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Docket No. 89082-Agenda 11-September 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
CAMERUN BLAYLOCK, Appellant.

Opinion filed November 21, 2002.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

This case presents us with a unique set of circumstances. Theoriginal issue raised before this court is whether the State couldretry defendant for first degree murder where the trial exhibitsfrom defendant's first trial, allegedly favorable to defendant, werelost by the circuit clerk of Vermilion County. After this issue wasfully briefed by both parties, but before oral arguments, themissing box of trial exhibits were found in the clerk's office. Westayed proceedings and remanded the cause to the circuit court fora hearing on the status of the recently discovered evidence. Thecircuit court completed this hearing in February 2002. We alloweddefendant's motion to file a supplemental brief concerning theissues raised and findings made on remand. We must nowdetermine whether the original issue raised before this court ismoot in light of the reappearance of the missing trial exhibits andwhether this court should consider the new issue raised indefendant's supplementary brief.

BACKGROUND

In 1993, defendant was indicted on five counts of first degreemurder and six counts of home invasion in connection with themurder of Robin Jackson. The testimony at trial showed thatdefendant, Ranterris Landfair and Arnell Render drove to thevictim's house. While Landfair waited in the car, Render anddefendant kicked in the front door of the house and gainedentrance. Once inside the house, Render stabbed the victim witha jagged knife two times and defendant shot the victim three times.As the three men drove away from the house, defendant andRender undressed and threw the clothes and shoes they werewearing out of the car window. At trial, defendant argued that hecould not be found guilty because the State's witnesses, Landfairand Render, were not believable. He pointed out that the jacketand shoes that were recovered by the police did not fit defendantbut, instead, fit Landfair. Defendant's theory was that he was notat the scene of the crime. At the conclusion of the trial, the juryreturned a guilty verdict as to the home invasion counts, butdeadlocked on the first degree murder counts. Defendant wassentenced to 30 years' imprisonment in the Department ofCorrections.

The trial court granted the State's motion to retry defendanton the murder counts. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss themurder charges arguing that retrial violated double jeopardygrounds. The trial court denied this motion and defendantappealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling andremanded for retrial. People v. Blaylock, No. 4-95-0381(December 26, 1997) (unpublished order under Supreme CourtRule 23). This court denied defendant's petition for leave toappeal. People v. Blaylock, 178 Ill. 2d 584 (1998) (leave to appealdenied).

In 1998, defendant learned that the clerk's office had lost theexhibits admitted into evidence at the previous trial. During thetrial, the State had 59 exhibits admitted into evidence anddefendant had 33 exhibits admitted into evidence. The itemsadmitted into evidence included the clothing that defendant andRender had thrown out of the car after the commission of thecrime, the gun, bullets and shoes that were discarded, a cardwritten by Render to his girlfriend, and the shoes defendant woreat the time of his arrest. The only exhibits that could be locatedwere the gun, bullets, and bullet casings.

After learning that the majority of the evidence used duringfirst trial was lost, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the murderindictment, arguing that retrying him without the lost exhibitsdeprived him of due process of law.

Defendant argued that the trial exhibits were exculpatory.Specifically, he contended that the shoes and the jacket that wererecovered by the police did not fit defendant but, rather, fitLandfair. Defendant argued that these exhibits were used toimpeach the State's witnesses and show that defendant was notpresent at the crime scene. The trial court agreed, finding that themissing evidence was "critically important" to defendant and, inDecember 1998, granted defendant's motion to dismiss theindictment. The State appealed this order (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1))and the appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court andagain remanded for retrial. 311 Ill. App. 3d 399.

We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal in May2000. The parties proceeded to brief the issue of whetherdefendant's right to due process would be violated if the Stateretried him on the murder charges without the missing evidence.On November 30, 2000, while briefing was still in progress, thecircuit clerk of Vermilion County informed the parties that themissing evidence in question had been found. Defendant filed amotion for a stay of appeal and a limited remand to the circuitcourt for a review of the evidence and a determination of whetherit was the same evidence used in the first trial. This court granteddefendant's motion.

The trial court conducted hearings on several dates. Itconcluded that the evidence found by the clerk's office was, infact, the evidence used at defendant's first trial. Defendant soughtclarification of this court's mandate, and, following an order fromthis court clarifying its mandate, the circuit court held a secondhearing concerning the evidence. The circuit court found that theevidence was missing as early as June or July 1997. The courtfurther found that the evidence was not in the possession orcustody of the clerk's office during this time, either in the vaultwhere it was eventually found or elsewhere within the clerk'soffice or space. The location of the evidence during this time, theidentity of the person or persons who had custody of the evidence,and the circumstances surrounding its mysterious reappearance areunknown. The trial court specifically found that the sheriff's officewas not responsible for the missing evidence. According to thetrial court, the State knew of the missing evidence in June or Julyof 1997, during the first appeal, but did not disclose this fact to thecourt or defendant until September 1998, more than a year later.The court specifically made no determination of whether theevidence was in the same condition as it was at the time of trial.

Following the conclusion of the proceedings in the circuitcourt, defendant sought leave from this court to file asupplemental brief, which this court granted. In his supplementalbrief, defendant argues that his right to a speedy trial would beviolated if he were retried now after a period of more than threeyears.

ANALYSIS

In light of the reappearance of the missing trial exhibits, wemust address whether the original issue raised in defendant'sappeal is moot. Defendant maintains that this court should decidehow it would have ruled on the original issue of whether his dueprocess rights were violated. Specifically, defendant argues thatthis court should consider the original issue as part of the speedy-trial issue raised in the supplemental brief. That is, defendantcontends that this court must determine whether it was reasonablefor him to have failed to file a speedy-trial demand. In making thisdetermination, this court should decide how it would have ruled onthe original due process issue. The State counters that anyconsideration of the original due process issue is inappropriatesince the evidence has been located, rendering the original dueprocess issue moot.

We agree with the State and find that the original issue in thiscase is clearly moot. A question is said to be moot when it presentsor involves no actual controversy, interests or rights, or where theissues involved have ceased to exist. Chicago City Bank & TrustCo. v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 386 Ill. 508(1944); see Hill v. Murphy, 14 Ill. App. 3d 668 (1973) (thefunction of the courts is to decide controverted issues in adversaryproceedings; moot cases which do not present live issues are notordinarily entertained). Courts of review will generally notconsider moot or abstract questions because our jurisdiction isrestricted to cases which present an actual controversy.Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 522-23 (2001).When a reviewing court has notice that substantial questionsinvolved in the trial court no longer exist, it will dismiss theappeal. People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270 (1949).

Here, defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal from theappellate court's reversal of the trial court's dismissal of themurder charges against him. The issue on appeal was whether thetrial court incorrectly ruled that a retrial without the missingexhibits violated defendant's due process rights. Before oralarguments on the due process issue, the missing trial exhibits werefound. Once the exhibits were found, we stayed defendant's dueprocess appeal and remanded this cause back to the trial court fora hearing to determine the status of the missing evidence and anypertinent findings regarding the disappearance and reappearance.The trial court determined that the exhibits were, in fact, those thatwere used in defendant's first trial. Because the trial exhibits haveresurfaced, we need not determine how we would have ruled onthe original due process issue when the exhibits were missing. Theissue has been rendered moot by the reappearance of the missingtrial exhibits.

Defendant further urges this court to vacate the appellatecourt's judgment and affirm the trial court's dismissal of themurder charges against him on the basis of a violation of hisconstitutional right to a speedy trial. He argues that if the entirecourse of events following defendant's filing of the motion todismiss are attributable to the State, then retrial has been delayedin violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial. He urges thiscourt to apply a four-part balancing test to make thisdetermination, including a consideration of (1) length of delay; (2)reason for delay; (3) prejudice to defendant; (4) defendant'sassertion of his rights. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed.2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972); People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42(2001). He notes that three years and three months have elapsedsince the trial court dismissed the first degree murder chargesagainst defendant. Defendant maintains that this is a delay of suchmagnitude that this court should recognize it as presumptivelyprejudicial so as to trigger a speedy-trial analysis. Defendantfurther maintains that it would be in the interest of judicialeconomy for this court to address the speedy-trial issue in this caserather than remand it to the trial court to rule on the issues first.

The State counters that this court lacks jurisdiction to reviewthe speedy-trial issue. The State contends that jurisdiction in thismatter is conferred by Supreme Court Rule 604(a), which permitsappeals by the State from orders dismissing a charge, and SupremeCourt Rule 315, which provides for petitions for leave to appeal.The sole issue on appeal, the State notes, was the propriety of thetrial court's ruling that defendant's due process rights would beviolated if he were retried without the missing trial exhibits. TheState contends that the due process issue is the only one that isproperly before this court on appeal from the appellate court'sreversal of the trial court's order, not the speedy-trial issue raisedin the supplemental brief. Because there was no order from thetrial court, final or otherwise, with regard to a speedy-trialviolation, the State argues that it is improper for this court toconsider that issue.

We conclude that we need not address the State's jurisdictionargument because, given the unique procedural history of thiscase, the record before us is inadequately developed. This issuehas never been raised in the trial court. Following the reappearanceof the missing evidence, the trial court made certain findings.Specifically, the trial court determined that the missing evidenceis the same evidence used in defendant's first trial, the clerk'soffice was not in possession of the evidence, the evidence wasmissing as early as June or July 1997, the sheriff's office was notresponsible for the missing evidence, and the State knew that theevidence was missing in June or July 1997. These were the onlyfindings that the trial court made. The location of the evidence,during its mysterious disappearance, has yet to be determined. Theidentity of the person or persons who had custody of the evidenceand the circumstances surrounding its sudden reappearance areunknown. Further, the condition of the evidence is unclear. Webelieve that the trial court is in the best position to make these, andany other determinations, necessary for the resolution of thespeedy-trial issue. Consequently, we decline to review the speedy-trial issue based on limited information and an undevelopedrecord.

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's appeal is dismissedand the cause is remanded to the trial court for furtherproceedings.

Appeal dismissed.