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THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
DAVID BELLMYER, Appellee.

Defendant, David Bellmyer, was charged with first degreemurder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 1998)) in the circuit court ofRock Island County. Defendant raised the affirmative defense ofinsanity. After the parties presented evidence in a stipulated benchtrial, the trial court found that the stipulated evidence wasinsufficient to make a decision regarding defendant's insanitydefense. Defendant moved to dismiss the charged offense based ondouble jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied the motion andsubsequently set the matter for a full trial.

Defendant brought an interlocutory appeal to the appellatecourt. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(f). The court held that jeopardy hadattached at the stipulated bench trial and that double jeopardybarred a second prosecution. The appellate court reversed the trialcourt's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the charges. 323Ill. App. 3d 269.

We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2dR. 315(a). We now reverse the appellate court and remand thecause to the trial court for further proceedings.

The charges at issue in this case arise from the January 24,1999, shooting death of George Bellmyer (hereafter victim).Defendant, the victim's son, was arrested, taken to the Rock IslandCounty sheriff's department and advised of his Miranda rights. Heinvoked his right to counsel. On January 25, 1999, defendant wascharged in an information with two counts of first degree murder(720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998)). In his first courtappearance, also on that date, the court advised defendant that hehad a right to an attorney and warned him of the possibility of trialin absentia. The court also set bond and informed defendant of thedate of his preliminary hearing. Because defendant appeared notto understand these actions, the State moved for a fitness hearingto determine if defendant was fit to plead or stand trial. The courtgranted the State's motion and appointed Dr. Eric Ritterhoff toconduct the fitness examination.

On February 22, 1999, Dr. Ritterhoff submitted a report to thetrial court and, on March 5, testified at a fitness hearing. Dr.Ritterhoff concluded that defendant was not fit to plead or standtrial at that time, but that he would be fit within one year.

Defendant was remanded to the custody of the IllinoisDepartment of Human Services, which periodically submittedwritten mental health evaluations of defendant. In its third reportto the court, dated August 25, 1999, the Department concludedthat defendant was fit to stand trial. At a fitness hearing onSeptember 1, 1999, defendant and the State stipulated thatdefendant was fit to stand trial. The trial court reviewed the thirdwritten report and, based thereon, found defendant fit to standtrial.

On November 8, 1999, defendant moved for a continuance sothat he could be examined to determine whether the insanitydefense was available to him at trial. Defendant and the Stateagreed that Dr. Robert Chapman would examine defendant on theissue of sanity. On November 30, defendant filed notice that heintended to raise the affirmative defense of insanity. Attached tohis notice was Dr. Chapman's written report, in which heconcluded that defendant was insane at the time of the shooting.

In response, on December 6, 1999, the State sought acontinuance for a second opinion on the issue of sanity from Dr.Kirk Witherspoon. In a written report dated December 24, 1999,Dr. Witherspoon also concluded that defendant was insane whenhe shot the victim. On January 6, 2000, defendant and the Stateinformed the court that because both of their experts opined thatdefendant was insane at the time of the offense, the parties wouldproceed via a stipulated bench trial. Defendant waived his right toa jury trial. After questioning, the trial court found that defendant'sjury waiver was knowing and voluntary.

On February 29, 2000, the trial court heard openingstatements, received stipulated evidence, and heard closingarguments. The parties agreed to the following facts at thestipulated bench trial. In January 1999, defendant and his daughter,April, lived in the home of his parents in Coal Valley. During thistime, the victim was recovering from a leg injury and was using awheelchair. Also, defendant had begun to carry a handgun.

On January 22, defendant was arrested for disorderly conductand spent the night in the county jail. No charges were filedagainst defendant with respect to the arrest, and defendant wasreleased the next day. When defendant returned home on January23, he became angry because he could not find his gun, and arguedwith his parents. The victim returned the handgun to defendant,who calmed down, went to his room, and repeatedly cleaned thegun. Also on that day, defendant complained to his brother, Gary,of having experienced a "bad trip" from illegal narcotics he hadbeen taking.

Between 1 a.m. and 3 a.m. on January 24, defendant had anargument with his girlfriend, Katherine McCollom, who lived withhim at his parents' home. Defendant pointed a gun at McCollomand demanded that she mop the floors. She complied, whiledefendant paced back and forth.

Later that morning, defendant again cleaned his gun andplaced it under the couch in the living room. He forgot where hehad put it and became infuriated. At approximately 1:30 p.m.,Gary, who lived across the street from the house, went to hisparents' home. Defendant's mother and the victim were in theliving room and appeared frightened. Defendant was looking forhis gun and appeared nervous and agitated. Gary returned to hishome. When defendant found the handgun, he began to point it athis mother, the victim, and McCollom. He did not point the gun athis daughter, April, who was also present. He told April to go tothe basement. She complied, but returned to the living room andsaw what transpired.

Defendant hit the victim with the gun on the head and the leg.Defendant's mother and April escaped through a window and fledto Gary's home. They told Gary that defendant was beating thevictim with a gun. Police were called.

Defendant then kicked the victim's wheelchair out from underthe victim and continued to beat him with the gun. McCollom thenescaped through the window as well, leaving defendant and thevictim in the house alone.

The first law enforcement officials to arrive at the scene sawMcCollom run from the victim's home across the street to Gary'sresidence. A short time later, officials heard three shots being firedfrom inside the victim's residence. For approximately the nexthour, police attempted, via a public address system, to persuadedefendant to exit the house. During this time they heard multipleshots being fired inside the home.

At approximately 5 p.m., law officers forced their way intothe house through the back door. They found the victim's body onthe floor inside the back porch. Defendant was siting on a couchin his bedroom with a handgun beside him.

An autopsy disclosed that the victim had died as a result ofthree gunshot wounds to the head. Further, it was determined thatthe bullets recovered during the autopsy were fired from the gunfound next to defendant.

The parties agreed that the State could prove the chargedoffenses beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the partiesdisagreed as to whether defendant was sane at the time of theshooting or should be found not guilty by reason of insanity.Accordingly, the State and defendant stipulated as to the evidencepertaining to the issue of sanity, but not to the sufficiency of theevidence to find defendant insane.

The State contended that despite the reports of Drs. Chapmanand Witherspoon, the court should find defendant either guilty orguilty but mentally ill. Pointing to the facts that defendant hadargued with his parents and McCollom the day before the shootingand had been cleaning his gun, the State argued that defendant hadplanned the incident. The State also argued that defendant, by notpointing the gun at his daughter and ordering her to go to thebasement, knew that his actions were wrong.

The defense, in its closing argument, emphasized that Drs.Chapman and Witherspoon both concluded that defendant wasinsane at the time of the shooting. Both found that defendantsuffered from "schizoaffective disorder, bi-polar type"; bothagreed that, due to this mental condition, defendant could notappreciate the criminality of his conduct. The defense contendedthat the trial court should find defendant not guilty by reason ofinsanity.

After hearing closing arguments, the court noted that it hadquestions regarding the qualifications of Dr. Witherspoon. Thecourt also expressed concern regarding the lack of evidence ofhow defendant acted prior and subsequent to the shooting. Thecourt asked the State to submit additional information regardingthese matters. Complying with this request, the parties presentedadditional stipulated evidence pertaining to Dr. Witherspoon'squalifications and defendant's behavior from the time of theshooting until the time of his arrest and the appointment of thepublic defender.

On April 7, 2000, the court held a hearing at which it wasexpected that the court would render its judgment. However, thejudge complained that, despite the additional information, thestipulated evidence was not adequate or sufficient to determine theissue of defendant's sanity at the time of the shooting. "Manythings the Court needs to see and hear simply do not come outthrough a written stipulation." The court stated that it needed tosee the demeanor of defendant as he testified regarding hisbehavior, or see the demeanor of witnesses who observeddefendant's behavior, prior and subsequent to the shooting. Thetrial court explained that the credibility of witnesses was veryimportant in deciding this issue and that stipulated evidence didnot provide the court with an opportunity to judge credibility.Accordingly, the court refused to enter a ruling.

On April 12, 2000, defendant filed a motion to compel theverdict. The State did not object to the motion and agreed withdefendant that the stipulations contained all of the availableinformation. Both parties agreed that they could not provide thecourt with any additional evidence and that nothing would beadded by cross-examining the witnesses. The trial court stated thatmuch more could be brought out in a full trial and denied themotion to compel the verdict.

Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss the charged offenseof murder based on double jeopardy. The State objected to thismotion, and the trial court denied the motion and a subsequentmotion to reconsider. The trial court thereafter allowed defendantto withdraw his jury waiver and set the matter for a jury trial.

Defendant brought an interlocutory appeal to the appellatecourt. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(f). The appellate court, with onejustice dissenting, held that jeopardy attached at the stipulatedbench trial and that double jeopardy barred a second prosecution.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order, which haddenied defendant's motion to dismiss the charged offense based ondouble jeopardy. 323 Ill. App. 3d at 275-77. The dissenting justiceopined that jeopardy had not attached at the stipulated bench trialand, consequently, double jeopardy did not bar a secondprosecution. 323 Ill. App. 3d at 277 (Holdridge, J., dissenting).The State appeals to this court.

The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to theUnited States Constitution, made applicable to the states throughthe fourteenth amendment, provides that no person shall "besubject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life orlimb." U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV. The same protection isafforded by the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,