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Docket No. 99941-Agenda 16-September 2005.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. A
PARCEL OF PROPERTY COMMONLY KNOWN AS 1945
NORTH 31ST STREET, DECATUR, MACON COUNTY,
ILLINOIS (Moises Luna et al., Appellants).

Opinion filed December 15, 2005.
 

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Pursuant to the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (ForfeitureAct) (725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2002)), the State initiated civilforfeiture proceedings in the circuit court of Macon County againstseveral parcels of real estate. Claimants, Moises and Ramona DeLuna, answered. At the close of a hearing, the circuit court entered anorder of forfeiture. A divided appellate court affirmed the order of thecircuit court. No. 4-03-0917 (unpublished order under SupremeCourt Rule 23). We allowed claimants' petition for leave to appeal(177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and now affirm the judgment of the appellatecourt.

BACKGROUND

In January 2003, the State filed a complaint for forfeiture of asingle family residence at 1945 North 31st Street in Decatur, and twovacant and unimproved lots, known as lots 214 and 215 inMeadowlark Fourth Addition, Macon County. Claimants are theowners of record of the property. However, the State alleged that thisreal estate was actually owned by claimants' son, Miguel Luna, andwas related to felony drug offenses that he committed. According tothe complaint, Miguel provided $40,000 cash as a down payment onthe property at 1945 North 31st Street and was the true owner of thepremises. This property was placed in the name of claimants "in anattempt to hide the identity of the true owner in the event that MiguelLuna would be caught dealing drugs." Further, according to thecomplaint: "Nearly all of Miguel Luna's property [was] held in thename of [claimants] for the same reason." The State alleged,therefore, that the real estate was subject to forfeiture under theCannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/12(a) (West 2002)) or theIllinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/505(a) (West2002)).

Claimants filed a claim to the real estate, and each filed an answerresponding to the State's allegations. Claimants each stated that thefunds for their real estate came from a sale of property in Mexico andfrom loans from several individuals. Ramona additionally claimed thatthe 1945 N. 31st Street residence was the homestead of her andMoises and that they held title as tenants by the entirety.

The circuit court held a hearing on the complaint for forfeiture.Both sides presented testimony, which the court heard for four daysinterspersed between March and June 2003. The court did not makeany findings prior to hearing all of the evidence.

At the hearing, Decatur police Detective David Dailey testifiedthat the Decatur police department began an investigation into thesuspected drug dealing of a man subsequently identified as MiguelLuna. Dailey coordinated the investigation and oversaw a surveillanceteam consisting of officers and detectives from the Decatur policedepartment.

Detective Dailey's unit conducted surveillance on Miguel fromMarch to November 2002. The surveillance team followed Miguel,observed his activities, checked the license plates of his vehicles, andestablished an observation post near his residence. Pursuant to thisinvestigation, the team discovered that Miguel was using the nameJose T. Cervantes and living in a mobile home at 2299 North 37thStreet in Decatur. A 1996 Nissan Altima was registered to a Jose T.Cervantes of that same address. During the investigation, thesurveillance team also observed Miguel operate a 1995 ChevroletLumina, which was registered to a Jose T. Cervantes. The addresslisted in this registration was that of a mobile home next door towhere Miguel resided. The surveillance team also observed Migueloperate a Chevrolet pickup truck registered to a Tina and FelipeHerrera. In late October or early November 2002, Miguel moved intothe house in question in this case, at 1945 North 31st Street. Thesurveillance team did not learn of Miguel's true identity until he wasarrested on November 20, 2002.

Claimant Moises was first observed by the surveillance team onNovember 19, 2002. On that day, at approximately 7 p.m., Moisesarrived at the 1945 North 31st Street home, driving the Nissan Altima.He backed into the driveway, where the Chevrolet Lumina wasalready parked, such that the trunks of the Altima and the Luminawere back-to-back. Moises subsequently removed items from thetrunk of the Lumina and placed them in the trunk of the Altima. Whena member of the surveillance team drove past the house, Moisesquickly closed the trunk of the Altima. Police then followed Moisesas he drove the Altima to the mobile home at 2299 North 37th Street.There, Moises removed from the trunk two white plastic bags fromthe trunk of the car and carried them into the mobile home.

On November 20, 2002, at approximately 2 p.m., Miguel left the1945 North 31st Street home and drove the Lumina to the mobilehome at 2299 North 37th Street. Dailey testified that surveillanceteam members saw Miguel "messing around" with items inside a smallstorage shed located directly outside the front door of the trailer.Miguel then entered the mobile home. A short time later, he exited themobile home carrying two white plastic bags that were consistent inappearance with the white plastic bags that Moises had carried intothe mobile home the previous night. Miguel placed the bags in thepassenger compartment of the Lumina.

After following Miguel for a while, the surveillance teamconducted a traffic stop of Miguel's vehicle. He presented an Illinoisdriver's license in the name of Jose T. Cervantes with the address of2295 North 37th Street. A search of the vehicle recovered a digitalscale and approximately 54 pounds of cannabis in the compartmentarea and the trunk. Some of the cannabis was contained in a whiteplastic bag similar to the bags Moises and Miguel had carried, and theremainder was contained in a duffel bag. Police arrested Miguel andplaced him in the backseat of a squad car to be transported to jail.After his arrival at the station, police searched the backseat of thatsquad car and discovered 7.7 grams of cocaine in the backseat.

During the arrest, officers asked Miguel where he resided. Heinitially responded that he resided in the mobile home located at 2299North 37th Street. However, upon further questioning, he stated thathe was Miguel Luna, that he lived at the 1945 North 31st Streethome, and that he was the son of Moises Luna. Miguel had keys toboth residences. Miguel admitted involvement in drug dealing.

Dailey further testified that, on the date of Miguel's arrest, policesearched the 1945 North 31st Street house. They seized 2,400 gramsof cocaine, packaging materials consistent with drug distribution, ahandgun and ammunition, and various documents relating to Miguel.The above-mentioned Chevrolet pickup truck was in the garage of theresidence. Miguel acknowledged that the truck belonged to him.Moreover, Tina Herrera, whose name was listed on the registrationpapers, told Dailey that the truck actually belonged to Miguel. Shefurther revealed that: Miguel was having difficulty obtaining credit tobuy a vehicle, Miguel chose the truck and gave her $5,000 cash to useas a down payment to purchase it, and Miguel gave her money to paythe $1,000 monthly payments on the truck.

On that same day, police also searched the mobile home locatedat 2299 North 37th Street. Dailey stated that prior to thecommencement of the search, Moises arrived at the trailer driving theNissan Altima. Dailey asked Moises whether he lived at the mobilehome, and Moises responded that he did. Because Moises was notable to understand or speak English fluently, Dailey contacted aSpanish translator. Upon the translator's arrival, Dailey asked forMoises' consent to search the mobile home. Moises replied that hewould allow the officers to search, but he was not responsible foranything in the trailer. Dailey responded that he could not provide anyguarantees regarding responsibility for items found in the trailer.Moises consented to the search and completed the prescribed form.Inside the trailer, in the rear bedroom closet, police recoveredapproximately 180 grams of cannabis, a scale, and a handgun withammunition. Included among the numerous documents recoveredwere titles to the Nissan Altima and the Chevrolet Lumina in the nameof Jose T. Cervantes; two resident alien identification cards, bothbearing photos of Miguel, but one bearing the name of Miguel Lunaand the other bearing the name of Jose T. Cervantes; and two socialsecurity cards, one bearing Miguel's name and the other bearing thename of Jose T. Cervantes. Inside the adjacent storage shed, policerecovered a duffel bag containing packaging materials consistent withdrug distribution.

In the ensuing police interview, Moises told police that he hadbeen in Decatur for approximately seven or eight weeks. He was, atthat time, employed at a tree farm, earning approximately $8.50 perhour. Moises planned to save money and eventually move his familyfrom California to Decatur. He lived in the 2299 North 37th Streetmobile home and was paying Miguel $260 per month in rent, althoughhe was one month behind on the rent. Dailey testified that upon beingshown Miguel's driver's license photograph, Moises at first deniedthat Miguel was his son. Instead, Moises told police that he wasMiguel's uncle and that he had raised Miguel since Miguel was sevenyears old. Moises subsequently acknowledged that Miguel was hisson.

Detective Dailey also interviewed Miguel's girlfriend, ElizabethKupish. At that time, she was residing at the 1945 North 31st Streetresidence with Miguel. Detective Dailey related the followingstatements of Kupish. Miguel had placed $40,000 down on theresidence, but that it was in the name of his father and mother. Kupishbelieved that Miguel did this because he was a drug dealer and knewthat if he was arrested the property would be seized. Similarly, Miguelalso purchased Lots 214 and 215 for $6,500 cash and placed title inhis parents' names.

Detective Dailey also testified to his formal training in drugtrafficking and his experience, including more than 200 of his owndrug investigations and hundreds of other drug investigations.Without objection, Dailey testified as an expert in the field of narcoticuse and distribution. Dailey opined that it is common for people whodistribute illegal narcotics to place their assets in the names of otherpeople so that their properties would not be subject to seizure if theywere arrested. Dailey also testified that those involved in thedistribution of drugs commonly launder drug money by convertingcash to money orders.

In furtherance of his investigation, Detective Dailey obtainedbank records for accounts in the names of Jose T. Cervantes, MiguelLuna and Moises Luna. These records show that, on August 22, 2002,Moises opened an account at National City Bank with $8,000 in theform of 16 individual postal money orders-eight for $300 each andeight for $700 each. Moises subsequently made deposits into theNational City account in the amounts of $10,500 and $3,500. Basedon all of his testimony, Detective Dailey opined that Moises was alsoinvolved in drug dealing.

Both Moises and Ramona testified at the hearing through aninterpreter. Both of them denied knowledge of Miguel's drugactivities. Both of them also denied that Miguel ever provided themwith money for the purchase of the real estate at issue.

Prior to his testimony, Moises was advised of his fifth amendmentrights and he indicated that he understood them. Moises testified thathe has been a legal resident of the United States for 15 years. He livedin California until August 2002. In California, he worked primarily asa migrant worker on fruit farms and also did landscaping. He rentedan apartment in California and did not own property there. However,he did own property in Mexico. In June 2001, he sold a piece ofproperty in Mexico for $35,000 and placed the proceeds in a safe-deposit box in Mexico. His wife also opened an account atEarthmover Credit Union in Decatur. In February 2002, Moises gaveMiguel a power of attorney to purchase the vacant lots 214 and 215in Macon County. The record shows that the purchase price for thetwo lots was approximately $6,500.

In August 2002, Moises moved from California to Decatur.Moises came to Decatur by himself. At the time of Miguel's arrest,Ramona continued to reside in California. Upon his arrival, Moiseslived at the 2299 North 37th Street mobile home with Miguel andKupish. In November 2002, Moises returned to Mexico, retrieved his$35,000, and deposited it at National City Bank in Decatur. He alsoreceived two personal loans of $4,000 and $8,000 from his daughterand niece, respectively, which he deposited in the National Cityaccount. Claimants then purchased the 1945 North 31st Street house.Their down payment consisted of a $22,000 check drawn on theNational City account and a $17,000 check drawn on Ramona'sEarthmover Credit Union account. Also, claimants secured amortgage from Prairie State Bank and Trust for approximately$22,993. According to Moises, these three financial instruments addup to the purchase price of approximately $62,000. Moises deniedreceiving money from Miguel for the purchase of the vacant lots orthe house.

After Moises purchased the 1945 North 31st Street house, heallowed Miguel and Kupish to move into the house. Moises explainedthat Kupish was pregnant, was expected to soon give birth, and themobile home was not big enough for them and a baby. Miguel andKupish moved into the house approximately one week prior toMiguel's arrest. Miguel had keys to the trailer and had access theretowhen Moises was absent.

Moises admitted that on the night of November 19, 2002, hebacked the Nissan Altima into the driveway of the house, such that itwas back-to-back with the Chevrolet Lumina. He did so because hewas picking up bread and Miguel's dog, which liked to enter theAltima through its open hatchback. According to Moises, this was theonly way the dog would cross over to the other vehicle. Claimantsalso introduced into evidence two white paper bags. The bagscontained bread and were the actual bags he had carried into themobile home on November 19, 2002. The bread bags were on histable when police searched the mobile home on November 20, 2002.

Moises stated that he had no knowledge of the cannabis andother items police found in the rear bedroom closet of the mobilehome. He had always slept in the living room of the mobile home. Hecontinued to do so after Miguel and Kupish moved into the housebecause he could watch television.

In her testimony, Ramona stated that she cannot read English orSpanish. She had lived in California for 14 or 15 years. She hadworked for Home Depot, selecting and selling plants. She moved toDecatur approximately one month prior to her testimony and residedwith Moises in the 1945 North 31st Street house. She and Moisesowned a house in Mexico, and they sold that house. However, she didnot remember how much they received for it. Ramona corroboratedMoises' testimony concerning the source of the funds for the purchaseof the house and the vacant lots. Ramona denied that Miguel gavethem money to buy the properties. Ramona, was also unaware thatMiguel was ever involved in possessing or distributing drugs.

At the time of the hearing, claimants and their children wereliving in, and making mortgage payments on, the 1945 North 31stStreet house. Claimants introduced into evidence the contract for thesale of the property in Mexico, both in the original Spanish andtranslated into English. The contract indicates a sale date of June 9,2001, and a sale price of $35,000 in United States currency.

Claimants also called Kupish to testify as an adverse witness intheir case in chief. After preliminary questions, Kupish stated that shewas facing criminal charges regarding these events. She invoked herfifth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. V) rights precluding furtherquestioning. In the State's rebuttal case Decatur police SargentMcElroy, a member of the surveillance team, testified that Moises'Nissan Altima was not a hatchback vehicle, but rather was a midsize,four-door vehicle with a regular trunk. On the night of November 19,2002, Sargent McElroy did not see any dog with Moises when hewent into the mobile home. Also, the white bags that Sargent McElroysaw Moises carry were not the bread bags that Moises introduced intoevidence. At the close of all the evidence, the circuit court took thematter under advisement.

The docket sheet reflects that on July 29, 2003, the circuit courtentered the following findings. First, the circuit court found that theState established probable cause that the real estate at issue wassubject to forfeiture under the Cannabis Control Act or the IllinoisControlled Substances Act. The court further noted that Moises hadnot established by a preponderance of the evidence that the real estatewas not subject to forfeiture or that it was exempt from forfeiture.The court, therefore, ordered that the interest of Moises in the threepieces of property be forfeited to the State. On August 7, 2003, thecourt entered a written forfeiture order memorializing these findings.

By its terms, however, the original order forfeited only Moises'interest in the real estate. The State filed a motion for an amendedforfeiture order, and claimants filed a motion for reconsideration. Thedocket sheet reflects that on September 24, 2003, the circuit courtentered the following additional findings. The court, in finding that theState established a prima facie case, did not rely on any of thepresumptions allowed under section 7 of the Forfeiture Act (725 ILCS150/7 (West 2002)).⁽¹⁾ The court found that the homestead exemptiondoes not apply to a forfeiture case (see 735 ILCS 5/12-903.5 (West2002)). Continuing its findings, the circuit court also found that thethree parcels of real estate were held by claimants only as nominees ofMiguel, whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture and whose illegaldrug sales activities were the source of most if not all of the cashinvested. The court also found that Moises participated in part inMiguel's illegal drug sales activities by transporting some drugs fromone location to another. The circuit court also found claimants'"explanation and evidence not credible and not sufficient to overcomethe State's prima facie case." The circuit court found that the evidencedid not establish Ramona was involved in Miguel's drug dealing.However, the circuit court found that the evidence did establish thatRamona stood to acquire substantial proceeds from Miguel's conductand that Ramona held the property for the benefit of or as nominee forMiguel. On October 1, 2003, the circuit court entered an amendedorder that forfeited the interests of Miguel and claimants in the realestate.

On appeal, a divided appellate court affirmed the forfeiture orderof the circuit court. No. 4-03-0917 (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court majority concluded thatthe State satisfied its burden of demonstrating the existence ofprobable cause for the forfeitures in question. The majority furtherconcluded that claimants failed to meet their burden of establishing bya preponderance of the evidence that the properties were notpurchased with the proceeds of illegal drug activities. Justice Appletondissented, reasoning in toto:

"In opposition to the State's assertion that the propertiessought to be forfeited were purchased with the proceeds ofMiguel's illegal drug activity, Moises and Ramona producedevidence of the source of the funds used by them to acquirethe properties. This evidence was not rebutted by the State.I would agree that the manner of funding these transactionsdoes not comport with standard business practices but giventhe language and cultural differences demonstrated by theLunas, such a deviation cannot be assumed to be unworthyof belief."

Justice Appleton would have reversed the circuit court's forfeitureorder as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Claimants appeal to this court (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). Additionalpertinent background will be discussed in the context of our analysisof the issues.

ANALYSIS

We preface our discussion of the issues raised in this cause witha brief review of the forfeiture procedure set forth in the ForfeitureAct. Our General Assembly has expressly found that civil forfeiturehas a significant beneficial effect in deterring the rising incidence of theabuse and trafficking of substances prohibited by the IllinoisControlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2002))and the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 2002)).725 ILCS 150/2 (West 2002). We note that claimants began oralargument in this cause by stating that forfeitures are not favored in thelaw and "therefore, we must construe the forfeiture statute strictly."Courts have, of course, "stated that as a general rule forfeitures aredisfavored at law and that statutes authorizing them must be construedstrictly in a manner as favorable to the person whose property isseized as is consistent with fair principles of statutory interpretation."People v. United States Currency $3,108, 219 Ill. App. 3d 441, 446(1991) (interpreting Controlled Substances Act); see People v. One1986 White Mazda Pickup Truck, 251 Ill. App. 3d 79, 83 (1993)(same). However, against this backdrop, the General Assembly hasdeclared its intent that the provisions of the Forfeiture Act "beliberally construed so as to effect their remedial purpose." 725 ILCS150/13 (West 2002).

The General Assembly also expressly found that the federalnarcotics civil forfeiture statute "has been very successful in deterringthe use and distribution of controlled substances within this State andthroughout the country." 725 ILCS 150/2 (West 2002). Therefore,the General Assembly based the Forfeiture Act on the federal civilforfeiture statute and expressly declared its intent "that the forfeitureprovisions of this Act be construed in light of the federal forfeitureprovisions contained in 21 U.S.C. 881 as interpreted by the federalcourts, except to the extent that the provisions of this Act expresslydiffer therefrom." 725 ILCS 150/2 (West 2002). See People ex rel.Devine v. $30,700.00 United States Currency, 199 Ill. 2d 142, 149(2002); People v. $1,124,905 U.S. Currency & One 1988 ChevroletAstro Van, 177 Ill. 2d 314, 325-26 (1997).

If the State seizes real property, the Forfeiture Act provides fora judicial in rem procedure. 725 ILCS 150/9 (West 2002). The Statebrings the action against seized property pursuant to the legal fictionthat the property itself is guilty of facilitating a crime. See UnitedStates v. Property at Route 1, Box 137, Randolph, 743 F. Supp. 802,804 (M.D. Ala. 1990); United States v. One Rural Lot, 739 F. Supp.74, 77 (D. Puerto Rico 1990). The State's Attorney initiates theaction by filing a verified complaint for forfeiture. 725 ILCS 150/9(A)(West 2002). Only an owner or interest holder may file an answerasserting a claim against the property. 725 ILCS 150/9(C) (West2002). The answer must contain certain information, including thecircumstances surrounding the claimant's acquisition of the property.725 ILCS 150/9(D) (West 2002).

In a proceeding under the Forfeiture Act, the State has the initialburden of showing the existence of probable cause for forfeiture of theproperty. 725 ILCS 150/9(G) (West 2002). When the State satisfiesits burden of establishing probable cause, the burden shifts to theclaimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the propertyis not subject to forfeiture. 725 ILCS 150/9(G) (West 2002). Aclaimant may satisfy this burden by establishing one of the innocent-owner defenses provided in section 8 of the Forfeiture Act. 725 ILCS150/8 (West 2002). "If the State does show existence of probablecause and the claimant does not establish by a preponderance of theevidence that the claimant has an interest that is exempt under Section8 of this Act, the court shall order all property forfeited to the State."725 ILCS 150/9(H) (West 2002). With these principles in mind, weturn to claimants' contentions.

I. Statutory Exemption

Claimants first observe that they hold title to the 1945 North 31stStreet property as tenants by the entirety. They also point to thecircuit court's additional finding that the evidence did not establishthat Ramona was legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to theforfeiture, or that she solicited, conspired, or attempted to commit theconduct giving rise to the forfeiture. Because the circuit court foundRamona to be an innocent spouse, claimants contend that she qualifiesas an innocent owner under section 8 of the Forfeiture Act. Therefore,according to claimants, the 1945 North 31st Street residence "wasexempt from forfeiture when Ramona was found to be an innocentspouse."

To resolve this issue, we turn to section 8 of the Forfeiture Act,which provides for innocent-owner defenses. 725 ILCS 150/8 (West2002). The controlling principles are familiar.

"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertainand give effect to the true intent of the legislature. [Citation.]The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used inthe statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinarymeaning. [Citations.] The statute should be evaluated as awhole, with each provision construed in connection withevery other section. [Citation.] If legislative intent can beascertained from the statute's plain language, that intent mustprevail without resort to other interpretive aids." Paris v.Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997).

Because the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, our reviewis de novo. Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 444 (2002); In reEstate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330 (2000).

Section 8 of the Forfeiture Act provides in pertinent part:

"