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Docket Nos. 87147, 87148, 87149, 87150 cons.-Agenda 12-November 1999.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. DANIEL J. CONLAN.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RICK C. SCOTT.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. STEPHEN M. MAIERS.-THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. ROBERT T. WITTMAN.

Opinion filed February 17, 2000.

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:

At issue in these consolidated cases is the constitutionality of section 15-111 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/15-111 (West 1998)), a statute regulating weights and loads of vehicles operating upon Illinois highways. The six cases in question come before this court from the circuit court of Jo Daviess County where an associate circuit judge dismissed them, holding that section 15-111 of the Code violates due process and is void for vagueness. The State appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603). We reverse and remand.

The events which culminated in the court's rulings began on October 2, 1997, when defendant Robert Wittman was issued a traffic ticket in Jo Daviess County, Illinois, for allegedly operating a truck with a gross weight 6,320 pounds in excess of the maximum weight allowed by section 15-111 of the Code. The charge against defendant was dismissed after a bench trial conducted on May 12, 1998, the trial court finding that the statute was void for vagueness and violated fundamental guarantees of due process. As noted by both the circuit court and the State, that decision was not appealed and is not before this court for review. However, the circuit court chose to make the transcript of that abbreviated bench trial a part of subsequent rulings in other cases and, in that sense alone, it is a part of the record in the cases now before us.

Defendant Wittman, driving the same truck, was thereafter ticketed for violations of section 15-111(f) of the Code on October 9, 1997, December 12, 1997, and November 19, 1998. On those dates, his truck was alleged to have been overweight by 4,780 pounds, 4,240 pounds and 8,050 pounds, respectively. Those three cases come before us as case No. 87150.

Defendant Daniel J. Conlan was ticketed for a violation of section 15-111(f) while driving the aforementioned truck on January 1, 1998. The truck was allegedly 5,380 pounds in excess of legal limits. That case comes before us as case No. 87147.

Defendant Stephen M. Maiers was driving the truck in question on March 29, 1998, when he was charged with operating the vehicle at a weight 3,500 pounds in excess of the maximum weight allowed by section 15-111(f). That case comes before this court as case No. 87149.

Finally, defendant Rick C. Scott was charged on May 19, 1998, for operation of a different truck which was 11,560 pounds in excess of the weight limitation set forth in section 15-111(f). That case is before us as case No. 87148.

Docket entries indicate that the first two cases involving defendant Wittman, and the cases against defendants Conlan and Maiers, were set for "further proceedings" on May 29, 1998. According to a summary order entered that date, the circuit court granted each defendant's oral motion to dismiss, based upon the court's prior ruling in the original Wittman case.

The State filed motions to reconsider findings that the statute is unconstitutional and dismissal of the respective charges. In the meantime, defendant Scott had filed a motion to dismiss his charge. Those matters were still pending on January 6, 1999, when defendant Wittman's final case came before the court for a bench trial.

At that trial, Trooper Michael Lowary testified that he and two Department of Transportation employees were operating portable scales in Jo Daviess County on November 19, 1998, when he observed a vehicle which had a significant bulge of its tires and appeared to be overweight. The five-axle, tanker truck, operated by defendant Wittman, was stopped and weighed on the portable scales. Individual axles were weighed and the results were added together to determine the gross weight of the loaded vehicle. The gross weight, which included the vehicle, the driver and the load being hauled, was found to be 67,550 pounds. Although Lowary's testimony is somewhat difficult to follow in places, because he referred to a diagram which was not made a part of the record on appeal, it appears that he then measured the distance between extreme axles (front and rear) of the vehicle. That distance measured 25 feet, 9 inches in length, which Lowary rounded to the nearest foot (thus 26 feet) pursuant to the directive of the statute. Apparently, Lowary also measured the distance between certain inner axles to determine if an excessive load was being carried over and between those axles, i.e., an inner bridge violation. Lowary testified there was no violation of individual axle load limitations and no "inner bridge violation"; however, he calculated the gross weight of the vehicle, with its load, to be 8,050 pounds in excess of the legal limit as set forth in a table in section 15-111(f) of the Code. According to Lowary, the applicable table provides that a vehicle 26 feet in length, with four axles, can have a maximum gross weight of 59,500 pounds. He stated, "Illinois by law does not permit the tabulation of five axles on *** single vehicles." He testified, in the case of a single vehicle, as opposed to vehicles operated in combination, the maximum gross weight limit is calculated on the basis of a four-axle vehicle, irrespective of any additional axles on the vehicle. After Lowary's testimony, the court adjourned until January 14, 1999.

When court resumed, defendant Wittman, who represented himself throughout the trial, testified in his own behalf to his efforts to comply with the law and his belief that his "turnable axles," representing the "newest technology," do less damage to the road than older axles. Under cross-examination, defendant admitted that he was driving a "straight" truck, not a combination, that his vehicle was 26 feet long and weighed 67,550 pounds, and that his vehicle was overweight, although he disputed the extent to which that was true. He noted that his individual axles were all under allowable limits and maintained that he was not damaging the highway. At the conclusion of defendant's testimony, the court took the matter under advisement.

On January 27, 1999, the circuit court entered an order denying the State's motion to reconsider disposition of the four cases previously dismissed and dismissing defendant Wittman's remaining case and that of defendant Scott. The court held section 15-111 of the Code constitutionally "infirm in all of its applications," violative of due process and "void for vagueness." The court found "several significant and substantial problems immediately apparent." We quote from the court's order:

"There is the sheer volume of it. The section under scrutiny consists of three pages, double columns of small print in the official State Bar Association volume. *** There is not a consistent tone or theme from beginning to end. There is not a consistent use of defined terms. There is use of a variety of terms without definition, most of which are terms beyond ordinary understanding (e.g. 'wheel loads', 'axle loads', and 'allowable loads'). There is reference to at least one algebraic formula, and there are two 'tabular form' charts purporting to specify weight limitations under certain circumstances. The text is replete with exceptions and 'provided thats' ***."

It was the opinion of the circuit court that the statute did not provide fair warning of the conduct prohibited. The judge was also troubled by the different ways in which an offending vehicle could violate the statute, which he apparently felt accorded the police undue discretion in charging an offense. The circuit court found the "bridge method" a "particular mystery," and was uncertain whether calculation of a vehicle's "gross weight" included the driver and any other occupants of the cab of the vehicle. The court concluded that the statute "cannot be clearly understood by persons of ordinary intelligence," and it was thus unconstitutional.

The State filed timely notice of appeal in each case, and we consolidated the cases for review pursuant to the State's motion. The State has filed a brief; defendants neither have entered appearances nor have they filed briefs. We review de novo a circuit court's holding with respect to the constitutionality of a statute. Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 441 (1998).

At the outset, we wish to emphasize, as we recently did in People v. Every, 184 Ill. 2d 281, 285 (1998), that statutes enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. While that certainly does not mean they are unassailable, neither should circuit courts lightly or cavalierly declare unconstitutional that which the representatives of the people have seen fit to enact.

In order to satisfy constitutional principles of due process, a statute must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly, and provide explicit standards for those police officers, judges and juries who apply it in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminating enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 227, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298-99 (1972); Russell, 183 Ill. 2d at 442. Where, as here, no first amendment concern is implicated, there is no right to challenge the statute as being vague on its face if it clearly applies to defendants' conduct. Russell, 183 Ill. 2d at 442. Thus, the issue is whether section 15-110 of the Code is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct for which these defendants were prosecuted. See People v. Jihan, 127 Ill. 2d 379, 385 (1989); Russell, 183 Ill. 2d at 442. We hold that it is not.

The circuit court first complained that the "sheer volume" of the statute was one of the factors which rendered it unconstitutionally vague. The court also believed it contained too many exceptions and "provided thats." We are aware of no case authority which would authorize invalidation of a statute on those bases. Many statutes and regulations are necessarily lengthy and replete with exceptions and conditions because they address diverse matters of considerable complexity. We live in a complex society. That reality is reflected in the history of the very statute in question, which has undergone substantial change since this court held application of a prior, simpler version constitutional in 1967 (see People v. Hinchey, 37 Ill. 2d 410, 415 (1967); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 95