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Docket No. 91465-Agenda 16-January 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
RUDOLFO CARRERA, Appellee.

Opinion filed December 19, 2002.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a stipulated bench trial, the circuit court of CookCounty convicted defendant of three counts of possession of acontrolled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS570/401(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D) (West 1996)) and sentencedhim to concurrent terms of 15 years of imprisonment. Theappellate court found that the police did not have authority toarrest defendant. Consequently, the court reversed the circuitcourt's denial of defendant's second motion to quash arrest andsuppress evidence and remanded for further proceedings. 321 Ill.App. 3d 582. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal(177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm thejudgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

On August 26, 1997, Chicago police officers conductedsurveillance of defendant's home in Franklin Park, Illinois. Theofficers observed defendant leave his home and drive to a storagefacility in Schiller Park, Illinois. Defendant entered the storagefacility and returned to his car carrying a bag. Upon his returnhome, the officers confronted defendant and learned that the bagcontained a controlled substance. The officers arrested defendant.Subsequently, defendant signed consent forms for the search of hishome and a locker at the storage facility in Schiller Park. Theofficers recovered controlled substances from defendant's garageand storage locker.

The State charged defendant with three counts of possessionof a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Following hisindictment, defendant moved to quash his arrest and to suppressthe evidence recovered by the police officers. Defendant arguedthat the officers did not have probable cause to effectuate hisarrest. Consequently, defendant maintained, the contents of thebag, as well as certain evidence recovered from his home, garage,and storage locker, should be suppressed.

The circuit court held a hearing on defendant's motion toquash arrest and suppress evidence. At the hearing, defendanttestified that on August 26, 1997, he retrieved a brown paper bagfrom his storage locker in Schiller Park and placed the bag in thetrunk of his car. Upon his return home, he exited the car andopened the trunk, intending to remove the bag. However, beforehe could do so, he saw the police approaching. One police officertold him to put his hands on top of the car. The officers thengrabbed the bag and the car keys and handcuffed him. They askedhim whether he lived at the Franklin Park residence and who wasinside the house. Upon being told that defendant's wife and threechildren were inside the house, the officers entered the house withdefendant. Once inside the house, the officers had defendant,defendant's wife and their children sit in the living room. Theofficers threatened that defendant and his wife would be sent tojail and the children removed from their care. The officers askeddefendant if he had anything in the house. Defendant replied thathe had a scale in the basement, whereupon three officers tookdefendant to the basement to look for the scale. The officersrecovered the scale. They then told defendant that the law requiredthat he sign consent forms for the search of the house and thingswould be hard for him if he did not. Defendant signed the forms.Back upstairs, the officers searched the house. The officerstransported defendant to a Chicago police station.

Rosa Elaina Carrera, defendant's wife, also testified at thehearing. She stated that defendant left the house at 12 p.m. onAugust 26, 1997. At 12:30 p.m., the door opened and four policeofficers entered, along with defendant. One officer asked her tobring the children to the living room and sit next to them. He toldher that there were some problems and he was going to arrest her.The officers sat defendant in the living room as well. Indefendant's presence, the officers told Mrs. Carrera that they weregoing to arrest her. They also added that they would take herdaughters away and she would not see defendant again. Theofficers then asked defendant what else he had in the house.Defendant replied that he had a scale in the basement. Threeofficers accompanied defendant to the basement. One officerstayed to watch Mrs. Carrera and the children. While the otherofficers were in the basement with defendant, the police officercontinued to threaten her. Approximately 20 minutes later, theofficers and defendant returned from the basement. The officersproceeded to search the house. Eventually, two other officersarrived at the house. These officers told Mrs. Carrera that theywould not take her or the children. Yet later, as the police officerswere about to leave the house with defendant, a police officer fromFranklin Park arrived at the house.

Officer Joseph DiGiacomo testified next. On August 26,1997, he was employed by the Chicago police department. Hereceived information that a Hispanic male named Rudolfo, whodrove a gray Mercury Marquis, was dealing drugs from hisresidence at 3112 N. Emerson in Franklin Park. OfficerDiGiacomo testified that he, along with Sergeant DeAntonio,Officer Cane, Officer Herrera, Officer Horton, and Officer Rowan,all of the Chicago police department, proceeded to Franklin Park.The officers drove separate cars. Each officer carried a gun, abadge, and a pair of binoculars. The officers communicated viawalkie-talkie. In Franklin Park, the officers set up surveillance atdefendant's home. At 12:30 p.m., defendant left his home anddrove away in a car matching the description provided by theinformant. The officers followed defendant to the storage facilityin Schiller Park. Shortly after defendant entered the facility, hereturned to his car carrying a brown paper bag, which he placed inthe trunk of the car. The officers followed defendant back toFranklin Park. The officers had not observed defendant commitany crimes up to this point. Also, the officers had not received anyinformation regarding defendant's use of a storage locker inconnection with the alleged sale of drugs at the Franklin Parkresidence.

Once home, defendant exited the car, opened the trunk andpulled the bag from the trunk. Acting on a "hunch," OfficerDiGiacomo and the other officers "converged" on defendant.Officer DiGiacomo explained that, as he exited his vehicle, heconfronted defendant, stating: "Police officer. What do you havein the bag." Defendant replied that he had drugs in the bag andhanded the bag to Officer DiGiacomo. Officer DiGiacomo openedthe bag and saw what he suspected to be cocaine.⁽¹⁾ OfficerDiGiacomo placed defendant under arrest.

Officer DiGiacomo further testified that Officer Herreraadvised defendant of his rights in Spanish. Officer DiGiacomothen asked defendant how much more cocaine he had in thestorage locker. Defendant replied that he had two kilos of cocainein the locker. Next, defendant asked to go inside the house.⁽²⁾ Onceinside, defendant signed consent forms in Spanish for the searchof the house and storage locker. Officer DiGiacomo recoveredsuspected cocaine from defendant's garage and storage locker.

Officer Herrera was the last witness at the hearing. Hetestified that he participated in the surveillance of defendant'shome. Upon defendant's return home, the police officers,including Officer Herrera, approached defendant. As he movedtowards defendant, Officer Herrera surveyed the area to make surethat everything was secure. Officer Herrera saw defendant hand abrown paper bag to Officer DiGiacomo. The officers then placeddefendant under arrest.

Defendant spoke Spanish and only a little English. OfficerHerrera, a native Spanish speaker, communicated with defendantin Spanish. Officer Herrera gave defendant the Miranda warningsin Spanish. Also in Spanish, defendant indicated that he wanted toget off the street and go inside the house. Once inside the house,defendant spoke to his wife, who gathered the children into theliving room. Officer Herrera communicated with defendant's wifein Spanish and stayed with her and the children while the otherofficers searched the house. Officer Herrera denied everthreatening defendant, defendant's wife or their children.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that theinformation that the officers had was sufficient to sustain theencounter. The court also found that, upon being approached,defendant volunteered he had drugs in his hands and gave those toOfficer DiGiacomo. Lastly, the court found that defendantwillingly entered the house in an attempt to remove a potentiallyembarrassing situation from the street and signed the consent-to-search forms for the premises.

Subsequently, defendant filed a second motion to quash arrestand suppress evidence in which he maintained that the Chicagopolice officers did not have authority to arrest him outside theterritorial limits of the City of Chicago. The State rejoined that thepolice officers effectuated a valid citizen's arrest. The Statemaintained that, even though the police officers possessedreasonable suspicion to effectuate a Terry stop prior to defendant'sactual arrest, defendant did not submit to the officers' authority.Without actual submission to the officers' authority, "no policeaction occurred until the facts justified a valid 'citizen's arrest.' "The State claimed that "[d]espite defendant's assertions, [thecircuit] Court never found any submission by the defendant topolice authority prior to his incriminating admissions, nor did [thecircuit] Court ever rule that the officer's initial approachconstituted a Terry stop." In the alternative, the State argued thatthe circuit court should not suppress the evidence recovered by thepolice officers because the officers acted in good-faith relianceupon an amendment to the extraterritorial arrest statute, section7-4-8 of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/7-4-8 (West1996)), as amended by Public Act 89-404, effective August 20,1995. The amendment was declared unconstitutional severalmonths after defendant's arrest.

The circuit court denied defendant's second motion to quasharrest and suppress evidence. The court found that the policeofficers acted in good faith in effectuating defendant's arrest. Thecourt explained:

"THE COURT: *** It appears to me that when youdescribe what happened in this case as you counseldescribed the police, they were not fortuitously in SchillerPark, Franklin Park. They launched an investigation basedon some information that they had, and they went outthere and they did this surveillance. But at the time thatthey did that, everyone agrees that that was within theirstatutory authority as it existed at the time.

Now, because of this single subject problem that theState is currently going through, it turns out that thatstatute was invalid. But at the time that the police-if youlook into the police minds, for example at the time thatthe police decided okay, we are going to go out to SchillerPark and do this investigation, and in their mind they wereof a belief they were not committing misconduct becauseit was statutorily authorized. So obviously what I amtalking about is good faith exception to the exclusionaryrule."

The court concluded that the purpose of the exclusionary rulewould not be served by suppressing the evidence recovered.

The matter proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. At theconclusion of the trial, the circuit court convicted defendant ofthree counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent todeliver and sentenced him to concurrent terms of 15 years ofimprisonment.

Defendant appealed the denial of his second motion to quasharrest and suppress evidence. He maintained that the policeofficers did not have authority to arrest him in Franklin Park anddid not effectuate a valid citizen's arrest. Defendant alsocontended that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary ruleshould not apply because the amendment to the extraterritorialarrest statute, upon which the officers relied, was void ab initio.

The State argued that the police officers effectuated a propercitizen's arrest. The State claimed that defendant voluntarily gaveOfficer DiGiacomo the bag containing the cocaine. OnceDiGiacomo examined the bag, he had reasonable grounds tobelieve that defendant was committing a crime, as required by theprivate citizen's arrest statute (725 ILCS 5/107-3 (West 1996)).The State also argued that the officers did not use the power oftheir office to gather evidence against defendant that would nothave been available to private citizens.

The appellate court considered first whether the actions of thepolice officers constituted a seizure of defendant. The court notedthat if a seizure did not occur, the protections of the fourthamendment would not be invoked. Based on the totality of thecircumstances, the court found that "there was a sufficient show ofauthority by the threatening presence of several officers at the timeof the encounter to constitute a seizure." 321 Ill. App. 3d at 590.The court also found that the seizure could not be justified as avalid citizen's arrest because Officer DiGiacomo "used the powerof his office to collect the evidence necessary to give himreasonable grounds to arrest defendant." 321 Ill. App. 3d at 593.Lastly, the court refused to apply the good-faith exception to theexclusionary rule. The court noted that the amendment to theextraterritorial arrest statute was found to be unconstitutional.Because a statute which is unconstitutional is void ab initio, thecourt stated that it would view the facts of the case as though thestatute never existed. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 599. The court suppressedthe contents of the bag recovered from defendant and defendant'sstatement to Officer DiGiacomo that the bag contained drugs. 321Ill. App. 3d at 599-600. The court remanded the cause to the trialcourt for a determination as to whether the illegal arrest tainted thesubsequent evidence recovered by the police from defendant'shome, garage and storage locker. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 600.

As noted above, this court granted the State's petition forleave to appeal.

ANALYSIS

In its petition for leave to appeal, the State advanced twoarguments for reversal of the appellate court's judgment. First, theState argued that a private citizen, or a police officer who actsoutside his territorial jurisdiction and is therefore considered aprivate citizen, can conduct an investigatory stop based on areasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Second, the State arguedthat the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should applywhere the legislature enacts a statute in violation of the singlesubject rule and police officers conduct a seizure pursuant to thestatute. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal toconsider the arguments presented.

In its brief on appeal, the State abandons its claim that thepolice officers effectuated a valid citizen's arrest. The Staterepeats its argument that the good-faith exception to theexclusionary rule is applicable where the police officers rely upona statute later declared unconstitutional. In addition, the Stateargues that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable because the policeofficers did not conduct a constitutionally unreasonable search orseizure, but simply acted outside the territorial limits of the Cityof Chicago without valid statutory authority to so.

Noting that the State failed to argue in its petition for leave toappeal that the exclusionary rule does not apply under thecircumstances at bar, defendant maintains the State has waivedthis contention. Pursuant to Rule 315(b) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b)), apetition for leave to appeal must contain "a statement of the pointsrelied upon for reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court"and "a short argument (including appropriate authorities) statingwhy review by the Supreme Court is warranted and why thedecision of the Appellate Court should be reversed or modified."This court has previously declined to consider points that a partyrelied upon for reversal in its brief on appeal but failed to includein its petition for leave to appeal. City of Naperville v. Watson, 175Ill. 2d 399, 406 (1997); People v. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1987);People v. Anderson, 112 Ill. 2d 39, 44 (1986).

The State acknowledges that a point not raised in the petitionfor leave to appeal is waived. However, the State urges this court,in the exercise of its discretion, to consider the argument inquestion. The State claims this court must first determine whetherthe exclusionary rule applies before this court can determinewhether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.The State concludes that because consideration of it's argumentregarding the exclusionary rule is necessary to consideration ofwhether the good-faith exception applies, this court shouldexercise its authority to override application of the rule of waiver.

It is not necessary for us to determine whether the State haswaived the argument at issue, as defendant maintains. Nor needwe consider whether the alleged waiver must be excused under thecircumstances at bar. As discussed below, Illinois law is settledthat the exclusionary rule is applicable where the police effectuatean extraterritorial arrest without appropriate statutory authority.Thus, full consideration of the State's argument is not a necessaryfirst step to a determination of whether the good-faith exception tothe exclusionary rule is applicable.

In People v. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 379 (1992), this court affirmedthe judgments of the lower courts suppressing evidence the policeobtained during the course of an extraterritorial arrest. Thedefendant was driving in unincorporated Kane County,approximately seven-tenths of one mile outside the Village ofSleepy Hollow. At the time, Officer Beyer of the Sleepy Hollowpolice department was conducting stationary radar surveillancenear that location. Based on a radar reading of the defendant's car,Officer Beyer stopped defendant and issued a traffic citation forspeeding. At the time of the arrest, Officer Beyer was in uniform,was driving an official police vehicle, and held himself out to thedefendant as a police officer.

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss thecharges against him, predicated on the fact that the defendant wasarrested by Officer Beyer of the Sleepy Hollow police departmenton a road located outside that municipality's boundaries. Thecircuit court construed the defendant's motion as a motion toquash arrest and suppress evidence. The court granted the motion,finding that Officer Beyer lacked official police authority to arrestthe defendant and that the arrest could not be legitimized as aprivate citizen's arrest. The appellate court affirmed. The courtheld that the officer used the power of his office to gain access toevidence not available to private citizens. The officer's use of theradar equipment tainted the gathering of the information and itslater use against the defendant. People v. Lahr, 207 Ill. App. 3d419, 421 (1991). This court granted the State's petition for leaveto appeal.

Initially, this court observed that a police officer actingoutside his jurisdiction retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen,including the right to effect a citizen's arrest. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at382. This court recognized, however, that, outside his jurisdiction,a police officer's right to arrest is no greater than that of a privatecitizen. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 382-83. Thus, this court stated that anextraterritorial arrest will not be upheld if in making the arrest theofficer uses the powers of his office to obtain evidence notavailable to private citizens. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 383.

This court next considered whether Officer Beyer used thepowers of his office in making the arrest. This court rejected theState's argument that because the defendant was driving on anopen roadway and because the radar equipment was available tothe general public, Officer Beyer did not use the powers of hisoffice to obtain evidence not available to a private citizen. Inrejecting this argument, the court reasoned that the use of radarguns for monitoring the speed of traffic is limited to policeofficers. Therefore, despite the fact that this type of radarequipment was not strictly limited to police officers, its use in thiscase was an assertion of the officer's police authority. Lahr, 147Ill. 2d at 383-84. The court concluded that the evidence should besuppressed since Officer Beyer was not investigating anyparticular individual or suspected crime; there was no evidenceexcept the radar which indicated that Officer Beyer had reasonablegrounds to believe a crime had been committed; and Officer Beyerdid not effectuate a valid citizen's arrest. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 386-87.

We note that in Lahr we did not have occasion to considerwhether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule isapplicable where police officers effectuate an extraterritorial arrestpursuant to a statute that is later found to be unconstitutional.Citing People v. Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d 546 (1999), the State arguesthat the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule appliesbecause the police officers did not violate defendant's substantiveconstitutional rights in effectuating the extraterritorial arrest.While we acknowledge the State's argument on this issue, wechoose to resolve this cause on narrower grounds. In ourestimation, the result that we reach is dictated by application of thevoid ab initio doctrine.

Prior to 1995, section 7-4-8 of the Illinois Municipal Code(65 ILCS 5/7-4-8 (West 1994)) authorized the police of anymunicipality in a police district, defined as the territory embracedwithin the corporate limits of adjoining municipalities within anycounty of the state, to go into any part of the district to suppress ariot, to preserve the peace, and to protect the lives, rights, andproperty of citizens. As amended by Public Act 89-404, effectiveAugust 20, 1995, section 7-4-8 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/7-4-8(West 1996)) gave police officers from any municipality in apolice district full authority and power as peace officers andauthorized the officers to go into any part of the district to exercisethat authority and power. Thus, the amended statute purported togive Chicago police officers authority to go into Franklin Park toeffectuate defendant's arrest. In People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 12(1999), this court held that Public Act 89-404 was adopted inviolation of the single subject rule. Subsequently, in People v.Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154, 156 (2000), this court stated that PublicAct 89-404 is void ab initio.

This court has previously explained that a statute which isfacially invalid and thus unconstitutional in its entirety is void abinitio. See Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 156; In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 43(2000) (noting that when an act is held unconstitutional in itsentirety it is void ab initio); People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80, 94(1999); People v. Tellez-Valencia, 188 Ill. 2d 523, 526 (1999);People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384 (1990). An unconstitutional lawconfers no right, imposes no duty and affords no protection.Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d at 399, citing People v. Schraeberg, 347 Ill.392 (1932). It is as though no such law had ever been passed.Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 156; Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d at 399. The void abinitio doctrine applies equally to legislative acts which areunconstitutional because they violate substantive constitutionalguarantees (Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d at 399) and those that areunconstitutional because they are adopted in violation of the singlesubject clause of our constitution (In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 43).The single subject clause of our constitution regulates the processby which legislation is enacted. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d at 83;Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 8. In Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 13, this courtstressed the importance of the single subject clause and theseriousness with which this court regards single subject clauseviolations. The court reviewed the dual purposes of the singlesubject clause:

"On one hand, the clause serves to prevent the enactmentof legislation that, standing on its own, could not garnerthe votes necessary for passage. Johnson [v. Edgar], 176Ill. 2d [499,] 514 [(1997)]; Geja's Cafe v. MetropolitanPier & Exposition Authority, 153 Ill. 2d 239, 258 (1992).Indeed, in upholding the mandate of the IllinoisConstitution, this court is duty-bound to ensure that thelegislature refrains from the ' "practice of bringingtogether into one bill subjects diverse in their nature, andhaving no necessary connection, with a view to combinein their favor the advocates of all ***." ' Fuehrmeyer [v.City of Chicago], 57 Ill. 2d [193,] 202 [(1974)], quotingPeople ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 494-95(1865).

A second and equally important purpose of the singlesubject clause is to facilitate the enactment of billsthrough a legislative process that is orderly and informed.See Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 514. By limiting each bill to asingle subject, each legislator can better understand andmore intelligently debate the issues presented by a bill.Johnson, 176 Ill. 2d at 514-15. These dual purposes of thesingle subject clause, therefore, promote directconfrontation and informed discussion of legislativeissues submitted for enactment." Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 13-14.

In light of the serious nature of single subject clause violations, thecourt concluded these violations are not subject to a harmless erroranalysis. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 16.

As noted above, in People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d at 12, thiscourt held that Public Act 89-404 is unconstitutional because itwas adopted in violation of the single subject rule. Further, inPeople v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 156, this court stated that PublicAct 89-404 is void ab initio. As of the date of defendant's arrest,the amendment to section 7-4-8 had not been declaredunconstitutional. Thus, the State urges application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. However, to apply thegood-faith exception would run counter to our single subjectclause and void ab initio jurisprudence-specifically, that once astatute is declared facially unconstitutional, it is as if it had neverbeen enacted. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d at 43; Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d at390.

The State argues that this court should give legal effect to thehistorical fact that Public Act 89-404 existed and that the policeofficers acted pursuant to the amendment to section 7-4-8. Wedecline to do so. In our estimation, to give effect to the historicalfact that the amendment existed at the time of defendant's arrestwould effectively resurrect the amendment and provide a graceperiod (in this case four years between the effective date of theamendment and the date of our opinion in Reedy finding PublicAct 89-404 unconstitutional) during which our citizens wouldhave been subject to extraterritorial arrests without properauthorization. Our decision not to recognize an exception to theexclusionary rule where a statute is adopted in violation of thesingle subject clause comports with our jurisprudence that a statutewhich is facially invalid, and thus unconstitutional in its entirety,is void ab initio.

CONCLUSION

The State has abandoned its position that the policeeffectuated a valid citizen's arrest. Further, the State acknowledgesthat the police effectuated an extraterritorial arrest pursuant to anamendment to section 7-4-8 of the Code later held to beunconstitutional. We conclude that the amendment is void abinitio and the police officers effectuated an unlawful arrest.Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

Appellate court judgment affirmed.

The majority concludes that the extraterritorial arrest ofdefendant by Chicago police officers was unlawful because thestatute authorizing the arrest was enacted in violation of the singlesubject requirement of the Illinois constitution. Slip op. at 10-11.However, the State, as appellant, has not asked this court toanswer the question addressed by the majority. Indeed, the Stateacknowledges that the arrest was unlawful. The narrow questionposed by the State as appellant before this court is whether thegood-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when officersrelied on an apparently valid statute when they made an arrest that,while unlawful, did not violate the individual's state or federalconstitutional rights. I write separately to clarify a distinction thatthe majority obscures-the difference between quashing an arrestbecause it was not authorized by a valid statute and applying theexclusionary rule to suppress evidence that was obtained inviolation of a defendant's right to be free from unreasonablesearch and seizure.

As a threshold matter, the majority does not identify thestandard of review it applies. Although a trial court's ruling on amotion to quash arrest and suppress evidence is generallyreviewed for manifest error, the parties agree that the issuepresented is purely a question of law, subject to de novo review.People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60, 64 (1996). As such, defendanthas not disputed the facts presented in the State's brief, nor hasdefendant questioned the credibility of the officers. Nevertheless,the majority recounts in detail the conflicting testimony before thetrial court during the hearing on defendant's first motion to quashhis arrest, at which he argued that the officers lacked probablecause. The trial court denied that motion and defendant did notraise this issue on appeal. It serves no purpose at this stage of theproceedings to recount accusations made by defendant and hiswife against the police officers when the accusations were foundnot credible by the trial court, and particularly when they haveabsolutely no bearing on the issue we have been asked to decide.

I agree with the majority that the statute upon which theofficers relied is void ab initio and that the legislative enactmentof which this statute was a part is void in its entirety as a result ofthe single subject violation (slip op. at 11). The majority thennotes that harmless error analysis is inappropriate, given theserious nature of single subject clause violations. Slip op. at 12.

However, if we were to consider whether or not it is necessaryto apply the exclusionary rule in this case, we would not beengaging in harmless error analysis. The effect of declaring thestatute unconstitutional on single subject grounds is to return thelaw to the status quo ante. People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154, 156(2000). Thus, the resolution of the question posed by the State isgoverned by the law that existed prior to the enactment of theflawed statute. As such, we must apply the earlier version ofsection 7-4-8 (65 ILCS 5/7-4-8 (West 1994)) and the commonlaw of extraterritorial arrests. This does not constitute harmlesserror analysis; it is simply a matter of determining what remedy,if any, defendant would have been entitled to under previouslyapplicable law.

Defendant suggests that the State has waived its argumentregarding the application of the exclusionary rule. Although theState did not include this threshold question in its petition forleave to appeal, I agree with the State that it is necessary to addressthe applicability of the rule itself before addressing any exceptionsto the rule.

The majority disposes of the exclusionary rule issue by citingthis court's decision in People v. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d 379 (1992), forthe proposition that "Illinois law is settled that the exclusionaryrule is applicable where the police effectuate an extraterritorialarrest without appropriate statutory authority." Slip op. at 8-9.Lahr, however, contained no discussion of the exclusionary rule.In fact, the terms "exclusionary rule," "constitution," and "fourthamendment" do not appear in the Lahr opinion at all. Lahrinvolved only common law analysis, not the application of state orfederal constitutional principles. The sole issue in Lahr was notwhether evidence should be suppressed but, rather, whether theextraterritorial arrest of defendant was valid. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at383.

In Lahr, this court acknowledged the general rule that"municipal and county police officers [have] no authority to arresta defendant outside the territorial limits of the political entitywhich appointed them to their office." Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 382.The sole exception to the rule, at common law, was for the freshpursuit of a suspected felon fleeing the jurisdiction of the arrestingofficer. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at 382. Based on section 107-3 of theCode of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38,par. 107-3), which permits citizen's arrests, the Lahr court createda second exception to the general rule of invalidity ofextraterritorial arrests. Lahr merely established that when outsidehis jurisdiction, a police officer has the same ability to make avalid arrest as any citizen, no more and no less. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2dat 382-83. If an officer making an extraterritorial arrest uses thepowers of his office to obtain the evidence justifying the arrest, thearrest cannot be justified as a citizen's arrest. Lahr, 147 Ill. 2d at383.

In the present case, the appellate court concluded, based onLahr and its progeny, that Officer DiGiacomo did use the powersof his office to obtain the evidence that gave him probable causeto arrest defendant and, thus, did not make a valid citizen's arrest.321 Ill. App. 3d 582, 593-94. Because the State has abandoned itsargument that the arrest was valid as a citizen's arrest (slip op. at8), Lahr is irrelevant to the issue raised by the State in this appeal.In any event, Lahr tells us nothing about the application of theexclusionary rule or any of its exceptions to evidence gathered bya police officer acting outside his jurisdiction.

The majority did not consider the history of the exclusionaryrule and the function it serves before concluding that Lahr settledthis issue. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created devicedesigned to protect fourth amendment rights in general. The ruleitself is not a constitutional right, and it is not intended to redressthe injury to the privacy of the defendant who has been the subjectof the illegal search or seizure, for any "[r]eparation comes toolate." Linkletter v. Walker 381 U.S. 618, 637, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601,613, 85 S. Ct. 1731, 1742 (1965). As the Supreme Court noted inMapp v. Ohio, the rule safeguards fourth amendment rights bydeterring police misconduct. It " 'compel[s] respect for theconstitutional guaranty' " of freedom from unreasonable searchand seizure " 'in the only effectively available way-by removingthe incentive to disregard it.' " Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656,6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1692 (1961), quotingElkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1677,80 S. Ct. 1437, 1444 (1960).

In Illinois, however, this judicially created remedy has beenin existence since 1923, when this court declared in People v.Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448 (1923), that "there must, of necessity, be aremedy" when the individual's "constitutional rights wereruthlessly and unlawfully violated" by a warrantless search of hishome. Brocamp, 307 Ill. at 453-55.

The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was firstarticulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon in thecontext of an officer's good-faith reliance on a search warrant thatwas later determined to be unsupported by probable cause. UnitedStates v. Leon, 486 U.S. 897, 919-22, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 696-98,104 S. Ct. 3405, 3418-20 (1984). Because the purpose of theexclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, and becauseapplication of the rule will not serve to deter a police officer whois acting in good faith when he conducts a search pursuant to sucha warrant, the Court determined that an exception to the rule waswarranted. Leon, 486 U.S. at 916-21, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 694-97, 104S. Ct. at 3417-19 (noting that the exclusionary rule "cannot beexpected, and should not be applied, to deter objectivelyreasonable law enforcement activity").

This court adopted the Leon good-faith exception in Peoplev. Stewart, 104 Ill. 2d 463, 477 (1984). However, when theSupreme Court later extended the Leon good-faith exception, thiscourt declined to follow. In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 94 L.Ed. 2d 364, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987), the Court held that theexclusionary rule does not bar evidence seized by a police officerwho reasonably relied, in objective good faith, on a statuteauthorizing a warrantless administrative search, although thestatute was subsequently held unconstitutional on fourthamendment grounds. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50, 94 L. Ed. 2d at375, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 1167. In Krueger, this court declared a statuteallowing police executing a search warrant to make "no-knock"entries under certain circumstances unconstitutional on fourthamendment grounds. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 70. Relying on ourown state constitution and the long-standing history of theexclusionary rule in this state, beginning with Brocamp, this courtfound that the exclusionary rule arising from article I, section 6, ofthe Illinois constitution provides greater protection than the fourthamendment exclusionary rule:

"We are not willing to recognize an exception to our stateexclusionary rule that will provide a grace period forunconstitutional search and seizure legislation, duringwhich time our citizens' prized constitutional rights canbe violated with impunity. We are particularly disturbedby the fact that such a grace period could last for severalyears and affect large numbers of people. This is simplytoo high a price for our citizens to pay. We thereforeconclude that article I, section 6, of the IllinoisConstitution of 1970 prohibits the application of Krull'sextended good-faith exception to our state exclusionaryrule." Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 75-76.

However, the question of whether a search or arrest is legal isentirely separate from the question of whether evidence derivedfrom that search or arrest should be excluded. People v. Turnage,162 Ill. 2d 299, 307 (1994). The exclusionary rule is applicablewhen suppression of the evidence would further its purpose ofdeterring further police misconduct (Leon, 468 U.S. at 917, 82 L.Ed. 2d at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 3417; Turnage, 162 Ill. 2d at 307) or,as this court noted in Krueger, when the giving effect to searchand seizure legislation that violates the fourth amendment or thestate constitution would permit "our citizens' prized constitutionalrights" to be violated with impunity (Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d at 75).

In the present case, however, the constitutional infirmity in thestatute did not spring from any violation of the fourth amendmentof the United States Constitution or article I, section 6, of the stateconstitution. The appellate court concluded that the actions of theChicago police officers when they approached defendant outsidehis home constituted a seizure. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 590. I agree.However, the seizure itself did not violate defendant's rights underthe state or federal constitutions. Rather, the officers' actionsviolated the preexisting statute governing the power of policeofficers to act outside their assigned district. Unless such astatutory violation is per se unconstitutional, or the exclusionaryrule is applicable to a statutory, as opposed to a constitutional,violation, any evidence obtained as a result of the seizure need notbe suppressed.

The Supreme Court of Colorado addressed this issue inPeople v. Vigil, 729 P.2d 360 (Colo. 1986), where the defendantargued that evidence should be excluded because the Denverpolice officers who arrested her outside of their jurisdictionviolated the state statute governing extraterritorial arrests (8AColo. Rev. Stat.