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Docket No. 92937-Agenda 20-September 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOHN BELK, Appellee.

Opinion filed January 24, 2003.

JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:

The sole issue in this case is whether aggravated possessionof a stolen motor vehicle can be considered to be a forcible felonyfor purposes of the felony-murder rule. The defendant, John Belk,stole a van and, while being pursued by police at a high rate ofspeed, crashed into another vehicle, killing both occupants.Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, Belkwas convicted of two counts of felony murder and one count ofaggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The appellatecourt reversed, holding that the felony-murder statute was notintended to apply in situations where the defendant's conduct wasonly reckless. 326 Ill. App. 3d 290. We granted the State's petitionfor leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons that follow,we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

The relevant facts are as follows. On the evening of May 14,1998, Belk, age 16, and another person broke into a van and stoleit. Residents in a nearby apartment complex heard the sound ofbreaking glass and observed two men breaking into the van andcalled police. Sergeant Craig Kincaid of the Blue Island policedepartment was on duty that night. Upon receiving a radiodispatch regarding an automobile theft in progress and adescription of the vehicle, Kincaid activated his emergency lightsand siren on his patrol vehicle and drove toward the location of thecrime.

As Kincaid was approaching the intersection of 127th Streetand Vincennes, he observed a van matching the description of thestolen vehicle heading towards him. Kincaid made a U-turn and,with his lights and siren still activated, began pursuing the van.The van continued west on 127th Street at about 60 miles per hourfor one block, then made a sharp right turn into a Walgreen'sparking lot. The van sped through the pharmacy drive-throughlane, around the Walgreen's building, then proceeded north onWestern Avenue.

Once on Western Avenue and with police still in pursuit, thevan increased its speed. As it approached 115th Street, the van wastraveling at over 100 miles per hour. The posted speed limit in thatarea was 30 miles per hour. This section of Western Avenue hadnumerous restaurants and other establishments that were still openfor business. Kincaid testified that there was other vehicular trafficpresent on Western Avenue and that there were pedestrians on thesidewalk. The other vehicles were pulling over to the side of theroad and the van was passing them.

At the intersection of 111th Street and Western Avenue, thevan crashed into the rear of the victims' car, propelling it 375 feetfrom the point of impact. The victims, Tom and Joanna Peragine,died as a result of injuries sustained in the crash.

The van flipped over and landed 330 feet from the point ofimpact, where it caught fire. Belk crawled out of the van andattempted to flee on foot, but was tackled by a police officer. Belkbegan kicking the officer, but the officer subdued him and placedhim under arrest. Belk was taken to the emergency room of anearby hospital for treatment of his injuries. While there, atoxicology test was performed. The test revealed that Belk'sblood-alcohol level was 0.19.

The trial court found Belk guilty beyond a reasonable doubtof two counts of felony murder and one count of aggravatedpossession of a stolen motor vehicle, determining that Belk'scommission of the felony of aggravated possession of a stolenmotor vehicle proximately caused the death of the victims. Thecourt sentenced Belk to a term of natural life.

Belk appealed, arguing that because aggravated possession ofa stolen motor vehicle was not an enumerated forcible felonyunder the felony-murder statute or a forcible felony threateningviolence against individuals, his conviction should be reduced toreckless homicide. The appellate court agreed, holding that theevidence presented at trial demonstrated that while Belk actedrecklessly, his actions did not fall within the purview of the felony-murder statute. Specifically, the appellate court held that theevidence did not support an inference that Belk contemplatedviolence or acted intentionally when his vehicle struck that of thevictims, or that he intended to kill or cause great bodily harm toanyone who got in his way. The appellate court concluded thatwhile the evidence clearly demonstrated that Belk was determinedto elude capture and that he drove the van in a reckless manner, itdid not show that he intended to kill anyone during the course ofhis attempt to escape. The appellate court reduced Belk'sconviction to reckless homicide, vacated his sentence of naturallife, and remanded the cause for resentencing.

On appeal, the State argues that the appellate court erred inholding that the felony-murder rule did not apply because Belk'sconduct was merely reckless and he did not intend to kill thevictims. The State contends that the felony-murder rule does notrequire an intent to kill and that an intent to kill is irrelevant to thedetermination of whether a felony qualifies as a forcible felony.

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain andgive effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Richardson,196 Ill. 2d 225, 228 (2001). Legislative intent is best ascertainedby examining the language of the statute itself. People v.Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996). Where the language is clearand unambiguous, there is no need to resort to aids of statutoryconstruction. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). Becausethe construction of a statute is a question of law, review is denovo. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d at 228.

Aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle is a Class 1felony and occurs when "a person *** who is the driver oroperator of a vehicle and is not entitled to the possession of thatvehicle and who knows the vehicle is stolen or converted *** whohas been given a signal by a peace officer directing him to bringthe vehicle to a stop, to willfully fail or refuse to obey suchdirection, increase his speed, extinguish his lights or otherwise fleeor attempt to elude the officer." 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7) (West1996). Belk does not dispute that he was guilty of this offense.

Section 9-1(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code)provides that "[a] person who kills an individual without lawfuljustification commits first degree murder if, in performing the actswhich cause the death *** he is attempting or committing aforcible felony other that second degree murder." 720 ILCS5/9-1(a)(3) (West 1996). Under the felony-murder statute, a felonis responsible for the direct and foreseeable consequences of hisactions. People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462, 470 (1997). Thepurpose behind the felony-murder statute is to limit the violencethat accompanies the commission of forcible felonies, so thatanyone engaged in such violence will be automatically subject toa murder prosecution should someone be killed during thecommission of a forcible felony. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301,322 (1998), citing People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 105 (1998).

Section 2-8 of the Code defines "[f]orcible felony" as"treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatorycriminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexualassault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residentialburglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping,kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm orpermanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony whichinvolves the use or threat of physical force or violence against anyindividual." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 1996).

Because aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle isnot one of the felonies specifically enumerated in section 2-8, thequestion becomes whether, under the facts of this case, Belk'saggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle involved the useor threat of physical force or violence against any individual.

In People v. Golson, 32 Ill. 2d 398 (1965), we held thatnonviolent felonies could serve as the predicate offense for felonymurder. In Golson, the defendants purchased a gun and set out tosteal from automobiles. Unable to find any automobiles fromwhich to steal, they stole two mail sacks from a loading dock.Shortly after leaving the dock, the defendants were stopped by twopostal inspectors, whom they shot and killed.

On appeal, the defendants argued, inter alia, that the felony-murder doctrine applied only in cases where the conspirators hadconspired to commit a forcible felony, which by its nature isdangerous to human life, and that their theft by stealth of two mailsacks was a nonforcible felony that would not ordinarily involveany danger to human life. We rejected the defendants' argument,holding that "the test to be applied in determining whether thefelony-murder doctrine is applicable is not whether the felony isnormally classified as non-violent, but is whether, under the factsof a particular case, it is contemplated that violence might benecessary to enable the conspirators to carry out their commonpurpose." (Emphasis added.) Golson, 32 Ill. 2d at 407-08. Afterexamining the record, we concluded that there was "sufficientevidence from which the jury could infer that the conspiratorsintended to forcibly resist any attempt to arrest them, either duringthe course of the crime or in an attempt to escape from the scene.Such a plan comes within the doctrine of felony-murder, since itwas contemplated that violence might be necessary to enable theconspirators to carry out their common purpose." Golson, 32 Ill.2d at 408-09.

In reaching our decision in Golson, we relied upon ourprevious decision in People v. Bongiorno, 358 Ill. 171 (1934). InBongiorno, the defendants were in the process of committing anarmed robbery when a police officer entered. The defendant'scompanion escaped out a window, but the defendant was caughtand arrested. As the defendant was being escorted down a hallway,his companion shot the officer in the back. On appeal, thedefendant argued that he was not guilty of murder becauseapproximately five minutes had elapsed after the robbery had beencompleted and because the evidence did not show a previous planor design to kill. We upheld the murder conviction, reasoning thatthe uncontradicted evidence demonstrated that the defendantsplanned to commit robbery by using a deadly weapon to intimidatethe victims and to escape with the proceeds. We noted that "[a]plan to commit robbery would be futile if it did not comprehendan escape with the proceeds of the crime. These factualcircumstances are inseparable. Unless the plan of robbery is toterrify the victim, and, if occasion requires, to kill any personattempting to apprehend them at the time of or immediately upongaining possession of the property, it would be inane and child-like." Bongiorno, 358 Ill. at 174.

In Bongiorno, we affirmed the defendant's conviction formurder because the facts demonstrated that perpetrators' plan tocommit robbery contemplated an escape with the proceeds and theuse of deadly force against anyone attempting to apprehend them.Relying on Bongiorno, we held in Golson that the evidencesupported the inference that the perpetrators intended to forciblyresist any attempt to arrest them, either during the course of thecrime or in an attempt to escape the scene. Because the evidencedemonstrated that they contemplated that the use of force orviolence against an individual might be necessary, the theft bystealth of the mail sacks was a forcible felony for purposes of thefelony-murder statute. Golson, 32 Ill. 2d at 408-09.

The question before us, then, is whether, under the particularfacts of this case, there is any evidence which would give rise toan inference that at some point during his attempt to elude thepolice, Belk contemplated that escape might involve the use offorce or violence against an individual. After reviewing the record,we conclude that there is not. The evidence shows that Belk wasintoxicated, that he stole a van, and that in an attempt to eludecapture, he drove at an excessive rate of speed through an areawhere he was likely to encounter other vehicular or pedestriantraffic. While this evidence would support an inference that Belkacted recklessly and contemplated that in attempting to eludepolice he was likely to cause death or great bodily harm, aninference that clearly supports a conviction for reckless homicidepursuant to section 9-3 of the Code (720 ILCS 5/9-3 (West1996)), it does not support an inference that Belk contemplatedthat the use of force or violence against an individual might benecessary in order for him to accomplish his escape.

The crucial distinction between the present case andBongiorno and Golson is that, in those cases, the surroundingcircumstances, particularly the fact that the perpetrators werearmed, gave rise to an inference that the perpetrators intended touse force to escape. This necessarily implies that theycontemplated that the use of force or violence against anindividual might be involved and that they were willing to usesuch force or violence in order to make their escape. It is thecontemplation that force or violence against an individual mightbe involved combined with the implied willingness to use force orviolence against an individual that makes a felony a forcible felonyunder the residual category of section 2-8.

In the present case, there is no evidence that either Belk or hisaccomplice was armed, and no evidence that they contemplatedand were willing to use force or violence against an individual tomake their escape. While it is true that a vehicle can be used as adeadly weapon (see People v. Crocket, 13 Ill. App. 2d 255 (1957)(abstract of op.)), there is no evidence in this case that Belkcontemplated using the van in such manner. Although OfficerKincaid testified that there were pedestrians on the sidewalk, thereis no evidence that Belk contemplated that striking a pedestrianwith the van might be necessary to elude police. Likewise, thereis no evidence that Belk contemplated that striking another vehiclemight be necessary to accomplish his escape. Indeed, as can beseen from the present case, a high-speed collision with anothervehicle would not only impede an escape attempt, it would presenta serious risk of death or bodily injury to the perpetrator.

In support of its argument that aggravated possession of astolen motor vehicle should be considered a forcible felony underthe circumstances of this case, the State cites People v. Stevens,324 Ill. App. 3d 1084 (2001), and People v. Thomas, 266 Ill. App.3d 914 (1994). In those cases, the defendants were fleeing policein stolen motor vehicles when they were involved in accidentswhich resulted in the victims' deaths. The defendants wereconvicted of first degree murder pursuant to section 9-1(a)(2) ofthe Code, which provides that a person commits first degreemurder when he knows that his actions created a strong probabilityof death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2000).The appellate court upheld the convictions in those cases, findingthat a jury could have concluded from the evidence that thedefendants knew that their actions created a strong probability ofdeath or great bodily harm. These cases are inapposite. While adefendant's knowledge that his actions create a strong probabilityof death or great bodily harm is sufficient to support a convictionfor first degree murder under section 9-1(a)(2) of the Code, adefendant's knowledge that his actions might involve the threat oruse of force or violence against an individual is not sufficient,under Golson, to make a felony a forcible felony under section2-8.

As noted above, the State argues that the appellate courterroneously held that Belk was not guilty of felony murder becausethe evidence did not support an inference that it was Belk's intentto kill or cause great bodily harm. While we do not interpret theappellate court's opinion as requiring evidence of an intent to killin order to sustain a felony-murder conviction, other courts havedone so (see People v. McCarty, 329 Ill. App. 3d 969 (2002)) andthe dicta therein could easily give rise to such misunderstanding.We therefore wish to reemphasize that whether the perpetratorintended to kill the victim is irrelevant for purposes of the felony-murder statute. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d at 322.

In sum, we hold that under the facts of this case, aggravatedpossession of a stolen motor vehicle is not a forcible felony forpurposes of the felony-murder statute because the evidence doesnot support an inference that Belk contemplated that the use offorce or violence against an individual might be involved inattempting to elude police.

The judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.

Appellate court judgment affirmed.