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Docket No. 91417-Agenda 15-January 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
DAVID BELCHER, Appellant.

Opinion filed April 4, 2002.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

In the circuit court of Champaign County, defendant, DavidBelcher, pled guilty to one count of first degree murder (720 ILCS5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1996)) in exchange for the dismissal of othercharges and received a sentence of 60 years' imprisonment. Thetrial court denied defendant's motion to reconsider sentence. Onappeal, the appellate court declined to vacate defendant's guiltyplea and sentence or allow him leave to file a motion to withdrawhis guilty plea in the trial court. However, the appellate courtfound that the certificate defense counsel filed with the motion toreconsider sentence did not meet the requirements of SupremeCourt Rule 604(d). The appellate court therefore remanded thematter so that defense counsel could comply with Rule 604(d) andfile a new motion to reconsider sentence. People v. Belcher, No.4-96-0959 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule23).

On remand, the trial court denied defendant's motion toreconsider sentence. Defendant appealed and the appellate courtaffirmed its previous order denying defendant leave to file amotion to withdraw his guilty plea. No. 4-99-0755. We granteddefendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), andfor the reasons that follow we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

In 1996, defendant was charged with seven counts of firstdegree murder and two counts of residential burglary inconnection with the murder of Nathan Ehler on February 28, 1996.Prior to trial, defendant moved for the appointment of apsychiatrist. The court ordered Dr. Lawrence Jeckel to examinedefendant as to his sanity at the time of the alleged offense and hisfitness to stand trial.

Dr. Jeckel found defendant fit to stand trial. He also found,pursuant to section 6-2(a) of the Criminal Code, that defendantwas sane at the time of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West1996).⁽¹⁾ Specifically, Dr. Jeckel stated in his report, and intestimony later given at defendant's sentencing hearing, thatdefendant "appreciated the criminality of his conduct at the timeof the alleged crime." Based on this evaluation, defendantstipulated to being fit to stand trial. He also pled guilty to onecount of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 1996))in exchange for the dismissal of all other charges, pursuant to aplea agreement with the State. There was no agreement as tosentencing, and in fact, the State gave notice that it was seekingthe death penalty. The trial court fully admonished defendant inaccordance with Supreme Court Rule 402 (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 402).The court determined that there was a factual basis for the plea,noted the plea agreement, and found defendant's plea voluntaryand knowing. For these reasons the trial court accepteddefendant's plea of guilty.

Defendant's sentencing hearing was held approximately 29days after his plea was accepted by the trial court. At the hearing,Dr. Jeckel testified that he would have found defendant insane atthe time of the alleged offense under the prior version of theinsanity statute. 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 1994). This was due tothe fact that defendant was unable to "conform his conduct to therequirements of law." As noted above, at the close of the hearingthe trial court sentenced defendant to 60 years of imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellate court found that the certificatedefense counsel filed with the motion to reconsider sentence didnot meet the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 604(d). Theappellate court noted that the certificate requirements of Rule604(d) must be strictly complied with, and that the remedy fornoncompliance is a remand to the trial court for the filing of a newmotion to withdraw the guilty plea or reconsider the sentence, anda new hearing on the motion. The appellate court observed thatdefense counsel could not have reviewed the transcript of thesentencing hearing since the hearing on the motion to reconsiderwas combined with the sentencing hearing. Further, the appellatecourt observed that it appeared from the record that counsel didnot communicate with defendant to ascertain his contentions oferror in the sentence or entry of the guilty plea.

During the pendency of this direct appeal, defendant alertedthe appellate court to the fact that Public Act 89-404 wasunconstitutional, citing this court's decision in Johnson v. Edgar,176 Ill. 2d 499 (1997). The appellate court was also aware of itsholding in People v. Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d 182 (1998), that PublicAct 89-404 was enacted in violation of the single subject rule andthat the new version of the insanity statute could not stand.Defendant requested that the appellate court vacate his guilty pleaand sentence or, in the alternative, grant him leave to file a motionto withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. The appellate courtdeclined this opportunity to grant either of defendant's requests.

Defendant's appeal proceeded as noted at the outset of thisopinion. Additional facts will be set forth as needed in the analysisportion of our discussion.

ANALYSIS 

Defendant contends that the appellate court erred in denyinghis request to vacate his guilty plea. The State responds thatdefendant cannot challenge the validity of his guilty plea becausehe did not properly move to vacate his plea in the trial court priorto raising this issue on appeal. Defendant rejoins that he asked forleave to vacate his plea at the first available opportunity. The Stateis correct in its assertion that defendant did not file a motion towithdraw his guilty plea within the allotted time of Rule 604(d)and, in the usual circumstances, such a failing would leave adefendant without remedy. But this is not the usual case. While itis true this court does not approve of any failure to comply strictlywith the explicitly stated requirements of Rule 604(d) (People v.Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 103 (1988)), the unusual and fact-specificcircumstances found in this case lead us to believe that the ends ofjustice will be better served by permitting defendant leave to filea motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court.

As noted above, Dr. Jeckel found defendant sane at the timeof the offense, pursuant to the insanity provisions enacted as partof Public Act 89-404. It is important to understand that theseprovisions made it more difficult for a defendant to assert theaffirmative defense of insanity than the former version of the lawwith its broader definition of insanity. See People v. Ramsey, 192Ill. 2d 154, 156 (2000) (noting the differences between the twoversions of the insanity statute and explaining that the provisionsof Public Act 89-404 narrowed the definition of insanity). "Theamended version of the law was significant because it altered thedefinition of insanity." Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 156. "Under theamendment, a defendant could no longer raise an insanity defensebased on his inability 'to conform his conduct to the requirementsof law.' " Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d at 156, quoting 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a)(West 1994). Since the time of defendant's guilty plea, the courtsof this state have repeatedly held that Public Act 89-404 isunconstitutional because it was enacted in contravention of thesingle subject rule. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999); Peoplev. Pitts, 295 Ill. App. 3d 182 (1998).

The representation made by Dr. Jeckel to the court and todefendant foreclosed the availability of the affirmative defense ofinsanity by defendant. In light of these circumstances, defendantpled guilty to the murder. Defendant argues that Dr. Jeckel'sconclusion led him to forgo the opportunity this affirmativedefense offers. We now know that the insanity provisions used attrial were enacted in contravention of the single subject rule. Hadthis fact been known to defendant at that time, his decision toforgo the affirmative defense and to enter a guilty plea might havebeen different. In fact, Dr. Jeckel testified that under the formerversion of the insanity statute, his opinion of defendant's sanity atthe time of the offense would change. He would conclude thatdefendant was insane at the time of the murder because defendantwas unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.

We emphasize that Dr. Jeckel was a court-appointedpsychiatrist who opined that defendant was sane at the time of themurder. The trial court relied upon that representation in acceptingdefendant's guilty plea. In light of the case law noted above, itnow appears that the court's expert, the court and defendant mayhave been operating under a misapprehension of law. Lastly, wenote that defendant asked the appellate court to vacate his guiltyplea at the earliest opportunity and did not wait until the eleventhhour to raise the issue.

These unusual circumstances lead us to believe that defendantshould be given an opportunity to file a motion to vacate his guiltyplea. The basis for vacatur of the guilty plea, misapprehension ofthe law, is well recognized in our jurisprudence. People v.Morreale, 412 Ill. 528 (1952).

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the judgments of the circuitand appellate courts are reversed and the cause is remanded to thetrial court.

Judgments reversed;

cause remanded.

1. The version of the insanity statute in effect at the time ofdefendant's trial provided:

"(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if atthe time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mentaldefect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminalityof his conduct." 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 1996).

The prior version of the insanity statute provided:

"(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if atthe time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mentaldefect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate thecriminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to therequirements of law." 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 1994).