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Docket No. 98621-Agenda 6-September 2005.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
JESSICA C. DINELLI, Appellee.

Opinion filed December 15, 2005.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

In this appeal we are asked to review the constitutionality ofsection 4-103(a)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2000)). Section 4-103(a)(1) provides the trierof fact may infer that a person exercising exclusive unexplainedpossession over a stolen vehicle has knowledge the vehicle is stolen,regardless of when it was stolen. 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West2000).

Defendant was charged in Du Page County with unlawfulpossession of a stolen motor vehicle and unlawful possession of aconverted motor vehicle, in violation of section 4-103(a)(1). TheState dismissed the conversion count and defendant pleaded guilty tounlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant subsequentlysought to withdraw her guilty plea and challenged the constitutionalityof section 4-103(a)(1). Defendant also argued the Du Page Countycharge should be dismissed based on double jeopardy because she hadalso pleaded guilty to criminal trespass to the same vehicle in CookCounty, and the unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle chargein Du Page County was the same continuing transaction.

The Du Page County circuit court allowed defendant to withdrawher guilty plea and denied her motion to dismiss based on doublejeopardy. The circuit court then dismissed the unlawful possession ofa stolen motor vehicle charge, finding the permissive inference ofsection 4-103(a)(1) unconstitutional based on this court's decision inPeople v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400 (2003). The State appealed pursuantto Supreme Court Rules 603 and 604(a)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R. 603; 188Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).

We hold the circuit court prematurely held the statuteunconstitutional as applied to defendant and it was error to dismiss theindictment on that ground. We further hold that defendant's claim ofdouble jeopardy does not support the circuit court's ruling dismissingthe indictment. Consequently, we reverse that part of the order of thecircuit court of Du Page County dismissing the indictment and remandfor further proceedings. Because the State does not dispute thepropriety of the circuit court allowing defendant to withdraw herguilty plea, we therefore affirm that ruling.

I. BACKGROUND

Initially, we are compelled to remark upon the extremelyconfusing and perplexing facts, pleadings, transcripts, and record inthis case. The following background best details the trials andtribulations befalling this obviously troubled young woman whoapparently suffers from psychiatric and eating disorders and a heroinaddiction.

Defendant's troubles began on March 24, 2002, in Cook Countywhen a verified complaint charged her with criminal trespass to avehicle (720 ILCS 5/21-2 (West 2000)). The complaint alleged sheknowingly and without legal justification entered the vehicle of MartinJ. Corzine without his permission. The complaint named "Corzine J.Martin" as the complainant, but was signed by an unknown person"for Martin Corzine." The complaint further states, "Corzine J.Martin, being duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that he read theforegoing complaint by him subscribed and that the same is true."Inexplicably, the attestation clause is again signed by an unknownperson "for Martin Corzine." The attestation clause appears to beverified by a deputy clerk.

On February 18, 2003, defendant was transported from theDu Page County jail to Cook County and pleaded guilty to thatcharge. She was sentenced to a term of 116 days in jail, with credit for116 days served in Du Page County, where she was being held on thecharge resulting in the ruling we now review. The basis for thissentencing credit for time served in another county on a completelydifferent charge does not appear in the record, and is not an issue inthis appeal.

Also on March 24, 2002, a criminal complaint was filed in theCircuit Court of Du Page County against defendant, alleging that onor about March 4, 2002, she committed the offense of unlawfulpossession of a stolen vehicle, in violation of section 4-103(a)(1) ofthe Code (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2000)), a Class 2 felony.The complainant is listed as "Ofc. LeJeune." The signature on thecomplaint is unreadable and, as later explained, was signed by OfficerLeJeune. Martin J. Corzine is listed as a witness on the complaint. Aslater explained, Martin Corzine, the owner of the vehicle, refused tosign the complaint. An arrest warrant was issued upon this complaint.

Thereafter, the State commenced a felony prosecution byindictment. On April 11, 2002, a Du Page County grand jury indicteddefendant on one count of unlawful possession of a stolen motorvehicle and one count of unlawful possession of a converted motorvehicle. 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2000). The indictmentindicates the only witness testifying before the grand jury was OfficerLeJeune. It appears that on April 11, 2002, defendant was released onbond.

Defendant was charged under section 4-103(a)(1) of the Code,stating:

"A person not entitled to the possession of a vehicle oressential part of a vehicle to receive, possess, conceal, sell,dispose, or transfer it, knowing it to have been stolen orconverted; additionally the General Assembly finds that theacquisition and disposition of vehicles and their essentialparts are strictly controlled by law and that such acquisitionsand dispositions are reflected by documents of title, uniforminvoices, rental contracts, leasing agreements and bills of sale.It may be inferred, therefore[,] that a person exercisingexclusive unexplained possession over a stolen or convertedvehicle or an essential part of a stolen or converted vehiclehas knowledge that such vehicle or essential part is stolen orconverted, regardless of whether the date on which suchvehicle or essential part was stolen is recent or remote[.]"625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2000).

On August 6, 2002, defendant failed to appear for a statushearing and a bench warrant was issued. The bench warrant wasvacated when defense counsel disclosed that defendant had beenadmitted to three different hospitals on four different occasions duringAugust for psychiatric, gall bladder and appendix problems, and forsurgery. She was finally released from the last hospital on September22, 2002. It appears that defendant was subsequently arrested forfailure to appear on an October 25, 2002, court date and no bond wasfixed. On November 13, 2002, a full cash bail of $100,000 was set,then reduced to a $100,000 bond, 10% to apply. Defendant wasapparently unable to make bond and was held in the Du Page Countyjail, where she remained a total of 116 days.

To participate in the Du Page County drug court program forinpatient treatment of her heroin addiction, defendant pleaded guiltyto unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle on January 28, 2003,and the State dismissed the unlawful possession of a converted motorvehicle charge. Defendant was released from jail on February 20,2003, for substance abuse treatment. On March 11, 2003, defendantwas returned to jail when she was dismissed from the inpatientprogram. On April 28, 2003, defendant was released from jail to enteranother inpatient substance abuse program. On June 12, 2003,defendant was once again returned to jail, apparently for failing tocomplete successfully the substance abuse program. Beginning June25, 2003, defendant was released from jail to the custody of herparents for a few hours each day for intensive outpatient treatment forher eating disorder, psychological services, meetings, and workrelease. She was then released from jail on September 22, 2003. OnSeptember 28, 2003, defendant was again taken into custody and heldin jail on $50,000 full cash bail. On October 7, 2003, the Statepetitioned to discharge defendant from the drug court program due tononcompliance.

In response, on November 13, 2003, defendant filed a motion todismiss the indictment, alleging the statute was unconstitutional as aviolation of due process. Defendant also brought a double jeopardychallenge, based on her pleading guilty to criminal trespass to avehicle, a lesser-included offense of unlawful possession of a stolenmotor vehicle, in Cook County on February 18, 2003. Defendantfurther sought to withdraw her guilty plea based on newly discoveredevidence that Corzine's testimony would exculpate her.

On January 22, 2004, the circuit court held a hearing ondefendant's double jeopardy challenge. Martin Corzine testified he hadknown defendant for years and loaned her one of his automobiles onor about March 4, 2002. He never told anyone defendant stole thevehicle, nor did he request she return the car. Rather, he voluntarilygave defendant the car and never filed a stolen automobile report.Defendant's mother called him a number of times in mid-March 2002,and informed him that defendant was in the hospital and that the carwas at their home and he could pick it up. Corzine responded hewould pick the car up at his convenience. Defendant's parents laterinformed him that defendant was released from the hospital and hadtaken the car. Corzine indicated his only reason for contacting thepolice was his concern for defendant's safety.

Defendant's mother, Karen Dinelli, testified that defendant livedat her home during March 2002 and that Corzine loaned defendant hisvehicle. Defendant was hospitalized during mid-March forapproximately six days. She called Corzine numerous times to tell himthe car was in her driveway and he could pick it up at any time.Corzine told her he was busy, but would eventually pick up the car.Corzine never told her that defendant stole the car or exertedunauthorized control over it, or that he wanted it back. Karen Dinelliindicated on cross-examination that defendant told her that she hadpermission to have the vehicle.

Defendant testified that Corzine is a very good friend and heloaned her the car in early March 2002. Corzine never asked her toreturn the car. Defendant knew her parents called Corzine andinformed him the vehicle was available at their house. Defendant washospitalized from about March 16 to March 22, 2002. The car was inher general custody from early to late March 2002. On cross-examination, defendant indicated she was motivated to plead guilty tothe Cook County and Du Page County charges to get into drugtreatment.

Officer Steven LeJeune testified that on March 23, 2002, MartinCorzine told him that he loaned his car to defendant for a couple ofdays, that she returned the car on March 4, but the car was missingthe next morning. Corzine did not tell him that he received any phonecalls from defendant's parents regarding the missing car. OfficerLeJeune called defendant's mother but did not go to their home to getthe car. LeJeune never asked Corzine to sign a statement regardingthe theft of the car or the investigation. According to LeJeune,Corzine said defendant did not return his car. LeJeune admittedCorzine did not sign a complaint against defendant. LeJeune latertestified Corzine signed a criminal complaint, but on cross-examination admitted the signature was his own.

On February 2, 2004, the circuit court issued an oral rulingallowing defendant to withdraw her guilty plea and denying hermotion to dismiss based on double jeopardy. Based on this court'sdecision in People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400 (2003), the circuit courtalso found the permissive inference of section 4-103(a)(1)unconstitutional. The court reasoned:

"Okay this is the bottom line. You know I'm very familiarwith [Greco] and the statute is exactly the same and the issueis remote as to whether the defendant has reason to know orshould have known that the vehicle was stolen. Thispresumption as it's written in the statute although applied toa different, a part of a vehicle rather than the whole vehicle in[Greco] it's still the same statute. And this inference allowsthe State to prevail on a possession of stolen motor vehiclesimply by showing that the vehicle had been reported stolenand that the defendant was in possession of the car. *** Forexample someone who buys a vehicle without a title[,] youknow[,] that ought [to] raise some concern as to whether ornot this vehicle is stolen or not[,] or [an] attempt to buy a carwhere the steering column has been peeled or there's no keysto the car. However here that's not the issue and thisdefendant stands in the place of the purchase[r] of theperson[, and] she argues [it] is unfair [as] to this statute[,and] is unconstitutional. So in that she was given the car withpermission. And arguably that permission was withdrawnlater and if that's the case it was withdrawn, don't quote meon the exact date like after the 20th or so of March / she'sthen arrested in Cook County in possession of the stolenmotor vehicle, but she pleads guilty to trespass. She ischarged on virtually the same date and time with possessionof [a] stolen motor vehicle in Du Page. I find one that thestatute is unconstitutional [based on Greco] and[,] however,I would decline to having found the statute unconstitutional[on double jeopardy grounds]. I think that there is enough ofa factual difference to allow the matter on double jeopardyjust to proceed to trial. [The motion to dismiss based ondouble jeopardy] would be denied because I think there's asufficient factual difference. And with respect to the ***newly discovered evidence *** it's the type of evidence thatfrankly the court just can't turn its back on ***. So I wouldfind I'll allow the defendant to withdraw her plea of guiltyand I find that the statute is unconstitutional and if itproceeds she's entitled to a new trial."

The circuit court then entered the following written order:

"[T]hat after arguments being heard and evidence beingpresented, for the reasons stated in the record, theDefendant's motion to vacate her plea of guilty and dismissthe indictment is granted with regards to constitutionality.The defendant's motion with regards to double jeopardy isdenied.

Case continued *** for bond hearing. Defendant incustody. Speedy tolled." (Emphasis added.)

It bears mentioning at this point that despite the written orderindicating dismissal of the charge against defendant, she continued tobe held in jail until February 11, 2004. Bond was then set andconditions attached requiring submission to urine screening, enteringa dual treatment program, and reporting to the court every Monday.

On May 21, 2004, the circuit court denied the State's motion toreconsider the dismissal order. On June 11, 2004, the State filed atimely notice of appeal directly to this court, asserting jurisdictionpursuant to Supreme Court Rules 603 and 604(a)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R.603; 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). Defendant did not appeal the denial ofher motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy.

II. ANALYSIS

Two issues are presented in this appeal. First, whether the circuitcourt erred in declaring the permissive inference contained in section4-103(a)(1) of the Code unconstitutional. Second, whetherdefendant's claim of double jeopardy supports the circuit court'sdismissal of the indictment.

A. Constitutionality of Section 4-103(a)(1)

The State argues the inference contained in section 4-103(a)(1)is constitutionally valid as applied to motor vehicles within the contextof the facts in this record and that the circuit court erred in finding theinference unconstitutional. Defendant argues the inference operates asa presumption and violates her right to due process of law.

This court has recognized that "[a]ll statutes are presumed to beconstitutional, and the burden of rebutting that presumption is on theparty challenging the validity of the statute to demonstrate clearly aconstitutional violation." People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 406(2003), citing People v. Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d 334, 338 (2001). A courtmust construe a statute so as to affirm its constitutionality, ifreasonably possible. People v. Funches, 212 Ill. 2d 334, 339-40(2004) (citing Greco, 204 Ill. 2d at 406, and In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d291, 296 (2001)). We review the constitutionality of a statute denovo. Funches, 212 Ill. 2d at 340.

In this case, the circuit court, in an oral ruling, declared thatsection 4-103(a)(1) of the Code is unconstitutional. Unfortunately,the written order granting the motion to dismiss did not summarize thecircuit court's specific findings of fact or grounds for its conclusionsof law. The circuit court's oral pronouncement did not specify theconstitutional provision it was relying upon to invalidate the law. Thecircuit court recited no relevant facts in rendering its judgment and didnot set forth in any manner why this statute is unconstitutional. Thecircuit court did not indicate whether it found the statute faciallyunconstitutional, or unconstitutional only as applied to this defendant.The oral pronouncement makes no mention of dismissal of the charge.Nevertheless, the dismissal is announced in the written order and laterconfirmed by denial of the State's motion to reconsider. Accordingly,we must presume the charge was in fact dismissed.

The difficult job of reviewing a circuit court's decision toinvalidate a statute is made much more demanding when the record isunclear and the basis for the ruling is ambiguous. See In re Parentageof John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253, 266 (2004) ("Our task of reviewing thecircuit court's judgment *** is hampered by a lack of clarity in thecourt's ruling. The scope of the ruling is not readily apparent from thetext of the order").

This court has emphasized that "[w]hen a circuit court doessomething as serious as holding that a statute violates the constitution,then the circuit court must also be mindful to clearly state whatportion of the statute is unconstitutional as well as the legal basis forthat ruling." People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (2004). Inseveral recent cases, we have been forced to determine the scope ofa circuit court's decision striking down a statute on constitutionalgrounds based on a ruling that was " 'conclusory and unsupported byany legal analysis or explanation.' " Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 189,quoting In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d at 266. Accordingly,we again "remind our circuit courts that statutory enactments arepresumed constitutional, and that it is the duty of the court to construea statute so as to affirm its constitutionality, if such a construction isreasonably possible." Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 189 (citing Vuagniauxv. Department of Professional Regulation, 208 Ill. 2d 173 (2003), andBurger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 32 (2001)).

We must, therefore, initially determine the scope of the circuitcourt's holding. In examining the transcript of the judge's oralpronouncement, we note that the circuit court relied on this court'srecent decision in Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400. Based on the circuit court'sreliance on Greco, and its reference to the specific facts of this case,we logically conclude that the circuit court determined that thepermissive inference violates due process as applied to this defendant.This is the only reasonable interpretation of the circuit court's rulingthat is apparent from the record before us. This interpretation issupported by this court's pronouncement that the constitutionality ofan inference must be examined "only as applied to the particulardefendant within the context of all the evidence in the record."(Emphasis added.) Funches, 212 Ill. 2d at 343.

Section 4-103(a)(1) of the Code contains an evidentiaryinference. Funches, 212 Ill. 2d at 341; Greco, 204 Ill. 2d at 405. Thiscourt has recognized that "[i]nferences are essential to the expeditiousresolution of factual questions." Funches, 212 Ill. 2d at 342.

In criminal prosecutions, however, our legislature may onlycreate statutory inferences in compliance with due process. Funches,212 Ill. 2d at 342. We have consistently held that:

"An inference does not violate due process guaranteeswhere three conditions are satisfied: (1) there must be arational connection between the basic fact and the presumedfact; (2) the presumed fact must be more likely than not toflow from the basic fact; and (3) the inference must besupported by corroborating evidence of guilt. If there is nocorroborating evidence, the leap from the basic fact to thepresumed element must still be proved beyond a reasonabledoubt." Funches, 212 Ill. 2d at 342-43 (citing People v.Hester, 131 Ill. 2d 91, 100 (1989), and People v. Housby, 84Ill. 2d 415, 421 (1981)).

Applying this test, we are required to determine whether the inferenceis invalid as applied to defendant under the evidence in this record.

Here, the circuit court relied on Greco and implicitly determinedthat section 4-103(a)(1) violated due process as applied to thisdefendant, in the context of the evidence in this case. In Greco, thiscourt held that the inference contained in section 4-103.2(b)incorporating section 4-103(a)(1) violated due process as applied toa charge of aggravated unlawful possession of special mobileequipment (625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(5) (West 2000)). Greco, 204 Ill.2d at 414-15. We explained that by omitting the requirement that theequipment be recently stolen from the inference, the General Assembly"dramatically weakened the probability that the inference will becorrect with regard to special mobile equipment." Greco, 204 Ill. 2dat 414. We reasoned that "there is no substantial assurance that aperson with unexplained possession of a piece of special mobileequipment stolen, for example 10 years ago, more likely than not hasknowledge that the piece of equipment was stolen." Greco, 212 Ill. 2dat 414.

In Greco, this court recognized that the acquisition and transferof special mobile equipment is not subject to the strict control anddocumentation requirements for conveyance of other vehicles. Greco,212 Ill. 2d at 414. Consequently, we expressed no opinion on theconstitutionality of the same permissive inference in the context ofother vehicles. Greco, 212 Ill. 2d at 414.

In Funches, this court faulted a trial court for its "clearlymisplaced" reliance on Greco in holding that the permissive inferencewas unconstitutional without examining the constitutionality of theinference as applied to the defendant in that case. Funches, 212 Ill. 2dat 346. "In Greco, we expressly limited our constitutional assessmentto the particular crime charged ***." Funches, 212 Ill. 2d at 345.Accordingly, simply because this court struck down the inference asit applies to special mobile equipment does not mean the inference isinvalid in every case.

Funches emphasized that the constitutionality of an inference canbe tested only as applied to a particular defendant, under a particularcharge, in light of the particular record. Funches, 212 Ill. 2d at 345-46. This court determined that the circuit court erred in holdingsection 4-103.2(b) unconstitutional as applied to the defendant whenthe allegations of the criminal information had not yet been subjectedto adversarial testing and consideration of any evidence. Funches, 212Ill. 2d at 346. We reasoned that the defendant did not have standingto challenge the inference as applied to him when the defendant couldnot establish, under the facts of the case, that there was no rationalway the trier of fact could make the connection permitted by theinference. Funches, 212 Ill. 2d at 346.

Accordingly, the defendant had "failed to demonstrate that theinference *** violates due process as applied to him." Funches, 212Ill. 2d at 346. Here, defendant's guilty plea was based on stipulatedfacts. When she stipulated to the factual basis of guilt, the permissiveinference was unnecessary and inoperative in this case. Thus, thepermissive inference was not actually applied to her. Even if thepermissive inference had been applied in conjunction with a guiltyplea, a defendant cannot be affected by application of a permissiveinference during a guilty plea that has been withdrawn.

The record in this case, like Funches, has not been subject toadversarial testing, and the circuit court invalidated section4-103(a)(1) without considering any evidence. This case isdistinguishable from Greco, when it was apparent from the Grecorecord that the State intended to rely on the permissive inference, anddefendant was in immediate danger of sustaining direct injury as aresult of enforcement of the statute. It is not at all apparent from therecord here that the inference could be or will be applied to defendant.

Before a trial court may apply a permissive inference, "(1) theremust be a rational connection between the basic fact and the presumedfact; (2) the presumed fact must be more likely than not to flow fromthe basic fact; and (3) the inference must be supported bycorroborating evidence of guilt." Funches, 212 Ill. 2d at 342-43(citing Hester, 131 Ill. 2d at 100, and Housby, 84 Ill. 2d at 421).During the hearing concerning double jeopardy, Corzine, the ownerof the vehicle, testified that he loaned the car to defendant, neverrequested defendant to return the vehicle, and did not file a stolenautomobile report with the police department. Corzine further testifiedthat defendant's parents notified him that the car was at their homeand he told them he would eventually come and pick it up.Defendant's mother corroborated this testimony and testified thatCorzine never indicated that defendant had stolen the car or exertedunauthorized control over it. Further, Officer LeJuenne testified thatCorzine refused to sign a statement because defendant did not stealthe car. Officer LeJuenne then testified that Corzine signed a criminalcomplaint for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. However, oncross-examination, LeJuenne admitted that he, and not Corzine,signed the complaint.

If these are the facts likely to be admitted into evidence uponremand for trial, it is improbable that the trier of fact could rationallymake the connection to trigger the inference. Thus, we conclude thatdefendant has failed to show that she is in immediate danger of havingthe permissive inference applied to her.

On the other hand, if additional evidence is adduced at trial thatwould permit the trier of fact to make a rational inference, defendantcannot establish at this juncture that the statute would beunconstitutional as applied to her. Accordingly, we hold that thecircuit court improperly held the inference contained in section4-103(a)(1) unconstitutional as applied to defendant, and the circuitcourt's holding does not support dismissal of the indictment.

B. Double Jeopardy

Defendant asserted in the trial court that her conviction upon herguilty plea in Du Page County violated her right not to be twice putin jeopardy for the same offense, as guaranteed by the fifthamendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.V). She claimed that she had already been convicted of the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass to the same vehicle in CookCounty, and that the Du Page County prosecution involved the samecontinuing transaction. The State maintained that defendant's twoprosecutions were based on different acts, separated by fundamentalintervening events. The trial court denied defendant's motion todismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.

Defendant did not appeal this issue. Nonetheless we may affirmthe circuit court on any basis supported by the record. See People v.Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 132 (2003). Thus, we will reviewdefendant's double jeopardy challenge solely to determine whether thechallenge justified the circuit court's dismissal of the indictment.

The circuit court's oral pronouncement denying defendant'smotion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds simply stated: "Ithink there is enough of a factual difference to allow the matter ondouble jeopardy just to proceed to trial." The circuit court did notelaborate on the factual differences it found.

Both the United States and Illinois constitutions provide that noperson shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same criminal offenses.U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,