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Docket No. 88852-Agenda 7-November 2000.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. SAMUEL HUFF, Appellee.

Opinion filed January 29, 2001.

JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Samuel Huff, was charged with several traffic-related offenses in the circuit court of Macoupin County. The trialjudge dismissed the charges, finding a violation of the speedy-trialstatute. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the defendanthad not filed a valid demand for a speedy trial. No. 5-97-0562(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). On remand,the defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the ground thatdefense counsel was ineffective for having failed to submit aproper speedy-trial demand. The trial court agreed with thedefendant and again dismissed the charges. The appellate courtaffirmed. 308 Ill. App. 3d 1046. We allowed the State's petitionfor leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now vacate thejudgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to that courtfor further proceedings.

The defendant was charged on September 15, 1996, withdriving under the influence of alcohol, failing to reduce speed toavoid an accident, and failing to wear a seat belt. The defendantposted his driver's license in lieu of bond. On October 15, 1996,defense counsel filed a document by which counsel entered hisappearance in the matter and by which the defendant pleaded notguilty and demanded a speedy trial. The document stated:

"ENTRY OF APPEARANCE, PLEA OF NOT GUILTY,

AND DEMAND FOR SPEEDY JURY TRIAL

Comes now Ted E. Barylske, and enters his appearanceas attorney of record for the Defendant herein and entersa plea of Not Guilty on behalf of said Defendant.

The Defendant, by his attorney, further demands a jurytrial of the above styled cause within 120 days from thedate he was taken into custody.

In the event that the Defendant was not taken intocustody or posts a bond and is released from custody atany point after his arrest in the above styled cause,whether prior or subsequent to the filing of this Demand,he further demands a jury trial of the above styled causewithin 160 days from the date of this Demand."

The matter was originally scheduled for jury trial on February19, 1997. On either February 13 or February 19, 1997, defensecounsel made an oral motion for a continuance. The trial judgegranted the motion and continued the matter to the "next jury."The next jury call was to begin May 5, 1997. The case was not setfor trial until July 1997, however. On July 14, 1997, prior to trial,the defendant filed a motion for discharge, arguing that the Statehad failed to bring him to trial within the time prescribed bystatute. After a hearing, the trial judge granted the defendant'smotion, finding that the only delay attributable to the defendantbegan in February 1997, when he sought a continuance, and endedin May 1997, when the next jury call was set to begin. The judgeconcluded that the State had failed to bring the defendant to trialwithin the time limits set by statute.

The State moved for reconsideration, arguing, among otherpoints, that the defendant had failed to cite the speedy-trial statutein his demand for a speedy trial, and that, under the appellatecourt's decision in People v. Ground, 257 Ill. App. 3d 956 (1994),the demand was ineffective. Ground had held that a demand forspeedy trial, to be valid, must satisfy certain formal requirements,including the requirement that the demand cite the speedy-trialstatute, section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963(725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 1996)). The trial judge deniedreconsideration, reasoning that the demand in this case wassufficient to apprise the State of the defendant's invocation of hisstatutory right.

The State appealed, and the appellate court reversed, findingthat the defendant had not made a valid demand for a speedy trial.Relying on its previous decision in Ground, the appellate courtconcluded that the demand in this case was insufficient because itdid not specifically cite section 103-5 of the Code of CriminalProcedure. The court also noted that the defendant's demand wasmade in contingent terms. The appellate court remanded the causefor further proceedings. No. 5-97-0562 (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23).

On remand, defense counsel again moved to dismiss thecharges, but this time on grounds of ineffective assistance ofcounsel. Defense counsel maintained that his failure to file a validdemand for speedy trial constituted ineffective assistance. The trialjudge agreed with the defendant and dismissed the charges. TheState filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that thedefendant's argument was premature and that ineffectiveassistance of counsel was not a basis on which charges could bedismissed prior to trial. The trial judge denied the State's motion.

The State appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. 308 Ill.App. 3d 1046. A majority of the court concluded that counsel wasineffective for having failed to submit an effective demand fortrial. In addition, the majority questioned its earlier decision thatthe defendant's speedy-trial demand was not valid. The majoritysuggested that the demand made in this case was sufficient, eventhough it did not expressly cite the speedy-trial statute, as Groundrequired. The dissenting justice believed that the defendant'sdemand for a speedy trial was insufficient under Ground and,further, that the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance ofcounsel was premature. 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1051-53 (Steigmann,J., dissenting). We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal(177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now vacate the judgment of theappellate court and remand the cause to that court for furtherproceedings.

We may affirm the result below on any basis that is supportedby the record. In re Application of the Cook County Treasurer,185 Ill. 2d 428, 436 (1998). Rather than consider whether counselwas ineffective for failing to file an effective demand for a speedytrial, we believe instead that counsel's initial demand for trial wasvalid and effective, and was sufficient to constitute a demand fora speedy trial under the provisions of the statute. We note that thelaw of the case doctrine does not bar our consideration of thisissue. Relph v. Board of Education of DePue Unit School DistrictNo. 103, 84 Ill. 2d 436, 442 (1981). This is our first opportunity toaddress the issue in this case, and the law of the case doctrine doesnot limit our review here.

A defendant charged with an offense has both a constitutionaland a statutory right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const., amends VI,XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,