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Docket No. 90635-Agenda 30-May 2001.

MICHAEL C. LANGENDORF, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF 
URBANA, Appellant.

Opinion filed July 26, 2001.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

Section 7-1-46 of the Illinois Municipal Code (the Code)provides for a one-year statute of limitations for actions that"directly or indirectly" contest an annexation. 65 ILCS 5/7-1-46(West 1998). The plaintiff, Michael C. Langendorf, filed thisdeclaratory judgment action against the defendant, the City ofUrbana (the City), challenging the zoning of two parcels ofproperty that were rezoned by the City pursuant to annexationagreements between the City and the owners of those parcels. Theplaintiff does not challenge the zoning of his own property. Thecircuit court of Champaign County granted the City's motion todismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint, finding that his causeof action was barred because it was filed beyond the limitationsperiod set forth in section 7-1-46 of the Code. The appellate courtreversed. No. 4-99-0449 (unpublished order under Supreme CourtRule 23). We allowed the City's petition for leave to appeal (177Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and now reverse the judgment of the appellatecourt and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff filed his initial complaint on August 14, 1998,more than one year after the annexations and rezoning of theproperties in question. The circuit court dismissed that complaintpursuant to the City's motion filed under section 2-615 of theCode of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)).

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Count Iof the plaintiff's amended complaint concerns the annexation ofa parcel of property known as Stone Creek Commons. The parceladjoins the plaintiff's property on the south side and is owned byClinton T. Atkins. On February 17, 1997, the City approved anagreement with Atkins for the annexation of Stone CreekCommons, which provided that the northern 25 acres-42% of thetract-would be converted from county to city zoning and rezonedas "B-3 General Business District" and that the southern 35acres-58% of the tract-would be rezoned as "R-4 Medium DensityMultiple-Family Residential District." On July 7, 1998, the Citypassed an ordinance implementing the zoning. The plaintiffalleged that the rezoning was inconsistent with 1993 amendmentsto the City's comprehensive plan, which provided that thenorthwest corner of Stone Creek Commons-approximately 12%of the tract-be used for "commercial purposes," while theremaining portion be used for "residential purposes."

Count II of the plaintiff's complaint challenged the zoningwith respect to a tract of land immediately to the north of StoneCreek Commons known as the Meijer Tract. On January 3, 1995,the City entered into a similar annexation agreement with Atkinsand the three other owners of the Meijer Tract. The agreementprovided for rezoning of the entire Meijer Tract to "B-3 GeneralBusiness District." On June 19, 1995, the City passed an ordinancerezoning the property to "B-3 General Business District." Theplaintiff's amended complaint further alleged that the rezoningwas inconsistent with 1993 amendments to the City'scomprehensive plan that designated the western half of the tractfor "commercial purposes" and the eastern half for "residentialpurposes."

Both counts of the amended complaint alleged that (1) therezoning of the properties would materially impair the fair marketvalue of the real estate owned by the plaintiff and others similarlysituated, (2) the application of the zoning ordinance to allow amovie theater and a Meijer superstore would adversely affect theproperty values of the plaintiff and others similarly situated, and(3) the application of the zoning ordinance would be contrary tothe stated goals, objectives and principles of the 1993 amendmentsto the City's comprehensive plan.

The trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss theplaintiff's amended complaint based on the statute of limitationscontained in section 7-1-46 of the Code. That section provides inrelevant part:

"Neither the People of the State of Illinois nor anyperson, firm or corporation, public or private, nor anyassociation of persons shall commence an actioncontesting either directly or indirectly the annexation ofany territory to a municipality unless initiated within oneyear after the date such annexation becomes final ***."(Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/7-1-46 (West 1998).

The trial court found that the plaintiff's amended complaint andthe exhibits attached thereto showed that the zoning provisionscontained in the annexation agreements were an integral part ofthe agreements and were accomplished by the City on July 7,1997. The court noted that while the plaintiff may be challengingostensibly only the City's zoning actions, an attack on the zoningactions is, in reality, an attack on the annexation agreementsthemselves. This is because the zoning actions were an integralpart of the annexation agreements, which the City would fail tofulfill without effecting the rezoning. Therefore, the courtconcluded, the plaintiff's cause of action was governed by the one-year statute of limitations in section 7-1-46 applicable tochallenges mounted against annexation agreements. In reaching itsconclusion, the trial court followed the decisions of the AppellateCourt, Second District, in Echo Lake Concerned CitizensHomeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Village of Lake Zurich, 68 Ill. App. 3d219 (1979), and People ex rel. Foreman v. Village of Round LakePark, 171 Ill. App. 3d 443 (1988), which are directly on point.

On appeal, the appellate court reversed, and declined tofollow the rationale of Echo Lake and Foreman. No. 4-99-0449(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Instead, theappellate court stated that "[a]nnexation and zoning are, in theabstract, distinct concepts." The court further stated that "[e]venwhere the two are undertaken as part of a single integratedagreement, challenge to the one does not necessarily entailchallenge to the other." The appellate court also questionedwhether the legislature could properly enact a period of limitationsfor a constitutionally grounded cause of action such as a zoningchallenge.

ANALYSIS

On appeal to this court, the City argues that the appellate courterred in concluding, in essence, that the plaintiff couldsuccessfully attack the zoning of the annexed properties withoutat least indirectly contesting the annexations. The City contendsthat, in viewing the full statutory scheme in relation to theannexation agreements in this case, it is apparent that the zoningof the parcels cannot be separated from their annexation. Thus, anattack of the zoning is an indirect attack on the annexations, and,therefore, the limitations period set forth in section 7-1-46 appliesto the plaintiff's cause of action.

We agree. In 1963, the legislature amended the Code byadding a statutory scheme authorizing annexation agreements andspecifically providing that a change in zoning of property subjectto an annexation agreement could be a valid and binding part ofsuch an agreement for a limited period. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 24,pars. 11-15.1-1, 11-15.1-2; see also Meegan v. Village of TinleyPark, 52 Ill. 2d 354, 357 (1972) (zoning is a permissible subjectof an annexation agreement and to the extent the legislature limitsthe enforcement of such agreements it is exercising its policepower).

The purpose of a statutory scheme allowing for annexationagreements with enforceable zoning provisions is to ensure thepredictability necessary for orderly growth and development. SeeR. Cope, Annexation Agreements-Boundary Agreements: Walkinga Fine Line into the Future-A Map of the Dangers to the UnwaryLand Use Traveler, 17 N.I.U. L. Rev. 377, 378 (1977). To thatend, the current version of section 11-15.1-1 of the Code providesin relevant part that "the corporate authorities of any municipalitymay enter into an annexation agreement with one or more of theowners of record of land in unincorporated territory" and that the"agreement shall be valid and binding for a period of not to exceed20 years from the date of its execution." 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-1(West 1998). Section 11-15.1-2(b) states that an annexationagreement may provide for "[t]he continuation in effect, oramendment, or continuation in effect as amended, of anyordinance relating to *** zoning *** provided, however, that anypublic hearing required by law to be held before adoption of anyordinance amendment provided in such agreement shall be heldprior to execution of the agreement, and all ordinance amendmentsprovided in such agreement shall be enacted according to law." 65ILCS 5/11-15.1-2(b) (West 1998). Section 11-15.1-2 furtherprovides that after the expiration of the annexation agreement, theprovisions therein related to zoning "shall remain in effect unlessmodified in accordance with law." 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-2 (West1998).

Section 11-15.1-3 of the Code establishes the procedurenecessary to create a valid and binding annexation agreement. Itsets forth significant hurdles to validity, i.e., notice, public hearingand a two-thirds majority vote of the corporate authorities forpassage. 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-3 (West 1998). Section 11-15.1-5 ofthe Code states that any annexation agreement which is executedwith a two-thirds majority vote and contains provisions notinconsistent with section 11-15.1-2 is "valid and enforceable asto such provisions for the effective period of such agreement, orfor 20 years from the date of execution thereof, whichever isshorter." (Emphasis added.) 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-5 (West 1998).

In the present case, the provisions of the annexationagreements make it clear that the rezoning of the properties was anintegral part of and was in fact the essential condition of andconsideration for the agreements. In that regard, the agreementsprovide that upon annexation, the tracts will be converted fromcounty zoning to city zoning as described in exhibits to theagreements, that the zoning will remain in effect for a 20-yearterm, and that the corporate authorities will not rezone theproperties for the life of the agreements. As the statutory schememakes clear, the zoning provisions of an annexation agreement areenforceable for the effective period of the agreement up to 20years. See 65 ILCS 5/11-15.1-5 (West 1998). Under thecircumstances, we do not believe that the plaintiff could challengethe rezoning of the property without at least indirectly contestingthe annexation agreements themselves.

We agree with the rationale expressed by the majority in EchoLake. There, the village entered into an annexation agreement witha property owner to rezone his land from a single-family to amultiple-dwelling district. Four years after the rezoning andannexation became final, an association of nearby property ownersfiled an action against the village, alleging that the defendants hadnot followed the proper procedures in passing the annexation andrezoning ordinances and that the multiple-family zoning of theproperty was unconstitutional. The appellate court considered andrejected the merits of the plaintiff's procedural claim, but foundthat the plaintiff's constitutional challenge to the validity of thezoning ordinance was barred by the one-year limitations period ofsection 7-1-46 of the Code. Echo Lake, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 222-24.The court noted that the plain language of section 7-1-46prohibits the plaintiffs from " 'directly or indirectly' " challengingthe annexation unless the action is commenced within one-yearfrom the date the annexation becomes final. Echo Lake, 68 Ill.App. 3d at 222, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 24, par. 7-1-46.The court pointed out that several parts of the annexationagreement, including the preamble, emphasized that rezoning ofthe property was a prerequisite to annexation. Echo Lake, 68 Ill.App. 3d at 222-23. The court concluded that if the annexationagreement is to be given any legal force, a successful attack on therezoning could lead to a suit by the owners to declare theannexation void. Echo Lake, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 223. Accordingly,the plaintiffs could not successfully attack the rezoning without atleast indirectly contesting the annexation and, therefore, thelimitation of section 7-1-46 was applicable. Echo Lake, 68 Ill.App. 3d at 222-23.

The appellate court in the instant case, however, relied uponthe specially concurring opinion of Justice Seidenfeld in EchoLake. The special concurrence found that the plaintiff's cause ofaction was barred by laches, but disagreed with the majority'sinterpretation of section 7-1-46. Echo Lake, 68 Ill. App. 3d at225-26 (Seidenfeld, J., specially concurring). In finding that anattack on the zoning is not necessarily an attack on the annexation,Justice Seidenfeld stated the following:

"A court in determining the constitutionality of zoning orits procedural aspects need not inquire into the validity ofthe annexation.

*** [I]f a trial court were to find that the challengedzoning was null and void from its inception because ofsome substantial procedural defect, then it appears that thelandowners would have a cause of action against thevillage for breach of contract. [Citation.] The landowners,arguably, could sue for money damages; or, arguably, thelandowners would be entitled to disconnection. [Citation.]The prospect of a law suit by the landowners against thevillage, however, does not give this court warrant toimport a statute of limitations, which deals only withannexation ordinances, into an area of law where it has noapplication." Echo Lake, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 226(Seidenfeld, J., specially concurring).

While we do not find the rationale of the specially concurringopinion in Echo Lake and the appellate court in this case to betotally lacking in merit, we find the reasoning of the majority inEcho Lake to be more persuasive. In interpreting a statute, theprimary rule is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent andmeaning of the legislature evidenced by the language used. Kraft,Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). A statute should beconstrued so that no word or phrase is rendered meaningless orsuperfluous. Kraft, Inc., 138 Ill. 2d at 189. When the terms of astatute are not specifically defined, the words must be given theirpopularly understood meanings construed with reference to thepurposes and objectives of the statute. Niven v. Siqueira, 109 Ill.2d 357, 366 (1985).

The appellate court's and the plaintiff's interpretation of thestatute in this case would render the word "indirectly" meaninglessand would effectively read it out of the statute. It would alsoignore the statutory scheme which has the obvious intent ofshielding the zoning provisions of annexation agreements fromattack after the passage of the one-year limitation period and thenfor the duration of the shorter of the 20-year statutory period or theterm listed in the agreement. In this case, there are no allegationsas to any procedural defects in the City's passage of the annexationand zoning ordinances. The plaintiff does not allege lack of noticeor lack of opportunity to be heard at the required hearings. Nordoes the plaintiff claim that the ordinances were not passed by atwo-thirds vote of the corporate authorities. Instead, the plaintiffnow claims, more than one year after the annexations and rezoningwere accomplished, that the rezoning is inconsistent with theCity's comprehensive plan and diminishes his property values.The limitations period set forth in section 7-1-46 precludes thekind of belated indirect attack on the annexation that the plaintiffmakes at this stage.

The plaintiff argues that application of section 7-1-46 to thiscase would have the effect of creating a statute of limitations fora limited class of zoning actions. He argues that it would beimpermissible for the state to place a limitation on a cause ofaction to enforce a federal constitutional right such as would beinvolved in a zoning challenge.

The plaintiff's argument fails for two reasons. First, theplaintiff's amended complaint does not raise a federalconstitutional claim. He made allegations of a federalconstitutional violation in his original complaint but chose todelete those allegations from his amended complaint. Second,there is no merit to the plaintiff's contention that a statute oflimitations cannot be applied to an action involving theenforcement of a constitutional right. For example, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) specifically provides that onlyclaims involving questions of federal or state constitutional rightsmay be raised in a proceeding under the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(West 1998). Nonetheless, the statute places a three-year statute oflimitations on the filing of such claims. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c)(West 1998); People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1999) (holdingthat section 122-1 of the Act with its "culpable negligence"standard is a statute of limitations). Thus, our courts have applieda statute of limitations of our state to bar federal constitutionalclaims in another context.

A statute of limitations is by definition an arbitrary periodafter which all claims will be cut off. Chase Securities Corp. v.Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 89 L. Ed. 1628, 1635, 65 S. Ct.1137, 1142 (1945). However, the need to encourage claimants toinvestigate and pursue causes of action in order to discouragedelay, in time, outweighs the right to litigate a claim. Golla v.General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353, 369-70 (1995).

Here, the plaintiff does not argue that he filed this lawsuitwithin the one-year statute of limitations. Furthermore, he cites nocase holding that a state statute of limitations cannot be applied toa zoning challenge, or even more generally to a case involving theenforcement of a constitutional right. However, in Horn v. City ofChicago, 403 Ill. 2d 549 (1949), this court considered a plaintiff'scontention that the five-year statute of limitations in section 15 ofthe Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, ch. 83, par. 16) could notbar his state constitutional claim against the city. The plaintiffalleged that the city's construction of a viaduct near the plaintiff'sproperty constituted the taking and damaging of his propertywithout the payment of just compensation and without due processof law. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the statute oflimitations could not be applied because the right of action aroseunder a constitutional provision, this court stated:

"The legislature may, without violating constitutionalguarantees, enact statutes which limit the time withinwhich actions may be brought ***. [Citation.] Even asubstantive right created by a State constitution isgoverned and controlled in its enforcement andadministration by regulatory and procedural legislationenacted by the General Assembly, which legislativeenactments may include a limitation as to the periodwithin which action may be taken to enforce thesubstantive right." Horn, 403 Ill. at 560.

Thus, Horn supports the conclusion that a limitations period maybe applied to a constitutional claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the limitations periodof section 7-1-46 applies to the plaintiff's suit under the facts ofthis case. Because the cause of action was filed beyond the one-year time limit, it was properly dismissed by the circuit court.Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court andaffirm the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.