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Docket No. 99501-Agenda 10-September 2005.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
BENJAMIN CAMPA, Appellee.

Opinion filed December 1, 2005.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

At issue is whether defendant, Benjamin Campa, received aspeedy trial as required by section 103-5 of the Code of CriminalProcedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2000)). The appellatecourt held that he did not. 353 Ill. App. 3d 178. We granted theState's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). For thereasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was arrested on August 19, 2001, following a trafficaccident. He was eventually charged with driving under the influenceof alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) (2) (West 2000)), driving withouta license (625 ILCS 5/6-101 (West 2000)), and driving withoutinsurance (625 ILCS 5/3-707 (West 2000)). At his arraignment onAugust 20, 2001, defendant filed a demand for a speedy trial inaccordance with the speedy-trial provision of the Code of CriminalProcedure (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2000)). The circuit court ofCook County set bail at $5,000, but defendant was unable to post themoney required to make bail.

On August 21, 2001, the Cook County sheriff's office placeddefendant in its "Electronic Home Monitoring Program." However,on September 5, 2001, the Cook County sheriff's office transferreddefendant to the Day Reporting Center. In connection with thetransfer, defendant signed a document entitled "Agreement GoverningTransfer to the Day Reporting Center." The agreement specifiedcertain terms and conditions for defendant's participation in the DayReporting Center program, including the requirements that defendantreport to the Day Reporting Center as scheduled; attend all portionsof the Day Reporting Center program; and abide by all program rules.⁽¹⁾Lastly, the agreement warned that defendant's failure to comply withthe conditions contained therein "and any additional conditions shallresult in the revocation of this agreement and return to the CookCounty Department of Corrections." During the time that defendantparticipated in the Day Reporting Center program, he reported to theDay Reporting Center⁽²⁾ Monday through Friday from 8 a.m. until 1:30p.m.

By agreement, the trial court scheduled defendant's trial forDecember 21, 2001. On that day, the State represented to the courtthat the arresting officer was in court, but the State's complainingwitnesses were not. The State requested a continuance. Defensecounsel made both an oral and a written demand for a speedy trial.Defense counsel informed the court that defendant was not free onbond, but had to report every day to the Day Reporting Center.Because the court indicated its willingness to reconsider the amountthat had been set for defendant's bail, defense counsel moved for abond reduction. The court realized, however, that the court file onanother DUI case pending against defendant was missing. The courtthen stated that it could not reduce the amount of bail withoutreviewing the other file. Although defense counsel insisted that he wasready to proceed to trial and demanded trial, the court continued thecase to January 31, 2002. The court indicated on the court file that thecomplaining witness was not in court.

On January 31, 2002, the State indicated that it was not ready toproceed. Having filed a written demand for a speedy trial, defendantstated that he was ready for trial and that he was demanding trial. Thetrial court asked the State to check "term" and indicated that the trialwould be set to "term." The State requested that the court continuethe case to May 3, 2002, and the court granted the continuance.

On May 3, 2002, defendant filed a petition for discharge pursuantto section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS5/103-5(a) (West 2000)). Defendant stated that he had been incontinuous custody at the Cook County Department of Correctionsthrough the Cook County sheriff's Day Reporting Center programsince the date of his arrest. Since he had not caused, contributed to,or acquiesced in any delay since December 21, 2001, and since morethan 120 days had elapsed from that date to the date of trial,defendant maintained that he must be discharged.

At the hearing on the petition, defendant cited People v. Moss,274 Ill. App. 3d 77 (1995), as controlling authority. Pointing to theholding in Moss that a defendant on electronic home monitoring is incustody, defendant argued that he was likewise in custody. The Statedistinguished Moss, arguing that electronic home monitoring iscustody, but day reporting is not. The trial court agreed with theState. The court held that defendant was not in custody within themeaning of the speedy-trial provision and denied the petition fordischarge.

At trial, the State presented the testimony of the arresting officeras its only evidence. Defendant did not call any witnesses andpresented only the evidence elicited in cross-examination of thearresting officer. The court found defendant guilty of all charges.

Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, again arguing that heshould have been tried within 120 days of December 21, 2001,because he was in custody and not on bail or recognizance. Defendantalso argued that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.The trial court denied the motion. The court opined that the State hadmet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to all thecharges. On the speedy-trial challenge, the court ruled that defendantwas not in custody and was properly tried within 160 days of hisDecember 21, 2001, demand for trial. When defendant asked that thecourt make a finding as to whether defendant was on bail orrecognizance, the court refused to do so. Instead, the court explained:"[W]hat I'm saying is that for purposes of the speedy trial demand,which would be made for someone who is in custody, that my findingis that because he was on daily reporting, he was not in custody forpurposes of the Speedy Trial Act in determining and requiring theState to proceed to trial within 120 days. That's my ruling. Okay."

Subsequently, the court sentenced defendant to 24 months ofsupervision, and fines totaling $425 on the charge of driving under theinfluence of alcohol; supervision and a fine of $75 on the charge ofdriving without insurance; and supervision and a fine of $55 on thecharge of driving without a license. The periods of supervision on thecharge of driving without insurance and the charge of driving withouta license were satisfied by the 15 days that defendant spent onelectronic home monitoring.

The appellate court reversed. 353 Ill. App. 3d 178. Initially, thecourt rejected the State's argument that the conditions placed ondefendant as a result of his participation in the day reporting programwere analogous to those imposed on a defendant on bail orrecognizance, and, consequently, the 160-day limit of section103-5(b) should apply. The court noted that the circuit court isresponsible for either admitting a defendant to bail or placing him onrecognizance. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 183. In the present case, "the trialcourt had no involvement in the decision to place defendant in the dayreporting program. The decision was made entirely by the sheriff'sdepartment, and the sheriff's department alone determined theconditions of defendant's 'release' into the program." 353 Ill. App. 3dat 183. For this reason, the appellate court rejected "any suggestionthat defendant was 'on bail or recognizance' within the meaning of thestatute." 353 Ill. App. 3d at 183.

The appellate court considered next defendant's contention thathe was "in custody" within the meaning of the speedy-trial provision.While recognizing that the conditions of day reporting noted abovewere far less onerous than physical confinement in the Cook CountyDepartment of Corrections, the court concluded that defendant wasnevertheless in the custody of the sheriff's department and "incustody" within the meaning of the speedy-trial statute. 353 Ill. App.3d at 184. The court reasoned: "[I]t is unclear what legal recourse, ifany, defendant would have had if the sheriff's department hadunilaterally decided that he was no longer eligible for the day reportingprogram or decided to discontinue the program entirely. Accordingly,we must conclude that defendant remained under the control of thesheriff's department, which retained the power to imprison defendant.We are reluctant to find that the sheriff's release of defendant,unauthorized by the trial court, circumvented the prophylactic effectof the 120-day rule." 353 Ill. App. 3d at 184.

The appellate court found support for its holding in this court'sopinion in People v. Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d 270 (1981), where a prisoner,who was allowed six hours of independent day release at a shoppingcenter, was found to have escaped from a "penal institution" when hefailed to return to prison as scheduled. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 184. Theappellate court also relied on the holding in Moss, 274 Ill. App. 3d at82, that a defendant on electronic home detention was properly foundguilty of possession of a controlled substance in a penal institutionwhere he sold cocaine to an informant. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 184. Theappellate court concluded that, for purposes of the speedy-trialstatute, an individual may be "in custody" despite enjoyingconsiderable freedom. 353 Ill. App. 3d at 184.

We granted the State leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

The State argues that the appellate court committed error infinding that defendant was in "custody" within the meaning of thespeedy-trial statute. In Illinois, a defendant possesses bothconstitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial. U.S. Const.,amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,