M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center

Case Date: 12/31/1969
Court: Supreme Court
Docket No: 90527 Rel

Docket No. 90527-Agenda 28-May 2001.

M.A.K., Appellee, v. RUSH-PRESBYTERIAN-ST.-LUKE'SMEDICAL CENTER, d/b/a Rush Behavioral Health
Center-Du Page, Appellant.

Opinion filed December 20, 2001.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, M.A.K., filed a complaint in the circuit court of WillCounty against defendants, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's MedicalCenter (Rush) and Royal Maccabees Life Insurance Company(Royal), alleging that Rush had improperly released certainmedical records to Royal, pursuant to a written consent signed byplaintiff. The circuit court granted judgment on the pleadings toRush. Thereafter, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his action as toRoyal and appealed the circuit court's order. The appellate courtreversed and remanded (316 Ill. App. 3d 156). We granted Rush'spetition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and we nowreverse the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

In count I of his second amended complaint, plaintiff allegedthat Rush had breached the physician-patient relationship byreleasing his records without first advising plaintiff of its intentionto do so and obtaining his approval. In count II, for invasion ofprivacy, plaintiff alleged that Rush had wrongfully released hismedical records without his prior authorization or consultation.Count III alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The allegations of the complaint show that on January 13,1995, plaintiff was admitted to Rush's Behavioral HealthCenter-Du Page (Behavioral Health Center) for alcoholdependence. He was discharged on March 2, 1995. In October1994, plaintiff had applied to Royal for a disability incomeinsurance policy. Royal issued the policy. While receivingtreatment at Rush, plaintiff contacted his insurance agent aboutfiling a claim for benefits under the policy. After receiving a claimform from Royal, plaintiff notified Royal in February 1995 that hewould not be filing a claim. In April 1995, Rush received fromRoyal a written consent signed by plaintiff, dated October 12,1994, to release plaintiff's medical and nonmedical information toRoyal. The records that Rush released to Royal included plaintiff'srecords of alcohol-dependence treatment. After receivingplaintiff's medical records from Rush, Royal cancelled plaintiff'sdisability policy.

The written consent signed by plaintiff was entitled"AUTHORIZATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT" (hereafterauthorization) and stated in pertinent part as follows:

"I AUTHORIZE any physician, medical practitioner,hospital, clinic, health care facility, [or] other medical ormedically related facility[ ] *** having informationavailable as to diagnosis, treatment and prognosis withrespect to any physical or mental condition and/ortreatment of me *** and any other non-medicalinformation of me *** to give to Royal *** any and allsuch information.

I UNDERSTAND the purpose of this authorization isto allow Royal *** to determine eligibility for life orhealth insurance or a claim for benefits under a life orhealth policy. ***

I UNDERSTAND THAT my *** medical records maybe protected by certain Federal Regulations, especially asthey apply to any drug or alcohol abuse data. I understandthat I *** may revoke this authorization at any time as itpertains to any such drug or alcohol abuse data by writtennotification ***.

* * *

*** I AGREE this Authorization shall be valid for twoand one half years from [October 12, 1994]."

In the circuit court, Rush filed a motion for judgment on thepleadings (735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 1998)), arguing thatplaintiff's executed authorization expressly permitted Rush torelease his medical and nonmedical records to Royal and wastherefore facially valid. Plaintiff argued that the authorization wasnot a valid waiver of his right to confidentiality of his medicalrecords that were not in existence at the time he signed theauthorization and that Rush should have notified plaintiff thatRoyal had submitted a request for his medical records. Plaintiffalso filed a reply to Rush's reply brief in support of its motion forjudgment on the pleadings in which plaintiff included an affidavitof his attorney, who stated that, during a meeting with PaulFeldman, the medical director of the Behavioral Health Center,Feldman admitted that plaintiff's records should not have beenreleased to Royal. On December 11, 1997, the circuit court grantedRush's motion.

The issue addressed by the appellate court was whether theauthorization complied with the requirement of section 2.31(a)(1)of the Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Recordsregulations (hereafter regulation). Confidentiality of Alcohol andDrug Abuse Patient Records, 42 C.F.R.