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Docket No. 91715-Agenda 24-January 2002.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex rel. N. DAVID 
GRAF et al., Appellees, v. THE VILLAGE OF LAKE BLUFF, 
Illinois, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant.

Opinion filed June 19, 2003.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

In this case, we decide whether a trial court's finding that aparcel of land is contiguous to the annexing municipality in aproceeding initiated under section 7-1-2 of the Illinois MunicipalCode (Code) (65 ILCS 5/7-1-2 (West 2000)) is subject to acollateral attack in a quo warranto action.

The circuit court of Lake County denied plaintiffs' motion forleave to file a complaint in quo warranto seeking to challenge theannexation of a parcel of land on the basis that it was notcontiguous to the annexing village. The appellate court reversed,holding that the existence of contiguity was a jurisdictionalcondition precedent to the filing of a court-controlled annexationproceeding under section 7-1-2 of the Code and that contiguitycould be raised collaterally in a quo warranto proceeding. 321 Ill.App. 3d 897, 906. For the reasons that follow, we reverse thejudgment of the appellate court.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 10, 1980, two owners of parcels of land in an 8.3-acre tract, commonly referred to as " the Triangle," filed a petitionpursuant to section 7-1-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev.Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 7-1-2 (now codified at 65 ILCS 5/7-1-2(West 2000))), seeking to annex the Triangle to the Village ofLake Bluff (Village). The petitioners alleged that they were amajority of the land owners in the Triangle and that the Trianglewas contiguous to the Village. No objections were filed. After ahearing, the court found that the petition conformed to section7-1-4 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/7-1-4 (West 2000)) and orderedthat the question of annexation be submitted to the corporateauthorities of the Village.

The annexation was completed by an ordinance adoptedNovember 24, 1980. As part of this process, the Village alsoannexed a portion of railroad right-of-way 1,000 feet long and 100feet wide abutting a portion of the Triangle and also abutting theborder of the Village. No appeal was ever taken from the courtorder approving the annexation, nor did any party ever seek post-judgment relief.

In 1998, the Village annexed a different tract of land knownas "the Sanctuary," again using the court procedures created bysections 7-1-2, 7-1-3, 7-1-4 and 7-1-7 of the Code (65 ILCS5/7-1-2, 7-1-3, 7-1-4, 7-1-7 (West 2000)). The Village initiatedthe process by an ordinance adopted August 10, 1998, and filedwith the circuit court in accordance with section 7-1-2. OnSeptember 2, 1998, the court conducted a hearing under section7-1-4 and found: (1) the Sanctuary was contiguous to the Village;(2) the ordinance was lawfully adopted and in compliance with therequirements of section 7-1-2; and (3) there were no validobjections to the annexation. The court then directed the issue tobe submitted to a referendum of the electors residing in theSanctuary, pursuant to section 7-1-7. The annexation wasapproved by a majority of the electors and, under the terms of thecourt's order, the Sanctuary became a part of the Village. TheSanctuary abutted a portion of the Triangle, but did not touch anyother boundary of the Village. No appeal was taken from thejudgment approving the Sanctuary annexation, nor did any partyrequest post-judgment relief in the trial court.

On June 2, 1999, plaintiffs filed their motion for leave to filea complaint in quo warranto to challenge the annexations.Plaintiffs alleged that contiguity in the Triangle annexation existedneither in fact nor in law. Further, they claimed that the subsequentSanctuary annexation was invalid because it was dependent on theTriangle's defective annexation. Therefore, the Sanctuaryannexation also failed for want of contiguity and was void.

The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion, finding that it was animpermissible collateral attack on the final orders entered in twoannexation proceedings. The court further found that none of theplaintiffs had standing to assert a challenge to the annexationsbecause their pleadings did not describe a special interest orprivate right infringed by the annexations. Plaintiffs appealed.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order on thestanding of plaintiffs Graf, Price and Surkamer, who resided in theVillage. The court found that plaintiffs' allegation, concerningVillage tax revenues being diverted to pay for government servicesto the Sanctuary property, was speculative and insufficient. 321 Ill.App. 3d at 901. Therefore, plaintiffs did not show the requisiteinterest in the case to establish standing. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 901.The court, however, partially reversed the trial court as to plaintiffGottschalk, a Sanctuary resident, finding that Gottschalk'saverments were sufficient to confer standing. 321 Ill. App. 3d at902.

The appellate court further held that the existence ofcontiguity is a jurisdictional condition precedent to annexation,and its absence can be raised in a quo warranto action. 321 Ill.App. 3d at 906. The appellate court believed the provisions ofsection 7-1-46 of the Code (65 ILCS 5/7-1-46 (West 2000)),imposing a one-year statute of limitations on annexationchallenges, showed the legislature's intent that contiguity be ajurisdictional prerequisite. We granted leave to appeal to theVillage. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

II. ANALYSIS

Quo warranto is an extraordinary remedy. It was originally awrit of right for the crown against one who claimed or usurped anyoffice, franchise or liberty, to challenge the authority underlyingthat assertion of the right. People ex rel. Hansen v. Phelan, 158 Ill.2d 445, 448 (1994). Quo warranto proceedings are now codified(735 ILCS 5/18-101 et seq. (West 2000)) and may be brought byprivate parties under special circumstances. They may do so,however, only by leave of court. 735 ILCS 5/18-102 (West 2000).The decision to grant or deny a petition for leave to file a quowarranto action is a matter within the trial court's sounddiscretion. Phelan, 158 Ill. 2d at 449. Where discretion has beenvested in the trial court, only a clear abuse of discretion or anapplication of impermissible legal criteria justifies reversal.Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville v. Martin, 155 Ill. 2d 305,314 (1993).

A. Standing

We first address the Village's argument that the appellatecourt erred in holding that plaintiff Gottschalk had standing tobring a quo warranto action. Gottschalk alleged that, as a result ofthe annexation, he must: (1) purchase vehicle stickers from theVillage; (2) pay Village property taxes; and (3) pay for garbage-collection service regardless of whether he chooses to use it. Theappellate court held that these allegations are sufficient to assertthe kind of special interest necessary to maintain an action in quowarranto. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 902.

The Village argues here that Gottschalk's allegations do notdescribe a substantial adverse impact and that any new costs areoutweighed by the benefits and services provided to residents ofthe Village. We disagree.

The Village cites no authority applying a balancing test ofadverse impact versus new benefits and services. Nonetheless, itargues that a balancing test is consistent with the reasoning inPeople ex rel. Durst v. Village of Germantown Hills, 51 Ill. App.3d 969 (1977). There, a township asserted standing to challenge anannexation because it would lose motor fuel tax revenues as aresult of the reduction in the total number of miles under itsjurisdiction. The court observed that although annexation resultsin a township's loss of road jurisdiction, it also eliminates itsresponsibility for road maintenance. Durst, 51 Ill. App. 3d at 971.

In the case before us, the only new benefit described in therecord is garbage collection, a service unwanted by Gottschalk.Gottschalk's payments for garbage service, mandatory vehiclestickers, and Village property taxes significantly impact his privateinterests and are not outweighed by any benefits or servicesdescribed in the Village's pleading. Thus, Durst is inapplicablehere. Moreover, we agree with the appellate court that theincreased financial burdens to Gottschalk resulting from theassessment of Village property taxes and the requirement that hepurchase vehicle stickers from the Village are substantial. 321 Ill.App. 3d at 902.

In holding that taxpayers could challenge in quo warranto theright of a drainage district to continue to levy taxes, this courtobserved:

"Moreover, the interest of a citizen in the taxes to becollected from him is obviously distinct, for manypurposes, from a general public interest in theenforcement of the law. It is a personal and substantialinterest, and it does not become the less so because othercitizens have a similar interest." People ex rel. McCarthyv. Firek, 5 Ill. 2d 317, 324 (1955).

Therefore, we believe that Gottschalk has sufficiently allegeda special interest to confer standing to bring an action in quowarranto. The appellate court's reasoning on that issue wascorrect and needs no further explication here.

B. The Contiguity Challenge

In denying plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a quo warrantoaction in this case, the trial court construed section 7-1-2 of theCode and determined that the jurisdictional prerequisites to thefiling of a court-approved annexation proceeding were set out inthat section. Contiguity is not mentioned in that section and, thus,is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Section 7-1-4 of the Coderequires the trial court to find that contiguity exists between themunicipality and the parcel to be annexed. 65 ILCS 5/7-1-4 (West2000). Since that issue is a question of fact that the court in theannexation proceeding was empowered to decide, the trial courtdenied plaintiffs' motion, finding that a collateral attack on a finalorder is not authorized under such circumstances.

The appellate court reached a contrary conclusion, finding thataccording to the plain language of section 7-1-4, the legislatureintended contiguity to be a jurisdictional prerequisite to anannexation. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 904-06. In its analysis, the court didnot refer to section 7-1-2 of the Code, nor did it cite any casewhere the use of quo warranto was approved as a means ofchallenging a court-ordered annexation due to a lack of contiguity.Since we must construe the subject statutes to determine whetherthe trial court applied the correct legal criteria in the exercise of itsdiscretion, a question of law is presented, and our review is denovo. In re Estate of Andernovics, 197 Ill. 2d 500, 507 (2001).

Gottschalk argues, and the appellate court held, that theexistence of contiguity is a jurisdictional condition precedent toannexation because section 7-1-4 of the Code requires the trialcourt to determine whether the petition or ordinance filed undersection 7-1-2 is valid or invalid. The use of those terms, theappellate court reasoned, suggests that a petition not meeting therequirements of section 7-1-4 is without any legal force or effectand that an action based upon a petition that fails to meet thosestatutory requirements is void ab initio. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 904.

Section 7-1-4 requires the court to dismiss the petition orordinance if it finds that: (1) the annexation petition is not signedby the requisite number of electors or property owners of record;(2) the described property is not contiguous to the annexingmunicipality; (3) the description is materially defective; or (4) thepetition or ordinance is otherwise invalid. 65 ILCS 5/7-1-4 (West2000). The appellate court observed that the signature requirementhas been held to be a jurisdictional condition precedent and thatthe contiguity requirement appears in the same sentence of thestatute as the signature requirement. Thus, nothing warrantsinterpreting contiguity as a factual matter and signatures as ajurisdictional matter. According to the appellate court, theinclusion of both requirements in the same portion of the statuteis a manifestation of the legislature's intention that both serve thesame function. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 903-05, citing People ex rel.Jordan Co. v. Village of Forest View, 21 Ill. 2d 384, 390 (1961);People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 268 Ill. App.3d 420, 423 (1994).

The Village argues that the conditions precedent to theexercise of the court's jurisdiction are established not in section7-1-4 of the Code, but in section 7-1-2. That section provides asfollows:

"(a) A written petition signed by a majority of theowners of record of land in the territory and also by amajority of the electors, if any, residing in the territoryshall be filed with the circuit court clerk of the county inwhich the territory is located, or the corporate authoritiesof a municipality may initiate the proceeding by enactingan ordinance expressing their desire to annex thedescribed territory. *** The petition or ordinance, as thecase may be, shall request the annexation of the territoryto a specified municipality and also shall request that thecircuit court of the specified county submit the questionof the annexation to the corporate authorities of theannexing municipality or to the electors of theunincorporated territory, as the case may be." 65 ILCS5/7-1-2(a) (West 2000).

Section 7-1-2 does not require the petition to allege thecontiguity of the territory to be annexed to the municipality. TheVillage argues that we must look to section 7-1-2, rather thansection 7-1-4, to determine the applicable conditions precedentbecause the filing of the petition enables the court to exercise itssubject matter jurisdiction. Section 7-1-4, by its own terms,describes the findings the court must make to determine whetherthe petition is valid. Obviously, the court cannot make findingsunless it has jurisdiction. The Village contends that since asufficient petition, as prescribed by the legislature, was presentedto the court, it was empowered to determine the question ofcontiguity.

In the case before us, the petition to annex the Triangleproperty alleged that it was signed by a majority of the owners ofrecord and alleged that it was contiguous to the Village. It wassupported by the petitioners' verification under oath. Thus, itconformed to the requirements of section 7-1-2 of the Code (65ILCS 5/7-1-2 (West 2000)). The trial court subsequently foundthat the petition also conformed to the requirements of section7-1-4 and referred the question of annexation to Villageauthorities as provided by statute. In making its finding, the courtimplicitly determined that the Triangle territory was contiguous tothe Village. Any errors in the trial court's final order could havebeen directly appealed under section 7-1-4 (65 ILCS 5/7-1-4(West 2000)).

In August 1998, the Village enacted an ordinance to initiatethe annexation of the Sanctuary property. The ordinance containeda legal description of the property to be annexed and avermentsthat it was not within any other municipality and was contiguousto the Village. It also requested that the court find the ordinance tobe valid and in conformity with the Code. The trial court enteredan agreed order resolving the issues raised by the objectors,finding the territory contiguous to the Village and the ordinancelawfully adopted and in conformity with the requirements ofsection 7-1-2 and directing that the question of annexation besubmitted to a referendum vote pursuant to section 7-1-7 of theCode. The agreed order was not appealed. The trial court'sdetermination that the Sanctuary property was contiguous to theVillage could only have been based on its contiguity to thepreviously annexed Triangle property. Thus, the court in the 1998proceeding relied on the validity of the unchallenged 1980 courtorder.

In challenging the prior trial court orders, plaintiffs' quowarranto petition is an independent action, not filed in either ofthe annexation proceedings. Therefore, it is a collateral attack onthe two judgments that had previously found contiguity. City ofDes Plaines v. Boeckenhauer, 383 Ill. 475, 480 (1943). Plaintiffsargue that a collateral attack is authorized under the holding inJordan, 21 Ill. 2d 384. In that case, this court reviewed the findingthat the requisite number of eligible electors had signed anannexation petition and reasoned:

"Plaintiffs do not purport to review the determination ofthe county court. Rather, their claim is that the countycourt lacked jurisdiction to make any determination,because the failure of the petition to comply with thestatutory requirements rendered it insufficient to conferjurisdiction upon the county court. The statutoryrequirements of the petition are jurisdictional, and thelack of jurisdiction on the part of the county court can beasserted in a quo warranto proceeding." Jordan, 21 Ill. 2dat 389-90.

In light of our holding in Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. ToyotaMotor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002), Jordan has nocontinued viability. Jordan was decided in 1961, prior to theamendment of the judicial article to our state constitution (Ill.Const. 1870, art. VI (1964),