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Docket No. 94334-Agenda 3-May 2003.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PAUL
E. BOTRUFF, Appellee.

Opinion filed September 23, 2004.
 

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

This case concerns postcommitment provisions of the SexuallyViolent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq.(West 2000)). Following the completion of his sentence for criminalsexual assault, respondent was committed to the Department ofHuman Services (Department). In connection with a mandatoryreexamination procedure under the Act, he requested the appointmentof an independent evaluator. The circuit court of Warren Countydenied the request, and respondent appealed. A divided appellatecourt reversed (331 Ill. App. 3d 486), holding that: (1) section 25(e)of the Act (725 ILCS 207/25(e) (West 2000)), requiring a circuitcourt to appoint an independent evaluator upon an indigentrespondent's request, applies to postcommitment proceedings; and (2)section 65(b)(1) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000)),prohibiting a respondent from attending a limited probable causehearing, is unconstitutional. We reverse the decision of the appellatecourt.

I. BACKGROUND

The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act took effect onJanuary 1, 1998. Pub. Act 90-40, eff. January 1, 1998. The Actauthorizes the civil commitment of persons deemed sexually violent.725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2000). Section 15 of the Act allows theState to petition the court for the civil commitment of sexually violentpersons. 725 ILCS 207/15(b) (West 2000). The court then conductsa hearing "to determine whether there is probable cause to believe thatthe [individual] is a sexually violent person." 725 ILCS 207/30(b)(West 2000). Section 5(f) of the Act defines a "[s]exually violentperson" as:

"a person who has been convicted of a sexually violentoffense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violentoffense, or has been found not guilty of a sexually violentoffense by reason of insanity and who is dangerous becausehe or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes itsubstantially probable that the person will engage in acts ofsexual violence." 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2000).

Respondent in this case pleaded guilty to criminal sexual assaultand served approximately two years and eight months in prison.Criminal sexual assault is an enumerated sexually violent offense underthe Act (see 725 ILCS 207/5(e) (West 2000)). The State successfullypetitioned for respondent's civil commitment.

Following a civil commitment, the Department must conduct areexamination of the committed person's mental condition within sixmonths of the initial commitment, and additional reexaminations mustoccur in at least 12-month intervals. 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West2000). The purpose of these reexaminations is to determine whetherthe committed person has progressed enough to be conditionallyreleased or discharged. 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2000). At the timeof each reexamination, the committed person receives written noticeof the right to petition the court for discharge. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1)(West 2000). The notice must contain a waiver of rights. 725 ILCS207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). If the committed person does not waivethe right to petition for discharge, the court conducts a probable causehearing to determine if facts exist to warrant a hearing on the issue ofwhether respondent remains a sexually violent person. 725 ILCS207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). Section 65(b)(1) further provides that thecommitted person has the right to an attorney at the probable causehearing, but the respondent is not entitled to be present at theprobable cause hearing. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000).

Respondent's initial reexamination occurred in August 1999.Based on the examining doctor's report, the State moved for adirected finding against respondent on the issue of probable causeRespondent then moved for appointment of an independent evaluator.The motion was granted. Respondent ultimately stipulated to theexamining experts' reports. Based on those reports, the court grantedthe State's motion for a directed finding.

Respondent's next reexamination occurred in September 2000.Respondent did not waive his right to petition for discharge, and thecourt therefore conducted a probable cause hearing. While respondentwas statutorily prohibited from attending the hearing pursuant tosection 65(b)(1) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000)), anattorney appeared on respondent's behalf and requested theappointment of an independent evaluator. The court deniedrespondent's request. The court reasoned:

"I think in order for Mr. Botruff to be independently[evaluated] there must be at least some basis for the Court toorder such an independent [evaluation] other than just that hewould like to be [evaluated] by another party; that there issomething in the report of the [expert] that indicates to me heis perhaps somehow biased or skewed or not accuratelyreporting the results of the examination, or that there aresome other factors that the [expert] has not considered in thereport."

Based on the examining expert's report, the court found thatrespondent remained a sexually violent person and that no probablecause existed to warrant a hearing on the issue. Respondent appealed,and the appellate court reversed, holding that section 25(e) of the Actmandates that an independent evaluator be appointed at any hearingunder the Act upon the request of an indigent respondent, and toavoid equal protection concerns, a court must grant an indigentrespondent's request for appointment of an independent evaluatorduring postcommitment proceedings. 331 Ill. App. 3d at 491. Theappellate court also held that section 65(b)(1), prohibiting respondentfrom appearing at the probable cause hearing, was unconstitutional.331 Ill. App. 3d at 494.

The dissenting justice reasoned that the plain language of section25(e) indicates that it applies solely to initial commitment hearings.331 Ill. App. 3d at 495 (Lytton, P.J., dissenting). In addition, JusticeLytton stated that due to the limited nature of a section 65(b)(1)hearing, defendant's presence would have added nothing and,therefore, his due process rights were not infringed. 331 Ill. App. 3dat 497-98 (Lytton, P.J., dissenting).

We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.315(a).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Appointment of an Independent Evaluator

The State argues that the appellate court erroneously determinedthat the mandatory appointment of an independent evaluator provisionof section 25(e) is applicable to a committed person who is subject toreexamination under section 55(a). Section 25(e) of the Act provides,in part, as follows:

"Whenever the person who is the subject of the petition isrequired to submit to an examination under this Act, he orshe may retain experts or professional persons to perform anexamination. *** If the person is indigent, the court shall,upon the person's request, appoint a qualified and availableexpert or professional person to perform an examination ***and participate in the trial on behalf of an indigent person."725 ILCS 207/25(e) (West 2000).

Section 55(a), in addition to providing for periodic reexaminationof persons committed under the Act, states, in relevant part:

"At the time of a reexamination under this Section, theperson who has been committed may retain or, if he or she isindigent and so requests, the court may appoint a qualifiedexpert or a professional person to examine him or her."(Emphases added.) 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2000).

According to the State, section 25(e) pertains to a person's rightsat the time of the original petition for civil commitment, while section55(a) involves a respondent's rights upon reexamination, after theperson has been civilly committed. Respondent counters that, whensection 55(a) is read in light of section 25(e), the intent of thelegislature is unclear. Respondent argues that section 25(e) requiresthe appointment of an independent examiner upon an indigentperson's request "whenever" the person is subject to an examination.According to respondent, there is nothing in the statute to provedefinitively that the legislature intended section 25(e) to apply solelyto precommitment proceedings and section 55(a) to apply solely topostcommitment proceedings.

As the issue before us is a matter of statutory construction, ourreview is de novo. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225,232 (2001). The primary objective of this court in construing themeaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention ofthe legislature. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook,191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). All other rules of statutoryconstruction are subordinate to this cardinal principle. Henrich v.Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 387 (1998). The intent ofthe legislature can be best determined by examining the language ofthe statute. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). The statutory languageis to be given its plain, ordinary and popularly understood meaning.Union Electric Co. v. Department of Revenue, 136 Ill. 2d 385, 397(1990).

Because all provisions of a statutory enactment are viewed as awhole (Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 382(1995)), words and phrases should not be construed in isolation, butmust be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute(Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232; Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191Ill. 2d at 504). Each word, clause and sentence of the statute, ifpossible, must be given reasonable meaning and not renderedsuperfluous. A.P. Properties, Inc. v. Goshinsky, 186 Ill. 2d 524, 532(1999). Accordingly, in determining the intent of the legislature, thecourt may properly consider not only the language of the statute, butalso the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to beremedied, and the purpose to be achieved. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill.2d 36, 42 (2000). In construing a statute, we also presume that theGeneral Assembly, in its enactment of legislation, did not intendabsurdity, inconvenience or injustice. Michigan Avenue NationalBank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504. "Statutes must be construed in the mostbeneficial way which their language will permit so as to preventhardship or injustice, and to oppose prejudice to public interests."Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District, 123 Ill. 2d 303, 313 (1988).

A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that where thereexists a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision,either in the same or in another act, both relating to the same subject,the specific provision controls and should be applied. KnollsCondominium Ass'n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459 (2002). It isapparent that section 25(e) is a general provision that applies to allproceedings under the Act when a committed individual "is requiredto submit to an examination." See, contra, In re Ottinger, 333 Ill.App. 3d 114, 118 (2002) (section 25(e) pertains to proceedings on thepetition under section 15 of the Act, not to proceedings under sections55, 60, and 65). Section 55(a), by its plain language, specificallyapplies to periodic reexamination proceedings mandated by the Actand, thus serves as a gateway to petitions for discharge under section65. Here, section 55(a) more specifically addresses the appointmentof an independent examiner in periodic reexamination proceedingsand, therefore, controls over the more general provision of section25(e).⁽¹⁾ Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court was not requiredto appoint an independent evaluator; rather, it was a matter ofdiscretion under section 55(a). The question thus becomes whetherthe trial court abused its discretion.

Respondent argues that the trial court's decision violates equalprotection by applying the law in a way that respondent, as an indigentperson, was denied the use of an independent examiner in a situationwhere a nonindigent respondent would not have been denied. TheConstitution, however, does not require states to provide identicalrights, but merely protects against invidious discrimination amongclasses of individuals. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612, 41 L.Ed. 2d 341, 352, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 2444 (1974). In Moffitt, the UnitedStates Supreme Court stated:

"[T]he fact that a particular service might be of benefit to anindigent defendant does not mean that the service isconstitutionally required. The duty of the State under ourcases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may beprivately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuingeffort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure theindigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present hisclaims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process."Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 616, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 354, 94 S. Ct. at2447.

When analyzing legislation under equal protection, the level ofscrutiny applied depends on the type of legislative classification atissue. Classifications based on race or national origin or affectingfundamental rights are strictly scrutinized (McLean v. Department ofRevenue, 184 Ill. 2d 341, 354 (1998). Intermediate scrutiny applies todiscriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. In reDetention of Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d 548, 561-62 (2000). In all othercases, the court employs the highly deferential "rational basis" test.Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, 174 Ill. 2d 1, 33 (1996).As the statutory provisions assailed by defendant are not based onrace, national origin, sex or illegitimacy, nor do they implicatefundamental rights, the case at hand falls into this latter category. SeeSamuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 562. Under the rational basis test, the courtinquires whether the method or means employed in the statute toachieve the stated goal or purpose of the legislation is rationallyrelated to that goal. Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 562. If any set of factscan reasonably be conceived to justify the classification, it must beupheld. In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32, 38 (1998). Whether a rational basisexists for a classification is a question of law, subject to de novoreview. A.A., 181 Ill. 2d at 38.

A defendant may be entitled to funds to hire an expert witnesswhere expert testimony is deemed "crucial" to a proper defense.People v. Keene,169 Ill. 2d 1, 7-8 (1995). This is established when thedefendant shows that the expert services are "crucial" to "build adefense" and the defendant's financial inability to obtain his ownexpert will prejudice his case. People v. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187, 220-22 (1994); Keene, 169 Ill. 2d at 8.

In the case at hand, nothing in the record demonstrates thatrespondent's case was prejudiced or that the court would have founddifferently had an independent examiner been provided. At thehearing, the judge reviewed the State's tendered reevaluation report.The court then invited "[a]ny comments with reference to the report."Counsel for respondent offered no comments, objections, orquestions. The only position taken by respondent was to request anindependent evaluator to "rebut the findings [in the tendered report]."Respondent's counsel provided the court with no reason or suggestionas a possible basis to rebut the report. It is rational not to appoint anindependent evaluator when a respondent has shown no need for one,especially during perfunctory reexamination proceedings where therespondent has not affirmatively opted to petition for discharge.Samuelson, 189 Ill. 2d at 562; A.A., 181 Ill. 2d at 38. Without more,the court did not abuse its discretion by denying respondent's requestfor an independent evaluation. Accordingly, we agree with the Statethat respondent was not denied equal protection by the failure of thecourt to appoint an independent evaluator. See People v. Sanchez,169 Ill. 2d 472, 501 (1996) (no equal protection violation regardinga court's failure to appoint an expert witness for an indigentrespondent).

B. Prohibition of Respondent from Attending Probable CauseHearing

The State also claims that the appellate court erred in concludingthat the provision of section 65(b)(1), not allowing a respondent toattend the probable cause hearing at the time of a periodicreexamination, violates due process. The State maintains that, sincerespondent is entitled to have an attorney represent him at this verylimited probable cause hearing, no constitutional infirmity exists.According to respondent, his representation by an attorney at theprobable cause hearing was insufficient and due process mandates thathe be allowed to attend the hearing himself. In assessing thesearguments, we must be ever mindful of the well- established principlesthat: (1) all statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality(People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (2000)); and (2) the partychallenging a statute bears the burden of clearly establishing theconstitutional infirmity (People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 111(1995)).

Under section 65(b)(1), respondent had three options followinghis periodic reexamination. First, he could have waived his right to ahearing, essentially assenting to further commitment. 725 ILCS207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). Second, he could have petitioned forrelease and would have received a full probable cause hearing. 725ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). Finally, respondent could have donenothing. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000). Respondent chose thethird option. When a respondent does not file a petition for discharge,yet fails to waive the right to petition under section 65(b)(1), then theprobable cause hearing consists only of a review of the reexaminationreports and arguments on behalf of the parties and the respondent'sattendance is prohibited. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2000).

There are three factors used in determining what procedures arerequired by the fourteenth amendment due process clause in specifictypes of proceedings that implicate fundamental liberty interests: (1)the private interest implicated by the official action; (2) the risk of anerroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used andthe probable value of the proposed additional or substitute safeguards;and (3) the government's interest, including the function involved andthe administrative or fiscal burdens that would result from theproposed additional or substitute safeguards. Mathews v. Eldridge,424 U.S. 319, 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976).These same factors are also used in determining what procedures arerequired by the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.Const. 1970, art. I,