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Docket No. 99696-Agenda 14-September 2005.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
TOMMY O. HARDIN, Appellant.

Opinion filed December 1, 2005.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Tommy O. Hardin, was represented at trial by anassistant public defender. He was represented in postconvictionproceedings by another assistant public defender. His postconvictionattorney argued that his trial attorney was ineffective. The sole issuein this case is whether the simple fact that both attorneys wereemployed by the Du Page County public defender's office necessitatedan inquiry by the circuit court of Du Page County into a potentialconflict of interest. The appellate court refused to remand for such aninquiry and affirmed the dismissal of the defendant's postconvictionpetition. 353 Ill. App. 3d 522. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On May 5, 1997, the defendant was indicted on five counts ofaggravated criminal sexual abuse. See 720 ILCS 5/12-16(d) (West1996). The trial court appointed the Du Page County publicdefender's office to represent the defendant. Assistant Public DefenderJameson Kunz was assigned the defendant's case.

The defendant's complaints with Kunz's representation beganalmost immediately. At an October 6, 1997, court date, the defendantreported that Kunz had made "unethical and uncalled for" statements.According to the defendant, Kunz said his job was to "sell me out,"which led the defendant to "look bad on the whole public defendersystem." The trial court found that the defendant's accusation was notcredible. The court told the defendant that it was Public DefenderStephen Baker's decision which attorney would represent him, and thecourt indicated that it had not heard anything to discredit Kunz'swork. The defendant replied, "I respectfully do not want him as myattorney. I have told him to his face that he was fired. I don't think heis going to represent me. And I do not have faith in him due to the factof what was said in our conversations, period." The trial court statedthat Kunz was experienced and competent, but that the defendant hadthe option of representing himself. The court refused to direct thepublic defender to reassign the case, and it declined to appoint privatecounsel. The defendant then warned, "Your honor, it's just that I feelit will be a conflict due to the fact that I will be filing with thedisciplinary commission." The trial court told the defendant that itwould reconsider its decision if he filed a disciplinary complaint andsuch a conflict arose.

At a September 17, 1998, court date, the defendant asked thetrial court to dismiss and replace Kunz. The trial court stated that"there has been nothing to indicate to me that he is incompetent orineffective in his representation of you. If you are having some type ofpersonality difficulties, that is something that I will not get involvedin, and that is something that you have to direct to Mr. Baker." Thecourt requested that the defendant put his complaints in writing, soKunz could understand them and relay them to Baker. On September23, 1998, when the trial court asked if the defendant was continuingto ask for the dismissal of the public defender, the defendant clarified,"This particular one." The defendant then submitted to the court ahandwritten letter, which specified 16 reasons why Kunz wasineffective:

"1. He has made statements in the past that it is his job tosell me out.

2. He has tride [sic] to have a pre ple [sic] report orderedand he knew I was aposed [sic].

3. He knows that I have said that I will not plead out thiscase, but he has tried to get me to plead out.

4. He has state [sic] that if I bring thease [sic] points up toyou that I will be found incopated [sic] for tril [sic].

5. Jami has told me that I have no say in what gose [sic]on this case.

6. I have told him on severol [sic] accounts that this istaking to [sic] long.

7. He has asked for some continuances so he could dosomthing [sic] but never did it.

8. I have object [sic] to some of the continuances that heand the State have agreed to and even on record and forexample and I was over ruled by you your Honer [sic].

9. Jami has made threats that if I cause him problemes[sic] that I will get more time.

10. Jami has kept me in the dark on most things.

11. When I asked him to file things he has refused.

12. On some motions that he has filed he wasn't preparedto argure [sic] the motion but the State was.

13. He has been doing the States [sic] job for examplewhen I objected to this last contunence [sic] he did notargure [sic] for me but agreed with the State and argued forthem.

14. I'm intitled [sic] to counsle [sic] that has my bestintrsed [sic] in minde [sic] but I don't example I was servedwithe [sic] the wornt [sic] in the I.D.O.C. at Centrale [sic] onor around March 8th 1997 and Jami knew this. But the policeofficers came and got me on April 25th 1997 my indictmentdid not come till May 2nd 1997 whe [sic] the police officerscame and got me it should never have happend [sic] myrights to the right of due process for the state to find probablecause with in the alotted [sic] amount of time give [sic] bylaw 30 days I told him about this he blew it off.

15. I've asked for a compleat [sic] copy of the transcriptsso that I might use and find the ones that would prove mypoints in the past but Jami has said he will decide whattranscripts that I will get.

Under Artacol [sic] 1 Secten [sic] 8 of the Illinois StateConstitution

16. I have tried to get Jami to file a motion to supress [sic]evedens [sic] he refuse. I my self [sic] asked Judge Dockerywho denide [sic] it."

The court scheduled a hearing on the defendant's allegations.

At an October 5, 1998, court date, Kunz stated that he haddiscussed this list with Baker, and that Baker saw no basis in thedefendant's charges to reassign the case. The trial court agreed,stating:

"Most of these items, to be perfectly honest, are veryvague, and some of them are certainly matters of strategy orlegal tactics which do fall within the province of the attorney***. *** [M]ost *** are items that appear to be some typeof a personality conflict between the two individuals ***.And as I indicated to [the defendant] several times, the Courtis not going to become involved in any type of issues ofpersonality conflict. My concern is whether there has beenineffective representation by Mr. Kunz of the defendant, andI find nothing raised in these points to show that."

The court continued the case to allow the defendant time to decidewhether to continue with the public defender, to retain a privateattorney, or to represent himself.

The next day, the defendant chose none of the above. He couldnot afford to retain a private attorney, and he explained that he wasnot qualified to represent himself. He then stated that he "will notwork with [Kunz] in any way, shape or form" and that "what he says,he does not say for me. He does not do for me." The defendantinformed the court that he had obtained forms to file a disciplinarycomplaint against Kunz and added, "I think he will be so prejudicedand retaliate." The trial court found no basis for a disciplinarycomplaint, stating that the defendant's threat of filing one was merelyan attempt to circumvent the court's order denying his motion tosubstitute counsel. The court reiterated that Kunz would remain asdefense counsel until the defendant chose to represent himself.

The defendant continued to be uncooperative, and Kunzexpressed to the trial court his concern about the defendant,questioning whether his obstinacy was a conscious decision or a resultof a mental-health problem. On November 6, 1998, the trial court helda sua sponte fitness hearing and found the defendant unfit for trial.The defendant disagreed with this finding. On July 22, 1999, the trialcourt found the defendant was fit for trial. The defendant then claimedthat Kunz had disclosed confidential medical and psychologicalreports to a doctor whom Kunz had contacted as a possible mitigationwitness. The defendant stated that he could not trust Kunz and againasked the court to dismiss and replace him. The court refused to doso.

On December 2, 1999, the defendant again voiced his displeasurewith Kunz's representation, stating to the court, "For yourinformation, your Honor, I am filing a lawsuit against [Kunz] forincompetency, and I want to get rid of him." The court responded,"Well, you can file whatever suits you want." The court gave thedefendant the choice to continue with Kunz as his attorney or torepresent himself. This exchange followed:

"THE COURT: If you file a lawsuit against [Kunz], thecase law is clear-I have numerous times indicated that [Kunz]would represent you, and unless the Public Defender's officechanges that-simply filing an ARDC complaint or any type oflawsuit does not-

THE DEFENDANT: I am telling you he is not going torepresent me.

THE COURT: Then you are going to represent yourself.

THE DEFENDANT: I am not qualified and neither is he.

THE COURT: The issue is, you are either going torepresent yourself or he is going to represent you.

THE DEFENDANT: This is what the situation boils downto, I am being blackmailed into pleading guilty-

THE COURT: No, you are not."

The case proceeded to a jury trial. A jury convicted the defendanton all five counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and the trialcourt sentenced him to concurrent 22-year terms of imprisonment.The defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. See Peoplev. Hardin, No. 2-00-0441 (2001) (unpublished order under SupremeCourt Rule 23).

On April 9, 2002, the defendant filed a pro se petition under thePost-Conviction Hearing Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West2002). The defendant alleged that Kunz was ineffective for tworeasons: he failed "to include" evidence of unnamed witnesses'psychological records, and he breached client confidentiality. Thedefendant requested postconviction counsel, and the trial courtappointed the Du Page County public defender's office to representthe defendant. Ricky Holman was assigned the defendant's case.

At a July 8, 2002, court date, Holman informed the trial courtthat the defendant's foremost request was to be represented by anattorney outside of the public defender's office. The court denied thatrequest. On November 26, 2002, Holman filed an amended petitionfor the defendant in which he fleshed out the defendant's ineffectiveassistance of counsel claims and added additional claims. Theamended petition alleged that the defendant was denied effectiveassistance of counsel because Kunz failed to cross-examine twowitnesses at trial regarding their psychological histories; failed tointroduce the psychological histories of two witnesses who gavevictim impact statements at the sentencing hearing; and failed to cross-examine those witnesses at the sentencing hearing. The amendedpetition further alleged that the trial court erred in refusing to allowKunz to cross-examine the alleged victims regarding theirpsychological histories and because it found the defendant unfit. Thepetition further alleged that Kunz violated the attorney-client privilegewhen he gave medical records to a Du Page County jail psychologistand, finally, that his sentence violated the proportionate penaltiesclause. Holman filed a Rule 651(c) certificate along with the amendedpetition, stating that he had consulted with the defendant aboutputative violations of his constitutional rights, examined the recordand transcripts, and made necessary amendments to the defendant'spro se petition. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c).

On November 26, 2002, the trial court found that the amendedpetition stated the gist of a constitutional claim and ordered the Stateto file a response. On December 20, 2002, the State filed a motion todismiss this petition. At a January 28, 2003, court date, Holmaninformed the court that he had received two letters from thedefendant. According to Holman, the defendant "distrusts the [publicdefender's] office immensely, and he's displeased, and [I] thought I'dbring it up once again." On February 28, 2003, the trial court receiveda letter from the defendant:

"The reason that I am writing this letter is to make aformail [sic] complaint against the Public Defenders Office.I had requested that I be appointed counsle [sic] out side[sic] of the Public Defenders Office due to the conflict ofinterest. I was then appointed the Public Defenders Officewho then appointed Ricky M. Holman to represent me. Thisletter is to inform you that he has failed to represent meproperly I was told that I would receve [sic] copies of everything filed and ordered. I have not receved [sic] anything norhas he kept me informed of anything. I have only receved[sic] 1 phone call in June 2002 and 1 letter telling me that Iwill be in open court to hear the aguments [sic]. I don't knowwhats [sic] going on at all. I wish to be present in court todeal with this problem. I can not have some one [sic]represent me who dose [sic] not keep me informed or has[sic] my best intrust [sic] in mind. So I ask the court toappoint counsle [sic] outside the Public Defenders Office dueto the conflict of interest. I would also like to file for areduction of time if at all possable [sic]."

The trial court acknowledged that it had received this letter, andHolman informed the court that he had recently updated the defendanton the case. The court observed that the defendant "apparently justwants more communication." Holman repeated, "[E]very time Icommunicate with him he does not want the public defender torepresent him. I'm just making that again as a matter of record."

On April 11, 2003, at the hearing on the State's motion todismiss, Holman addressed some inconsistencies among arguments inthe amended petition. Holman explained that the petition was draftedas directed by the defendant:

"Knowing his background ahead of time, psychologicalbackground, and knowing that he does not want the publicdefender's office to represent him, either at this stage of theproceedings or at trial stage, *** I followed through with hisrequest and filed each and every paragraph as he insisted thatthey be brought before the Court. I'd respectfully ask that theCourt look at each paragraph individually as it rules on theState's motion to dismiss."

The court granted the State's motion and dismissed the amendedpetition.

On appeal, the defendant did not address the merits of hispetition; he simply argued that the trial court erred by failing to inquireinto whether a conflict of interest arose when Holman attacked Kunz'seffectiveness. The appellate court affirmed. 353 Ill. App. 3d 522. Theappellate court initially reviewed People v. Banks, 121 Ill. 2d 36(1987), where this court stated that a trial court should conduct acase-by-case inquiry into a potential conflict of interest. The defendantargued that the trial court should have made this inquiry when itappointed the public defender's office to represent him inpostconviction proceedings. The appellate court disagreed, statingthat the dispositions of the consolidated cases in Banks showed thata trial court inquiry is not required. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 526.

The appellate court then relied on People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d1 (1988), and held "a trial court's duty to investigate arises only if, atan early stage in the proceedings, a defendant presents factssuggesting a conflict that goes beyond the problem of one publicdefender having to attack another." 353 Ill. App 3d at 527. Theappellate court found that the defendant's conflict of interestallegation did not trigger this duty. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 528. Thoughthe defendant did use the phrase "conflict of interest" in his letterduring postconviction proceedings, he failed to provide any detailsregarding this putative conflict of interest, other than the fact that hispostconviction attorney worked in the same office as his trial attorney.353 Ill. App. 3d at 528. The appellate court concluded that Holman'shandling of the petition does not suggest that he shied away frompursuing the ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 353 Ill. App. 3dat 528. The defendant's assertion that Holman was not communicatingwith him did not show a conflict of interest, but rather the defendant's"unrealistic expectations." 353 Ill. App. 3d at 528.

We granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

The defendant raises a single issue: whether the trial court shouldhave conducted an inquiry to ensure that there was no conflict ofinterest between his postconviction public defender and his trial publicdefender. The defendant essentially claims that Holman may have hada conflict of interest stemming solely from his employment in the samepublic defender's office as Kunz, and thus that Holman providedineffective assistance of counsel. See People v. Titone, 151 Ill. 2d 19,32 (1992) (treating a conflict of interest argument as an ineffectiveassistance argument). On this legal question, our review is de novo.People v. Morales, 209 Ill. 2d 340, 345 (2004).

The right to effective assistance of trial counsel comes from thesixth amendment and includes the correlative right to conflict-freerepresentation. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 67 L. Ed.2d 220, 230, 101 S. Ct. 1097, 1103 (1981); People v. Washington,101 Ill. 2d 104, 109-10 (1984). There is no correspondingconstitutional right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel.See People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 567 (2003). The right toassistance of counsel in postconviction proceedings is a matter oflegislative grace, and a defendant is guaranteed only the level ofassistance provided by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See Peoplev. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 204 (2004). We have labeled that level"reasonable" assistance. See People v. McNeal, 194 Ill. 2d 135, 142(2000).

However, when a defendant's appointed postconviction attorneyis called upon to assert that the defendant's appointed trial attorneywas ineffective, the distinction between constitutional and statutoryrights makes no difference. If postconviction counsel is appointed tomold the defendant's allegations into legally cognizable shapes (seePeople v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 365 (1990)), that counsel must beas conflict-free as trial counsel. See generally People v. Graham, 206Ill. 2d 465, 472 (2003) ("Just as no servant can serve two masters, noattorney can represent conflicting interests"). The right to reasonableassistance of postconviction counsel includes the correlative right toconflict-free representation. See Banks, 121 Ill. 2d 36 (considering, intwo consolidated cases, whether appointed postconviction attorneyshad conflicts based on their claims of ineffective assistance ofappointed trial attorneys). Obviously, like the constitutional right, thestatutory right does not include the right to representation by counselof the defendant's choosing, or by counsel with whom the defendanthas an amicable rapport. Cf. People v. DeRossett, 262 Ill. App. 3d541, 544 (1994), citing People v. Cox, 22 Ill. 2d 534 (1961); Peoplev. Ogurek, 356 Ill. App. 3d 429, 433 (2005). We turn to the merits.

In People v. Smith, 37 Ill. 2d 622, 623-24 (1967), we held thata per se conflict of interest exists when one public defender mustquestion the effectiveness of another public defender in the sameoffice. Twenty years later, we overruled Smith in Banks, 121 Ill. 2d36. There, we stated that "it is not clear *** that where an assistantpublic defender asserts the incompetency of another assistant, thereputation of the whole office is negatively impacted." Banks, 121 Ill.2d at 43. Arguably, when one public defender aggressively pursues anineffective assistance claim against another public defender, theintegrity of that office is bolstered. Banks, 121 Ill. 2d at 43. Werefused to assume that a public defender would place office loyaltyahead of a client's interests. Banks, 121 Ill. 2d at 43. Thus, "where anassistant public defender asserts that another assistant from the sameoffice has rendered ineffective assistance, a case-by-case inquiryshould be conducted to determine whether any circumstances peculiarto the case indicate the presence of an actual conflict of interest ***."Banks, 121 Ill. 2d at 44.

The defendant labels this rule "straightforward, clear andunequivocal." According to the defendant, when his postconvictionpublic defender, Holman, levied ineffective assistance claims againsthis trial public defender, Kunz, the trial court was required to conductan inquiry into a possible conflict of interest. The defendant, in effect,reads Banks to mandate a sua sponte investigation by the trial courtof a possible conflict. We do not believe that Banks is that broad. IfBanks provides that no per se conflict of interest exists when onepublic defender argues that another public defender in the same officewas ineffective, it cannot mean the trial court always must open aninquiry into a potential conflict.

Shortly after we decided Banks, we created a framework foranalyzing conflict of interest cases in Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1. Spreitzernoted a dichotomy between per se conflicts-conflicts created bydefense counsel's prior or current association with either theprosecution or the victim-and a second class of alleged conflicts.Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 16-17. If the defendant shows a per se conflictof interest, he need not show prejudice resulting from that conflict inorder to obtain relief. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 15. If the defendantdoes not show a per se conflict of interest, the analysis depends uponwhen he raised the issue. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 17-18. Here,Spreitzer noted another dichotomy:

"If counsel brings the potential conflict to the attention ofthe trial court at an early stage, a duty devolves upon the trialcourt to either appoint separate counsel or to take adequatesteps to ascertain whether the risk of conflict was too remoteto warrant separate counsel. (Holloway v. Arkansas (1978),435 U.S. 475, 484, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 434, 98 S. Ct. 1173,1178.) If such steps are not taken, the fact of a 'potential orpossible conflict may deprive the defendant of the guaranteedassistance of counsel.' (Emphasis in original.) (People v.Jones (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 21, 28.) While this rule is not per se***, reversal of a conviction under this rule does not requirea showing that the attorney's actual performance was in anyway affected by the purported conflict. In this sense, reversalfor the trial court's failure to alleviate possible or potentialconflicts does not require a showing of 'specific prejudice.'Holloway, 435 U.S. at 487, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 436, 98 S. Ct. at1180.

However, if the trial court is not apprised of the potentialconflict, then reversal of the conviction will only be had upona showing that 'an actual conflict of interest adverselyaffected' counsel's performance. [Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446U.S. 335, 350, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 348, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1719(1980).] What this means is that the defendant must point tosome specific defect in his counsel's strategy, tactics, ordecision making attributable to the conflict. *** [T]hedefendant is never required to prove that his attorney'sdeficiencies did not constitute harmless error. He is notrequired, in other words, to prove that the conflictcontributed to his conviction." Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 18-19.

Spreitzer swallowed the Banks rule. The trial court must takeadequate steps-i.e., conduct "a case-by-case inquiry" per Banks-todetermine whether the risk of a conflict colored the defendant'srepresentation, but only when the potential conflict is brought tocourt's attention. Bare allegations of a conflict are not enough. SeePeople v. Williams, 139 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1990). "In the absence of anevidentiary record of conflict, one should not be created based onmere speculation." Banks, 121 Ill. 2d at 46-47 (Clark, C.J., speciallyconcurring, joined by Ward, Ryan, and Miller, JJ.). The appellatecourt here held that "a trial court's duty to investigate arises only if,at an early stage in the proceedings, a defendant presents factssuggesting a conflict that goes beyond the problem of one publicdefender having to attack another." 353 Ill. App. 3d at 527; accordPeople v. Jones, 210 Ill. App. 3d 375, 378 (1991) (holding that thedefendant must provide facts to establish what the conflict was). Weagree with the appellate court, but caution that the pleading thresholdis low.

In the context of a potential conflict between two publicdefenders, the conflict issue will normally be raised by the defendant.Consequently, the defendant needs only to present the gist of such aconflict. Cf. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001), citingPeople v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). The defendant mustsketch, in limited detail, a picture of how the working relationshipbetween the public defenders created an appearance of impropriety.See People v. Moore, 338 Ill. App. 3d 11, 16 (2003). Relevant factorsinclude whether the two public defenders were trial partners in thedefendant's case (see People v. Claybourn, 221 Ill. App. 3d 1071(1991); People v. Vaughn, 200 Ill. App. 3d 765 (1990)); whether theywere in hierarchical positions where one supervised or was supervisedby the other (see People v. Munson, 265 Ill. App. 3d 765 (1994);People v. Levesque, 256 Ill. App. 3d 639 (1993)); or whether the size,structure, and organization of the office in which they worked affectedthe closeness of any supervision (see People v. Blakes, 131 Ill. App.3d 1004 (1985); People v. South, 70 Ill. App. 3d 245 (1979)).

Vaughn illustrates that the burden placed upon the defendant inthis regard is not heavy. In Vaughn, the defendant was represented bya public defender named Viola Rouse. The defendant pleaded guiltyto aggravated criminal sexual assault, but a month later filed a pro semotion to withdraw his plea, alleging that Rouse was ineffective whenshe counseled him to plead guilty. The trial court appointed anotherpublic defender named Steve Helis to represent him on this motion.The defendant requested a Chicago Bar Association lawyer, notingthat Rouse and Helis were " 'working together.' " Vaughn, 200 Ill.App. 3d at 768. The trial court denied this request.

The appellate court remanded for an inquiry into a potentialconflict springing from the working relationship between the twopublic defenders. Vaughn, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 770. The court statedthat "defendant's expressed fear of representation by attorney Helisbecause he and Rouse were 'working together,' however inarticulate,was sufficient, without further factual substantiation by defendant ***to require further inquiry by the trial court as to whether a potentialconflict of interest existed." Vaughn, 200 Ill. App. 3d at 769.

Here, the defendant did not raise a conflict of interest issue in hispro se postconviction petition, but he alluded to a conflict of interestin his February 28, 2003, letter to the trial court. The defendant statedthat he asked the trial court to appoint him an attorney from outsidethe public defender's office "due to the conflict of interest." In thisletter the defendant charged that Holman failed to represent himproperly in that Holman allegedly did not send him copies of unnameddocuments and did not keep him informed of postconvictionproceedings.

It is unclear when the defendant made this prior request forprivate counsel to remedy a conflict of interest, and what conflict thedefendant was raising. The defendant made several requests forprivate counsel before trial, and even threatened to file a disciplinarycomplaint against Kunz in order to manufacture a conflict that hehoped would force the court to appoint an attorney outside the publicdefender's office. Later, he instructed Holman to press his request forprivate counsel. Assuming that the defendant was referring to apotential conflict between Holman and Kunz, the trial court made acursory, but sufficient, inquiry. The court noted that it had receivedthe defendant's letter and that the defendant complained about a"communication breakdown" with Holman. Holman assured the courtthat he had given the defendant a complete update on thepostconviction proceedings and a copy of the State's answer to theamended petition. Because there was no other information to relay tothe defendant, the court added, "Okay and he apparently just wantsmore communication. There's no requirement."

If Holman had been covering for Kunz, the defendant presumablywould have complained about Holman's failure to attack Kunz. Thedefendant points to nothing in the record to warrant an inquiry intoHolman's diligence. In effect, the defendant asks us to order the trialcourt to act as his advocate, investigating a nebulous conflict ofinterest. Holman's work in the postconviction proceedings wasbeyond reproach. His Rule 651(c) certificate indicates that heconsulted with the defendant and reviewed the record beforeamending the defendant's pro se petition. He refashioned thedefendant's vague constitutional claims into claims that the trial courtadvanced through the summary dismissal stage. Further, he went toextraordinary lengths to assuage the defendant's distrust of the publicdefender's office by consulting with the defendant on these claims andeven how to phrase them. He raised the defendant's desire for privatecounsel at numerous court dates, and he zealously argued against theState's motion to dismiss. Tellingly, the defendant does not arguebefore us that the trial court erred in dismissing his amended petition,nor does he argue that Holman was ineffective. In the absence of somegist of a conflict of interest, we refuse to sanction a fishing expeditionto allow the defendant to cloud Holman's performance.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons that we have stated, we affirm the judgment ofthe appellate court.

Affirmed.