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Docket No. 97062-Agenda 8-September 2004.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOHN
W. CORNELIUS, Appellee.

Opinion filed December 2, 2004.
 

CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Defendant, John Wayne Cornelius, was charged by indictment inthe circuit court of Champaign County with one count of unlawfulfailure to register as a sex offender in the City of Champaign, within10 days of establishing residence there, in violation of section 3(b) ofthe Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS150/3(b) (West 2002)). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss thecharge, arguing that the Registration Act, as well as the Sex Offenderand Child Murderer Community Notification Law (Notification Law)(730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2002)), violated several provisionsof the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution of 1970.The circuit court granted defendant's dismissal motion. For thereasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court, andremand this cause for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

The Sex Offender Registration Act and the Sex Offender andChild Murderer Notification Law operate in tandem, providing acomprehensive scheme for the registration of Illinois sex offenders andthe dissemination of information about these offenders to the public.People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 416 (2000).

The Registration Act requires that all sex offenders, as defined insection 2 of that act (730 ILCS 150/2 (West 2002)), shall register inperson with municipal or county law enforcement officials within 10days of establishing a residence in that municipality or county. 730ILCS 150/3(a)(1), (a)(2), (b) (West 2002). Pursuant to theRegistration Act, an offender must provide a written, signed statementwhich includes the registrant's current address and current place ofemployment. In addition, the offender must submit a photograph. TheRegistration Act further provides that the registry information mayalso include the offender's fingerprints. 730 ILCS 150/3(c)(6), 8(West 2002). Finally, the registration information must also includewhether the person is a sex offender as defined in section 105 (730ILCS 152/105 (West 2002)) of the Notification Law. 730 ILCS 150/8(West 2002). The registering law enforcement agency shall enter theinformation into the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System(LEADS). 730 ILCS 50/8 (West 2002).

The Registration Act further requires that, in making thisregistration, the offender must provide "positive identification anddocumentation that substantiates proof of residence at the registeringaddress." 730 ILCS 150/3(c)(5) (West 2002). A registrant whochanges his address must inform the law enforcement agency withwhich he last registered within 10 days of the change, and he mustregister anew with the appropriate local law enforcement agencyhaving jurisdiction over his new residence, also within a 10-dayperiod. 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2002). Failure to comply with theregistration requirements of this act is a Class 4 felony. 730 ILCS150/10 (West 2002).

An offender who is subject to Registration Law is, in turn, alsosubject to the provisions of the Notification Law. The NotificationLaw provides that at the time a sex offender registers under section 3of the Registration Act, or reports a change of address under section6 of that Act, "the offender shall notify the law enforcement agencyhaving jurisdiction with whom the offender registers or reports achange of address *** that the offender is a sex offender." 730 ILCS152/110 (West 2002). The Notification Law requires the Illinois StatePolice to maintain a Statewide Sex Offender Database "for thepurpose of identifying sex offenders and making that informationavailable" to those individuals specified in the Notification Law. 730ILCS 152/115(a) (West 2002). The information contained in thisdatabase-which includes the name, address, date of birth, place ofemployment, school attended and offense or adjudication of all sexoffenders required to register under section 3 of the RegistrationAct-must be disclosed to entities such as school boards, schoolprincipals, and child care facilities in the county where the offender isrequired to register, resides, is employed, or is attending an institutionof higher education. 730 ILCS 152/120 (West 2002). The StatePolice, in its discretion, may also disclose this information to anyperson "likely to encounter a sex offender." 730 ILCS 152/120(b)(West 2002). Local law enforcement authorities must make theregistry information available and "open to inspection by the public"in accordance with procedures set forth in the Notification Law. 730ILCS 152/120(c) (West 2002).

On July 1, 2000, section 115 of the Notification Law wasamended by adding a new subsection (b), which requires that theIllinois State Police make the information contained in the StatewideSex Offender Database accessible to the general public by means ofthe Internet. 730 ILCS 152/115(b) (West 2002). Specifically, section115(b) provides:

"(b) The Department of State Police must make theinformation contained in the Statewide Sex OffenderDatabase accessible on the Internet by means of a hyperlinklabeled 'Sex Offender Information' on the Department'sWorld Wide Web home page. The Department of StatePolice must update that information as it deems necessary."

It is against this background that defendant was arrested on April18, 2002. At the time of his arrest, defendant lived in an apartmentbuilding in the City of Champaign and had resided at that locationsince July 2001. The landlord of the building called police after severalfemale tenants complained that defendant had engaged in peculiar anddisturbing behavior, including roaming the hallways at night whilemoaning, peeping at them from his windows, and making strangenoises.

When the police responded, they ran defendant's name throughthe LEADS system. LEADS indicated that defendant had beenconvicted in 1992 for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Accordingly,because a conviction for aggravated criminal sexual abuse classifieddefendant as a "sex offender" pursuant to section 2 of the RegistrationAct (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1) (West 2002)), defendant was required tocomply with the Act's registration requirements. At the time of his1992 conviction, defendant was registered at an address in Rantoul,Illinois. However, the Champaign officers discovered that, at the timeof his arrest, defendant was not in compliance with the provisions ofthe Registration Act, as he had failed to notify the authorities that hehad moved to Champaign.

Defendant was subsequently indicted by a Champaign Countygrand jury for unlawful failure to register as a sex offender, inviolation of section 3 of the Registration Act. The provision underwhich defendant was charged specifically provides as follows:

"Any sex offender, regardless of any initial, prior or otherregistration, shall, within 10 days of establishing a residence,place of employment, or temporary domicile for more than 10days in any county, register in person as set forth insubsection (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a-5)." 730 ILCS 150/3(b) (West2000).

In addition to the registration requirements set forth in section 3 of theRegistration Act, defendant was also subject to the similar registrationrequirement found in section 110 of the Notification Law (730 ILCS152/110 (West 2002)), as well as the provision requiring that his sexoffender registry information be available on the State Police Internetsite pursuant to section 115(b) of the Notification Law. 730 ILCS152/115(b) (West 2002).

On July 31, 2002, defendant moved to dismiss the charge.According to defendant's motion to dismiss, "the Illinois Sex OffenderRegistration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2002)) and itscompanion Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community NotificationLaw (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2002)) are in violation of theUnited States and Illinois Constitutions as they violate the defendant'sDue Process rights and constitute unconstitutional punishment inviolation of the Ex Post Facto clause of the United States and IllinoisConstitutions and are in violation of the right to privacy guaranteed bythe Illinois constitution." Defendant further asserted in his dismissalmotion that both the Registration Act and the Notification Law wereunconstitutional because they violated the prohibition against doublejeopardy in the Illinois and United States constitutions; they violatedthe equal protection provisions in the Illinois and United Statesconstitutions; and they violated the right to privacy implied in theUnited States Constitution.

In his motion to dismiss, defendant acknowledged that this court,in our prior decision in People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413 (2000),held that section 3 of the Registration Act and section 110 of theNotification Law did not violate the federal and state constitutions.Defendant asserted, however, that subsequent to our decision inMalchow, the General Assembly added the new subsection (b) tosection 115 of the Notification Law, which requires the Illinois StatePolice to publish information about a sex offender and his or herphotograph on its Internet site. According to defendant, the additionof subsection (b) to section 115 of the Notification Law raised new expost facto, privacy, due process, and double jeopardy concerns notaddressed by this court in the Malchow decision. Defendant furtherdistinguished Malchow on the basis that Malchow did not discuss thegeneral due process implications of the Registration Act andNotification Law and only "briefly discussed" whether thoseprovisions impermissibly infringed on the defendant's privacy rights.In his motion, defendant stressed that he was not challenging, onprivacy grounds, the requirement that he register under theRegistration Act; defendant's challenge was limited to section 115(b)of the Notification Law, which requires that his sex-offender data bemade available on the Internet. According to defendant, the"wholesale dissemination by the State of his private information on itsWorld Wide Web site violates his right to privacy."

In addition, defendant asserted in his motion to dismiss that twothen-recent decisions rendered by the United States Court of Appeals"mandate[d]" a finding that both the Registration Act and theNotification Law were unconstitutional. In Doe v. Department ofPublic Safety, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 1, 155 L.Ed. 2d 98, 123 S. Ct. 1160 (2003), the Second Circuit Court ofAppeals held that a Connecticut sex offender registration law violatedprocedural due process when it failed to provide persons on the statesex offender registry an opportunity to avoid being listed on theregistry by proving they were not currently dangerous to the public.In Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 84, 155L. Ed. 2d 164, 123 S. Ct. 1140 (2003), the Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals held that because the effects of the Alaska sex offenderregistration and notification law were punitive, that scheme violatedthe ex post facto clause.

On August 11, 2003, defendant filed a supplemental memorandumin support of his motion to dismiss. In this pleading, defendant noted thatthe United States Supreme Court had recently decided ConnecticutDepartment of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98, 123S. Ct. 1160 (2003), wherein the Court reversed the Second Circuit Courtof Appeals' decision in Doe v. Department of Public Safety, which heldthat the public disclosure of the Connecticut sex offender registry violatedthe due process clause. In his supplemental memorandum, defendantattempted to factually distinguish his case from that of Doe. Whereas inDoe the defendant asserted that his right to procedural due process hadbeen violated by the statutory provisions, in the matter at bar defendantstressed that the Registration Act and Notification Law violated hisconstitutional right to substantive due process.

On September 3, 2003, the circuit court conducted a hearing ondefendant's motion to dismiss the charge. Defendant and the Statewere each represented by counsel, who briefly presented argumentsto the circuit court. The transcript of this hearing, which consists of15 pages, reveals that defense counsel focused his brief argumentupon the substantive due process and privacy challenges to thestatutes and did not mention the numerous other constitutionalchallenges to the statutes set forth in his written motion to dismiss.

At the conclusion of argument, the trial court judge made an oralruling, granting defendant's motion to dismiss the charge. The entiretyof that oral ruling is as follows:

"THE COURT: Counsel, this is an interesting issue. Ithink as I have indicated on more than one occasion, theIllinois Supreme Court [in Malchow] was rather specific anddetailed in their analysis of the old statute, and they base theirdecision on the limited dissemination of that information. Thefact that the new statute mandates putting this information onthe Web, which makes it available to literally everyone in theworld, is interesting, and quite frankly, troubling. Our Illinoisconstitution talks about the right to privacy. And I have toagree with [defense counsel], if you're going to establish alaw that allows this information to be so broadlydisseminated, there has to be a purpose for it, and I believethe old law was appropriate and correct, and [defensecounsel], I'm going to give you the opportunity, if the Statewishes to appeal this, to argue your case before the IllinoisSupreme Court. I'm going to grant the Motion to Dismiss."

The record reveals that this is the only pronouncement made by thecircuit court with respect to its grant of defendant's motion to dismissthe charge. The record does not contain a written order entered by thecircuit court with respect to this ruling.

The State timely made a direct appeal to this court. 134 Ill. 2d R.603.

ANALYSIS

Although the circuit court did not explicitly declare theRegistration Act and the Notification Law unconstitutional, a findingof unconstitutionality can be the only basis for granting dismissal ofthe charge against defendant. Accordingly, the circuit court'sjudgment granting defendant's motion to dismiss is before us on directreview. Because the constitutional validity of a statute is a question oflaw, we review de novo the circuit court's decision declaring thestatute unconstitutional. In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253(2004); Arvia v. Madigan, 209 Ill. 2d 520, 536 (2004).

In the matter at bar, the circuit court, in a very brief oral ruling,granted defendant's motion to dismiss the charge against him. In turn,defendant's dismissal motion alleged numerous grounds upon whichthe Registration Act and the Notification Law violated both theUnited States and the Illinois Constitutions. Unfortunately, the circuitcourt failed to set forth the specific grounds upon which it granteddefendant's motion to dismiss. As we recently observed in In reParentage of John M., "[o]ur task of reviewing the circuit court'sjudgment in the case at bar is hampered by a lack of clarity in thecourt's ruling." In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d at 266. It iswith concern that we note that the instant cause is the second occasionin which we have recently been forced to discern the scope of a circuitcourt's ruling declaring a statute to be unconstitutional. See In reParentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253 (2004).

As in In re Parentage of John M., we are here faced with acircuit court ruling that is "conclusory and unsupported by any legalanalysis or explanation." In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d at266. When a circuit court does something as serious as holding thata statute violates the constitution, then the circuit court must also bemindful to clearly state what portion of the statute is unconstitutionalas well as the legal basis for that ruling.

We remind our circuit courts that statutory enactments arepresumed constitutional, and that it is the duty of the court to construea statute so as to affirm its constitutionality, if such a construction isreasonably possible. Vuagniaux v. Department of ProfessionalRegulation, 208 Ill. 2d 173 (2003); Burger v. Lutheran GeneralHospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 32 (2001). This presumption derives from thefact that when a circuit court declares a statute unconstitutional, sucha holding destabilizes the area of law within which the statute isinvalidated until that ruling is reviewed by this court. We havepreviously cautioned that circuit courts should " 'not *** compromisethat stability in the first place by declaring legislation unconstitutionalwhen the particular case does not require it.' " Hearne v. Illinois StateBoard of Education, 185 Ill. 2d 443, 454 (1999), quoting Trent v.Winningham, 172 Ill. 2d 420, 425 (1996). To that end, it is wellsettled that only where the party challenging the validity of theenactment has borne his or her burden to clearly establish aconstitutional violation that a statute may be declared invalid. In reJ.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 62 (2003); People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203Ill. 2d 264, 290 (2003). If a statute's construction is doubtful, a courtshould resolve that doubt in favor of the statute's validity. Miller v.Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 57-58 (2001).

This is not to mean that statutes are unassailable; however,"neither should circuit courts lightly or cavalierly declareunconstitutional that which the representatives of the people have seenfit to enact." People v. Conlan, 189 Ill. 2d 286, 291-92 (2000).Accordingly, the best practice for our circuit courts when holding astatute unconstitutional is to state with specificity the statutoryprovision or provisions found to violate the constitution, theconstitutional provision or provisions violated, and the legal basissupporting that determination.

Turning to the matter at bar, "our task, initially, is to define theparameters of the circuit court's holdings." In re Parentage of JohnM, 212 Ill. 2d at 267. To this end, we must, therefore, look at therecord as a whole and give the court's statements their most logicalmeaning. We begin by examining the text of the circuit court's oralruling. The scope of the ruling is not readily apparent from the vagueand general statements made by the circuit court judge in his one-paragraph pronouncement. We note that, in granting defendant'smotion, the circuit court judge spoke of the "new statute" challengedin this case and the "old statute" reviewed by this court in Malchow.In addition, in the course of his ruling, the circuit court judge statedthat the "new statute mandates putting this information on the Web."Finally, we note that the circuit court judge mentioned, in the courseof the ruling, that "[o]ur Illinois constitution talks about the right toprivacy."

Because the circuit court makes reference to the "old" statutebeing the statute we reviewed in Malchow and the "new" statute ascontaining the Internet provision, we logically conclude that the circuitcourt intended by this ruling to find the recently added Internetprovision of the Notification Law, found in section 115(b) (730 ILCS152/115(b) (West 2002)), to be unconstitutional as an invasion ofdefendant's right to privacy as guaranteed by article I, section 6, ofthe Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,