People v. Kaczmarek
Case Date: 12/31/1969
Court: Supreme Court
Docket No: 90865 Rel
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Docket No. 90865-Agenda 1-May 2003. Opinion filed October 2, 2003.
JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court: Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County,defendant, Henry Kaczmarek, was convicted of murder, residentialburglary, home invasion, and armed robbery. Defendant wassentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment on the murderconviction, but no sentences were imposed on the other convictions.Defendant appealed. On March 31, 1993, the appellate court filed anopinion in which it declined to review defendant's convictions forresidential burglary, home invasion, and armed robbery, due to lackof finality, but reversed the murder conviction and remanded for anew trial. People v. Kaczmarek, 243 Ill. App. 3d 1067 (1993). Wedenied leave to appeal. People v. Kaczmarek, 151 Ill. 2d 571 (1993). Prior to the commencement of his second trial in November of1996, defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the State's chargeson the grounds that his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedytrial had been violated. Following a retrial by jury, defendant wasagain found guilty of murder, and, based upon a trial court findingthat the victim's murder was exceptionally brutal and heinous,defendant again received an enhanced term of natural life in prisonpursuant to section 5-8-1(a)(1)(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections(Unified Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1)(b)). Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that he had been deniedhis constitutional right to a speedy trial, and challenging the validityof his life sentence, claiming the penalty enhancement schemeprovided by section 5-8-1(a)(1)(b) of the Unified Code isconstitutionally infirm in light of the United States Supreme Court'sdecision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435,120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The appellate court rejected defendant'sspeedy-trial claim, but vacated defendant's life sentence andremanded for resentencing, concluding that "the penalty scheme setforth in section 5-8-1(a)(1)(b) of the Corrections Code offends theconstitutional principles announced in Apprendi." 318 Ill. App. 3d340, 341-42. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (177Ill. 2d R. 315). The State argues that the defendant's sentence does not violateprinciples of Apprendi or, in the alternative, a violation of Apprendidoes not warrant resentencing given the reasoning of this court'srecent opinions in People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003) (applyingharmless error analysis to Apprendi violations), and People v. Crespo,203 Ill. 2d 335 (2001) (applying plain error analysis). By way ofcross-appeal, the defendant reiterates his appellate contention that hisconstitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. For the reasonsthat follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part. A comprehensive and detailed recitation of the proceduralhistory of this case and the evidence adduced at defendant's trial andsentencing hearing is not necessary for our analysis. The pertinentfacts are those which bear upon the parties' speedy-trial andsentencing issues. Hence, we will at this juncture summarize therelevant evidence presented at defendant's retrial, in order to providea general overview, and more fully treat facts specifically relating tothe speedy-trial and sentencing issues in our discussion of thoseissues. Defendant was tried for the murder of 86-year-old MillieNielsen. The evidence indicated that defendant broke into Nielsen'sapartment where he stabbed, beat, and strangled her in the course ofan attack that apparently started in Nielsen's kitchen and concludedin her bedroom. Defendant took items of minimal value fromNielsen's residence and was later apprehended in possession of someof her bloodstained personal belongings. When he was arrested,officers observed bloodstains on the quilted shirt defendant waswearing, and bloodstained jeans were recovered from the trunk of hiscar. A witness testified that he had seen defendant in the back yard ofNielsen's apartment building on the night of the murder. The witnesssaw defendant carry a bag through the back yard, place it in the trunkof his car, and drive away. Dr. Michael Chambliss performed the medical examination ofNielsen's body and testified to her extensive injuries. Dr. Chamblissconcluded that Nielsen died as a result of manual strangulation withthe contributing factors of blunt force injuries and stab wounds. Dr.Chambliss stated that Nielsen could have died from the blunt forceinjuries alone. Pamela Fish, an expert in electrophoresis, serology, and DNAanalysis, testified to the results of her 1987 examination of thephysical evidence. At that time, she determined the blood found ondefendant's jacket and jeans was consistent with Nielsen's blood typeand could not have come from defendant. Fish determined that thesubstance on other evidentiary items was human blood, but due to thesmall quantity provided, she was unable to identify a particular bloodtype. Prior to defendant's second trial, Fish attempted to performDNA testing on blood samples collected in this case; however, theirsmall size and degraded condition made testing ineffective. Rod Englert, an expert in crime scene reconstruction and bloodsplatter, examined the physical evidence and photographs in the case.Englert stated that the blood on Nielsen's kitchen floor appearedsmeared, indicative of a struggle in which someone bled. Englertnoted that the blood on the kitchen wall immediately outside thebedroom represented classic medium velocity splatter, suggestive ofblunt force being inflicted upon the victim. Given the low angle ofprojection, Englert believed that Nielsen had received numerousblows while on the kitchen floor. Englert concluded that the blood onthe knees of defendant's jeans, and the back of his shirt sleeves,represented transfer stains-blood swiped against something orsomeone. The blood on the front of defendant's shirt sleevesrepresented medium velocity splatter. The blood at the bottom ofdefendant's jeans was also consistent with medium velocity splatter.Englert testified that these stains were not consistent with defendanthaving picked up a bag with blood on it or with such a bag havingbeen placed on top of clothing. Englert further stated the stains werenot consistent with defendant having kneed another person in thenose. Defendant testified, offering an explanation for the blood on hisclothes and his possession of Nielsen's belongings. Defendantclaimed he had been involved in three fights prior to the night ofNielsen's murder, and he intimated that the blood on his clothing hadbeen deposited there during one or more of those altercations.Defendant claimed two of the fights were with his friends, TomSzeszol and Bill Henderson, while a third fight involved anunidentified man who was attempting to break into defendant's car.In the latter fight, defendant stated, he hit the man three or four timesin the face and kneed him in the nose. According to defendant,everyone involved in the fights bled. As for his possession of Nielsen's bloodstained property,defendant stated he had noticed a bag on the side of Nielsen'sapartment building. He looked inside the bag and discovered thereina box of silverware. He picked up the bag, carried it to his car, andplaced it in the trunk. Later that morning, defendant decided to lookinto the bag and removed the bag's contents, some or which werebloody. Defendant kept some items and disposed of others, includinga bloody pillow case, in a Dumpster. Defendant sold some of theitems for $60. Given this evidence, the jury found that defendant hadcommitted the murder of Millie Nielsen. We turn our attention to adiscussion of the law governing the constitutional right to speedytrial, followed by a recitation of the circumstances precedingdefendant's retrial and the facts pertinent to defendant's speedy-trialissue. SPEEDY TRIAL Both the United States Constitution and the Constitution ofIllinois guarantee an accused the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const.,amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, |