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Docket No. 95663-Agenda 19-September 2003.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General of Illinois, et
al., Petitioners, v. DONALD N. SNYDER, JR., Director of
Corrections, et al., Respondents.

Opinion filed January 23, 2004.
 

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

This case comes before the court as an original action for a writ ofmandamus. 188 Ill. 2d R. 381. The Illinois Attorney General filed thecomplaint on behalf of the people of the state of Illinois. The complaintseeks a writ of mandamus ordering the Director of Corrections and thewardens of Pontiac and Menard Correctional Centers to prevent therecording of certain commutation orders entered by former GovernorGeorge H. Ryan or, in the alternative, to expunge the commutation orderswhere they have already been entered.

Petitioners' complaint contains the following allegations. On January10, 2003, then-Governor George H. Ryan announced that he wasgranting "blanket clemency" for all inmates who were then, or who hadbeen, sentenced to death. He issued orders commuting the sentences ofmore than 160 inmates to life imprisonment, a maximum of lifeimprisonment, or 40 years. Petitioners challenge the validity of thecommutations with respect to two distinct groups of inmates.

In count I of the complaint, petitioners allege that the Governorlacked the authority to commute the sentences of inmates who failed tosign or otherwise consent to their clemency petitions. Article V, section12, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides that:

"The Governor may grant reprieves, commutations andpardons, after conviction, for all offenses on such terms as hethinks proper. The manner of applying therefore [sic] may beregulated by law."

Pursuant to this section, the General Assembly has exercised its authorityto regulate the process of application for clemency in section 3-3-13 ofthe Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-3-13 (West 2002)).That section provides that petitions seeking clemency "shall be in writingand signed by the person under conviction or by a person on his behalf."730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(a) (West 2002). A clemency application cannot becommenced on behalf of a person who has been sentenced to death,unless that person has consented. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(c) (West 2002).The complaint listed in an appendix a group of inmates who had notauthorized the filing of clemency petitions on their behalf. The statutemakes an exception for inmates who are mentally or physically incapableof deciding whether to seek clemency (730 ILCS 5/3-3-13(c) (West2002)), but none of the inmates listed in the appendix had claimed such aninfirmity.

Count I alleged that the legislature had regulated the procedure forapplying for executive clemency and that the section imposed a clear legalduty on the Governor not to grant a commutation to any inmate who failsto sign or consent to a commutation petition and who is not otherwiseexcused from doing so. Accordingly, petitioners allege that the ordersgranting commutations to these inmates are void.

The next three counts of the complaint deal with inmates who wereallegedly not under sentence when then-Governor Ryan issued thecommutations. In count II, petitioners argue that the Governor lacked theauthority to issue commutations to inmates not under sentence. Theseinmates had been under a sentence of death at one time, but theirsentences had been reversed in either direct appeals or in postconvictionproceedings and they were awaiting new sentencing hearings. Thecomplaint alleged that then-Governor Ryan had exceeded his authority inissuing a preemptive grant of commutation and had encroached on thejudiciary's sentencing powers. Accordingly, petitioner argued that thesecommutations were void.

In count III, petitioners argue that the Governor cannot commutesentences to unspecified terms. For most of the inmates referenced incount II of the complaint, the Governor used one of the following twoforms of commutation orders:

"Sentence Commuted to Natural Life Imprisonment Withoutthe Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief [sic];or in the alternative, Sentence Commuted to a Sentence OtherThan Death for the Crime of Murder, So that the MaximumSentence that may be Imposed is Natural Life ImprisonmentWithout the Possibility of Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief[sic]."

"Sentence Commuted to a Sentence Other Than Death forthe Crime of Murder, So that the Maximum Sentence that maybe Imposed is Natural Life Imprisonment Without the Possibilityof Parole or Mandatory Supervised Relief [sic]."

Petitioners argue that these are void orders because the Governor cannotcommute sentences to unspecified terms.

Count IV alleges that the Governor may not delegate hiscommutation power. According to the complaint, then-Governor Ryanimproperly delegated his commutation powers to the judiciary bycommuting sentences of the inmates listed in count II to unspecified terms.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy traditionally used to compela public official to perform a ministerial duty. People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe,201 Ill. 2d 552, 555 (2002). Generally, a writ of mandamus will beawarded only if a plaintiff establishes a clear right to relief, a clear duty ofthe public official to act, and a clear authority in the public official tocomply with the writ. People ex rel. Waller v. McKoski, 195 Ill. 2d 393,398 (2001). There must also be no other adequate remedy. Patzner v.Baise, 133 Ill. 2d 540, 545 (1990). However, even when all of the normalrequirements for the writ's award are not met initially, we may stillconsider a petition for a writ of mandamus if it presents a novel issue thatis of crucial importance to the administration of justice. People v. Latona,184 Ill. 2d 260, 277 (1998). If, in purporting to exercise his pardon orcommutation power, the Governor issues a void order, mandamus maybe used to require the officers charged with execution of the order todisregard it. People ex rel. Smith v. Jenkins, 325 Ill. 372, 374-75(1927); People ex rel. Fullenwider v. Jenkins, 322 Ill. 33 (1926).

I. Inmates Who Did Not Sign or Otherwise Consent to Their Petitions

We first consider petitioners' argument that former Governor Ryanlacked the authority to commute the sentences of inmates who did not signor otherwise consent to the filing of petitions on their behalf. For each ofthe inmates listed in the appendix to count I, a petition for executiveclemency was filed with former Governor Ryan. However, these inmateshad not signed consent forms allowing these petitions to be filed on theirbehalf.

Petitioners' argument is straightforward. The Illinois Constitutiongives the Governor the authority to "grant reprieves, commutations andpardons, after conviction, for all offenses on such terms as he thinksproper." Ill. Const. 1970, art. 5,