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Docket No. 82978-Agenda 31-May 1998.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. NORMA JEFFERSON, Appellant.

Opinion filed December 17, 1998.

JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, thedefendant, Norma Jefferson, was found guilty of attempted firstdegree murder and aggravated battery and was sentenced to 35years' imprisonment for those offenses. The appellate courtaffirmed the defendant's convictions and sentence in an unpublishedorder. No. 1-96-1163 (unpublished order under Supreme CourtRule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)). We allowed the defendant's petitionfor leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now affirm thejudgment of the appellate court.

The facts in the case are not in dispute, and they may be statedbriefly. The events giving rise to the present case occurred onMarch 25, 1992. That morning, the defendant took her daughter,Danisha, to Cook County Hospital. Dr. Demetra Soter examinedDanisha the next day, March 26. Danisha had been born onFebruary 8 of that year and was less than seven weeks old at thetime. At trial, Dr. Soter testified that an external examination of thechild showed swelling and bruising on her forehead, and she hadtwo black eyes. Danisha was placed in intensive care and wasintubated and put on a respirator. According to Dr. Soter, a CTscan performed when the child was admitted to the hospitalrevealed subdural hematomas on both the left and right sides of thehead. Other tests performed at that time disclosed the existence ofretinal hemorrhaging. Dr. Soter explained that both types ofinjuries are classic symptoms of shaken baby syndrome. Dr. Sotersaid that a second CT scan, which was taken on March 26, and anEEG also done that day showed severe brain damage from a lackof oxygen to the brain. Dr. Soter explained that this was a distinctinjury, unrelated to shaken baby syndrome, and would have beenthe result of strangulation or suffocation.

Another witness at trial, Dr. Padma Sundaram, testifiedregarding Danisha's development; Dr. Sundaram is a physician atSchwab Rehabilitation Center and has treated Danisha. Dr.Sundaram stated that the child has severe cerebral palsy as a resultof shaken baby syndrome. Dr. Sundaram last examined Danisha inApril 1995, a month before trial, when Danisha was more thanthree years old. According to Dr. Sundaram, Danisha's motor skillswere less than those of a four-month-old, and her mental capacitywas equivalent to that of a child five or six months old. Dr.Sundaram stated that Danisha will never be able to walk, sit up,turn over, or fully talk, and that she will always require constantcare.

The defendant gave law enforcement authorities severaldifferent accounts of the events leading up to the child's injuries.The defendant initially told investigators that she was cleaning inanother room in the apartment when she heard Danisha crying. Thedefendant's nephew, Jacob, who was then eight years old, told herthat another child was bothering Danisha. The defendant warnedthe children to leave Danisha alone, and she then resumed cleaning.Danisha began crying two more times, and on the last occasion thedefendant noticed that Danisha was having difficulty breathing andthat white matter was coming from her mouth. The defendant saidthat she then shook Danisha to help her breathe.

The defendant later told investigators that on the morning ofMarch 25 she left the apartment to go to a nearby store, leavingDanisha with Jacob and three other young children. The defendantsaid that upon her return about 15 or 20 minutes later, Jacob toldher to check on Danisha. The defendant found that Danisha washaving trouble breathing and that there was white matter aroundthe child's mouth. The defendant said that she shook Danisha tohelp her breathe. The defendant then wrapped Danisha in a blanketand ran downstairs to the security desk, where she asked the guardto call an ambulance.

The defendant eventually made an inculpatory statement toinvestigators. In the statement, the defendant said that on themorning of March 25 she left the apartment to go the store, leavingDanisha with Jacob and several other children. When the defendantreturned, she noticed a scratch below Danisha's left eye and rednessaround her right eye. The defendant said that she then beganwatching the "Perry Mason" show on television. Danisha begancrying, and the defendant said that she became angry with that,because the crying was interfering with the program. The defendantexplained that she also felt angry because her sister owed hermoney. According to the defendant, she grabbed Danisha's throatto make her stop crying. The defendant then gave Danisha a bottle,but she resumed crying a little later. The defendant said that shethen struck Danisha in the face with the palm of her hand. About20 or 30 minutes later, the defendant noticed white foamingmaterial like thick saliva coming from Danisha's mouth. Thedefendant picked up Danisha and shook her; the child's head rolledback and forth and her body was limp. The defendant then wrappedthe baby in a blanket and ran downstairs, where she asked asecurity guard to summon an ambulance.

The defendant testified in her own behalf at trial. She statedthat she left the apartment briefly on the morning of March 25 and,upon returning, found that Danisha had saliva coming out of hernose. Danisha was limp when the defendant picked her up, and shewould not awaken. The defendant said that she then wrapped thebaby in a blanket and took her downstairs to the security desk,where she asked the guard to call an ambulance. The defendanttestified that she signed an inculpatory statement because a policeofficer told her that Danisha had only several hours to live, and thatif she signed the statement she could see her child, talk to herparents, and go home.

During cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutionrequested a discussion with the trial judge outside the jury'spresence. The State sought to present evidence about thedefendant's agreement to take a polygraph examination and herlater decision, before the test could be conducted, to give aninculpatory statement. Over the defendant's objection, the trialjudge allowed the introduction of this evidence. In response tofurther questioning, the defendant testified that she agreed to takea polygraph test and that one was scheduled for her. The defendantdenied, however, that she later knocked on the door of the roomwhere she was being held and said that she wanted to give astatement.

In rebuttal, a detective testified that the defendant agreed totake a polygraph test. The detective scheduled one with anexaminer and told the defendant that an appointment had beenmade for that evening. According to the detective, about 5 or 10minutes later, the defendant knocked on the closed door of theinterview room where she was being held. The detective openedthe door, and the defendant explained that she wanted to talk tohim. The detective and an assistant State's Attorney entered theroom, and the defendant said that she wanted to tell the truth. Thedefendant then gave the statement in which she admitted chokingand shaking her daughter. The assistant State's Attorney who tookthe defendant's statement also testified in rebuttal, and she deniedthat the defendant was promised anything in exchange for herstatement or was told that her child had only several hours to live.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendantguilty of attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery.Following a sentencing hearing, the trial judge sentenced thedefendant to 35 years' imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed.The court rejected the defendant's argument that reversible erroroccurred when the trial judge allowed the prosecution to presentevidence about the defendant's agreement to undergo a polygraphexam. The appellate court believed that the evidence wasadmissible for the limited purpose of explaining the circumstancesin which the defendant's confession was made. In the alternative,the appellate court believed that any error in the introduction of thepolygraph testimony was harmless, given the overwhelming proofof the defendant's guilt. We allowed the defendant's petition forleave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).

The only issue presented by the defendant in this appeal iswhether the trial judge erred in allowing the State to introduceevidence about the defendant's agreement to undergo a polygraphexamination. The defendant argues that the evidence wasprejudicial and inadmissible because it violated the longstandingrule in Illinois barring the introduction of evidence regardingpolygraph examinations. In response, the State maintains that thedefendant, through her own testimony, opened the door to thepresentation of this evidence. The State notes further that thedefendant did not take the scheduled examination and that nopolygraph results were introduced into evidence in this case.

The defendant correctly observes that the general rule inIllinois is to preclude introduction of evidence regarding polygraphexaminations and the results of those tests. People v. Triplett, 37Ill. 2d 234 (1967). In People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225 (1981), thiscourt found error in the introduction at trial of the results of apolygraph examination taken by the defendant; the error was heldto be reversible even though the defendant, before the examination,had agreed with the prosecution that the test results could beadmitted in evidence. In People v. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d 191 (1994),this court found plain error in the introduction, without objectionby the defense, of testimony regarding the polygraph testing of aprosecution witness. The problems with polygraph evidence aretwofold. First, polygraphy is not sufficiently reliably to establishguilt or innocence. Second, the quasi-scientific nature of the testmay lead a trier of fact to give the evidence undue weight,notwithstanding its lack of reliability. People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d377, 391-92 (1984); see generally United States v. Scheffer, 523U.S. __, __, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413, 419-22, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1265-67(1998). Our cases have also held that polygraph evidence isinadmissible in capital sentencing hearings. People v. Pecoraro,175 Ill. 2d 294, 315 (1997); People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472,493 (1996); People v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d 327, 362 (1983).

The rule of exclusion is not without exception, however. Morethan 30 years ago, in People v. Triplett, 37 Ill. 2d 234 (1967), thiscourt, in an opinion by Justice Schaefer, suggested that polygraphevidence might be admissible to explain why a defendant made aconfession. After reviewing Illinois statutes and case law barringthe introduction of polygraph evidence, the court stated:

"Despite the strong aversion thus manifested, by statuteand decisions, it can be argued that a different resultshould follow when the issue is the voluntariness of aconfession. It can be said that the fact that the confessionfollowed a polygraph examination is a relevantcircumstance and that it is the fact of the examination,rather than its result, that is significant." Triplett, 37 Ill. 2dat 239.

The court concluded that a new trial was necessary in that case,however, because no limiting instruction had been given to the juryregarding its use of the polygraph evidence.

Later, in People v. Jackson, 198 Ill. App. 3d 831 (1990), theappellate court found that polygraph evidence, including the resultsof an examination, was properly admitted to rebut a defendant'stestimony that his confession was the product of coercion. Thecourt stated, "We believe that the evidence showing that thedefendant failed the polygraph examination was admissible for thelimited purpose of showing that it was his failure to pass the test,rather than the alleged threats of violence by the police, whichmotivated the defendant to confess." Jackson, 198 Ill. App. 3d at846. The appellate court also believed that any error in theintroduction of the evidence was harmless, in light of theoverwhelming evidence of guilt. Jackson, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 846.

More recently, in People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423 (1992),this court found reversible error in a trial court's refusal to permita defendant to present evidence regarding a polygraphexamination. The defendant sought to introduce the evidence tosupport the claim that his confession was not credible or reliable.Melock recognized this court's longstanding disapproval ofpolygraph evidence, yet the court concluded that exclusion ofevidence about the polygraph had denied the defendant his right toprevent a defense. Melock concluded:

"We do not here, today, announce a general rule on theadmissibility of polygraph evidence. We, instead, reservethe opportunity to revisit our position on the generalinadmissibility of such evidence as particular issues arepresented in future cases. We remain firm in our positionthat the fact, details or results of a polygraph examinationare generally inadmissible on the issue of guilt orinnocence." Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 466.

Melock discussed this court's opinion in Triplett and theappellate court's opinion in Jackson. Melock did not expresslyapprove of those decisions, though the court acknowledged theconcerns addressed in the two cases. The Melock court explained,"[W]e can agree with Jackson and Triplett on the value of limitedadmissibility of polygraph evidence in special circumstances.However, given the ordinarily prejudicial effect of polygraphevidence, the broader holding of Jackson, which would permit theState to offer polygraph evidence to rebut a defendant's assertionthat his confession was coerced, gives us pause. [Citation.]"(Emphasis in original.) Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 463.

This case presents us with the opportunity to revisit thequestion reserved in Melock and to determine whether, in thecircumstances shown here, the prosecution was properly allowedto present evidence about the scheduled polygraph examination tocounter the defendant's assertion that her confession was coerced.We conclude that the trial judge correctly permitted the State topresent evidence here regarding the circumstances surrounding thedefendant's confession, including her agreement to undergo apolygraph examination later that evening. Just as the defendant inMelock should have been allowed to present evidence concerningpolygraph testing, so too do we believe that the trial judge in thiscase correctly permitted the State to rebut the defendant's claim ofcoercion with polygraph evidence.

We agree with the State that the present case must bedistinguished from the line of decisions barring the presentation ofevidence concerning polygraph examinations. In this case, thechallenged evidence was offered for a limited purpose: to showwhy the defendant agreed to speak to authorities, after she testifiedthat her statement to authorities was prompted by their promisesthat if she made a statement she would be released from custodyand would be allowed to see her daughter and her parents. Torebut that testimony, the State presented evidence, elicited from thedefendant on cross-examination and presented through a rebuttalwitness, that the defendant agreed to undergo a polygraphexamination but, before the test could be conducted, toldauthorities that she wanted to tell the truth and then gave aninculpatory statement.

Evidence of the impending polygraph exam became admissibleto explain the circumstances surrounding the defendant'sinculpatory statement to police, after the defendant raised thecontention in her testimony that her statement was induced bypromises of lenient treatment. The Court of Appeals for theSeventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v.Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979). In that case the courtupheld a trial judge's ruling that if a defendant were to testify thathis confession had been coerced, the prosecution could thenintroduce evidence showing that the defendant made the confessionafter he was told that he had failed a polygraph test. The courtexplained, "It would have been unfair to allow defendant to presenthis account of his admissions *** without allowing theGovernment to demonstrate the extent to which failure of thepolygraph precipitated the confession." Kampiles, 609 F.2d at1244. For similar reasons, we believe that the present defendant, bytestifying that she signed the inculpatory statement because of thepromises allegedly made to her by authorities, opened the door tothe State's evidence regarding the defendant's agreement to take apolygraph exam. Not allowing the State to introduce this evidencewould have left the jurors with a misleading impression about thecircumstances in which the defendant made her confession. Thetrial judge properly allowed the prosecution to introduce thisevidence for the limited purpose of explaining why the defendantagreed to make and sign the statement.

Our result here is consistent with decisions in analogouscircumstances allowing the introduction of otherwise inadmissibleevidence for a limited purpose. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409,85 L. Ed. 2d 425, 105 S. Ct. 2078 (1985); Harris v. New York, 401U.S. 222, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 91 S. Ct. 643 (1971); People v.Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235, 259-61 (1989). As the preceding casesdemonstrate, evidence that is inadmissible may become admissibleif the defense opens the door to its introduction. We believe that asimilar rationale applies in this case. Having testified that thestatement was made in response to improper inducements by thepolice, the defendant cannot now be heard to complain about theintroduction of rebuttal evidence regarding the circumstances thatactually led her to make the statement. To disallow this evidencewould only succeed in permitting the defendant to unjustifiablyprofit from our general rule that bars introduction of evidencerelating to polygraphy testing.

We do not depart from our longstanding rule that evidenceabout polygraph testing is generally inadmissible in courts inIllinois. Such evidence became relevant and admissible here,however, when the defendant offered an alternative explanation forthe reasons that led her to confess to the charged offenses. Webelieve that the State was entitled to rebut the defendant'sexplanation with other evidence about her reasons for speaking toauthorities.

The defendant also argues, however, that the prosecutionimproperly alluded to the polygraph evidence even before shetestified. In its case in chief, the State presented testimony from awitness that an unspecified appointment had been made with "atechnician." The defendant correctly notes that the technicianreferred to was the polygraph examiner. We do not believe that anyerror occurred in the presentation of this testimony. The witnesscarefully avoided making any reference to the polygraphexamination. The reference to an unspecified technician wassufficiently vague, and it would not have led the jurors to anyimproper speculation. Moreover, as we have held above, theevidence became admissible once the defendant chose to challengethe circumstances that caused her to make the statement.

The defendant also contends that the trial judge incorrectlyinstructed the jury on the use of the polygraph evidence. Thechallenged instruction advised the jury in the following terms:

"[Y]ou heard some testimony concerning a polygraph test.You may consider that evidence for a limited purposeonly, not for the fact that someone did or didn't take apolygraph test. You will consider it only for the limitedpurpose of deciding whether the statement given by thedefendant was voluntary or involuntary, for that purposeonly, a limited purpose."

The defendant correctly observes that the voluntariness of aconfession is to be determined by the judge alone. People v. Page,155 Ill. 2d 232, 249-50 (1993); People v. Britz, 112 Ill. 2d 314,319 (1986); People v. Kincaid, 87 Ill. 2d 107, 117 (1981); seegenerally Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84S. Ct. 1774 (1964). Even after a trial judge has found a confessionto be voluntary, however, a defendant may still present evidence tothe trier of fact challenging the statement's reliability or truth, andit was this issue that the jury had before it. These principles areexpressed in section 114-11(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedureof 1963, which provides, "The issue of the admissibility of theconfession shall not be submitted to the jury. The circumstancessurrounding the making of the confession may be submitted to thejury as bearing upon the credibility or the weight to be given to theconfession." 725 ILCS 5/114-11(f) (West 1994).

It is not apparent from the record that defense counsel everobjected to the manner in which the trial judge phrased thecautionary instruction. Even if we assume that counsel did objectto the instruction, however, we do not believe that its use wasreversible error under the circumstances in this case. We considerthat the jury would have correctly assessed the true relevance ofthe polygraph evidence, applying that testimony to determinewhether the defendant's confession was false, as she asserted.Notwithstanding the use of the term "voluntariness" in thecautionary instruction, we do not believe that the jury would havemisconstrued the significance of the polygraph evidence or wouldhave considered it for some purpose other than the one for whichit was offered. A separate instruction regarding the defendant'sinculpatory statement advised the jurors:

"You have before you evidence that the defendant madea statement relating to the offenses charged in theindictment. It is for you to determine whether thedefendant made the statement and, if so, what weightshould be given to the statement. In determining theweight to be given to a statement, you should consider allof the circumstances under which it was made."

This last instruction correctly shaped and guided the jury's inquiry,and we believe that the jurors, faced with the two instructions,would have understood their task to involve a determinationwhether the defendant's statement was unreliable because it hadbeen induced by promises from the authorities, as the defendantasserted.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court,which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County,is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

"A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that `thejury is the lie detector.' " (Emphasis in original.) United States v.Scheffer, 523 U.S. ___, ___, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413, 421, 118 S. Ct.1261, 1266 (1998), quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973). This court has held consistently that theresults of a polygraph examination are inadmissible when offeredin evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocenceof a defendant. People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 459 (1992). Asthe majority states, polygraph is not sufficiently reliable to establishguilt or innocence, and the quasi-scientific nature of the test maylead a trier of fact to give the evidence undue weight,notwithstanding its lack of reliability. In People v. Baynes, 88 Ill.2d 225, 240 (1981), where the admission of polygraph evidencerose to the level of plain error for impinging upon the integrity ofour judicial system, the court reasoned that stipulation to itsadmission does not render unreliable evidence reliable. The courtconcluded that polygraph evidence is not reliable enough to beadmitted, that the prejudicial effects substantially outweigh theprobative value of admitting such testimony, and that no otherform of evidence is as likely to be considered as completelydeterminative of guilt or innocence as is a polygraph examination.Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 244. In People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 377, 391-92 (1984), this court declared that although the results ofpolygraph examinations are insufficiently reliable to be used toprove guilt or innocence, because their results appear to be quasi-scientific, jurors are likely to give such results undue weight. As thecourt said in Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 244, there is significant risk thejury will regard polygraph evidence as conclusive. Because it is thejury's function, as finder of fact, to determine the credibility ofwitnesses, "[a] potential trial by polygraph is an unwarrantedintrusion into the jury function." Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 244.

In People v. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d 191, 204 (1994), we heldevidence of polygraph examination of a witness inadmissible at trialfor the same reasons that this court has held evidence of polygraphexamination of a defendant inadmissible. In Gard we concludedthat evidence of polygraph testing is rendered no more reliable andjurors deem it no less worthy of belief because the person testedwas a witness rather than a defendant. As did the court in Baynes,we ruled in Gard, 158 Ill. 2d at 205, that the admission of evidenceof polygraph testing of witnesses at the defendant's trial constitutedplain error because it was error compromising the integrity andtarnishing the reputation of the judicial process itself. Whether thepolygraph examination is of defendant or witness, we said there,evidence of polygraph testing is equally unreliable and likely to beaccorded undue weight so that its prejudicial effect far exceeds itsprobative value. Gard, 158 Ill. 2d at 204.

Likewise, as the majority indicates, evidence of the results ofa polygraph examination is inadmissible not only at trial but also atcapital sentencing hearings. People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294,315 (1997); People v. Sanchez, 169 Ill. 2d 472, 493 (1996). InPeople v. Szabo, 94 Ill. 2d 327, 362 (1983), this court excludedpolygraph evidence from consideration by a sentencing jury in acapital case for the same reasons that polygraph evidence was heldinadmissible at trial in Baynes, that is, doubts concerning thereliability of the polygraph and the risk that a jury will findpolygraph results conclusive to the extent that the polygraphusurps the function of the jury as trier of fact. In Sanchez, 169 Ill.2d at 493, we said that although the rules of evidence are relaxedat capital sentencing hearings, we do not believe that polygraphevidence carries with it sufficient reliability to warrant theadmission of it even in those circumstances.

Moreover, testimony that a defendant was offered a polygraphexamination, or that he refused one, interjects into the caseinferences that bear directly upon his guilt or innocence: either hefailed the test, because presumably the State would not pursuecharges against an innocent, or the defendant refused to submit totesting out of fear that his guilt would be shown. People v.Eickhoff, 129 Ill. App. 3d 99, 103 (1984). Questions concerningprior solicitations of a witness for a polygraph examination implythat the witness fears the examination because he is lying. Peoplev. Rutledge, 45 Ill. App. 3d 779, 783 (1977). That which may notbe accomplished directly by evidence of the results of a polygraphexamination may not be accomplished indirectly by reference towhether a defendant was offered or declined a polygraphexamination. Eickhoff, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 103.

Agreeing with the State "that the present case must bedistinguished from the line of decisions barring the presentation ofevidence concerning polygraph examinations," the majorityexplains that in this case the polygraph evidence it deemsadmissible was offered for "a limited purpose." However, limitingthe purpose to which unreliable evidence is put does not invest itwith reliability. Polygraph evidence used for the limited purpose ofdetermining why a defendant agreed to make and sign a statementis no more reliable than polygraph evidence offered for the purposeof establishing the defendant's guilt or innocence. Nor does the useof polygraph evidence for this limited purpose diminish thesignificant risk that the jury will regard such evidence as conclusivefor that purpose. Whether polygraph evidence is used for thislimited purpose or to consider the guilt or innocence of theaccused, it is equally unreliable and likely to be accorded undueweight, so that its prejudicial effect far exceeds its probative value.

In Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 465, because the exclusion of thepolygraph evidence the defendant sought to introduce deprived himof his fundamental right to a fair opportunity to present a defense,this court held that the polygraph evidence should have beenadmitted at trial for the limited purpose of determining thecredibility and reliability of his confession. There the defendant,who had confessed after having taken a polygraph examination,contended that the trial court's preclusion of evidence concerningthe circumstances surrounding his confession had denied him hissixth amendment right to present a defense and his right to a fairtrial. He maintained that he should have been permitted to presentevidence of the polygraph examiner's deception concerning the"results" of the examination when, in fact, no responses fromdefendant's polygraph could be read and his polygraph examinationhad yielded no test results. In holding the polygraph evidenceadmissible for this limited purpose, the court acknowledged that itsresolution of the issue was not without regard for the potentialprejudicial effect of polygraph evidence but concluded that theimportance of permitting the jury to weigh the effects of everymotivating circumstance surrounding the obtaining of thedefendant's confession outweighs the importance of avoiding thepossible prejudice. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 465. Unlike Melock,however, no fundamental right of the defendant weighs in thebalance here.

In Melock, 149 Ill. 2d at 458, this court expressed itsawareness that the term " `polygraph evidence,' broadly construed,may include every aspect concerning polygraphy, includingresults." Although the instant defendant did not take a polygraphexamination, so that there was neither an examination nor theresults of one, evidence that a defendant had agreed to take apolygraph examination, was scheduled to do so, but confessedbefore being examined constitutes "polygraph evidence." The juryis as likely to regard such evidence as conclusive as it is so toregard the results of polygraph examination. Plainly, there issignificant risk that, because of a false assurance in the reliability ofpolygraph examination, the jury will reason that the defendantconfessed because of his belief that the scheduled polygraphexamination would shortly and inevitably expose his deceptions.Indeed, the State's closing argument in rebuttal in this case rested,in part, upon the implicit reliability of polygraph examination andencouraged jurors to infer that defendant confessed when she didbecause of her fear that the polygraph examination wouldimminently disclose her deceit.

For the same reasons that polygraph evidence is inadmissiblewhen used to establish the guilt or innocence of a defendant,polygraph evidence should be inadmissible when used by the Statefor the limited purpose of determining why a defendant agreed tomake and sign a statement. Therefore, the judgment of theappellate court should be reversed and the cause remanded for anew trial.

JUSTICE NICKELS joins in this dissent.