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Docket No. 88703-Agenda 11-September 2000.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
KEITH V. HASPREY, Appellant.

Opinion filed November 22, 2000.

JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Keith V. Hasprey, was convicted in the circuitcourt of Logan County of reckless driving. The appellate courtaffirmed his conviction and sentence (308 Ill. App. 3d 841), andwe granted leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).

BACKGROUND

On May 10, 1998, while driving in Lincoln, Illinois, defendantattempted to pass a pickup truck on a two-lane road. As he waspassing, the truck edged over toward defendant and made contactwith his vehicle. After passing the truck, defendant stopped andexited his vehicle. The driver of the truck also stopped, but thenbacked up and drove away. Defendant and a friend, who wasdriving another car nearby, decided to chase the truck. They caughtup to the truck and attempted to stop it. In so doing, they causedfurther contact between the truck and defendant's vehicle.

Subsequently, the driver of the truck pled guilty to one countof reckless driving. Defendant was charged with two counts ofreckless driving. After the State dropped one of the two countsagainst defendant, defendant proceeded to trial, and was convictedby a jury. The court sentenced defendant to 18 months' probation,a $1,000 fine plus costs, and $1,500 in restitution to the driver ofthe truck. The appellate court affirmed.

ANALYSIS

Defendant first argues that the trial court lacked authority toorder restitution. The appellate court held that section 5-5-6 of theUnified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West 1998))authorizes restitution in this case. Section 5-5-6 provides, inpertinent part, that "In all convictions for offenses in violation ofthe Criminal Code of 1961 in which the person received any injuryto their person or damage to their real or personal property as aresult of the criminal act of the defendant, the court shall orderrestitution as provided in this Section." 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West1998). Defendant contends that restitution is not authorizedbecause reckless driving, the offense of which he was convicted,is part of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-503 (West1998)) and not part of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq.(West 1998)).

Defendant is correct. Section 5-5-6 of the Code ofCorrections authorizes restitution only for violations of theCriminal Code. Defendant has not been convicted of violating theCriminal Code. While the Vehicle Code has its own restitutionprovision for those convicted of vehicle theft (see 625 ILCS5/4-108(b) (West 1998)), it has no such provision for the offenseof reckless driving. The trial court's order of restitution istherefore vacated.

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying hismotion in limine which sought to bar the State from arguing to thejury that defendant could be found guilty of reckless driving if heacted either willfully or wantonly. Defendant contends that bynaming the offense "reckless driving," the General Assemblyintended to require that a defendant's actions be both willful andwanton. The plain language of the statute, however, beliesdefendant's contention. The statute specifies that a person is guiltyof reckless driving if he drives a vehicle with "willful or wantondisregard for the safety of persons or property." (Emphasis added.)625 ILCS 5/11-503 (West 1998). The State thus was correct inarguing that defendant could be found guilty if he acted eitherwillfully or wantonly.

Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failingto declare a mistrial after it received a note from the jury. Prior tothe close of all the evidence, the jurors sent the judge the followingnote: "How do you vote if you feel at this point and time bothparties are at fault?" After discussing the matter with theprosecution and with defense counsel, the judge subsequentlyinstructed the jury as follows: "Each case is individual, each caseis different, and we deliberate a verdict as jurors after all theevidence has been presented and after you're instructed as to whatthe law is. In this particular case, it is not proper to be discussingthe case before all the evidence is in and before the instructions.*** [Y]ou have to wait until you have heard all the evidence and[been] instructed as to the law before you make any determinationon guilt or innocence." Defense counsel did not object to thisadmonition and did not move for a mistrial.

By failing to object to the judge's instructions or to request amistrial, defendant waived any objection to the court's handling ofthis matter. Furthermore, the court was under no obligation todeclare a mistrial sua sponte, because its response to the jurors'note sufficiently cured any misunderstanding on the jurors' part.

The appellate court's judgment is reversed in part andaffirmed in part. The circuit court's order of restitution is vacated.In all other respects, the circuit court's judgment is affirmed.

Appellate court judgment reversed in part

and affirmed in part;

circuit court judgment affirmed in part

and vacated in part.