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Docket No. 88503-Agenda 10-September 2000.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
CHARLES C. DRUM, Appellee.

Opinion filed November 22, 2000.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Charles Drum, was charged with first degreemurder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 1996)). The circuit court ofColes County denied the State's pretrial motion to admit certainhearsay statements at defendant's trial. See 725 ILCS 5/115-10.2(West 1998). The State brought an interlocutory appeal to theappellate court pursuant to our Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R.604(a)(1)). The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack ofjurisdiction. 307 Ill. App. 3d 743. We allowed the State's petitionfor leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now reverse andremand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

The State charged defendant; his brother, Thomas Drum; andtheir friend, Marcus Douglas with the first degree murder of thevictim, Shane Ellison. Thomas and Marcus were tried separately.At their trials, Thomas and Marcus each testified in his owndefense; each acknowledged that he was involved in the victim'smurder; but each characterized his involvement as minimal anddefendant's involvement as primary. Marcus testified at Thomas'trial, but Thomas refused to testify at Marcus' trial. Thomas andMarcus were each convicted of first degree murder.

Other than defendant, Thomas and Marcus were the onlywitnesses to the murder. Thomas and Marcus, respectively,through each of their counsel, indicated that they did not intend totestify at defendant's trial.

In pretrial motions, the State sought to admit the priortestimony of Thomas and Marcus at defendant's trial, pursuant tothe statutory residual hearsay exception. 725 ILCS 5/115-10.2(West 1998). At the close of a hearing, the trial court denied theState's motions.

Pursuant to our Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), theState brought an interlocutory appeal from the denial of thesemotions to the appellate court, which held as follows:

"The State contends that we have jurisdiction pursuantto Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) [citation]. We disagreeand instead hold that when (1) the State files a motion inlimine that seeks the admission of evidence and (2) thetrial court enters a discretionary ruling-that is, a rulingthat we would normally review deferentially-denying thatmotion, then (3) Rule 604(a)(1) does not conferjurisdiction on this court to hear an interlocutory appeal ofthat ruling." 307 Ill. App. 3d at 745.

Concluding that it lacked jurisdiction, the appellate courtdismissed this interlocutory appeal. The State appeals to this court.

DISCUSSION

As in People v. Phipps, 83 Ill. 2d 87, 90 (1980): "The issue onthis appeal is very narrow. It is simply whether the State may takean interlocutory appeal from the trial court's pretrial order." At theoutset, we note the following:

"Under the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the finalauthority to prescribe the scope of interlocutory appealsby the State in a criminal case rests exclusively with thiscourt [citation], and whether a particular order may beappealed depends solely upon our construction of ourRule 604(a)(1)." People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 239(1980).

The interpretation of a supreme court rule, like a statute, is aquestion of law that we review de novo. In re Estate of Rennick,181 Ill. 2d 395, 401 (1998).

The law is quite settled. Rule 604(a)(1) provides in pertinentpart: "In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order orjudgment the substantive effect of which results in ***suppressing evidence." 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). In Phipps, 83 Ill.2d at 90-91, this court concluded that the State could bring aninterlocutory appeal from a pretrial order, reasoning as follows:

"In our recent decision in People v. Young (1980), 82 Ill.2d 234, we held 'that Rule 604(a)(1) allows aninterlocutory appeal by the State of a pretrial suppressionorder whenever the prosecutor certifies to the trial courtthat the suppression substantially impairs the State'sability to prosecute the case.' (People v. Young (1980), 82Ill. 2d 234, 247.) The court stated that 'suppressedevidence' is to have a broader meaning than evidencewhich is illegally obtained. (82 Ill. 2d 234, 242-43, 246.)Thus, the instant inquiry is whether the trial court's ordercould be considered to have suppressed evidence.

We think that in its substantive effect, rather thansimply its form, the trial court's order in this case doesoperate to prevent evidence from being admitted."(Emphasis in original.)

Despite Young and Phipps, defendant relies on People v. VanDe Rostyne, 63 Ill. 2d 364 (1976), in contending that, under Rule604(a)(1), the State may not bring an interlocutory appeal from apretrial order that excludes evidence. Van De Rostyne stressed thedistinction between the "exclusion" of evidence and the"suppression" of evidence. That decision stated: "Rule 604 wasnot intended to give the State the right to an interlocutory appealfrom every ruling excluding evidence offered by the prosecution."Van De Rostyne, 63 Ill. 2d at 368.

However, this court in Young concluded that "the State shouldbe allowed to appeal from a pretrial suppression order whichsubstantially impairs its ability to prosecute the case involved. Tothe extent that Van De Rostyne may be read to the contrary it isoverruled." Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247. The reasoning of Young hasoverruled Van De Rostyne on this point and allows the State tobring an interlocutory appeal from a pretrial evidentiary ruling thathas the substantive effect of suppressing evidence. See, e.g.,People v. Keith, 148 Ill. 2d 32, 38-39 (1992); People v. Kite, 97 Ill.App. 3d 817, 822-23 (1981).

This court has repeatedly stressed that the substantive effectof a trial court's pretrial order, not the label of the order or itsunderlying motion, controls appealability under Rule 604(a)(1).See, e.g., People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148, 152 (1997); Keith, 148Ill. 2d at 38-39. Four of the five districts of our appellate courthave applied this conclusion. See, e.g., People v. Sargeant, 292 Ill.App. 3d 508, 510 (1st Dist. 1997); People v. Smith, 248 Ill. App.3d 351, 356-57 (2d Dist. 1993); People v. Thompson, 213 Ill. App.3d 1027, 1029-30 (5th Dist. 1991); People v. Keith, 206 Ill. App.3d 414, 416-17 (3d Dist. 1990), aff'd, 148 Ill. 2d at 38-39.Scholars have so recognized:

"Following Young and Phipps, the appellate court hasrepeatedly entertained state appeals in which the ordersuppressing evidence was based on an evidentiary groundrather than a finding that the evidence was obtainedillegally. These cases rejected defense claims that theYoung holding should be limited to cases of constitutionalor statutory violations or that it did not extend to rulingsof mere exclusion of evidence." 2 R. Ruebner, IllinoisCriminal Procedure