom crime witnesses. The roadblock at issue was not videotaped.Further, the police did not publicize the roadblock.

Between 6 and 12 police vehicles participated in theroadblock. Detective Vasil wore an orange reflective vest with theword "Police" on it, and stood between the eastbound lanes ofNorth Avenue, 15 feet from the roadblock. A line of cars formedat the roadblock. As each vehicle pulled up to Detective Vasil, hehanded a flyer to the driver of the vehicle requesting informationregarding the accident. Because defendant's Mazda minivanalmost hit him, Detective Vasil requested defendant's driver'slicense and insurance card. Detective Vasil smelled alcohol ondefendant's breath and noticed that defendant's speech wasslurred. Detective Vasil directed defendant to a side street whereDetective Roy Newton had defendant perform several sobrietytests.

The trial court denied defendant's motion.

At defendant's subsequent bench trial, Detective Newtontestified that he was assigned to the corner of North Avenue andCraig. His duties were to ensure that drivers did not skirt theroadblock and to provide help to the officers in the event theyexperienced any problems with the vehicles or drivers stopped atthe roadblock. The officers at the roadblock directed several cars,including defendant's vehicle, to Detective Newton's location. AtDetective Newton's request, defendant produced a driver's licenseand insurance information. Detective Newton then had defendantperform several sobriety tests and placed defendant under arrest.

The court found defendant guilty of driving under theinfluence of alcohol. The court sentenced defendant to one year ofconditional discharge and required that defendant participate incounseling, complete 14 days in the "Sheriff's Work AlternativeProgram," and pay a fine of $200.

ANALYSIS

As noted above, the appellate court relied on Edmond, 531U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 121 S. Ct. 447, in finding theroadblock at issue invalid. In Edmond, the United States SupremeCourt invalidated checkpoints set up by the police on Indianapolisroads in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. Initially, the Courtobserved:

"The Fourth Amendment requires that searches andseizures be reasonable. A search or seizure is ordinarilyunreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion ofwrongdoing. [Citation.] While such suspicion is not an'irreducible' component of reasonableness [citation], wehave recognized only limited circumstances in which theusual rule does not apply. For example, we have upheldcertain regimes of suspicionless searches where theprogram was designed to serve 'special needs, beyond thenormal need for law enforcement.' [Citations.] ***

We have also upheld brief, suspicionless seizures ofmotorists at a fixed Border Patrol checkpoint designed tointercept illegal aliens, Martinez-Fuerte, [428 U.S. 543,49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976)], and at asobriety checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers fromthe road, Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.444[, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481] (1990)."Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 340-41, 121 S.Ct. at 451-52.

The Edmond Court then reviewed its decisions in Martinez-Fuerteand Sitz, detailing the need for the checkpoints at issue and theimportant governmental interests they served. The Court observed:

"We have never approved a checkpoint program whoseprimary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinarycriminal wrongdoing. Rather, our checkpoint cases haverecognized only limited exceptions to the general rule thata seizure must be accompanied by some measure ofindividualized suspicion. We suggested in Prouse that wewould not credit the 'general interest in crime control' asjustification for a regime of suspicionless stops.[Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18, 59 L. Ed.2d 660, 671 n.18, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1399 n.18 (1979).]Consistent with this suggestion, each of the checkpointprograms that we have approved was designed primarilyto serve purposes closely related to the problems ofpolicing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadwaysafety." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 343,121 S. Ct. at 454.

The Edmond Court firmly rejected the suggestion that theIndianapolis checkpoints could be upheld pursuant to Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz:

"Petitioners propose several ways in which thenarcotics-detection purpose of the instant checkpointprogram may instead resemble the primary purposes ofthe checkpoints in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte. Petitionersstate that the checkpoints in those cases had the sameultimate purpose of arresting those suspected ofcommitting crimes. *** Securing the border andapprehending drunk drivers are, of course, lawenforcement activities, and law enforcement officersemploy arrests and criminal prosecutions in pursuit ofthese goals. [Citations.] If we were to rest the case at thishigh level of generality, there would be little check on theability of the authorities to construct roadblocks foralmost any conceivable law enforcement purpose.Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarilyto serve the general interest in crime control, the FourthAmendment would do little to prevent such intrusionsfrom becoming a routine part of American life." Edmond,531 U.S. at 42, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 343-44, 121 S. Ct. at 454.

The Edmond Court concluded that the Indianapolis checkpointswere invalid, stating:

"The primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcoticscheckpoints is in the end to advance 'the general interestin crime control,' [citation]. We decline to suspend theusual requirement of individualized suspicion where thepolice seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for theordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannotsanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection mayreveal that any given motorist has committed somecrime." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d at 345,121 S. Ct. at 455.

See also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81, 149 L.Ed. 2d 205, 218-19, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1290 (2001) (in invalidatinga program at a state hospital whereby urine samples from pregnantwomen were tested for drugs and the results communicated to thepolice, the Court stated: "Respondents argue in essence that theirultimate purpose-namely, protecting the health of both mother andchild-is a beneficent one. In Chandler [v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,137 L. Ed. 2d 513, 117 S. Ct. 1295 (1997)], however, we did notsimply accept the State's invocation of a 'special need.' Instead,we carried out a 'close review' of the scheme at issue beforeconcluding that the need in question was not 'special,' as that termhas been defined in our cases. [Citation.] In this case, a review ofthe M-7 policy plainly reveals that the purpose actually served bythe [hospital] searches 'is ultimately indistinguishable from thegeneral interest in crime control.' Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531U.S. 32, 44 (2000)").

In the present case, the appellate court held the roadblock atissue invalid under Edmond. The appellate court noted "that theroadblock's ostensible purpose was to seek evidence of 'ordinarycriminal wrongdoing.' " 319 Ill. App. 3d at 828. The courtconcluded "[t]his is the type of routine investigative work that thepolice must do every day and does not justify the extraordinarymeans chosen to further the investigation." 319 Ill. App. 3d at 828.

The State asserts that Edmond is distinguishable because theroadblock at issue had a specific purpose of assisting theauthorities in solving a crime that had already been committed andwas known to the police. Thus, police efforts were not directed atgeneral crime control. Unlike in Edmond, the Lombard policedepartment did not seek to interrogate and inspect motorists toferret out evidence that the motorists themselves had committedcrime that was as yet unknown to police. Defendant was onlysubjected to further investigation because he narrowly missedhitting an officer in the area where vehicles were stopped.

The State's interpretation of Edmond is incorrect. First, as theCourt reaffirmed in Edmond, the general rule is that "a search orseizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualizedsuspicion of wrongdoing." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37, 148 L. Ed. 2dat 340, 121 S. Ct. at 451. The checkpoints upheld in Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976)(immigration checkpoints located near the Mexican border), andMichigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 L.Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) (sobriety checkpoint), are"limited exceptions to the general rule." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41,148 L. Ed. 2d at 343, 121 S. Ct. at 454. Certainly the Lombardroadblock does not fall within the scope of the limited exceptionsheretofore approved by the Supreme Court.

Second, the Court in Edmond was keenly aware that anexception for roadblocks "designed primarily to serve the generalinterest in crime control" would abrogate the general rule requiringindividualized suspicion of wrongdoing. See 4 W. LaFave, Search& Seizure