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Docket No. 93412-Agenda 13-November 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. LEONARD 
A. SHERMAN, Director of Professional Regulation, Appellee, v.
YVONNE CRYNS, Appellant.

Opinion filed February 21, 2003.

CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of thecourt:

At issue in this case is the narrow question of whetherplaintiff, the People of the State of Illinois ex rel. LeonardSherman, Director of the Illinois Department of ProfessionalRegulation (Department), established a prima facie case thatdefendant, Yvonne Cryns, a lay midwife, violated provisions ofthe Nursing and Advanced Practice Nursing Act (Act) (225 ILCS65/20-75(a) (West 2000)) when she participated in the August 19,2000, birth of Spencer Verzi. Plaintiff filed a petition for apreliminary injunction against defendant, pursuant to section20-75(a) of the Act (225 ILCS 65/20-75(a) (West 2000)), arguingthat injunctive relief was warranted because defendant's actionsduring the Verzi birth constituted the practice of professionalnursing and advanced practice nursing without a license. Duringa hearing on plaintiff's petition, the circuit court of McHenryCounty granted defendant's motion for directed finding at theclose of plaintiff's case in chief. The circuit court found thatplaintiff had presented no evidence showing that any acts engagedin by defendant at the Verzi home constituted acts of nursing oradvanced practice nursing. The appellate court reversed, holdingthat plaintiff had presented prima facie evidence that during thebirth of Spencer Verzi, defendant had practiced professionalnursing and advanced practice nursing without a license inviolation of the Act. The appellate court accordingly remanded thiscause to the circuit court for further proceedings. 327 Ill. App. 3d753. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of theappellate court.

BACKGROUND

On January 18, 2000, Leonard Sherman, the Director ofProfessional Regulation (Director), issued a rule to show causeagainst defendant, who is a lay midwife. The rule to show causealleged that, in practicing midwifery, defendant engaged inconduct that constituted the practice of professional nursing andadvanced practice nursing, as defined within sections 5-10(l) and15-5 of the Act (225 ILCS 65/5-10(l), 15-5 (West 2000)). Therule to show cause provided defendant with seven days in whichto show why an order to cease and desist the unlicenced practiceof nursing and midwifery should not be entered against her.Defendant responded by filing a special and limited appearanceobjecting to the Department's jurisdiction over her as a nonnursemidwife. Defendant also filed an affidavit in which she averredthat she was not licensed as a nurse or engaged in a licensedprofession.

On April 7, 2000, the Director issued a cease and desist orderagainst defendant, commanding her to immediately cease anddesist from engaging in conduct constituting the practice ofnursing and midwifery, until she complied with the licensingrequirements for a professional nurse and an advanced practicenurse contained within the Act. Specifically, the cease and desistorder stated that defendant was not registered as a professionalnurse pursuant to section 10-5 of the Act (225 ILCS 65/10-5(a),(b), (c) (West 2000)); that defendant did not hold a current,national certificate as a nurse midwife from the appropriatenational certifying body (225 ILCS 65/15-10(a)(3) (West 2000));that defendant had not complied with a post-basic advancedformal education program in the area of midwifery (225 ILCS65/15-10(a)(5) (West 2000)); that defendant does not have acollaborative agreement with a physician as required of a certifiednurse midwife under the Act (225 ILCS 65/15-15 (West 2000));and that defendant has been practicing midwifery without theappropriate license and certificate.⁽¹⁾

On October 3, 2000, plaintiff filed a verified complaint forinjunctive relief against defendant. Pursuant to section 20-75(a)of the Act (225 ILCS 65/20-75(a) (West 2000)), the Director may,in the name of the People of the State of Illinois and through theAttorney General of Illinois, petition the circuit court for an orderenjoining any violation of the Act or for an order enforcingcompliance with the Act. The verified complaint alleged that theDepartment is statutorily authorized to enforce minimumstandards of professional education and licensure for the practiceof nursing and advanced practice nursing. According to thecomplaint, defendant, as a midwife, is improperly engaged inrendering prenatal, childbirth and postpartum care without anursing license. The complaint further alleged that defendantviolated provisions of the Act when she assisted with the birth ofSpencer Verzi, at the Verzi home on August 19, 2000. Accordingto the complaint, "[w]hile defendant was physically assisting withthe delivery, the Verzi baby was born in a breech position.Defendant waited approximately more than 15 minutes beforecalling paramedics. Defendant made efforts to resuscitate theVerzi baby which were unsuccessful." The complaint furtheralleged that "[v]ideotape shot at the scene shows the entireincident and shows defendant physically assisting in the birth ofbaby Verzi, which amounted to the continued practice of nursingor Midwifery" without the requisite license. The complaintconcluded by asserting that "[d]efendant's actions of continuingto practice nursing and Midwifery without the properqualifications, licensing and supervision is creating an imminentdanger of harm to the public."

On October 5, 2000, the circuit court entered a temporaryrestraining order against defendant's practice of nursing andmidwifery, pending a hearing on plaintiff's complaint forpreliminary injunction. The circuit court conducted a hearing onthe preliminary injunction complaint on October 13, 2000.Plaintiff called Louis Verzi, the father of Spencer Verzi, to testifywith respect to Spencer's birth. Verzi stated that he and his wife,Heather, hold "alternative ideas on health that are not shared withmost doctors in hospitals." Accordingly, the Verzis decided that itwas best that they have their child at home without the presence ofa doctor or nurse. The Verzis desired to take a natural approach tochildbirth and decided on a "water birth," wherein the mothergives birth while being partially submerged in a birthing pool.Verzi stated that the water-birth option was not available at anynearby hospitals, and that he and his wife hired defendant to workwith them to accomplish a home water birth. According to Verzi,defendant never claimed to be a nurse, and he and his wife did notview defendant as a nurse. Rather, Verzi testified, the purpose ofdefendant being in their home during Spencer's birth was "to giveus advice and to help us through the birth of our child, to help usin things that we didn't know." According to Verzi, defendantdiscussed with him and his wife the fact that if complications wereto arise during the birth, medical assistance would not beimmediately available.

According to Verzi, defendant had Heather fill out a "clientform," in which Heather indicated that the Verzis believed in"natural health" and did not believe in prescriptions or over-the-counter medications. The responses on this form also indicatedthat the Verzis viewed Heather's mother as their "doctor,"meaning that they relied on her for advice with respect to theirhealth. According to Verzi, Heather had several prenatal visitswith defendant, during which defendant monitored the baby'sheartbeat using both a specially designed stethoscope known as a"fetoscope," and also a device known as a "Doppler," in whichreflected sound waves are used to estimate the speed and directionof blood flow. Verzi stated that a few months before Spencer'sbirth, defendant had disclosed that a cease and desist order wasissued against her by the Department. This information, however,did not deter the Verzis from continuing their relationship withdefendant, as defendant was someone that they "had come to trust"and they "felt strongly" that defendant was the person to delivertheir child.

Verzi testified that at mid-morning on August 19, 2000, hiswife's water broke, and that defendant arrived at their homebetween 1 and 1:30 p.m. Several family members and friends hadgathered at the Verzi house to witness the birth. At approximately3:45 p.m., Heather began to deliver the baby when his left footemerged from the birth canal. According to Verzi, during thedelivery defendant used the fetoscope "four or five times" to listento the baby's heartbeat, and also used the Doppler device. Verzirecalled that at one point during the birthing process, Heatherasked defendant to physically pull the baby out, and that defendantrefused Heather's request. Verzi stated that defendant instead toldHeather to push the baby out, and that Heather's body would knowthe right thing to do. However, Verzi testified that Heathercontinued to have difficulty in delivering the baby and that "whenmatters became urgent" defendant did attempt to physically extractthe baby. By 4:30 p.m., the baby was born. However, upon hisbirth Spencer was not breathing. Verzi stated that althoughdefendant administered CPR to Spencer for approximately 10minutes using an "Ambu bag," which is a device used to push airinto a baby's lungs after birth, the baby was not responsive. Verzitestified that at that point defendant requested that 911 be called.According to Verzi, defendant was still at their home, attemptingto resuscitate Spencer, when the ambulance and paramedicsarrived.

Verzi further testified that the delivery of Spencer wasvideotaped by two cameras which were present in the room: onevideo camera was mounted on a tripod and was stationary, whilethe other video camera was hand-held and operated by a friend ofthe family. Verzi stated that, during the evening prior to histestimony, a police officer delivered a videotape to his home.Upon viewing the videotape, Verzi realized that the one tapecontained the video recordings from both cameras present duringthe birth. He also testified that the tape ran for approximately 1hour, 20 minutes. Verzi testified that although he did not knowwho combined the two videotapes together, the videotape heviewed on the evening prior to his testimony truly and accuratelyreflected the events which transpired at his home on August 19,2000. The videotape was not played in court.

Plaintiff thereafter moved to enter the videotape intoevidence. Defendant objected to the admission of the videotape onthe ground that plaintiff had failed to lay a proper foundation forthe tape recording. Defendant argued that plaintiff was required tocall the individuals who made the video recordings to testify. Thecircuit court, over defendant's objection, held that Verzi'stestimony that the videotape truly and accurately reflected theevents of Spencer's birth provided a sufficient foundation for theadmission of the videotape. The court then admitted the tape intoevidence. However, the circuit court judge did not view thevideotape at any time during the proceedings.

Plaintiff next called defendant to testify. Defendant invokedher fifth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. V) privilege againstself-incrimination because of criminal charges pending against heras a result of Spencer Verzi's death, and refused to answer anyquestions.

At this juncture, plaintiff rested its case.

After plaintiff rested its case, defendant moved for a directedfinding, arguing that plaintiff had presented no evidence showingthat any acts performed by defendant during the birth of SpencerVerzi constituted acts of nursing or of advanced practice nursing.The circuit court agreed, and granted defendant's motion. Thecircuit court stated that plaintiff produced no evidence that whatoccurred during the Verzi birth violated any provisions of the Act.The circuit court also dissolved the temporary restraining orderpreviously entered against defendant. However, the circuit courtstayed its order subject to an interlocutory appeal of its ruling.

The appellate court vacated the circuit court's order denyingplaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and remanded thecause to the circuit court. People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 321 Ill.App. 3d 990 (2001) (Cryns I). The appellate court determined thatthe circuit court abused its discretion in ruling on plaintiff'srequest for a preliminary injunction without viewing the videotapethat it had admitted into evidence.

On August 7, 2001, the circuit court entered an orderreaffirming its decision to grant a directed finding in favor ofdefendant. The circuit court held that after viewing the videotapeand reviewing the transcript of the hearing, it remained convincedthat "there is no evidence in the record *** from which this courtcould conclude that the activities of [defendant] constituted thepractice of nursing or Midwifery."

The appellate court reversed. 327 Ill. App. 3d 753 (Cryns II).The appellate court first rejected defendant's contention that thecircuit court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence thevideotape recording of the events that transpired at the Verzi homeon August 19, 2000. The appellate court held that a videotape isproperly admitted if it is identified as an accurate and completeportrayal of certain facts relevant to a particular issue and isverified by a witness with personal knowledge who attests that itis a correct representation of these facts. In the matter at bar, theappellate court determined that Verzi was a competent witnesswho had personal knowledge to identify the videotape as being acorrect representation of the birth of his child. The appellate courtalso rejected defendant's contention that although Verzi testifiedthat the videotape he viewed the night before the hearingaccurately depicted the events portrayed in the tape, there was noverification at the hearing that the videotape admitted intoevidence was the same one that Verzi had viewed. The appellatecourt observed that defendant failed to cite to any authority that avideotape must be viewed at trial in order to establish a foundationfor its admission into evidence. In addition, the appellate courtheld that defendant's suggestion that the videotape entered intoevidence might not have been the same as that viewed by Verzi thenight before was completely unsubstantiated.

The appellate court then turned to the question of whether thecircuit court erred in granting defendant's motion for a directedfinding at the conclusion of plaintiff's case in chief. The appellatecourt determined that in the matter at bar plaintiff, through thetestimony of Louis Verzi and the events depicted in the videotape,established a prima facie case that during Spencer's birthdefendant was practicing nursing or midwifery without a license.

The appellate court observed that under section 5-10(l) of theAct, "[r]egistered professional nursing practice" includes "theassessment of healthcare needs, nursing diagnosis, planning,implementation, and nursing evaluation," the "promotion,maintenance, and restoration of health," and "counseling, patienteducation, health education, and patient advocacy." 225 ILCS65/5-10(l) (West 2000). The appellate court noted that Verzi hadtestified that he and his wife, Heather, had hired and paiddefendant to advise and assist them in the delivery of their baby.In addition, the court observed that prior to Spencer's birth,defendant used various medical instruments to listen to hisheartbeat and ascertain his health status. Further, defendantactively assisted in delivering the baby and in resuscitation efforts.In light of these facts, the appellate court concluded that defendantwas practicing nursing or midwifery, as she was assessing thehealthcare needs of the mother and baby, making nursingevaluations, attempting to promote, maintain and restore thebaby's health, and attempting corrective measures to improve thebaby's health status. The appellate court also concluded that theAct provides adequate notice of what duties a person without anursing license is unable to perform. Accordingly, the appellatecourt held that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiffpresented no evidence from which the court could conclude thatdefendant's activities constituted the practice of nursing ormidwifery in violation of the Act.

Defendant petitioned this court for leave to appeal pursuant toour Rule 315(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)). We granted defendant'spetition.

ANALYSIS

The narrow issue presented in this appeal is whether plaintiffadduced evidence during the October 13, 2000, hearing sufficientto establish a prima facie case that defendant's conduct on August19, 2000, during the birth of Spencer Verzi constituted the practiceof nursing and advanced practice nursing without a license inviolation of the Act. For the reasons that follow, we hold that thecircuit court erred in directing a finding for defendant.

At the conclusion of plaintiff's case in chief, defendant,pursuant to section 2-1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2000)), moved for a finding in her favor.Section 2-1110 provides that in all cases tried without a jury, adefendant may, at the close of the plaintiff's case, move for afinding or judgment in his or her favor. In ruling on this motion,a court must engage in a two-prong analysis. Kokinis v. Kotrich,81 Ill. 2d 151, 155 (1980). First, the court must determine, as amatter of law, whether the plaintiff has presented a primafacie case. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by profferingat least "some evidence on every element essential to [theplaintiff's underlying] cause of action." Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 154.If the plaintiff has failed to meet this burden, the court shouldgrant the motion and enter judgment in the defendant's favor.Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 155. Because a determination that a plaintiffhas failed to present a prima facie case is a question of law, thecircuit court's ruling is reviewed de novo on appeal. See Kokinis,81 Ill. 2d at 154-55; Evans v. Gurnee Inns, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d1098, 1102 (1994).

If, however, the circuit court determines that the plaintiff haspresented a prima facie case, the court then moves to the secondprong of the inquiry. In its role as the finder of fact, the court mustconsider the totality of the evidence presented, including anyevidence which is favorable to the defendant. Contrary to thePedrick standard, which governs a motion for directed verdictduring a jury trial (Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d494 (1967)), under section 2-1110 the court is not to view theevidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kokinis, 81 Ill.2d at 154. Rather, the circuit court must weigh all the evidence,determine the credibility of the witnesses, and draw reasonableinferences therefrom. 735 ILCS 5/2-1110 (West 2000); Kokinis,81 Ill. 2d at 154-55. This weighing process may result in thenegation of some of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. Afterweighing the quality of all of the evidence, both that presented bythe plaintiff and that presented by the defendant, the court shoulddetermine, applying the standard of proof required for theunderlying cause, whether sufficient evidence remains to establishthe plaintiff's prima facie case. If the circuit court finds thatsufficient evidence has been presented to establish the plaintiff'sprima facie case, the court should deny the defendant's motion andproceed with the trial. Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 155. If, however, thecourt determines that the evidence warrants a finding in favor ofthe defendant, it should grant the defendant's motion and enter ajudgment dismissing the action. Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 155. Areviewing court will not reverse the circuit court's ruling on appealunless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.Kokinis, 81 Ill. 2d at 154.

As stated, in the matter at bar, the circuit court determinedthat plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case that defendant'sconduct during the Verzi birth violated provisions of the Act and,therefore, denied plaintiff's petition for a preliminary injunction bygranting defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The circuitcourt arrived at this conclusion by finding that plaintiff failed toadduce any evidence that defendant was engaged in the practice ofnursing without a license in violation of the Act. Because thecircuit court determined that plaintiff failed to establish a primafacie case as a matter of law, we consider the circuit court's rulingunder a de novo standard of review.

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain andpreserve the status quo, pending a decision on the merits of acause. Callis, Papa, Jackstadt & Halloran, P.C. v. Norfolk &Western Ry. Co., 195 Ill. 2d 356, 365 (2001). A preliminaryinjunction is not intended to determine controverted rights ordecide the merits of a case. People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 162Ill. 2d 117, 131 (1994). Under section 20-75 of the Act (225 ILCS65/20-75 (West 2000)), the Director is authorized to petition thecircuit court for an injunction against any individual who ispracticing nursing without a license. Where, as here, the State ora governmental agency is expressly authorized by statute to seekinjunctive relief, the traditional equitable elements necessary toobtain an injunction need not be satisfied. Sadat v. AmericanMotors Corp., 104 Ill. 2d 105, 111-13 (1984); see People v. VanTran Electric Corp., 152 Ill. App. 3d 175, 184 (1987); People exrel. Hartigan v. Stianos, 131 Ill. App. 3d 575, 580 (1985). TheState or the agency seeking the injunction need only show that thestatute was violated and that the statute relied upon specificallyallows injunctive relief. Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at 111-13; see MidlandEnterprises, Inc. v. City of Elmhurst, 226 Ill. App. 3d 494, 504(1993). This principle of law is animated by the rationale thatbecause statutes authorizing injunctive relief often do so on behalfof a public official in his or her capacity as the enforcer of aregulatory scheme, "the violation of such a statute implies aninjury to the general public [and] [s]uch injury necessitates thestatutory authorization for equitable relief and supplants thetraditional equitable pleading requirements." Sadat, 104 Ill. 2d at113. It is presumed that public harm occurs when a statute isviolated. See Midland, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 504; Stianos, 131 Ill.App. 3d at 580 ("The principle underlying the willingness of thecourts to issue statutory injunctions to public bodies to restrainviolations of a statute is that harm to the public at large can bepresumed from the statutory violation alone"). Once it has beenestablished that a statute has been violated, no discretion is vestedin the circuit court to refuse to grant the injunctive reliefauthorized by that statute. See Midland, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 504.

Accordingly, in order to establish a prima facie case forstatutory injunctive relief, and to withstand a motion for a directedfinding, plaintiff at bar was required to present at least someevidence in the circuit court that defendant's conduct during theVerzi birth violated the provisions of the Act. Defendant contendsthat the circuit court correctly held that plaintiff failed to meet thisevidentiary burden. Defendant characterizes herself as a"traditional (non-nurse) midwife" and contends that she is part ofa class of individuals that is not specifically identified in the Act.Defendant argues that because there is no explicit prohibitionagainst traditional (nonnurse) midwifery in the Act, her conduct,therefore, is not subject to regulation by the Department. Plaintiffresponds that the broad language chosen by the General Assemblyto describe the conduct governed by the Act, coupled with thelegislature's stated purpose in passing the Act of protecting thepublic health, safety and welfare, as well as the legislature'sexplicit command that the terms of the Act be liberally construedto effectuate this stated purpose, evince that the General Assemblyintended that conduct, such as that engaged in by defendant duringthe Verzi birth, be regulated under the Act.

The question of whether the conduct of defendant on August19, 2000, falls within the scope of the Act requires us to interpretthe statutory provisions found within that statute. Accordingly, theissue before us is a matter of statutory construction, and ourreview is de novo. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225,232 (2001). Our inquiry is guided by well-settled principles.

In construing the meaning of a statute, the primary objectiveof this court is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of thelegislature. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 307(2002); Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). All other rules of statutory constructionare subordinate to this cardinal principle. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at232; Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 387(1998). We ascertain the intent of the legislature by examining thelanguage of the statute, which is "the most reliable indicator of thelegislature's objectives in enacting a particular law." MichiganAvenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504; see also Yang v. City ofChicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001). The language of the statutemust be afforded its plain, ordinary and popularly understoodmeaning (Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308; Bubb v. SpringfieldSchool District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 381 (1995)), and we are togive the statutory language the fullest, rather than the narrowest,possible meaning to which it is susceptible (Lake County Board ofReview v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 119 Ill. 2d 419, 423(1988)). This court will not depart from the plain language of astatute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions thatconflict with the express legislative intent. Petersen v. Wallach,198 Ill. 2d 439, 446 (2002); Yang, 195 Ill. 2d at 103.

All provisions of a statutory enactment are viewed as a whole.Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504; Bubb, 167 Ill.2d at 382. Therefore, words and phrases must be interpreted inlight of other relevant provisions of the statute and must not beconstrued in isolation. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232; MichiganAvenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504. Each word, clause andsentence of the statute, if possible, must be given reasonablemeaning and not rendered superfluous. Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at232. Accordingly, in determining the intent of the GeneralAssembly, we may properly consider not only the language of thestatute, but also the purpose and necessity for the law, the evilssought to be remedied, and goals to be achieved. In re Detentionof Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308; People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36,42 (2000). "Legislative intent can be ascertained from aconsideration of the entire Act, its nature, its object and theconsequences that would result from construing it one way or theother." Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54,96 (1990). In construing a statute, we presume that the GeneralAssembly, in its enactment of legislation, did not intend absurdity,inconvenience or injustice. In re Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 309;Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 40 (2001).

It is well settled that the General Assembly has wideregulatory power with respect to the health-care professions, andit is within the broad discretion of the legislature " 'to determinenot only what the public interest and welfare require, but todetermine the measures needed to secure such interest.' " Burger,198 Ill. 2d at 41, quoting Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc.v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 364 (1985). An example of thelegislature's exercise of these broad regulatory powers is itsenactment of the Nursing and Advanced Practice Nursing Act (225ILCS 65/5-1 et seq. (West 2000)). In passing this Act, the GeneralAssembly explicitly stated that because "[t]he practice ofprofessional and practical nursing in the State of Illinois is herebydeclared to affect the public health, safety, and welfare," it is"subject to regulation and control in the public interest." 225 ILCS65/5-5 (West 2000). In this Act, the legislature clearly expressedits intent that it is "a matter of public interest and concern that thepractice of nursing, as defined in this Act, merit and receive theconfidence of the public and that only qualified persons beauthorized to so practice in the State of Illinois." 225 ILCS 65/5-5(West 2000). Therefore, the legislature mandated that "[f]or theprotection of life and the promotion of health *** any personpracticing or offering to practice professional *** nursing inIllinois shall submit evidence that he or she is qualified to practice,and shall be licensed as provided under this Act." 225 ILCS65/5-15 (West 2000). In order to effectuate the importantregulatory and remedial purposes of the Act, the legislatureexplicitly instructed that the Act is to be "liberally construed tobest carry out these subjects and purposes." 225 ILCS 65/5-5(West 2000).

The Act authorizes the licensure of nurses in three categories:licensed practical nurses, registered professional nurses, andadvanced practice nurses. Only the latter two categories are atissue in this appeal. A "registered professional nurse" is defined insection 5-10(k) of the Act as "a person who is licensed as aprofessional nurse under this Act and practices nursing as definedin paragraph (l) of this Section." 225 ILCS 65/5-10(k) (West2000). Paragraph (l) of section 5-10 of the Act (225 ILCS65/5-10(l) (West 2000)) sets forth the conduct that constitutes a"[r]egistered professional nursing practice" for purposes of theAct:

" 'Registered professional nursing practice' includes allnursing specialties and means the performance of anynursing act based upon professional knowledge,judgment, and skills acquired by means of completion ofan approved registered professional nursing educationprogram. A registered professional nurse provides nursingcare emphasizing the importance of the whole and theinterdependence of its parts through the nursing processto individuals, groups, families, or communities, thatincludes but is not limited to: (1) the assessment ofhealthcare needs, nursing diagnosis, planning,implementation, and nursing evaluation; (2) thepromotion, maintenance, and restoration of health; (3)counseling, patient education, health education, andpatient advocacy; (4) the administration of medicationsand treatments as prescribed by a physician licensed topractice medicine in all of its branches, a licensed dentist,a licensed podiatrist, or a licensed optometrist or asprescribed by a physician assistant in accordance withwritten guidelines required under the Physician AssistantPractice Act of 1987 or by an advanced practice nurse inaccordance with a written collaborative agreementrequired under the Nursing and Advanced PracticeNursing Act; (5) the coordination and management of thenursing plan of care; (6) the delegation to and supervisionof individuals who assist the registered professional nurseimplementing the plan of care; and (7) teaching andsupervision of nursing students."

A nurse who specializes in the delivery of babies is referredto as a "certified nurse midwife" in the Act and is characterized asan "[a]dvanced practice nurse." 225 ILCS 65/15-5 (West 2000).An advanced practice nurse (APN) is a registered professionalnurse, as defined in section 5-10(k) of the Act (225 ILCS65/5-10(k) (West 2000)), who meets the additional licensingrequirements set forth in section 15-10 of the Act (225 ILCS65/15-10 (West 2000)). Advanced practice nursing licenses aregranted for four categories of APNs, only one of which is relevanthere: certified nurse midwife. Pursuant to section 15-10 of theAct, a registered nurse shall be qualified for licensure as a certifiednurse midwife if that person has applied in writing to theDepartment; holds a current license to practice as a registerednurse in this state; has successfully completed requirements topractice as, and holds a current, national certification as, a nursemidwife; has paid the required fees; and has successfullycompleted a post-basic advanced practice formal educationprogram in nurse midwifery. 225 ILCS 65/15-10 (West 2000). Inaddition, pursuant to section 15-15 of the Act (225 ILCS65/15-15 (West 2000)), a certified nurse midwife must enter intoa written collaborative agreement with a physician who providesmedical direction as authorized in the collaborative agreement. Acertified nurse midwife must meet all of the above requirementsin order to be qualified to treat patients "by using medical,therapeutic, and corrective measures to treat illness and improvehealth status." 225 ILCS 65/15-5 (West 2000).

As an initial matter, we address an evidentiary argumentraised by defendant with respect to the videotape of Spencer'sbirth admitted into evidence by the circuit court. In her brief to thiscourt, defendant reiterates her position that the circuit court erredin allowing the videotape into evidence. Plaintiff is correct, anddefendant acknowledges, that defendant failed to raise thisargument in her petition for leave to appeal to this court (see 177Ill. 2d R. 315(b)(3) (the petition shall state "the points relied uponfor reversal of the judgment of the Appellate Court")), and that aparty's failure to raise an argument in the petition for leave toappeal may be deemed a waiver of that argument. Federal DepositInsurance Corp. v. O'Malley, 163 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (1994).However, the rule of waiver is a limitation on the parties and noton the court. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 518.We choose to address defendant's contention.

A videotape may be admitted as demonstrative evidence whenit is properly authenticated and is relevant to a particular issue inthe case. Cisarik v. Palos Community Hospital, 144 Ill. 2d 339,341-42 (1991). First, a foundation must be laid, by someonehaving personal knowledge of the filmed object, that the film is anaccurate portrayal of what it purports to show. Cisarik, 144 Ill. 2dat 342. "Verification may be furnished by the testimony of anycompetent witness who has sufficient knowledge to testify that thevideotape fully represents what it purports to portray." MissouriPortland Cement Co. v. United Cement, Lime, Gypsum & AlliedWorkers International Union, Division of Boilermakers, AFL-CIO,Local No. 438, 145 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1027 (1986). Second, avideotape will be considered relevant only as long as its probativevalue is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfairprejudice. Cisarik, 144 Ill. 2d at 342. The admission of a videotapeinto evidence is within the sound discretion of the circuit court andwill not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. MissouriPortland Cement Co., 145 Ill. App. 3d at 1027.

In her submission to this court, defendant does not quarrelwith the above-discussed principles of law. She does assert,however, that the circuit court erred in admitting the videotapeinto evidence because although Louis Verzi stated that thevideotape he viewed in his home the evening before his courttestimony was an accurate portrayal of the events that occurredduring his son's birth, this testimony was inadequate support forthe admission of the videotape that was actually admitted intoevidence. We agree. Whether the videotape viewed by Verzi at hishome on the evening prior to the October 13, 2000, hearing wasthe same tape produced by plaintiff in court and admitted intoevidence is unknown. During the hearing, the videotape that wasadmitted into evidence was not played for the parties, thewitnesses or the court. Plaintiff proffered no testimony during thehearing that, based upon Verzi's personal knowledge, thevideotape that was actually admitted into evidence was a true andaccurate depiction of what it purported to show. The testimonyproffered by Verzi with respect to the videotape he viewed at hishome during the previous evening was insufficient to establish aproper evidentiary foundation for the videotape that was actuallyadmitted. Accordingly, we hold that because the foundation foradmission of the videotape was insufficient, the circuit courtabused its discretion in admitting the videotape into evidence.

Upon reviewing the record in this matter, absent thevideotape, we conclude that the conduct of defendant on August19, 2000, during the birth of Spencer Verzi constituted prima facieevidence of "professional nursing" within the meaning of the Act.Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in finding thatplaintiff failed to present any evidence to establish a prima faciecase that during the Verzi birth defendant engaged in conductwhich violated the Act. It is clear that the General Assemblypassed the Act as a comprehensive regulation of the practice ofnursing, and that the Act reflects serious policy concerns about thedetrimental effect to the public health and safety when unlicencedindividuals engage in the conduct described in, and regulated by,the Act. To this end, the legislature explicitly provided in section5-15 (225 ILCS 65/5-15 (West 2000)) that only those personsqualified and licenced under the Act are authorized to engage inthe conduct defined as "professional nursing" in section 5-10(l) ofthe Act. 225 ILCS 65/5-10(l) (West 2000). The legislature chosebroad language to define those individuals covered by the Act,stating that "any person" who practices or offers to practiceprofessional nursing in this state must abide by the rules andregulations set forth in this statute. 225 ILCS 65/5-15 (West2000).

The General Assembly, however, also deemed it appropriateto enumerate certain limited and explicit exceptions to thecoverage of the Act. For example, the Act does not apply toindividuals who "furnish[ ] *** nursing assistance in anemergency" (225 ILCS 65/5-15(c) (West 2000)) or to instanceswhere "[t]he incidental care of the sick [is performed] by membersof the family, domestic servants or housekeepers" (225 ILCS65/5-15(e) (West 2000)). The Act also excludes from coveragethose individuals who care for the sick "where treatment is byprayer or spiritual means" (225 ILCS 65/5-15(e) (West 2000)) andexempts from its coverage persons "employed as nursing aides,attendants, orderlies, and other auxiliary workers in private homes,long term care facilities, nurseries, hospitals or other institutions"(225 ILCS 65/5-15(f) (West 2000)). Under the principle ofexpressio unius est exclusio alterius, the enumeration ofexceptions in a statute is construed as an exclusion of all otherexceptions. See 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on StatutoryConstruction