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Docket Nos. 86118, 86192 cons.-Agenda 17-May 1999.

DELORES McCLURE, Indiv. and as Special Adm'r of the Estate of Robert McClure, Deceased, et al., Appellees, v.OWENS CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed October 21, 1999.

JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

This case involves three actions by three different plaintiffs, Lois Bicknell (Bicknell), Vernadine Thacker (Thacker), andDelores McClure (McClure), against defendant Owens Corning Fiberglas Corporation (Owens Corning). McClure alsonamed Owens-Illinois, Inc. (Owens-Illinois), as a defendant in her suit. All three plaintiffs' complaints were based oninjuries allegedly resulting from their husbands' exposure to asbestos while employed by the Union Asbestos and RubberCompany (Unarco) at its Bloomington, Illinois, plant. Neither Unarco nor Johns-Manville Corporation (Johns-Manville), asupplier of asbestos used in the Bloomington plant, is named as a defendant in plaintiffs' complaints. In addition, plaintiffsalleged no exposure to Owens Corning or Owens-Illinois products and no employment relationship between defendants andtheir husbands. Nevertheless, plaintiffs claimed that defendants were responsible for the injuries alleged in their complaintsbecause defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy with Unarco, Johns-Manville, and other companies to suppressinformation concerning the harmful health effects of asbestos exposure and to falsely represent that it was safe for people towork in close proximity to asbestos-containing materials.

At plaintiffs' request, these three cases were consolidated for trial before the circuit court of McLean County. After trial, thejury returned verdicts in favor of Bicknell and Thacker against Owens Corning. The jury also found in favor of McClureagainst both Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois. The appellate court affirmed the judgments entered on these verdicts. 298Ill. App. 3d 591. Owens-Illinois then filed a petition for leave to appeal the judgment in the McClure case, and OwensCorning filed a petition for leave to appeal the judgments in all three cases. This court granted defendants' petitions (177 Ill.2d R. 315) and allowed plaintiffs' motion to consolidate defendants' appeals. In addition, we have permitted amicus curiaebriefs to be filed by the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel, the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., and theIllinois Manufacturers' Association. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. We reverse on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to showthat either defendant engaged in the alleged civil conspiracy with Unarco or Johns-Manville.

BACKGROUND

In her complaint against Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois,⁽¹⁾ Delores McClure, individually and as specialadministrator of the estate of Robert McClure, alleged that her husband, Robert McClure, worked in Unarco's Bloomingtonplant during the period 1959-61. She asserted that, while her husband worked at the Bloomington plant, he was exposed toasbestos, including asbestos that Johns-Manville supplied to Unarco. According to McClure, as a result of this exposure, herhusband contracted asbestosis and lung cancer, which caused his death.

McClure asserted that defendants, Unarco, and Johns-Manville knew of the health hazards associated with asbestosexposure and had a duty to warn their employees of these hazards and to provide a safe workplace. She further alleged thatdefendants conspired with Unarco, Johns-Manville, and other companies to "positively assert in a manner not warranted bythe information possessed by the conspirators, that *** it was safe for people to work with and in close proximity toasbestos and asbestos containing materials" and to "suppress information about the harmful effects of asbestos *** causingasbestos workers to be and to remain ignorant of that information." In furtherance of this alleged conspiracy, theconspirators, inter alia, sold asbestos without warning of its adverse health effects, refused to warn their own employeesand Robert McClure about these hazards, and altered and suppressed published reports concerning these hazards. Accordingto McClure, these acts were proximate causes of Robert McClure's injuries and death.

Lois Bicknell's complaint against Owens Corning (Owens-Illinois was a defendant only in McClure's complaint)⁽²⁾contained essentially the same conspiracy allegations stated by McClure. Bicknell alleged that, like Robert McClure, herhusband, Hugh Bicknell, worked in Unarco's Bloomington plant, although his period of employment was 1954 to 1955.According to Bicknell, as a result of her husband's exposure to asbestos while working in the plant, he developedpulmonary fibrosis and lung cancer, which resulted in his death. Also like McClure, Bicknell alleged that her husband'sinjuries and death were proximately caused by the acts taken in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.

Vernadine Thacker's complaint against Owens Corning⁽³⁾ also contained the same allegations of conspiracy asMcClure's complaint. Unlike McClure's and Bicknell's complaints, however, Thacker's complaint was based on her ownexposure to asbestos. Thacker alleged that her husband, Charles Thacker, was employed at Unarco's Bloomington plantbetween 1952 and 1965. Thacker asserted that she was exposed to asbestos fibers carried home from the plant on herhusband's person and clothing. According to Thacker, as a result of her exposure to these fibers, she developed pulmonaryfibrosis and lung cancer. Thacker claimed that the acts taken in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy were a proximatecause of her injuries.

Prior to trial, the circuit court granted plaintiffs' motions to consolidate these three cases. It denied Owens-Illinois' motionrequesting that it be tried separately from Owens Corning, although when evidence was admitted against only one of theseparties during trial, the circuit court gave the jury a limiting instruction.

The trial was divided into two phases. All issues except for punitive damages were determined at the first phase. Defendantsargue that the verdicts against them at the first phase must be overturned because there was insufficient evidence to supportplaintiffs' conspiracy claims and because certain trial errors require reversal. We agree with defendants that the verdictsfinding them liable for conspiracy cannot stand because the evidence does not permit a conclusion that they agreed withUnarco or Johns-Manville to conceal the health hazards of asbestos from employees. The following is a description of theevidence relevant to our disposition.

I. Medical and Scientific Literature

As circumstantial evidence of defendants' alleged knowledge of the health hazards of asbestos, plaintiffs presentedevidence of the information about these hazards contained in medical and scientific publications during the relevant timeperiods. Prior to 1930, there were approximately 12 case reports linking asbestos and disease in Britain, the United States,and Europe. In 1930, the first epidemiological study relating asbestos exposure to disease was published. This study, whichwas published in Britain and the United States, showed that approximately 25% of the asbestos industry workers studiedhad lung scarring and that the scarring was more severe in individuals who worked in dustier areas and had been exposed toasbestos for longer amounts of time. To prevent such lung damage, the author recommended dust control, respiratoryprotection, periodic health examinations of the workers, and education of workers concerning the risks of asbestos.

In 1938, a bulletin issued by the United States Public Health Service reported the results of a study on asbestos textilemanufacturing employees. The study connected asbestosis, which is irreversible lung scarring caused by asbestos fibers, toexposure to asbestos dust in concentrations greater than five million particles per cubic foot. The bulletin contained arecommendation that dust levels be kept below this threshold in order to prevent asbestosis.

In the 1940s and 1950s, the five million particles per cubic foot threshold limit value for asbestos was adopted by theAmerican Conference of Governmental and Industrial Hygienists and by many states, including Ohio and New Jersey. Inthe 1950s, however, the five million particles per cubic foot asbestos dust limit was criticized in the medical and scientificliterature because it was designed only to prevent asbestosis and did not account for the cancer risk associated with asbestosexposure. Nevertheless, the threshold limit value for asbestos remained the same until 1969, when it was lowered.

Beginning in the 1930s, case reports linking asbestos to lung cancer were published in the medical and scientific literature.In 1955, an epidemiological study involving asbestos and lung cancer was published in the British Journal of IndustrialMedicine. This study found that asbestos manufacturing workers with asbestosis had 10 times the rate of lung cancer as thegeneral population. In 1960, an epidemiological study linking asbestos exposure to mesothelioma, a cancer of themembrane surrounding the lungs, was published in the British Journal of Industrial Medicine.

In the 1960s, Dr. Irving Selikoff began a large scale epidemiological study of asbestos and disease. Selikoff became one ofthe leading authorities on asbestos and disease. Throughout the 1960s , 1970s, and 1980s, Selikoff published the results ofan ongoing health survey of members of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos WorkersUnion. In a 1964 article published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, Selikoff stated that, although manyresearchers had questioned the link between lung cancer and asbestosis, the results of his study proved that there was aconnection. He found that asbestos exposure put insulation workers at greater risk for diseases such as asbestosis, lungcancer, and mesothelioma. These diseases were most apparent in workers with more than 20 years since the date of theirfirst exposure.

II. Efforts by Asbestos Product Manufacturers Other Than Owens Corning and Owens-Illinois to Suppress InformationConcerning the Health Hazards of Asbestos

As other circumstantial evidence of defendants' involvement in the alleged conspiracy, plaintiffs presented evidenceintended to demonstrate that defendants' actions paralleled those of the other alleged conspirators. Plaintiffs' theory at trialwas that parallel conduct by the alleged conspirators demonstrated an agreement among them to suppress and misrepresentthe health hazards of asbestos. The majority of the evidence at trial related to similarities and differences in the activities ofthe alleged conspirators.

For example, plaintiffs presented evidence that, at the same time that information about the health hazards associated withasbestos exposure was appearing in medical and scientific publications, asbestos product manufacturers other thandefendants were causing published reports of such information to be suppressed or altered. There was no evidence thatdefendants participated in these particular activities. Instead, evidence of the actions of these other companies was part ofplaintiffs' evidence of alleged parallel conduct.

A. The Lanza Study

There was evidence that attorneys for Johns-Manville and Raybestos-Manhattan, another asbestos product manufacturer,edited an article published in 1935 by Dr. Anthony Lanza, a physician employed by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.Prior to publishing this article, which discussed the results of a study of workers at plants where asbestos-containingproducts were manufactured, Lanza permitted these attorneys to review the article and incorporated the changes theysuggested. These were changes that were favorable to the asbestos-containing products industry or consistent with its legalpositions. According to plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Barry Castleman, the substance of these changes was inconsistent withinformation contained in medical and governmental literature at the time.

B. Asbestos Magazine

Plaintiffs also presented evidence that, around the same time, Raybestos-Manhattan and Johns-Manville prevented thepublication of information concerning the health hazards of asbestos in Asbestos magazine, a monthly trade publication. InSeptember 1935, the editor of Asbestos magazine wrote Sumner Simpson, the president of Raybestos-Manhattan, to askwhether Simpson had any objections to the magazine publishing information about asbestosis and efforts to control it. Theeditor observed: "Always you have requested that for certain obvious reasons we publish nothing, and, naturally yourwishes have been respected." Simpson consulted with Vandiver Brown, an attorney for Johns-Manville, about the editor'srequest, and the two men agreed that it would be better if nothing were said about asbestosis.

C. Results of the Saranac Laboratory Research

Similarly, plaintiffs presented evidence that, due to the actions of certain asbestos product manufacturers other thandefendants, information concerning the health hazards of asbestos exposure was omitted from a 1951 article discussing theresults of a study conducted by the Saranac Laboratory. In 1936, a group of asbestos product manufacturers agreed tosponsor research on the health effects of asbestos dust. Members of this group included Johns-Manville and Unarco but notdefendants. In their agreement with Saranac, the sponsoring companies required that the results of the research remain theirproperty, that they maintain control over the disclosure of the results, and that any manuscript discussing the results besubmitted to them for approval prior to publication.

Consistent with this agreement, Saranac submitted a manuscript to the sponsoring companies. At a meeting, thesecompanies agreed that certain changes should be made to the manuscript, and Saranac incorporated these changes. Forexample, at the request of the sponsoring companies, references to cancer and tumors were removed from the manuscriptbefore publication. The published article nevertheless stated that it is a "complete survey" of the research and did notacknowledge the input of the sponsoring companies.

III. Unarco's and Johns-Manville's Plant Operations

Additional evidence relating to plaintiffs' parallel-conduct theory included testimony that Unarco and Johns-Manville failedto warn their employees of the health hazards of asbestos exposure and failed to protect their employees from these hazards.Employees who worked in Unarco's Bloomington plant during the fifties and sixties testified that Unarco never told themor other employees that breathing asbestos dust posed any health risks. These employees also described conditions in theBloomington plant before Owens Corning purchased it from Unarco in 1970. According to these employees, the plant usedraw asbestos supplied by Johns-Manville to make insulation and other products. Dust from the plant operations wasreleased into the air of the plant. The dust in the air was visible and covered surfaces in the plant. Ron Thacker, plaintiffVernadine Thacker's son, testified that he worked with his father in the plant and, when they left the plant, there was duston their clothing and hair.

These employees further testified that Bloomington plant employees were not required to wear respirators. One employeestated that he had a respirator, but employees did not use them frequently because they had difficulty obtaining filters forthe respirators, and the filters needed to be changed every day. There was some dust-collection equipment in the plant, but itdid not collect all of the dust because there was always dust in the air. Unarco had no ventilation equipment and noindustrial hygienist. Unarco also did not require employees to get annual chest X rays. According to the industrial hygienesurvey Owens Corning conducted during the summer after it purchased the Unarco plant, atmospheric conditions in theBloomington plant were "unbelievably bad," and exposures to asbestos were "excessive."

A Johns-Manville employee testified that, during the period 1946 to 1961, Johns-Manville did not give its employeeswarnings about the health hazards of asbestos. Johns-Manville did require employees to undergo periodic physicalexaminations, which included a chest X ray. These X rays were read, however, by Johns-Manville's own doctors andtreated as the property of the company. It was Johns-Manville's policy not to inform an employee that his X ray showedasbestosis or another lung disease unless the disease became disabling. This policy did not change until the early 1970s.

IV. Evidence of Owens-Illinois' Activities

In an attempt to connect Owens-Illinois and Owens Corning to Unarco and Johns-Manville, plaintiffs presented evidenceintended to show that defendants' actions with respect to their own production and distribution of asbestos-containingproducts were similar to Unarco's and Johns-Manville's. The evidence relating to defendants focused on their manufactureof "Kaylo," a high-temperature hydrous calcium silicate insulation.

In 1948, Owens-Illinois began commercial production and distribution of Kaylo. Kaylo included 15% to 22% asbestos. In1953, Owens-Illinois and Owens Corning entered into an agreement under which Owens-Illinois continued to manufactureKaylo, but Owens Corning assumed the responsibility for distribution. In 1958, Owens-Illinois sold the Kaylo division toOwens Corning. Owens Corning also purchased plants where Owens-Illinois had manufactured Kaylo, including its plant inBerlin, New Jersey. Although Owens Corning manufactured other asbestos-containing products, Kaylo was the onlyasbestos-containing product manufactured by Owens-Illinois. Beginning in the late sixties, Owens Corning performedresearch to find a substitute for the asbestos in Kaylo. A substitute was found in 1972, after which Owens Corning also didnot manufacture asbestos-containing Kaylo.

A. Knowledge and Communication of Health Hazards

With respect to Owens-Illinois' knowledge of the health hazards associated with exposure to Kaylo, there was evidencethat, in 1943, Owens-Illinois hired Saranac Laboratory to determine whether Kaylo presented an air hazard when mixed,sawed, or applied. In its initial correspondence with Owens-Illinois, Saranac expressed the desire to publish any results ofthis research, but stated that "nothing [would] be published without [Owens-Illinois'] authorization."

In 1946, Saranac reported to Owens-Illinois that, with respect to the Kaylo experiments, "no serious results [had] developed***. The dust alone [was] not causing anything suggestive of either silicosis or asbestosis." According to the preliminaryreport Saranac provided in 1947, Kaylo dust was biologically inactive, did not cause silicosis or asbestosis, and wouldprobably be harmless if inhaled in moderate amounts by humans over a long period of time. Just one year later, however, inNovember 1948, Saranac informed Owens-Illinois that further research had revealed that Kaylo dust did in fact causeasbestosis. Saranac reported: "Kaylo *** is capable of producing asbestosis and should be handled as a hazardous industrialdust."

Saranac submitted the final report on the Kaylo research to Owens-Illinois in February 1952. According to this final report,Kaylo was capable of causing a "peribronchiolar fibrosis typical of asbestosis," as a result of which, "every precautionshould be taken to protect workers against inhaling the dust." Saranac indicated that it hoped to publish the results of theKaylo research but that it would omit references to Kaylo and Owens-Illinois from any publication to protect the interests ofthe company. In addition, Saranac told Owens-Illinois that it would submit a manuscript to Owens-Illinois prior topublication and would welcome comments by Owens-Illinois.

Subsequent correspondence, however, indicates that, because of management changes at Saranac, Owens-Illinois was nevergiven the opportunity to review the article discussing the results of the Saranac research before this article was published.The article contained no references to Kaylo or Owens-Illinois.

In an effort to show that Owens-Illinois failed to share the information it had about the health hazards of Kaylo with itsemployees or consumers, plaintiffs presented evidence that Owens-Illinois failed to place warning labels on Kaylo duringthe time it manufactured this product. Plaintiffs also showed that, in 1952, Owens-Illinois issued an advertising brochure inwhich it represented that Kaylo was nontoxic. There was conflicting evidence at trial as to the meaning of "toxic" and theapplicability of this term to asbestos.

In addition, plaintiffs presented the testimony of Jerry Helser, who had worked for Owens Corning since 1961. Helsertestified that, during the first few years of his employment at Owens Corning, he worked with individuals who hadpreviously worked for Owens-Illinois at its Berlin plant and other locations. According to Helser, none of these formerOwens-Illinois employees told him that the asbestos used in Kaylo caused lung scarring and cancer or gave him anyindication that Owens-Illinois had informed them of these risks.

Contrary to Helser's testimony, a former Owens-Illinois employee, Richard Grimmie, testified that Owens-Illinoisemployees at the Berlin plant did receive warnings about the health hazards associated with exposure to the asbestos inKaylo dust. Grimmie testified that he began working for Owens-Illinois in 1945. Grimmie stated that, before beginningwork at the Berlin plant, he received a physical examination. At the time of this examination, he was told about asbestosand asbestosis and was informed that respirators were required in certain areas of the plant because of the silica andasbestos content of Kaylo.

Grimmie testified that he informed job applicants about the hazards of asbestos when he worked as personnel manager forOwens-Illinois. He testified that he told applicants that respirators were required in certain areas of the plant and that theplant manufactured a product containing silica, which causes silicosis, and asbestos, which causes asbestosis.

B. Plant Conditions

In addition to evidence of Owens-Illinois' communications concerning the health hazards of exposure to Kaylo dust, therewas evidence relating to the conditions of the plants where Kaylo was manufactured. Grimmie testified that the Berlin plantemployed a very large, powerful, and well-maintained dust collector with inlets near certain dusty plant operations, such asthe saws used to shape the finished Kaylo product. In addition to the dust collector, Owens-Illinois had mechanicalsweepers to vacuum dust from the floors and, before the end of each shift, workers were given time to clean their workareas.

According to Grimmie, Owens-Illinois also had a respirator program, under which employees were required to wearrespirators in areas where dust could not be controlled. The plant nurse administered the program. Respirators with cleanfilters were given to workers by their supervisors at the beginning of each shift. At the end of the shift, the respirators werereturned to the nurse, who would clean the filters. Workers often refused to wear their respirators and were disciplined forthese refusals. Grimmie testified that Owens-Illinois also employed an industrial hygienist, Willis Hazard, who wouldfrequently take dust samples throughout the plants.

Grimmie further testified that Owens-Illinois required every Owens-Illinois employee at the Berlin plant to have apreemployment X ray and annual X rays thereafter. Grimmie was aware of no asbestos-related disease showing on anyemployee's X ray during the time Owens-Illinois owned the Berlin plant. Grimmie was also unaware of any asbestos-related workers' compensation claim made during this time.

In addition to Grimmie's testimony, there was evidence of an industrial hygiene survey taken at the Berlin plant a few daysbefore and a few days after ownership of the Berlin plant was transferred from Owens-Illinois to Owens Corning in 1958.Consistent with Grimmie's testimony, the report noted that employees working at certain operations were wearingrespirators and that exhaust systems were available at certain locations. Nevertheless, the report stated that several airsamples exceeded or closely approached acceptable limits for asbestos dust. One sample taken near a saw showed 91.8million particles per cubic foot of air. The report also suggested improvements to the plant's exhaust systems and respiratorprogram.

V. Evidence of Owens Corning's Activities

Extensive evidence of Owens Corning's activities with respect to its own products and own employees was presented.Again, this evidence was intended to support plaintiffs' theory that similarities in the activities of Owens Corning and theother alleged conspirators demonstrated the alleged conspiracy.

A. Knowledge and Communication of Health Hazards

To show that, like the other alleged conspirators, Owens Corning was aware of the health hazards of asbestos and failed tocommunicate information about these hazards to its employees, plaintiffs relied on a 1942 internal memorandum. Thismemorandum indicated that Owens Corning planned to gather medical and scientific literature concerning asbestosis anduse this information as a "weapon-in-reserve" during negotiations with the Asbestos Workers Union. The memorandumproposed that the information on asbestosis be disclosed to union locals only if the union leadership rejected the company'soffer. Other evidence showed that, in 1956, Owens Corning received information from Saranac Laboratory that asbestoshad been "fairly well incriminated as a carcinogen."

Plaintiffs presented other evidence intended to show that Owens Corning made efforts to conceal the information it hadabout the health risks related to asbestos. For example, according to a sales brochure published by Owens Corning in 1956,Kaylo was "[n]on-irritating to the skin and non-toxic." In 1966, Owens Corning placed a label on Kaylo cartons concerningits asbestos content, but the label did not identify specific health hazards. The label provided: "This product containsasbestos fiber. If dust is created when this product is handled, avoid breathing the dust. If adequate ventilation control is notpossible, wear respirator approved by U.S. Bureau of Mines." In 1970, Owens Corning changed the label on cartons ofKaylo. The new label read: "Caution-Product contains asbestos fiber. Inhalation of dust in excessive quantities over longperiods of time may be harmful. Avoid breathing dust. If adequate ventilation is not possible wear respirators approved bythe U.S. Bureau of Mines for pneumoconiosis producing dust."

In addition to this evidence, plaintiffs relied on numerous internal Owens Corning memoranda as evidence that OwensCorning endeavored to conceal the health risks of asbestos. A 1966 internal memorandum contained a reminder regardingOwens Corning's "long-standing" policy that inquiries and complaints concerning the health hazards of Owens Corningproducts should be referred to certain corporate officers or the company's legal department. A 1967 internal memorandumindicated that an Owens Corning employee had questioned plans to expand Kaylo manufacturing given that "theGovernment will probably blow the whistle relative to the use of asbestos in the not too distant future."

In a 1968 internal memorandum, the author recognized the association between asbestos exposure and asbestosis, lungcancer, and mesothelioma, but observed that Owens Corning's position had been to indicate that "all medical research todate indicates no hazard to health." Another internal memorandum from that same year concerned the company'sparticipation in the Insulation Industry Hygiene Council. According to this memorandum, "much care and considerationwent into developing the proposed draft for the constitution by-laws of this organization *** [in order to] limit the influenceof Dr. Selikoff." Selikoff was an authority on asbestos and disease who had worked to publicize and protect workers fromthe health hazards of asbestos. Similarly, internal correspondence from 1970 indicates that Owens Corning was reluctant toparticipate in an industrial hygiene course organized by Selikoff. Owens Corning believed it would be unwise to attend thecourse because, inter alia, it would give "tacit approval to Selikoff."

The evidence presented at trial indicates that Owens Corning first began notifying employees of the health hazardsassociated with asbestos exposure in the 1970s. Some employees received this information in the early seventies. Forexample, internal Owens Corning memoranda show that, at meetings in 1971, Berlin employees were informed by theirplant manager about the adverse health effects of asbestos exposure. In addition, an employee in the Bloomington planttestified that she first learned of these health risks when Owens Corning sent her and certain other employees to a meetingat Illinois State University in 1971.

The evidence showed that Owens Corning did not inform other employees of these health hazards until 1978. In April ofthat year, United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Joseph Califano issued a "broadlypublicized statement bringing attention to the possible increased risk of death from an asbestos related disease many yearsafter exposure had terminated." Califano suggested that exposed workers should stop smoking cigarettes and receive aphysical examination from a physician. Around the time of the Califano announcement, the Surgeon General issued a"Physicians Advisory" concerning the health effects of asbestos.

Following the Califano announcement, Owens Corning communicated these health hazards to all Bloomington plantemployees. Before that time, "no formal education programs regarding asbestos hazards" had occurred at the Bloomingtonplant. After the Califano announcement, Owens Corning also notified former Bloomington plant employees of the diseasesthat could be caused by asbestos exposure.

There was also testimony, however, that not all Owens Corning employees received information from their employer aboutthe health risks related to asbestos. According to Jerry Helser, Owens Corning never informed him of these risks. Helsertestified that Owens Corning never told him that asbestos could cause asbestosis, lung cancer, or mesothelioma. He wasnever informed that Kaylo dust was a hazardous industrial dust or that he should wear a respirator to avoid inhaling Kaylodust because the dust was harmful.

B. Plant Conditions

In addition to this evidence of Owens-Corning's knowledge of and failure to communicate the health hazards of asbestos,the parties presented evidence of conditions at plants where Owens Corning produced asbestos-containing products. In1951, the Saranac Laboratory conducted an industrial hygiene survey at Owens-Illinois' Sayreville, New Jersey, plant, atwhich Kaylo was manufactured. The report concluded that "considerable attention had been given in the plant to the controlof dust." Given that some of the dust samples approached the "maximum allowable limits," however, the reportrecommended certain improvements to the plant's dust control measures.

In 1961, only two of the dust samples taken during an industrial hygiene survey of the Berlin plant exceeded the thresholdlimit value of five million particles per cubic foot. Of these two samples, one only slightly exceeded the limit and, withrespect to the other, "exposure was intermittent." The survey report made no recommendations for improvements.

Helser testified that, when he worked at the Berlin plant in the sixties, the plant had a ventilation and dust-collectionsystem, which had intake vents at all the saws and sanders used to shape the final product. Some dust, however, escaped thesystem. In addition to the dust-collection system, the Berlin plant had a respirator program under which respirators wererequired in certain areas of the plant and a program under which employees received annual physical examinations and Xrays. Throughout his career at Owens Corning, Helser received annual chest X rays.

One Bloomington plant employee testified that, after the sale of the Bloomington plant to Owens Corning in 1970, the plantcontinued to operate. Owens Corning installed dust-collection equipment in the plant, which helped control the dust, but ittook approximately a year for this equipment to be installed. Owens Corning asked employees to wear respirators, but didnot make this a requirement. It also held safety meetings with employees.

According to a 1978 internal Owens Corning memorandum, the Berlin plant was cleaned after asbestos production stoppedthere in 1972, and air samples showed that the concentrations of asbestos there were extremely low. Insulation containingasbestos was produced at the Bloomington plant only 1