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Docket No. 89780-Agenda 22-March 2001.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. JAMES E. RYAN, Attorney General of 
Illinois, Appellant, v. THE WORLD CHURCH OF THE
CREATOR et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed November 21, 2001.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The issue in this case is whether the Solicitation for CharityAct (Solicitation Act) (225 ILCS 460/0.01 through 23 (West1998)) is unconstitutionally vague on its face, as violative of thefirst and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution(U.S. Const., amends. I, XIV). The circuit court of Cook Countyheld the statute unconstitutional and dismissed the AttorneyGeneral's complaint against defendants for failure to register underthe Solicitation Act. The Attorney General appealed directly to thiscourt. 134 Ill. 2d R. 603. We now reverse the circuit court'sjudgment.

BACKGROUND

The Solicitation Act requires every "charitable organization,"with exceptions not relevant here, that solicits or intends to solicitcontributions from persons within Illinois to file with the AttorneyGeneral a registration statement providing specified information.225 ILCS 460/2(a) (West 1998). The Solicitation Act defines"[c]haritable organization" in pertinent part as:

"[A] benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, oreleemosynary person or one purporting to be such whichsolicits and collects funds for charitable purposes ***."225 ILCS 460/1(a) (West 1998).

The Solicitation Act defines "[c]haritable purpose" as "[a]nycharitable, benevolent, philanthropic, patriotic, or eleemosynarypurpose." 225 ILCS 460/1(f) (West 1998).

Annual reports must be filed with the Attorney Generalsetting forth detailed information concerning receipts andexpenses. 225 ILCS 460/4 (West 1998). When the AttorneyGeneral has reason to believe that a charitable organization isoperating in violation of the Solicitation Act, he may seek aninjunction prohibiting the organization from continuing to solicitor collect funds. 225 ILCS 460/9(c) (West 1998). In addition, anyorganization that violates the Solicitation Act shall, at the requestof the Attorney General, forfeit any monies received throughsolicitation (225 ILCS 460/9(h) (West 1998)) and may be subjectto punitive damages (225 ILCS 460/9(g) (West 1998)). Personsand organizations failing to register under the Solicitation Act orwhose registration is canceled by the Attorney General forviolation of the Solicitation Act are subject "to injunction, toremoval, to account, and to appropriate other relief before thecircuit court exercising chancery jurisdiction." 225 ILCS 460/2(i)(West 1998). In addition, the court "shall" impose a civil penaltyof not less than $500 and not more than $1,000 against suchperson or organization. 225 ILCS 460/2(i) (West 1998). TheSolicitation Act also provides civil and criminal penalties forprofessional fund-raisers found to be in violation of theSolicitation Act. 225 ILCS 460/6(g), (h) (West 1998).

On July 14, 1999, the Attorney General filed a complaintagainst defendants, The World Church of the Creator (WorldChurch) and Matthew Hale. The World Church is an organizationthat exists, according to a copy of its literature attached to thecomplaint, to promote the survival, expansion, and advancementof the white race. Count I sought a declaratory judgment that theWorld Church was a charitable organization subject to theSolicitation Act. It was alleged that the World Church held itselfout to be a religious not-for-profit unincorporated association andthat it was managed and controlled by Hale. The complaint allegedthat defendants sought members and solicited payment ofmembership dues and money from the general public through anInternet website and through flyers offering for sale books,materials, and merchandise. In these solicitations, defendantssuggested that purchases would benefit the not-for-profit cause ofthe World Church, thus giving it the appearance of a charitableorganization as defined in the Solicitation Act and subjecting it tothe statute's registration requirements. Count I requested that theWorld Church be declared to be engaged in charitable solicitationof the public and, therefore, subject to the Solicitation Act. CountII of the complaint requested a finding that defendants had violatedthe Solicitation Act and an injunction prohibiting defendants fromfurther soliciting of funds and from disbursing or transferring anyassets without court approval. The prayer for relief also requestedthat the court freeze the assets of defendants, order them toaccount for the funds collected from their solicitation on behalf ofthe World Church, and impose a $1,000 fine.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuantto section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS5/2-615 (West 1998)), claiming that the Solicitation Act isunconstitutionally vague on its face, in that it fails to adequatelydefine the terms "charitable organization" and "charitablepurpose."

In a memorandum opinion filed on February 8, 2000, thecircuit court granted defendants' motion. Relying on federal cases,the court found that the definition of "charitable organization" inthe Solicitation Act does not guide the Attorney General indetermining which organizations are subject to the provisions ofthe Solicitation Act. The court stated that the terms "benevolent,philanthropic, patriotic, or eleemosynary" used to define"charitable organization" are themselves undefined and so genericas to fail to provide adequate notice as to which organizations maybe subject to the Solicitation Act. The court also expressedconcern as to the Attorney General's unbridled discretion indetermining which organizations are subject to the Solicitation Actand the potential threat to protected first amendment activity. Thecourt determined that the Solicitation Act does not meet theheightened standard of precision required of legislative enactmentsthat regulate the first amendment right to freedom of speech. Thecircuit court denied the Attorney General's motion to reconsiderand this direct appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

All statutes are presumed to be constitutionally valid. Peoplev. Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d 524, 528 (1998). It is the court's duty toconstrue a statute in a manner upholding its constitutionality, ifsuch a construction is reasonably possible. City of Chicago v.Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 448 (1997). We review de novo thecircuit court's order granting defendants' section 2-615 motion todismiss the Attorney General's complaint (Neade v. Portes, 193Ill. 2d 433, 439 (2000)), as well as the court's determination of theAct's unconstitutionality (People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483(2000)).

It is well settled that the first amendment's guarantee offreedom of speech encompasses solicitation of funds. Village ofSchaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620,633, 63 L. Ed. 2d 73, 85, 100 S. Ct. 826, 834 (1980). Defendantsargue that, because the Solicitation Act regulates speech, it mustmeet a heightened standard of precision. See National Ass'n forthe Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405, 417-18, 83 S. Ct. 328, 337-38 (1963); Hynesv. Mayor & Council, 425 U.S. 610, 620, 48 L. Ed. 2d 243, 253, 96S. Ct. 1755, 1760 (1976) (stricter standards of permissiblestatutory vagueness may be applied to a statute that has a" 'potentially inhibiting effect on speech,' " quoting Smith v.California, 361 U.S. 147, 151, 4 L. Ed. 2d 205, 210, 80 S. Ct. 215,217-18 (1959)). However, not all laws that regulate speech aresubject to this higher standard. "Content neutral regulation ofprotected speech is subject to 'an intermediate level of scrutiny.' "American Target Advertising, Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1247(10th Cir. 2000), quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.Federal Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 642, 129 L. Ed.2d 497, 517, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994). In determining whethera regulation is content neutral, the main inquiry is whether thestate has adopted the regulation because of its disagreement withthe content of the message sought to be conveyed. Ward v. RockAgainst Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 675, 109S. Ct. 2746, 2754 (1989). Government regulation of expressiveactivity is content neutral so long as it is " 'justified withoutreference to the content of the regulated speech.' " (Emphasis inoriginal.) City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,48, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 38, 106 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1986), quotingVirginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens ConsumerCouncil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346, 364, 96 S. Ct.1817, 1830 (1976).

In American Target, a professional fund-raising corporationsought to have Utah's Charitable Solicitations Act declaredunconstitutional. Among other requirements, that law required allprofessional fund-raising consultants to register with the state andobtain permits. To obtain such a permit, the consultant mustcomplete a written application, pay an annual fee and post a bondor letter of credit. Plaintiff did not comply with the registrationrequirements and was consequently barred from assisting JudicialWatch, a nonprofit organization, with its mailing campaign inUtah. American Target, 199 F.3d at 1246. The court of appealsfound that the law was a content-neutral regulation of protectedspeech and was, therefore, subject to an intermediate level ofscrutiny. The law was designed to control the secondary effects ofprofessional solicitations, i.e., increased fraud andmisrepresentation. It simply facilitated oversight of the mailers'backgrounds and methods. The court noted that subjecting the lawto intermediate scrutiny required the state to show that the law "(1)serves a substantial governmental interest and (2) is 'narrowlydrawn' to serve that interest 'without unnecessarily interferingwith First Amendment freedoms.' " American Target, 199 F.3d at1247, quoting Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 637, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 87-88, 100 S. Ct. at 836.

The court of appeals further found that the mandatoryregistration and disclosure requirements were narrowly tailored toserve Utah's substantial interest in combating fraud, in that the lawallowed Utah citizens to make informed decisions about makingcharitable donations, and the requirements directly promotedUtah's legitimate interest, while not unnecessarily burdeningspeech. American Target, 199 F.3d at 1248.

Here, the Solicitation Act's registration provisions apply to allentities that solicit funds for purposes defined in the SolicitationAct, except those specifically exempted. They do not in any waycontrol the content of speech. We, therefore, conclude that theregistration and reporting requirements are content neutral and thelaw is therefore subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, ratherthan the more exacting standard urged by defendants.

Intermediate scrutiny first requires that the regulation at issueserve a substantial governmental interest. A state or municipalityundoubtedly has the power to protect its citizens from fraud byregulating solicitation of funds. Hynes, 425 U.S. at 616-17, 48 L.Ed. 2d at 251, 96 S. Ct. at 1758-59. The Solicitation Act seeks toprevent frauds on Illinois citizens in the solicitation and use ofcharitable funds. People ex rel. Scott v. Gorman, 96 Ill. App. 3d289, 290 (1981). To that end, violators may be subject to aprohibition on future solicitation of funds (225 ILCS 460/9(c)(West 1998)), forfeiture of any monies received throughsolicitation (225 ILCS 460/9(h) (West 1998)), civil penalties (225ILCS 460/2(i) (West 1998)), punitive damages (225 ILCS 460/9(g)(West 1998)) and, in some instances, criminal penalties (225 ILCS460/6(g) (West 1998)). The registration and reportingrequirements may serve as a deterrent to fraudulent solicitation offunds, since those intent on defrauding the public will be lesslikely to do so if required to disclose identifying information to theAttorney General. The additional deterrence provided by theregistration and reporting provisions of the Solicitation Actpromote Illinois' interest in protecting its citizens from fraud.Without such provisions, the State's ability to detect fraudulentsolicitations would be undermined. Thus, we conclude that theregistration and reporting requirements of the Solicitation Actserve a substantial governmental interest.

We now turn to the question of whether the challengedprovisions of the Solicitation Act are narrowly tailored to servethis interest. Defendants claim that the Solicitation Act is notnarrowly drawn and that its definitions of "charitableorganization" and "charitable purpose" are unconstitutionallyvague. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 33 L. Ed. 2d222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972), the United States Supreme Courtexplained the dangers posed by unconstitutionally vague laws:

"It is a basic principle of due process that an enactmentis void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearlydefined. Vague laws offend several important values.First, because we assume that man is free to steer betweenlawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give theperson of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunityto know what is prohibited, so that he may actaccordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by notproviding fair warning. Second, if arbitrary anddiscriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws mustprovide explicit standards for those who apply them. Avague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters topolicemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hocand subjective basis, with the attendant dangers ofarbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, butrelated, where a vague statute 'abut[s] upon sensitiveareas of basic First Amendment freedoms,' [citation] it'operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.'[Citation.] Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to' "steer far wider of the unlawful zone" ... than if theboundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.'[Citations.]" Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, 33 L. Ed. 2dat 227-28, 92 S. Ct. at 2298-99.

A law is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore violative ofdue process, when it lacks " 'terms susceptible of objectivemeasurement' " (Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Universityof the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 604, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629,641, 87 S. Ct. 675, 684 (1967), quoting Cramp v. Board of PublicInstruction, 368 U.S. 278, 286, 7 L. Ed. 2d 285, 291, 82 S. Ct.275, 280 (1961)) and when persons of " 'common intelligencemust necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to itsapplication' " (Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604, 17 L. Ed. 2d at 641, 87S. Ct. at 684, quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367, 12 L.Ed. 2d 377, 382, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 1320 (1964)).

The Attorney General argues that the Solicitation Act may notbe declared facially invalid because it is capable of at least onevalid application. He notes that during oral argument in the circuitcourt, counsel for defendants conceded that the Solicitation Actcould validly be applied to the United Way. However, a party mustestablish that a statute is impermissibly vague in all of itsapplications only where the statute does not implicateconstitutionally protected conduct. Village of Hoffman Estates v.Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L. Ed.2d 362, 369, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (1982); see City of Chicago v.Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67, 79, 119 S. Ct. 1849,1858 (1999) (noting that where vagueness permeates the text of alaw that infringes on constitutionally protected rights, the law issubject to a facial challenge).

The circuit court relied on three federal cases in concludingthat the Solicitation Act is unconstitutionally vague. The first case,Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v.Golden, 744 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1984), involved a city ordinanceprohibiting uninvited door-to-door solicitation unless the citymanager granted an exemption. Such an exemption would begranted only if the city council determined that the solicitation wasfor a "charitable, religious, patriotic or philanthropic purpose orotherwise provides a service or product so necessary for thegeneral welfare of the residents of the city that such activity doesnot constitute a nuisance." Golden, 744 F.2d at 741. The court ofappeals reversed the district court's judgment in favor of the city,finding that the ordinance vested unguided discretion in the citycouncil to grant exemptions. The court noted that the definition ofthe types of organizations eligible for an exemption was notspecific. It found the words "charitable, religious, patriotic orphilanthropic purpose" to be vague and indefinite. Such terms didnot provide sufficient guidance to the city council in exercising itsauthority under the ordinance. The court also noted that noregulations or written interpretations of the ordinance existed.Golden, 744 F.2d at 748.

In Association of Community Organizations for Reform Nowv. City of Chicago, No. 84-C-10536 (N.D. Ill. February 24, 1986)(unpublished decision), plaintiffs challenged two city ordinancesthat regulated solicitation activities through an application process.The city filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The originalordinance required that an organization, for a period of one yearprior to application, must have been engaged in charitable andphilanthropic work. Churches were excepted from thisrequirement. The grant or denial of an application was left to thesole discretion of a committee of the city council. Association ofCommunity Organizations for Reform Now, slip op. at 6. After suitwas filed, the city replaced this ordinance with a new one thatrequired an organization to obtain a permit prior to engaging insolicitation activities. Only those organizations that intended tosolicit for "charitable purposes" were required to apply for apermit. The ordinance did not purport to regulate political,religious, or other activities. Association of CommunityOrganizations for Reform Now, slip op. at 8.

Plaintiffs challenged the facial validity of the ordinance,arguing that the language was unconstitutionally vague,particularly with respect to the scope of the ordinance'sapplication. The district court noted that the ordinance did notdefine "charitable purposes." The court rejected the city'sargument that the ordinance's requirement that an organizationapplying for a permit must be a "benevolent, philanthropic,patriotic, or eleemosynary organization" registered under theCharitable Solicitation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 5102),or be exempt from such registration, served to narrow the scope ofthe ordinance. The court noted that this requirement merelycompelled organizations to be in compliance with state law.Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, slip op.at 21-22. The court found that the term "charitable purposes" wasunconstitutionally vague and required police to make decisions onthe street as to whether a particular organization was soliciting forcharitable purposes, as opposed to some other purpose. Thus, theordinance vested unbridled discretion in the police to decide whatorganizations were violating the ordinance when they solicitedwithout a permit. The court noted that the term "charitablepurposes" is "generic, malleable, and difficult to apply."Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, slip op.at 23.

The third federal decision relied on by the circuit court in thiscase is Carolina Action v. Pickard, 465 F. Supp. 576 (W.D.N.C.1979). There, the district court struck down an ordinance thatimposed a requirement that expenses of soliciting not exceed 25%of contributions and required a permit for organizations solicitingfor "charitable, patriotic, educational or philanthropic purposes."These terms were not defined in the ordinance. Carolina Action,465 F. Supp at 577. Plaintiff was denied a permit on the groundthat the cost of its fund-raising effort would exceed the 25%ceiling set forth in the ordinance. Carolina Action, 465 F. Supp. at578. The district court held the ordinance unconstitutionallyvague, noting the inconsistency with which defendants applied thepermit and expense percentage requirements. Some organizationswere allowed to solicit without any investigation into the accuracyof the statements on their permit applications. Other applicationswere approved despite incomplete information. At times,organizations whose reported costs exceeded the 25% limitationwere issued permits. Carolina Action, 465 F. Supp. at 579-80. Thecourt also noted that while defendants had construed the term"charitable" to exclude political organizations, it had included ascharitable some organizations that were in fact political. CarolinaAction, 465 F. Supp. at 581-82.

We note that lower federal court decisions are not binding onIllinois courts, but may be considered persuasive authority. Peoplev. Stansberry, 47 Ill. 2d 541, 545 (1971). However, this court hasthe final word on interpretation of Illinois statutes.

We find that the cited cases are distinguishable from the casebefore us. In Golden, the phrase "charitable, religious, patriotic orphilanthropic purpose or otherwise provides a service or productso necessary for the general welfare of the residents of the city thatsuch activity does not constitute a nuisance" was not defined in theordinance, nor were there any regulations or directions to guide thecity council's discretion. The record indicated that the council hadapplied the ordinance inconsistently. We disagree with the districtcourt's conclusion in Association of Community Organizations forReform Now that reference in the ordinance to the Solicitation Actdid not provide a definition of the term "charitable purposes." InCarolina Action, the terms "charitable," "patriotic," "educational,"and "philanthropic" were not defined in the ordinance. Althoughdefendants had interpreted those terms so as not to includepolitical organizations, the ordinance had been appliedinconsistently.

In all three cases, the regulatory schemes required either apermit to solicit or the obtaining of an exemption to a generalprohibition on solicitation. In the instant case, the Solicitation Actmerely requires that entities subject to its provisions register andreport certain specified information. In addition, the SolicitationAct contains definitions of the terms "[c]haritable organization"and "charitable purpose." 225 ILCS 460/1(a), (f) (West 1998).

In fact, the terms "charity" and "charitable" have a settledmeaning in Illinois case law. For example, in CongregationalSunday School & Publishing Society v. Board of Review, 290 Ill.108 (1919), the appellant's claimed exemption from personalproperty taxation for religious books and Sunday school supplieswas denied. See Congregational Sunday School, 290 Ill. at 109,113. This court, in construing the statutory term "beneficent andcharitable organizations," noted that charity is a gift to be appliedfor the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, by bringingtheir " 'minds and hearts under the influence of education orreligion, *** by assisting them to establish themselves in life ***or by otherwise lessening the burdens of government.' "Congregational Sunday School, 290 Ill. at 112-13, quoting Crerarv. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 643 (1893).

The Solicitation Act was construed in People ex rel. Hartiganv. National Anti-Drug Coalition, 124 Ill. App. 3d 269 (1984).There, the State sought injunctive relief against defendant and anaccounting of donations solicited by it without first registeringunder the Solicitation Act as a charitable organization. The circuitcourt granted the State's motion to strike defendant's affirmativedefenses that the Solicitation Act was unconstitutionally overbroadand vague and that it violated the first amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution. Hartigan, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 270. The circuitcourt granted the relief requested on the ground that defendant wasa charitable organization and required to register. Hartigan, 124Ill. App. 3d at 271.

On appeal, the appellate court found defendant'sconstitutional claims waived. Hartigan, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 272. Inaddressing the question of whether defendant was in fact acharitable organization, the appellate court noted that:

"The courts in this State are in accord in applying a broadlegal definition of 'charity' to include almost anythingthat tends to promote the improvement, well[-]doing andwell[-]being of social man. [Citation.] Moreover,charitable organizations may include organizations whoseprimary purpose is not to provide money or services forthe poor, the needy or other worthy objects of charity, butto gather and disseminate information about and toadvocate positions on matters of public concern."(Emphases in original.) Hartigan, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 274.

The court held that, based upon the evidence before the circuitcourt, defendant had a charitable purpose. Hartigan, 124 Ill. App.3d at 274-75.

Thus, the term "charity" has a broad legal meaning. This courthas stated:

" 'A charity, in a legal sense, may be more fully definedas a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, forthe benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either bybringing their hearts under the influence of education orreligion, by relieving their bodies from disease, sufferingor constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves forlife, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings orworks, or otherwise lessening the burthens ofgovernment.' " Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 643(1893), quoting Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 556.

The Solicitation Act's definition of "charitable organization"is so well understood that it has been incorporated into otherIllinois statutes. For example, the statute defining the offense ofinternational terrorism provides that the terms "[c]haritableorganization," "professional fund raiser," and "professionalsolicitor" have the meanings ascribed to them by the SolicitationAct. 720 ILCS 5/29C-5 (West 1998). Likewise, the GoodSamaritan Food Donor Act (745 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1998))provides that the term "[c]haritable organization" is to be definedas set forth in the Solicitation Act. 745 ILCS 50/2.02 (West 1998).Some Illinois statutes provide even broader definitions of"charitable organization" than does the Solicitation Act. TheIllinois Pull Tabs and Jar Games Act (230 ILCS 20/1 et seq. (West1998)) defines "[c]haritable organization" as "an organization orinstitution organized and operated to benefit an indefinite numberof the public." 230 ILCS 20/1.1 (West 1998). The same definitionapplies to the Bingo License and Tax Act (230 ILCS 25/1 (West1998)).

Other states have rejected vagueness challenges to broaddefinitions of "charitable" or similar terms. In State v. Watson, 433N.W.2d 110 (Minn. App. 1988), defendant was convicted of, interalia, diversion of charitable gambling funds. He challengedMinnesota's charitable gambling statute, arguing that it wasunconstitutionally vague. Watson, 433 N.W.2d at 111. He claimedthat use of the term "lawful purposes" as defined in the statute didnot give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of whatconduct was proscribed. Watson, 433 N.W.2d at 112. The statuteprovided that profits from lawful gambling could be used only forlawful purposes or expenses related to the gambling operation. Inupholding the statute's constitutionality, the court of appeals notedthat

"Statutes regulating charities must be inclusive so as tocover many varied organizations. The fact that a statute isinclusive does not make it vague. Definitions of charitableor lawful purposes, therefore, are by nature general andmore inclusive." Watson, 433 N.W.2d at 113.

The court found the definition of "lawful purposes" to besimilar to the generally accepted legal definition of "charitable."Watson, 433 N.W.2d at 113-14.

In Holloway v. Brown, 62 Ohio St. 2d 65, 403 N.E.2d 191(1980), an ordinance prohibited a person from soliciting for acharitable organization unless the organization registered with acommission. Professional promoters and solicitors were requiredto obtain a license. "Professional promoter" was defined in theordinance as a person who for compensation plans, promotes, orcarries on any drive or campaign for the purpose of solicitingcontributions on behalf of any charitable person or engages in thebusiness of soliciting contributions for charitable purposes.Holloway, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 67-68, 403 N.E.2d at 193. The term"charitable" was defined as "meaning and including 'the wordspatriotic, philanthropic, religious, social service, welfare,benevolent, educational, civic or fraternal, either actual orpurported.' " Holloway, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 70, 403 N.E.2d at 195.One of plaintiffs' arguments was that the definition of "charitable"was unconstitutionally vague. Holloway, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 70, 403N.E.2d at 195. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument,finding that the term "charitable" has a meaning that persons ofordinary intelligence can discern, and that this is especially truewhen the ordinance itself defines the term more specifically.Holloway, 62 Ohio St. 2d at 75, 403 N.E.2d at 198.

Although the terms at issue in this case are broad in scope, wefail to see how they could be more precisely defined. Given thewide variety of organizations subject to the Solicitation Act, an all-inclusive definition must be used. The terms defendants challengehave well-settled definitions in Illinois jurisprudence. Judicialinterpretations of the same or similar terms in other states alsosupport our conclusion that the terms "charitable organization"and "charitable purpose" are not unconstitutionally vague.

We conclude that the Solicitation Act's registration andreporting requirements are narrowly tailored to serve the state'ssubstantial governmental interest in protecting its citizens fromfraud and do not unnecessarily burden first amendment speech.Therefore, the terms "charitable organization" and "charitablepurpose" are not unconstitutionally vague.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court's judgmentand remand to that court for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.