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Docket No. 93472-Agenda 5-November 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 
BERNARD BUNCH, Appellee.
Opinion filed August 21, 2003.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County,defendant Bernard Bunch was convicted of possession of acontrolled substance and sentenced to a four-year term ofimprisonment. The appellate court determined that the trial courterred in denying defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppressevidence and reversed defendant's conviction. 327 Ill. App. 3d979. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (see 177Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm.

BACKGROUND

Defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidenceproceeded simultaneously with his trial. Officer Lukensmeyertestified that at 1:10 a.m. on February 1, 2000, he was workingalone in a marked police vehicle in the area of 35th Street andWentworth Avenue in Chicago. He observed a 1990 Pontiac,which was proceeding westbound on 35th Street, slow down andcome to a brief stop. Lukensmeyer did not see the car's brakelights activate. As the Pontiac continued on its way, Lukensmeyershined his MARS lights, his take-down lights, and his brightheadlights onto the rear of the car. Lukensmeyer testified that hesaw the driver lean forward twice toward the dashboard before thedriver pulled the vehicle over and stopped. One other person wasin the car, defendant, who was in the front passenger seat.Lukensmeyer approached the vehicle on the driver's side andcommanded to both, "Don't move." Lukensmeyer then asked thedriver for his license. When the driver could not provide a license,Lukensmeyer asked him to step out of the vehicle and placed himunder arrest. He handcuffed the driver and walked him to the rearof the car.

According to Lukensmeyer, he then walked around to thepassenger side and asked defendant to exit the car and step to therear of the vehicle, where the driver was standing. Lukensmeyertestified that he asked defendant out of the car so that he couldtake charge of the vehicle, i.e., because the driver was arrestedLukensmeyer was going to have the car transported to the stationwhere it would be towed to an impound lot. At some point duringthe traffic stop, Lukensmeyer learned that the driver was the ownerof the vehicle, but he could not recall whether this occurred beforeor after he asked defendant to exit the car.

Lukensmeyer testified further that after defendant exited thevehicle, he asked him, "What's your name? Where you [sic]coming from?" When questioned as to why he asked defendant hisname, Lukensmeyer responded, "I'm a policeman[.] I want[ed] toknow who he was and I was curious to find out exactly who hewas. That's all."

Defendant provided his name and additionally askedLukensmeyer why the driver was being arrested. Lukensmeyeranswered defendant's question. During this conversation, in whichthe two men were about one foot apart, Lukensmeyer twice shinedhis flashlight in defendant's face. Lukensmeyer explained thatwhen he is working nights, he shines his flashlight in everyone'sface because there is a "[s]trong possibility they may havesomething in their mouths." Lukensmeyer denied that hequestioned defendant merely to see if there was anything indefendant's mouth. Both times Lukensmeyer shined his flashlightin defendant's face, he observed a small, clear plastic item,containing something white, in defendant's mouth. Based on 35years of experience as a police officer and his participation inmore than 2,000 narcotics arrests, Lukensmeyer believed that thewhite substance was either heroin or cocaine. Lukensmeyerinformed defendant he was under arrest, and ordered him to spitthe object out of his mouth, which he did. Lukensmeyer recoveredone plastic bag containing a white powder. Lukensmeyerhandcuffed defendant and called for assistance. During his searchof the Pontiac, Lukensmeyer recovered two similar plastic bags,also containing what he believed to be heroin, from a space in thedashboard. At this point, according to Lukensmeyer, defendantmade an unsolicited statement that "[a]ll the heroin you found ismine." Lukensmeyer later tested the brakes on defendant's vehicle,which were working properly. The parties stipulated to the chainof custody and that the white powder tested positive for thepresence of heroin.

In connection with his motion to quash arrest and suppressevidence, defendant argued that the officer did not have probablecause to ask him to exit the vehicle, to step to the rear of the car,or to interrogate him. The State maintained that moving defendantto the rear of the vehicle was minimally intrusive and that nointerrogation took place. Rather, defendant engaged the officer inconversation.

The trial court denied defendant's motion. In its oral ruling,the trial court indicated that it found the officer's testimonystraightforward and credible. The trial court concluded that therewas nothing impermissible in asking defendant his name and thatmoving defendant to the rear of the car had no legal significance.The trial court further noted that the officer had numerous reasonsto have a conversation with defendant, including explaining to himthe reason for the arrest and determining if defendant could be analternative driver. According to the trial court, shining theflashlight in defendant's face merely allowed the officer to assessdefendant at 1 o'clock in the morning. Finally, the trial court foundthat the officer had probable cause to arrest defendant, based onhis observation of the object in defendant's mouth.

Following the trial court's denial of defendant's motion, thebench trial continued with defendant's testimony. Defendantoffered a different version of the vehicle stop. Defendant testifiedthat when the driver of the vehicle, his brother, asked OfficerLukensmeyer why he stopped them, the officer replied, "BecauseI saw two black men in the car." The officer made no mention ofthe Pontiac's brake lights and never examined them. According todefendant, after arresting and cuffing his brother, Lukensmeyerplaced his brother in the police vehicle. He then approacheddefendant and asked him to get out of the car. Once outside thevehicle, Lukensmeyer told defendant to turn around and thenplaced handcuffs on him, saying that it was for the officer's ownsafety. As Lukensmeyer spoke to him, the officer shined aflashlight in defendant's face. Defendant testified that he did nothave anything in his mouth and that the officer never asked him tospit out anything. After placing defendant in the police car,Lukensmeyer removed a black case from the trunk and returned tothe Pontiac. A short while later, Lukensmeyer returned to thepolice car and told defendant and his brother that he found drugsinside their car. Defendant denied having narcotics in hispossession that day and denied telling Lukensmeyer that any drugsin the car belonged to him.

The trial court found defendant guilty of possession of acontrolled substance and subsequently sentenced him to a four-year term of imprisonment. The appellate court reversed,concluding that the arrest of defendant violated the fourthamendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.IV). 327 Ill. App. 3d at 983-84. The appellate court stated, inrelevant part:

"[A] police officer has to have some lawful authority toask a defendant for identification ***.

In this case, the officer did more than ask foridentification. He ordered the defendant out of the car andto the rear of it because he was 'curious.' The defendantsubmitted. We believe the defendant was detained at thatpoint without lawful authority. Curiosity is not a goodreason to detain. Everything that flowed directly from thatunlawful detention must be suppressed." 327 Ill. App. 3dat 983.

For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment ofthe appellate court.

ANALYSIS

I

Generally, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress willnot be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. This deferentialstandard applies when the disposition of the suppression motionturns on factual determinations and credibility assessments.Where, however, no dispute exists as to the facts or witnesscredibility, the trial court's ruling will be reviewed de novo.People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 200-01 (2001); People v.Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 411-12 (1998). In the present case, thetrial court found Officer Lukensmeyer's testimony credible. Suchfinding was not manifestly erroneous. Accordingly, we conduct denovo review under the officer's version of events. See People v.Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 274-75 (2002); Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d at 412.

II

Before considering the merits of this appeal, we briefly reviewthe principles relevant to deciding whether a vehicle stop comportswith fourth amendment jurisprudence.

The temporary detention of individuals-passengers anddrivers alike-during a vehicle stop constitutes a "seizure" of"persons" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. People v.Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 225 (2003), citing Whren v. UnitedStates, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95, 116 S. Ct.1769, 1772 (1996). Vehicle stops are, therefore, subject to thefourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness. Because atraffic stop is more analogous to a Terry investigative stop (seeTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868(1968)) than to a formal arrest, the reasonableness of a traffic stopis analyzed under Terry principles. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 226. ATerry analysis involves a dual inquiry: "(1) 'whether the officer'saction was justified at its inception,' and (2) 'whether it wasreasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justifiedthe interference in the first place.' " Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228,quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at1879.

In this case, no issue exists concerning the lawfulness of theinitial stop of the vehicle-the first prong of the Terry analysis.Rather, this appeal concerns the lawfulness of the officer'sconduct following the initial stop, and thus concerns the secondprong of the Terry analysis. Under the second prong we considerthe length of the detention and the manner in which it was carriedout. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 233. That is, " 'an investigativedetention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessaryto effectuate the purpose of the stop,' " and " 'the investigativemethods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonablyavailable to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a shortperiod of time.' " Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 233, quoting Florida v.Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319,1325-26 (1983) (plurality op.). With these principles in mind, weconsider the State's arguments on appeal.

A

The State first maintains that Officer Lukensmeyer couldlawfully direct defendant to exit the vehicle. See Maryland v.Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 48, 117 S. Ct. 882,886 (1997) (holding that, consistent with the fourth amendment,"an officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get outof the car pending completion of the stop"); Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2dat 420 (following Wilson and holding that the officer's commandto the passenger of a lawfully stopped vehicle to return to the carwas not an unreasonable seizure); People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d425, 433 (2001) ("it is well established that following a lawfultraffic stop, police may, as a matter of course, order the driver andany passengers out of the vehicle pending completion of the stopwithout violating the protections of the fourth amendment").

Defendant concedes that Officer Lukensmeyer could lawfullydirect defendant to exit the vehicle so that the officer could takecharge of the car and have it towed. In light of defendant'sconcession, there is no reason to consider this point further.

B

The State next argues that the officer's questioning ofdefendant, after he exited the vehicle, did not implicate fourthamendment protections. In analyzing this issue, we consider ourrecent decision in People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003).

In Gonzalez, police stopped a vehicle for not having a frontlicense plate. While one of the officers processed the driver, theother officer approached the passenger, who was not suspected ofany criminal conduct, and requested identification. The passengercomplied, and the ensuing encounter between the officer and thepassenger resulted in a search of the passenger's person, revealinga packet of cocaine. The passenger was arrested and charged. Thepassenger later challenged the officer's request for identification,arguing that it was an unreasonable seizure under our federal andstate constitutions. See U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970,art. I,