People v. Kippa

Case Date: 12/31/1969
Court: Supreme Court
Docket No: 83962

People v. Koppa (Ill. S.Ct.)



Docket No. 83962-Agenda 13-May 1998.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ROBERT KOPPA, Appellee.

Opinion filed October 22, 1998.

JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Robert Koppa, was charged by indictment in the circuit court of Cook County with four counts of aggravatedcriminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996)), two counts of aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS5/10-2(a)(4), (a)(5) (West 1996)), and two counts of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1996)). The indictment allegesthat on July 13, 1996, defendant, while displaying a knife with at least a three-inch blade, kidnapped and committed acts ofsexual misconduct upon the victim.

On April 4, 1997, defendant filed pretrial motions to dismiss the armed violence counts. The circuit court granted defendant'smotions and dismissed the two counts of armed violence. The circuit court found that the armed violence counts violated theproportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 because those counts required proof of the same elements asthe other charged offenses, yet provided for a greater penalty. The court also found that the armed violence counts improperlyconstituted double enhancement because the factor of a weapon was used twice. The State filed a notice of appeal from thecircuit court's order in the appellate court. The appellate court subsequently granted the State's motion to transfer the appeal tothis court. The State's appeal from the circuit court's order is therefore before this court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. For the reasons thatfollow, we reverse the order of the circuit court.

The issues in this case are whether the armed violence charges against defendant violate the proportionate penalties clause of theIllinois Constitution of 1970 and whether they constitute impermissible double enhancement.

The State argues that the circuit court erroneously dismissed the two armed violence counts, which are herein referred to ascounts VII and VIII. The State contends that the armed violence statute, as applied in the instant case, does not violate theproportionate penalties clause and that the armed violence charges are not the product of double enhancement.

Count VII states that defendant committed the offense of armed violence in that "he, while armed with a dangerous weapon, towit: a knife with a blade of at least three inches in length, committed a felony defined by Illinois state law, to wit: aggravatedcriminal sexual abuse in violation of chapter 720, act 5, section 33A-2/I/12-16(a)(2)." Section 12-16(a)(2) of the Criminal Codeof 1961 provides that a defendant commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if he commits criminal sexual abuse and causesbodily harm to the victim. 720 ILCS 5/12-16(a)(2) (West 1996). The circuit court found count VII disproportionate whencompared to counts I through IV, which charged defendant with aggravated criminal sexual abuse.

Count VIII states that defendant committed the offense of armed violence in that "he, while armed with a dangerous weapon, towit: a knife with a blade of at least three inches in length, committed a felony defined by Illinois state law, to wit: aggravatedkidnapping in violation of chapter 720, act 5, section 33A-2/I/10-2(a)(4)." Section 10-2(a)(4) of the Criminal Code definesaggravated kidnapping as the commission of kidnapping while concealing identity. 720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(4) (West 1996). Thecircuit court found count VIII disproportionate to counts V and VI, which charged defendant with aggravated kidnapping.

We begin our analysis with the language of the statutes at issue. The armed violence statute provides, in pertinent part:

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