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Docket No. 96220-Agenda 10-January 2004.

MAREK PASZKOWSKI, Appellee, v. THE METROPOLITANWATER RECLAMATION DISTRICT OF GREATER CHICAGO, Appellant.

Opinion filed November 18, 2004.

CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of thecourt:

In early 2000, plaintiff Marek Paszkowski filed a negligence suitagainst defendant, the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District ofGreater Chicago (District), seeking damages for injuries allegedlysustained by plaintiff in 1998 while he was working on the District'sdeep tunnel construction project. Plaintiff brought his suit in thecircuit court of Cook County. The District filed a section 2-619motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim on the ground that it was notbrought within the one-year limitation period in section 8-101 of theLocal Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort ImmunityAct (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 1998)). Thecircuit court granted the motion to dismiss, and plaintiff appealed. Theappellate court reversed, holding that plaintiff's claim was governedby the four-year limitation period in section 13-214(a) of the Code ofCivil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West 1998)).According to the appellate court, plaintiff's claim was timely filedunder section 13-214(a). We allowed the District's petition for leaveto appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We now reverse the judgment of theappellate court.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his original, one-count complaint on February 9,2000, seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained on March 5,1998. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of theDistrict with regard to a cement remix car that apparently wasinvolved in the injury to plaintiff. In an amended complaint, plaintiffadded three counts (strict liability, breach of warranty, and negligentsale) against the manufacturer of the cement remix car. The only claimat issue in the appeal before us is count I, the claim against theDistrict.

In January 2001, the District moved to dismiss count I of thecomplaint on the ground that plaintiff failed to file the complaintwithin the one-year limitation period set forth in section 8-101 of theTort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 1998)). Plaintiffresponded that the proper limitation period was four years as providedin section 13-214(a) of the Code, which applies to construction-related causes of action. The circuit court denied defendant's motionto dismiss. Relying on Zimmer v. Village of Willowbrook, 242 Ill.App. 3d 437 (1993), the circuit court found that section 13-214(a)was the applicable statute and plaintiff therefore had four years, notone year, to bring his claim.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, relying upon Greb v.Forest Preserve District, 323 Ill. App. 3d 461 (2001), which wasdecided 11 days after the circuit court's denial of defendant's motionto dismiss in the case at bar. Greb held that any tort action against alocal governmental entity or its employees must be brought within theone-year limitation period in section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act,rather than the four-year period in section 13-214(a) of the Code. Inlight of the decision in Greb, the circuit court in the case at bargranted defendant's motion to reconsider and dismiss count I ofplaintiff's amended complaint as time-barred under section 8-101.Pursuant to Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), the court found thatthere was no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal of itsruling.

Plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court reversed. 338 Ill. App.3d 781. The appellate court rejected Greb as incorrectly decided, andheld that, in the case at bar, it was the four-year limitation period insection 13-214(a) that applied, rather than the one-year period insection 8-101. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal.177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). In addition, we granted leave to the followingentities to submit briefs as amici curiae (155 Ill. 2d R. 345): theIllinois Trial Lawyers Association; the City of Chicago and the IllinoisMunicipal League; and the Illinois Association of Defense TrialCounsel, the Illinois Governmental Association of Pools, the IllinoisAssociation of School Boards, and the Illinois Association of SchoolAdministrators.

ANALYSIS

Defendant's motion to dismiss count I of plaintiff's amendedcomplaint was brought pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code(735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2000)), which provides for thedismissal of an action that was not commenced within the time limitedby law. When ruling on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, a courtmust interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the lightmost favorable to the nonmoving party. In re Chicago FloodLitigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 189 (1997); In re Parentage of M.J., 203Ill. 2d 526, 533 (2003). The motion should be granted only if theplaintiff can prove no set of facts that would support a cause of action.Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the Cityof Chicago, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000); Chicago Flood Litigation,176 Ill. 2d at 189. We review both the dismissal of a complaint andthe interpretation of a statute de novo. In re Parentage of M.J., 203Ill. 2d at 533.

In the case at bar, the statutes at issue, as noted, are section8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 1998))and section 13-214(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West1998)). Section 8-101 provides:

"No civil action may be commenced in any court againsta local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless itis commenced within one year from the date that the injurywas received or the cause of action accrued. For purposes ofthis Article, the term 'civil action' includes any action,whether based upon the common law or statutes orConstitution of this State." (Emphases added.) 745 ILCS10/8-101 (West 1998).

The term "local public entity," as defined in the Tort Immunity Act,includes sanitary districts such as defendant. 745 ILCS 10/1-206(West 1998).

Section 13-214(a) of the Code, which was enacted subsequentto section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act, provides, in pertinentpart:

"(a) Actions based upon tort, contract or otherwise againstany person for an act or omission of such person in thedesign, planning, supervision, observation or management ofconstruction, or construction of an improvement to realproperty shall be commenced within 4 years from the timethe person bringing an action, or his or her privity, knew orshould reasonably have known of such an act or omission."(Emphases added.) 735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West 1998).

Section 13-214 defines "person" as "any individual, any business orlegal entity, or any body politic." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS5/13-214 (West 1998).

The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, to which all otherrules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the intention ofthe legislature. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232(2001); Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190,194 (1992). The starting point is always the language of the statute,which is the best indication of the intent of the drafters. Hernon, 149Ill. 2d at 194; County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst &White, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151 (1985). When this language isunambiguous, the law is to be enforced as enacted by the legislature.Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 391 (1998);Blinderman Construction Co. v. Metropolitan Water ReclamationDistrict of Greater Chicago, 325 Ill. App. 3d 362, 366 (2001),quoting 155 Harbor Drive Condominium Ass'n v. Harbor Point Inc.,209 Ill. App. 3d 631, 642 (1991). Where two statutes are allegedly inconflict, an interpretation that allows both to stand is favored, ifpossible. McNamee v. Federated Equipment & Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d415, 427 (1998); Jahn v. Troy Fire Protection District, 163 Ill. 2d275, 280 (1994). However, legislative intent remains the primaryconsideration. Traditional rules of statutory construction are merelyaids in determining legislative intent, and these rules must yield tosuch intent. Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity &Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 111 (1993).

In the case at bar, under the plain language of the two statutes atissue, either provision, in the absence of the other, could apply toplaintiff's claim against the District. Section 8-101 of the TortImmunity Act applies to civil actions against a local governmentalentity for any injury, and section 13-214(a) of the Code applies toconstruction-related causes of action against "any body politic" (735ILCS 5/13-214 (West 1998)). Plaintiff's claim is a civil action againsta local governmental entity seeking damages for an injury, and thusfalls within the scope of section 8-101, which defines "local publicentity" as including sanitary districts such as defendant. Plaintiff'sclaim also is a construction-related cause of action against a bodypolitic. The term "body politic" is defined as "[a] group of peopleregarded in a political (rather than private) sense and organized undera single governmental authority." Black's Law Dictionary 167 (7th ed.1999). This term clearly includes defendant. See County of Du Page,109 Ill. 2d at 151 ("It is clear that section 13-214, by stating that a'person,' as used in the section, may refer to a body politic, expresslyincludes governmental entities, such as the county, within itspurview"). Thus, section 13-214(a) also applies to plaintiff's claim.

However, sections 8-101 and 13-214(a) are in conflict. Section8-101 requires a claim to be filed within one year, while section13-214(a) allows a four-year filing period. The central issue in thisappeal is which of these two conflicting statutory provisions shouldapply.

Plaintiff argues that section 13-214(a) is more specific thansection 8-101 and therefore section 13-214(a) should control oversection 8-101. Plaintiff directs our attention to Hernon, which heldthat, where one of two provisions is general and designed to apply tocases generally, and the other is particular and relates to only onesubject, the particular provision should prevail. Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d at195, quoting Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 205 (1954).Plaintiff notes that section 8-101 applies to any civil action against alocal governmental entity for any injury, while the scope of section13-214(a) is more narrowly limited to construction-related claimsagainst a person, a business or a body politic. In further support of theposition that section 13-214(a) should control, plaintiff correctlynotes that section 13-214(a) was enacted later than section 8-101.Plaintiff points to this court's decision in Jahn, which observed that,where two statutes are in direct conflict, "the more recent enactmentgenerally will prevail as the later expression of legislative intent."Jahn, 163 Ill. 2d at 282. According to plaintiff, section 13-214(a)should be viewed as a limited exception to section 8-101. Under thisexception, the four-year limitation period in section 13-214(a) wouldapply only to causes of action (such as plaintiff's claim against theDistrict) that arise from the construction-related activities of a publicentity.

Defendant responds that it is the one-year limitation period insection 8-101, rather than the four-year period in section 13-214(a),that should govern in the case at bar. In support of this position,defendant argues, inter alia, that section 8-101 is the more specific ofthe two provisions. Defendant notes that section 8-101 applies onlyto civil actions against local entities, while section 13-214(a)encompasses construction-related claims not only against bodiespolitic, but also against individuals or any business or legal entity.According to defendant, section 13-214(a) is more general thansection 8-101.

Defendant also points to the sweeping language used in section8-101 as additional support for the position that section 8-101 shouldcontrol. As noted, section 8-101 bars all civil actions in any courtagainst a local entity for any injury unless the action is brought withinone year. According to defendant, the breadth of this languagedemonstrates the legislature's intent that section 8-101 should takeprecedence over other statutes of limitation. In defendant's view,section 8-101 embodies the purpose of the Tort Immunity Act, whichis "to protect local public entities and public employees from liabilityarising from the operation of government." 745 ILCS 10/1-101.1(West 1998).

These two arguments-that section 8-101 is the more specificstatute, and that the legislature intended section 8-101 to takeprecedence over other statutes of limitation-figured prominently inTosado v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186 (1999), where the matter at issuewas similar to the case at bar. The question in Tosado was whethermedical malpractice actions brought by adults against local entitiesand/or their employees were governed by the one-year limitationperiod in section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act or by the two-yearlimitation period in section 13-212(a) of the Code. 735 ILCS5/13-212(a) (West 1992). Section 13-212(a) deals with claimsagainst medical providers for damages arising from "patient care."Four members of the court agreed with the disposition that the one-year period in section 8-101 applied to medical malpractice actionsagainst local entities, but there was no majority agreement as to therationale for this result. The lead opinion, which was supported bytwo justices, concluded that section 8-101 applied because it wasmore specific than section 13-212(a). In reaching this conclusion, thelead opinion focused on the nature of the defendants, rather than onthe nature of the cause of action. Given this focus, the lead opinionreasoned that, because section 8-101 applied to defendants that werelocal public entities and their employees, it was more specific thansection 13-212(a), which applied to defendants who were medicalproviders, both public and private. Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 195(plurality op.). The other two justices in Tosado who agreed with thedisposition that section 8-101 should apply wrote separate concurringopinions advancing a different rationale for this result. Theseconcurring justices noted, similar to defendant in the case at bar, thatsection 8-101 "was designed to apply broadly to any possible claimagainst a local governmental entity and its employees." Tosado, 188Ill. 2d at 199 (Heiple, J., specially concurring); 188 Ill. 2d at 198(Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). In the concurring justices' view,"[t]his type of comprehensive protection necessarily controls overother statutes of limitations." Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 199-200 (Heiple,J., specially concurring).

Three justices dissented in Tosado. Two of the dissenting justicestook issue specifically with the lead opinion's focus on the nature ofthe defendants in determining that section 8-101 was more specificthan section 13-212(a). According to these two justices, the focus onthe nature of the defendants in making the specificity determinationconstituted a departure from traditional analysis, which looked"primarily to the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action and the typeof injury sustained by the plaintiff." Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 202(McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by Rathje, J.). These two dissentingjustices noted that section 13-212(a) was limited to causes of actioninvolving damages "for injury or death *** arising out of patient care"(735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 1992)), while section 8-101 appliedmore broadly to civil actions for "any injury." The dissenting justicesconcluded that, under traditional specificity analysis, section13-212(a) was more specifically applicable to the case before thecourt than was section 8-101, and therefore section 13-212(a), notsection 8-101, should control.

A little over a year after Tosado was decided, this courtconfronted essentially the same issue in Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202Ill. 2d 304 (2001). The question in Ferguson was whether a medicalmalpractice wrongful-death claim brought by a minor against a localgovernmental entity or its employees was subject to the one-yearlimitation period in section 8-101 or the eight-year repose period insection 13-212(b) of the Code. Ferguson held that section 13-212(b)applied to the minor's cause of action until she attained the age of 18and ceased to be a minor. However, the court concluded that, whenthe minor turned 18, the one-year limitation period in section 8-101applied. Because the minor's claim in Ferguson was not brought untilafter her nineteenth birthday, her claim was time-barred under section8-101. In affirming the applicability of section 8-101 to medicalmalpractice claims brought by an adult against a local governmentalentity, Ferguson relied upon the reasoning of the two concurringjustices in Tosado. The majority in Ferguson asserted: "[T]helegislature intended that section 8-101 of the Act apply 'broadly toany possible claim against a local governmental entity and itsemployees.' " (Emphases added.) Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 312,quoting Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 199 (Heiple, J., specially concurring).Accordingly, the majority in Ferguson held that the one-yearlimitation period in section 8-101 took precedence over the eight-yearrepose period in section 13-212(b) when the minor became an adult.As an additional basis, the majority in Ferguson noted that, under thereasoning of the lead opinion in Tosado, section 8-101 also was morespecific than section 13-212(b).

Three justices dissented in Ferguson, arguing, in the main, thatit was section 13-212(b) that was more specific than section 8-101.In keeping with the corresponding dissent in Tosado, the dissent inFerguson argued that, under a traditional analysis focusing on thenature of the plaintiff's cause of action rather than on the nature of thedefendant, the provisions of section 13-212(b) were "far more specificthan those of section 8-101, which apply to a 'civil action' for 'anyinjury.' " Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 317 (McMorrow, J., dissenting,joined by Harrison, C.J., and Kilbride, J.).

The rationale adopted by the majority in Ferguson is dispositiveof the case at bar. Regardless of whether section 13-214(a) is morespecific than section 8-101 or whether section 13-214(a) was enactedmore recently than section 8-101, it is the legislature's intent that isof foremost importance. Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 111; Hernon, 149 Ill.2d at 194; Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232. In Ferguson, this courtreached agreement as to the legislature's intent with regard to section8-101. According to Ferguson, "the legislature intended that section8-101 of the Act apply 'broadly to any possible claim against a localgovernmental entity and its employees.' " (Emphases added.)Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 312, quoting Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 199(Heiple, J., specially concurring). Given the breadth of this intent, weconclude, in keeping with Ferguson, that the comprehensiveprotection afforded by section 8-101 necessarily controls over otherstatutes of limitation or repose. Under the plain language of section8-101, "[n]o civil action may be commenced in any court against alocal entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it iscommenced within one year from the date that the injury was receivedor the cause of action accrued." 745 ILCS 10/8-101 (West 1998). Inthe case at bar, the one-year limitation period in section 8-101 of theTort Immunity Act controls over the four-year limitation period insection 13-214(a) of the Code, and applies to plaintiff's claim againstthe District. Accordingly, count I of plaintiff's amended complaint istime-barred.

CONCLUSION

The appellate court erred in reversing the circuit court's dismissalof count I of plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to section 8-101of the Tort Immunity Act. We reverse the judgment of the appellatecourt and affirm the judgment of the circuit court dismissing count Iof plaintiff's amended complaint.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting:

The rationale upon which the majority relies-that section 8-101applies "broadly to any possible claim against a local governmentalentity and its employees" and that "the comprehensive protectionafforded by section 8-101 necessarily controls over other statutes oflimitations"-was previously tempered by its context in Tosado and oursubsequent decision in Ferguson. Today's decision unjustifiablyexpands this rationale into a universal statement applicable to everyclaim against a local government or its employee. As such, thisopinion holds that the legislature lacks authority to create exceptionsto their own pronouncements. Because the majority departs fromwell-worn paths of statutory construction by failing to give effect tothe "body politic" language of section 13-214 of the Code (735 ILCS5/13-214(a) (West 2002)), I dissent.

We described these well-worn paths in Ferguson v. McKenzie,202 Ill. 2d 304 (2001). While a determination of legislative intentremains the primary inquiry, "[w]here there is an alleged conflictbetween two statutes, a court has a duty to interpret those statutes ina manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to bothstatutes, where such an interpretation is reasonably possible."Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 311-12, citing McNamee v. FederatedEquipment & Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d 415 (1998) (and cases citedtherein); People ex rel. Moore v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.Co., 414 Ill. 419 (1953). In this context, we then noted, "thelegislature intended that section 8-101 of the Act apply 'broadly toany possible claim against a local governmental entity and itsemployees.' " Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 312, quoting Tosado, 188 Ill.2d at 199 (Heiple, J., specially concurring); 188 Ill. 2d at 198(Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). In the penultimate sentence ofthe opinion, we carefully reiterated, " '[w]hen two legislative schemesdo not seem completely compatible, they should be interpreted so thatmeaning and effect is given to each statute.' " Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2dat 314, quoting Stephens v. Cozadd, 159 Ill. App. 3d 452, 456 (1987).

With these principles in mind, we restricted the repose period ofsection 13-212(b) of the Code to exclude governmental defendantsonce a minor attained 18 years of age. Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 313.Such an interpretation did not render section 13-212(b)'s reposeperiod superfluous. Rather, it restricted the meaning of the phrase"any physician" in section 13-212(b) to give effect to section 8-101of the Act.

But it is not true we decided that the Tort Immunity Actautomatically trumped the Code. The Ferguson majority restricted theTort Immunity Act by allowing an exception to the one-year provisionof section 8-101. We stated,

"a party must comply with both section 13-212(b) of theCode and section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act.

In this case, [the minor], by operation of section13-212(b) of the Code, was afforded an additional sevenmonths, until she reached 18 years of age, before the one-year limitations period of section 8-101 of the Tort ImmunityAct began to run." (Emphasis in original.) Ferguson, 202 Ill.2d at 313.

We therefore restricted the meaning of the phrase "any action" insection 8-101 to give effect to section 13-212(b). Therefore, thecontrary provision of section 13-212(b) trumped section 8-101 beforethe minor reached 18. Thus, there remained factual situations in whichboth statutes could be given effect.

Nor is it true that Ferguson concluded that "the comprehensiveprotection afforded by section 8-101 necessarily controls over otherstatutes of limitation or repose." Slip op. at 9. This statement wascontained solely in Justice Heiple's special concurrence in Tosado(Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 199-200 (Heiple, J., specially concurring)), butwas not repeated in Ferguson. Additionally, it is an overstatement ofJustice Heiple's rationale in Tosado. Justice Heiple's reasoning in hisspecial concurrence in Tosado provided,

"By its very nature then, section 8-101 was designed to applybroadly to any possible claim against a local governmentalentity and its employees. This type of comprehensiveprotection necessarily controls over other statutes oflimitations. Nothing suggests the legislature intended toabandon this scheme with respect to medical malpracticeactions." (Emphasis added.) Tosado, 188 Ill. 2d at 199-200(Heiple, J., specially concurring).

In Tosado and Ferguson there was no express statutory term to benullified. Here, in contrast, the presence of the "body politic" term insection 13-214 suggests the legislature intended to limit the Act withrespect to construction actions.

Moreover, the Tort Immunity Act itself does not evince acategorical legislative intent that section 8-101 necessarily controlsover other express statutes of limitations. Section 2-101 of the Actexcludes certain claims from the Act. 745 ILCS 10/2-101 (West2002). These exceptions include actions for relief other than damages,actions based on contract, and actions based on the Worker'sCompensation Act. 745 ILCS 10/2-101 (West 2002). The legislatureintended for the statutes of limitation for claims listed in theenumerated exceptions of section 2-101 to remain intact. Forexample, we held in Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove,209 Ill. 2d 248 (2004), that the legislature did not intend that section8-101 bar plaintiff's claim for relief other than damages. Therefore,we implicitly restricted section 8-101's use of the term "any action"to give effect to the enumerated exceptions in section 2-101.Accordingly, this court could not have applied the conclusion that "thecomprehensive protection afforded by section 8-101 necessarilycontrols over other statutes of limitations or repose" while alsoallowing plaintiff's claim to survive.

Today's decision departs from Ferguson by determining the Actto be so broad that it wholly nullifies contrary statutory language. Thefirst sentence of Code section 13-214 defines "person" as "anyindividual, any business or legal entity, or any body politic."(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/13-214 (West 1998). The nextsentence provides:

"(a) Actions based upon tort, contract or otherwise againstany person for an act or omission of such person in thedesign, planning, supervision, observation or management ofconstruction, or construction of an improvement to realproperty shall be commenced within 4 years from the timethe person bringing the action, or his or her privity, know orreasonably should have known of such act or omission."(Emphases added.) 735 ILCS 5/13-214(a) (West 1998).

The majority's interpretation violates the court's duty to giveeffect to both statutes by nullifying the "body politic" language foractions sounding in tort. The "body politic" language is superfluousbecause there remain no factual situations where it may be giveneffect. Furthermore, this interpretation violates this court's decisionin Jahn, which observed that where two statutes are in direct conflict,"the more recent enactment generally will prevail as the laterexpression of legislative intent" (Jahn, 163 Ill. 2d at 282) becausesection 13-214 of the Code was enacted after section 8-101 of theAct. See also Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 317-18 (McMorrow, J.,dissenting, joined by Harrison, C.J., and Kilbride, J.). Apparently, themajority today abandons judicial restraint by declaring that thelegislature did not mean what the plain language of the statuteimports.

The majority opinion also inflicts significant harm to otherstatutory provisions beyond the present matter. The majorityconceivably abrogates every specific statute of limitations "applyingbroadly to any possible claim" against a local governmental entity orits employee despite contrary statutory provisions. I see little reasonwhy the majority's sweeping conclusion that "the comprehensiveprotection afforded by section 8-101 necessarily controls over otherstatutes of limitations or repose" would not overrun the remainingprovisions of section 13-204(a) applying to actions for "contract orotherwise" against a local governmental entity. 735 ILCS 5/13-214(a)(West 2002). Furthermore, this categorical holding could even extendthe time for filing "any possible claim" against a local government oremployee where express language is to be nullified. For example, thetime for filing a claim for administrative review would be extendedfrom 35 days (735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 2002)) to one year; the timefor filing an open meetings claim would be extended from 60 days (5ILCS 120/3 (West 2002)) to one year. I do not mention theseexamples to forecast future holdings of this court based on today'sdecision, but rather to demonstrate the absurdity of reading Fergusonin light of only two sentences derived from Justice Heiple's specialconcurrence in Tosado.

Thus, the majority's holding is a sharp departure from Fergusonand traditional modes of statutory construction. Here, I would followestablished authority to restrict the meaning of "any action" in section8-101 of the Act in this factual situation and give effect to the "bodypolitic" phrase of section 13-214 of the Code. Because it isreasonably possible to give effect to both section 8-101 and section13-214, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

JUSTICES KILBRIDE and RARICK join in this dissent.