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Docket No. 92837-Agenda 28-September 2002.

MAURICE LAND et al., Appellees, v. THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed November 21, 2002.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The five plaintiffs are among 138 tenured public schoolteachers whose employment by the Board of Education of the Cityof Chicago (Board) was "honorably terminated" on January 22,1999. Defendants are the Board itself, its individual members, andseveral officers of the Chicago public schools. After they were laidoff from their teaching positions, plaintiffs filed a complaint in thecircuit court of Cook County seeking a writ of mandamus orderingtheir reinstatement, a declaration that the Board's layoff policywas invalid under sections 34-84 and 34-85 of the School Code(105 ILCS 5/34-84, 34-85 (West 1998)), and a permanentinjunction restraining the Board from terminating theiremployment. The parties filed cross-motions for summaryjudgment and the circuit court granted defendants' motion. Theappellate court reversed and remanded. 325 Ill. App. 3d 294. Wegranted leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315)to determine whether the Board may delegate its authority to layoff employees. We reverse that portion of the judgment of theappellate court holding that the Board may not delegate itsauthority to make layoffs (325 Ill. App. 3d at 307), but affirm theorder remanding this matter to the circuit court for further factfinding (325 Ill. App. 3d at 311).

BACKGROUND

Following the enactment of amendments to the School Codein 1995, the Board first adopted and later, in 1997, amended a"Policy Regarding Reassignment and Layoff of RegularlyCertified and Appointed Teachers." Section 1 of the policy permitsreassignment or layoff of teachers, inter alia, "[w]henever anattendance center is closed, there is a drop in enrollment, [or] theeducational focus of the attendance center is changed." Section 2Aof the amended policy applies when such a change requires theremoval of some but not all teachers, as in the present case:

"In Attendance Centers/Programs That Are Not Subjectto Reconstitution. If changes in an attendance center orprogram require the removal of some but not all teachers,teachers with appropriate certifications will be selectedfor retention based on seniority. Provisionals, Day-to-Daysubstitutes, Cadre substitutes, FTBs and Probationaryteachers within the attendance center or program will beremoved before any regularly certified and appointedteachers with the appropriate certification is [sic]removed, in that order. Within each group, system-wideseniority shall be the determining factor."

According to the affidavit of Xiomara C. Metcalfe, director ofChicago public schools bureau of recruitment and substituteservices, department of human resources, each of the five plaintiffs"became subject to reassignment for one of the reasons within thescope of the applicable Board policy" and was "selected forreassignment" based on seniority, as required by the policy.Metcalfe's statements are, for the most part, in the passivevoice-the plaintiffs "were selected," they "were notified," and they"became" reassigned until, eventually, they "were honorablydischarged." She did not explain on what basis plaintiffs becamesubject to reassignment, who determined that layoffs would benecessary as a result of a change in an attendance center orprogram, or who made the selection based on seniority. Accordingto Metcalfe, plaintiff Land's layoff was in accordance with the1995 version of the policy, which provided for laying off areassigned teacher who did not obtain a permanent position within20 months of reassignment. The other four plaintiffs were laid offin accordance with the 1997 amended policy, which provided fora layoff after 10 months if the teacher had not secured a permanentposition.

The record contains copies of a form letter sent to all fiveplaintiffs on January 6, 1999, informing them that they would belaid off and honorably terminated as of January 22, 1999, inaccordance with the policy. These letters were signed by one of thedefendants, Carlos Ponce, the director of the department of humanresources for the Chicago public schools. In addition, the affidavitof plaintiff Land states that he was informed of his impendingtermination by the principal of the school at which he taught.

Plaintiffs' complaint claimed that the layoff policy violatesthose sections of the School Code that permit the removal oftenured teachers only for cause and only after notice and a hearing.See 105 ILCS 5/34-84, 34-85 (West 1998). In effect, theplaintiffs' position was that the 1995 amendments to the SchoolCode did not give the Board the authority to lay off tenuredteachers. Even if the Board is empowered to lay off tenuredteachers, they argued, that power cannot be delegated and, inparticular, the power cannot be delegated to school principals.Because the Board did not expressly decide to terminate each ofthe plaintiffs, they asserted that their terminations were void.Plaintiffs also acknowledged that their removal was"accomplished by" the policy quoted above, but claimed that noneof the triggering events or conditions had occurred and that theirlayoffs were, therefore, unauthorized.

After the circuit court denied the Board's motion to dismiss,plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the basis that each ofthese claims could be decided as a matter of law. The Boardresponded with its own summary judgment motion in which itargued that tenured teachers may be laid off; the policy does notexceed the authority granted to the Board by the legislature; andthe record demonstrated that plaintiffs were laid off in accordancewith the policy. After a hearing, the circuit court denied plaintiffs'motion for summary judgment and granted defendants' motion.

Plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court rejected plaintiffs'argument that teachers are not subject to layoff, holding that thelayoff provision (105 ILCS 5/34-18(31) (West 1998)), and theremoval provision (105 ILCS 5/34-85 (West 1998)), are "entirelyseparate statutory provisions" that can both be given effect withoutconflict. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 304. The appellate court further foundthat the Board had the statutory authority to promulgate a layoffpolicy and that the policy is "clear and unambiguous." 325 Ill.App. 3d at 305. Because plaintiffs failed to present any competentevidence to support their assertion that the Board did not follow itsown policy, the appellate court found this claim waived. 325 Ill.App. 3d at 306.

The appellate court did address plaintiffs' claim that theBoard improperly delegated its layoff authority to individualschool principals. After concluding that the legislature gave theBoard exclusive authority to determine layoffs, and that theauthority may not be delegated at all (325 Ill. App. 3d at 307), theappellate court determined that remand was necessary to resolvea disputed issue of material fact-who made the determination thatthese five plaintiffs would be laid off (325 Ill. App. 3d at 308).

ANALYSIS

In an appeal from the grant of summary judgment, review isde novo. Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution TrustCorp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 390 (1993). The purpose of summaryjudgment is not to try a question of fact, but to determine whetherone exists. Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d511, 517 (1993). Summary judgment is proper where pleadings,depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when viewed in thelight most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveal that there is nogenuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitledto judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West2000).

This case also presents questions of statutory interpretation,which are reviewed de novo. Michigan Avenue National Bank v.County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503 (2000). In interpreting astatute, a court's primary goal is to ascertain the intent of thelegislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). "The bestevidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statuteitself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning." Paris,179 Ill. 2d at 177. When the plain language of the statute is clearand unambiguous, the legislative intent that is discernable fromthis language must prevail, and no resort to other tools of statutoryconstruction is necessary. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177.

The appellate court, in its effort to give effect to all of therelevant sections of the School Code, invoked the doctrine of inpari materia. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 307. Under this doctrine ofconstruction, two legislative acts that address the same subject areconsidered with reference to one another, so that they may begiven harmonious effect. See United Citizens of Chicago &Illinois v. Coalition to Let the People Decide in 1989, 125 Ill. 2d332, 339 (1988). This court has previously held that sections of thesame statute should also be considered in pari materia, and thateach section should be construed with every other part or sectionof the statute to produce a harmonious whole. Sulser v. CountryMutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555 (1992). The doctrineis consistent with our acknowledgment that one of thefundamental principles of statutory construction is to view all ofthe provisions of a statute as a whole. Michigan Avenue NationalBank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504. Words and phrases should not beconstrued in isolation, but interpreted in light of other relevantportions of the statute so that, if possible, no term is renderedsuperfluous or meaningless. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191Ill. 2d at 504; In re Marriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156, 163 (2001).Further, we presume that the legislature, when it enacted thestatute, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice.Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504.

This dispute is governed by article 34 of the School Code,which applies to cities of over 500,000 inhabitants. 105 ILCS5/34-1 et seq. (West 1998). The sections of article 34 that arerelevant to the present case include section 34-8.1, whichdescribes the powers and duties of school principals (105 ILCS5/34-8.1 (West 1998)); section 34-18, which describes the powersof the Board (105 ILCS 5/34-18 (West 1998)); and sections 34-84and 34-85, which govern the appointment and promotion ofteachers and the removal of teachers for cause, respectively (105ILCS 5/34-84, 34-85 (West 1998)).

Section 34-18 is entitled "Powers of the board." Prior to the1995 amendments, this section contained 29 enumerated powersas well as a "catch-all" provision authorizing the Board to exerciseall other powers "requisite or proper for the maintenance and thedevelopment of a public school system, not inconsistent with theother provisions of this Article or provisions of this Code." 105ILCS 5/34-18 (West 1994). Layoffs were not mentioned in thissection, but were addressed in section 34-84, which concerns theappointment and promotion of teachers. 105 ILCS 5/34-84 (West1994). The 1995 amendments deleted the language regardinglayoffs from section 34-84 and added several new enumeratedpowers to section 34-18, including the power, "except asotherwise provided by this Article," to:

"promulgate rules establishing procedures governingthe layoff or reduction in force of employees and therecall of such employees, including, but not be limited to,criteria for such layoffs, reductions in force or recall rightsof such employees and the weight to be given to anyparticular criterion. Such criteria shall take into accountfactors including, but not be limited to, qualifications,certifications, experience, performance ratings orevaluations, and any other factors relating to anemployee's job performance[.]" 105 ILCS 5/34-18(31)(West 1998).

The powers and duties of school principals are set out insection 34-8.1 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34-8.1 (West1998)). The responsibilities of a principal include the duty to"direct, supervise, evaluate, and suspend *** [or] discipline"teachers, but the "right to employ, discharge, and layoff shall bevested solely with the board." The principal, however, "may makerecommendations to the board regarding the employment,discharge, or layoff of any individual." 105 ILCS 5/34-8.1 (West1998).

Section 34-84 governs the appointment and promotion ofteachers. Following completion of a probationary period,"appointments of teachers shall become permanent, subject toremoval for cause in the manner provided by Section 34-85." 105ILCS 5/34-84 (West 1998). Under section 34-85, no permanentteacher shall be removed "except for cause." Written notice ofcharges and specifications and a hearing, with the right of review,are provided for. 105 ILCS 5/34-85 (West 1998).

A. Board's Authority to Lay Off Tenured Teachers 

Before the circuit court and the appellate court, the plaintiffsclaimed that because the Board's layoff power is limited by the"except as otherwise provided" language of section 34-18, andbecause section 34-85 provides "otherwise," their layoffs areentirely unlawful and void. The appellate court formulated theissue as "whether the legislature intended sections 34-84 and34-85 to be exceptions to the layoff provision provided in34-18(31)." 325 Ill. App. 3d at 303.

We agree with the appellate court's conclusion that these twoseparate statutory provisions may both be given effect withoutviolating the plain language of the statute or ignoring legislativeintent. The Board had the power to lay off tenured teachers priorto the 1995 amendments. Indeed, it has long been established thatamong the unenumerated powers of the Board was the authority"to lay off employees in good faith for lack of work or purposes ofeconomy." Perlin v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 86Ill. App. 3d 108, 112 (1980) (citing Kennedy v. City of Joliet, 380Ill. 15 (1942), Thomas v. City of Chicago, 273 Ill. 479 (1916), andFitzsimmons v. O'Neill, 214 Ill. 494 (1905)). Prior to 1995, limitson that power were set out in section 34-84, which permitted theBoard, under certain circumstances, to designate teachers as"reserve teachers" (see 105 ILCS 5/34-1.1 (West 1994)) and tohonorably terminate such teachers from service after 25 months(105 ILCS 5/34-84 (West 1994)). The 1995 amendments did noteliminate or reduce this power. Instead, by deleting the layoffprovision from section 34-84 and adding section 34-18(31), thelegislature gave the Board the authority to formulate andimplement its own rules and procedures regarding layoffs ratherthan binding the Board to a legislatively mandated procedure. We,therefore, affirm that portion of the appellate court judgmentholding that sections 34-84 and 34-85 do not exempt tenuredteachers from layoff.

B. Board's Ability to Delegate the Authority to Make Layoffs

In the circuit court and the appellate court, plaintiffs alsoargued that while section 34-18(31) permits the Board topromulgate a procedure for determining layoffs, it does not permitthe Board to delegate to others the responsibility for implementingthat procedure. Based primarily on the provision that the "right toemploy, discharge, and layoff shall be vested solely with theboard," found in section 34-8.1 (105 ILCS 5/34-8.1 (West 1998)),the appellate court agreed. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 306-08. Before thiscourt, the parties now agree that the Board may not onlypromulgate a procedure for determining layoffs, but may alsodelegate the authority for implementing that procedure.Nevertheless, we may not reverse this portion of the appellatecourt's judgment merely because the parties are in agreement thatthe appellate court erred. We must examine the issue ourselves.

The appellate court based its conclusion that the authority tomake layoffs may not be delegated on "the statute's unequivocallanguage." 325 Ill. App. 3d at 307. In an earlier case, however, adifferent panel of the same appellate district found this languageambiguous. See Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees v.Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 309 Ill. App. 3d 88,100 (1999) (finding section 34-8.1 ambiguous and interpreting itto mean that the Board "may delegate a nonexclusive power, suchas the power to suspend," but may not delegate its "absoluteauthority").

A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two equallyreasonable and conflicting interpretations. People v. Whitney, 188Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1999). Only if the statutory language is ambiguousmay we consider extrinsic aids for construction, such as legislativehistory, to determine legislative intent. In the absence ofambiguity, we must rely on the plain and ordinary meaning of thewords chosen by the legislature. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d at 97-98.Further, where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,a court must give it effect as written, without reading into itexceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did notexpress. Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181,184-85 (1999).

We agree with the appellate court that section 34-8.1 isunambiguous and that resort to extrinsic aids of construction is notappropriate. We do, however, conclude that the appellate courtread more into this provision than its plain language justifies. Ourconclusion necessarily overrules the Chicago School Reformcourt's finding of ambiguity.

The Board argues that section 34-18(31), by empowering theBoard to "promulgate rules establishing procedures governing ***layoff[s]" (105 ILCS 5/34-18(31) (West 1998)), expresses alegislative intent that such rules are "obviously for the use of [theboard's] administrators." In keeping with this reading of section34-18(31), the policy states in its introductory sentence: "TheChief Executive Officer recommends adoption of the followingpolicy for use by the Board and administrators."

To "promulgate" is to "declare or announce publicly; toproclaim," or to "put (a law or decree) into force or effect."Black's Law Dictionary 1231 (7th ed. 1999). There is nothinginherent in the act of promulgating rules or procedures thatsuggests someone other than the one announcing the rules willimplement them. The Board could promulgate rules andprocedures either as a means of instructing its agents or employeesto whom the task will be delegated, or as a means of giving noticeto affected parties of the procedures and criteria that it intends toapply. By enacting this provision authorizing the Board topromulgate rules, the legislature simply did not speak to the matterof delegating authority for layoffs. We conclude that section34-18(31), standing alone, does not reveal either a legislativeintent that the Board may delegate responsibility for carrying outthe layoff policy or the opposite intent.

The appellate court then looked to the language of section34-8.1: "The right to employ, discharge, and layoff shall be vestedsolely with the board." 105 ILCS 5/34-8.1 (West 1998). Relyingon dictionary definitions of the words "vested" and "right," theappellate court concluded that the Board alone is allowed to makelayoffs and, thus, cannot implement a policy delegating thisauthority. These words, however, need not be read so narrowly. Aright is a power or privilege to which one is entitled (325 Ill. App.3d at 307; see also Black's Law Dictionary 1323 (7th ed. 1999)(defining "right" as a "power, privilege, or immunity secured to aperson by law")), but such entitlement does not preclude thedelegation of that power or privilege to another. The appellatecourt also looked to an earlier edition of Black's Law Dictionaryfor the definition of "vested" and found " 'giving the rights ofabsolute ownership.' " 325 Ill. App. 3d at 307, quoting Black'sLaw Dictionary 1563 (6th ed. 1990). Black's, however, defines a"vested right" as a "right that so completely and definitely belongsto a person that it cannot be impaired or taken away without theperson's consent." (Emphasis added.) Black's Law Dictionary1324 (7th ed. 1999). One could not delegate a right or privilege toanother unless one was "vested" with the right in the first place.For example, a stockholder possesses the exclusive right to votehis or her shares, but may delegate that right by granting a proxyto another. A property owner is vested with the right to excludeothers from his property by virtue of ownership in fee simple, butmay delegate that right to another by granting a lease. Giving thewords in this sentence their plain and ordinary meaning, we canconclude only that the Board has the exclusive power to employ,discharge, or lay off employees. Section 34-8.1, however, does notaddress the ability of the Board to delegate any of thisresponsibility, with one exception.

The language at issue ("The right to employ, discharge, andlayoff shall be vested solely with the board") is contained insection 34-8.1, which is the provision that defines the powers andduties of principals. This sentence is immediately followed by:"The principal shall fill positions by appointment as provided inthis Section and may make recommendations to the boardregarding the employment, discharge, or layoff of any individual."105 ILCS 5/34-8.1 (West 1998). Thus, plaintiffs assert, the"vested solely" language is intended to describe the role of aprincipal vis-a-vis the Board. As between the principal and theBoard, the Board has the sole authority to lay off employees; theprincipal's role is entirely advisory.

Reading section 34-8.1 as whole, it is clear that the Board isprohibited from delegating the responsibility for making layoffs toprincipals. The 17 paragraphs of section 34-8.1 not only define thepowers and duties of principals, but also describe in detail therelationship between principals and the Board. For example, theengineer in charge is "[u]nder the direction of and subject to theauthority of" the principal, while the Board "shall" establish asystem of semiannual evaluations by which the principal willevaluate the performance of the engineer in charge. Similarprovisions apply to the principal's supervision of the food servicemanager. Each principal must hold a valid administrativecertificate, but the Board may impose additional qualifications.With regard to layoffs, the Board has the sole right to make them,but the principal "may make recommendations to the board." 105ILCS 5/34-8.1 (West 1996). This section is clear andunambiguous-the determinations of whether layoffs are necessaryand who will be laid off may not be made by principals. The roleof principals is purely advisory.

This reading is consistent with the language of section34-18(31), which authorizes the Board to establish criteria forlayoffs that include, but are not limited to, "qualifications,certifications, experience, performance ratings or evaluations, andany other factors relating to an employee's job performance." 105ILCS 5/34-18(31) (West 1996). The Board chose to rely entirelyon seniority as the basis for determining who would be laid off. Ifit were to adopt a policy under which job performance is aconsideration, the input of the principals would be quite relevant.Under such a policy, however, the principal could onlyrecommend, not decide, who should be laid off.

Our reading of section 34-8.1 is also supported by its title,"Principals." "When the legislature enacts an official title orheading to accompany a statutory provision, that title or headingis considered only as a 'short-hand reference to the general subjectmatter involved' in that statutory section, and 'cannot limit theplain meaning of the text.' " Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191Ill. 2d at 505-06, quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29, 91 L. Ed. 1646,1652, 67 S. Ct. 1387, 1391 (1947). Such official headings or titlesare of use " 'only when they shed light on some ambiguous wordor phrase' " within the text; they " 'cannot undo or limit thatwhich the text makes plain.' " Michigan Avenue National Bank,191 Ill. 2d at 506, quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 331U.S. at 529, 91 L. Ed. at 1652, 67 S. Ct. at 1392.

In this case, we do not find the provision ambiguous so ourconsideration of the title or heading is not for the purpose ofundoing or limiting the text. Rather, we find section 34-8.1 to besilent on the question of the Board's ability to delegate layoffdecisionmaking, other than with respect to principals. The title"Principals" is, however, consistent with our conclusion thatsection 34-8.1 deals with the powers and duties of principals, andthe relationship of principals to the Board, but does not otherwiselimit the powers of the Board provided for in section 34-18.

We conclude that section 34-8.1 is not intended to impose alimitation on the power of the Board to delegate its layoffauthority. If that had been the intent of the legislature, thislanguage would have been moved in 1995 when other languageaffecting layoffs was deleted from section 34-84 and added tosection 34-18. The continued presence of these words in section34-8.1 is a clear indication of legislative intent that this languageis a limit only on the role of principals. Although we agree withplaintiffs that the plain language of section 34-8.1 prohibitsdelegation of the authority to make layoffs to principals, we muststill decide whether the Board may delegate this authority toanyone other than a principal.

The Board offers five separate arguments in support of itsclaim that it may delegate layoff authority. First, when thelegislature intends to prohibit delegation of the Board's authority,it does so expressly, as in section 34-19 of the School Code. See105 ILCS 5/34-19 (West 1998). Second, when the legislatureintends for the Board to take action on a given matter, it makesthat requirement explicit. See 105 ILCS 5/34-18 (West 1998)(various subsections provide that the Board "shall" carry outcertain duties and "may" perform others); 105 ILCS 5/34-85(West 1998) (providing that, after a hearing, the Board "shallmake a decision as to whether the teacher or principal shall bedismissed"). Third, the case law has recognized that delegation ofthe Board's powers is permissible. Fourth, legislative historydemonstrates intent to permit delegation. And fifth, policyconsiderations weigh in favor of permitting delegation. We findthe Board's first argument dispositive and, therefore, need notaddress the remaining arguments.

The Board's first argument is that an entirely separate sectionof the School Code authorizes the delegation of layoff authority.Section 34-19 is entitled "By-laws, rules and regulations; businesstransacted at regular meetings; voting; records" and provides, inpertinent part, that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision in thisArticle or in the School Code, the board may delegate to thegeneral superintendent or to the attorney the authorities granted tothe board in the School Code." 105 ILCS 5/34-19 (West 1998).The delegation provision also requires that "appropriate oversightprocedures" be established, and lists six nondelegable functions,none of which are relevant in this case.

"[C]ourts should not, under the guise of statutoryconstruction, add requirements or impose limitations that areinconsistent with the plain meaning of the enactment." Nottage v.Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). The holding of the appellatecourt is in direct conflict with section 34-19, which expresslyauthorizes the Board to delegate all but six enumerated functionsto either the general superintendent or the attorney.

In sum, we find no language in any applicable provision of theSchool Code that indicates the legislature's intent to prohibitdelegation of the authority to make layoffs to anyone other thanprincipals, and we find express authorization of delegation to thegeneral superintendent and attorney. We reverse that portion of theappellate court's judgment holding that the Board is entirelyprohibited from delegating its layoff authority. On the recordbefore us, we need not determine whether the authority may bedelegated to officers or administrators other than the generalsuperintendent and attorney.

C. Necessity for Remand

Although summary judgment aids in the expeditiousdisposition of a lawsuit, it is a drastic measure and should begranted only if the moving party's right to judgment is clear andfree from doubt. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing,Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 292 (2001). A motion for summary judgmentdoes not ask the court to try a question of fact, but to determine ifa question of material fact exists that would preclude the entry ofjudgment as a matter of law. Gilbert, 156 Ill. 2d at 517. Thus,although the nonmoving party is not required to prove his case inresponse to a motion for summary judgment, he must present afactual basis that would arguably entitle him to judgment. AllegroServices, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 172 Ill.2d 243, 256 (1996). "If the party moving for summary judgmentsupplies facts that, if not contradicted, would warrant judgment inits favor as a matter of law, the opponent cannot rest on hispleadings to create a genuine issue of material fact." Harrison v.Harden County Community Unit School District No. 1, 197 Ill. 2d466, 470 (2001).

The appellate court found that summary judgment for theBoard was improper and that remand would be necessary todetermine who laid off the plaintiffs. 325 Ill. App. 3d at 308.Although the parties now agree that some delegation of layoffauthority is permissible, they disagree on the need for remand. TheBoard argues that it promulgated a "self-executing" policy,properly delegated authority to carry out the policy, and laid offthe plaintiffs in accordance with the policy. Therefore, the Boardclaims, no further fact finding is required. We disagree.

The record before the circuit court when it granted summaryjudgment in favor of the Board included the pleadings, the Board'spolicy, the layoff notice letters signed by Ponce, the Metcalfeaffidavit, and the Land affidavit in which he stated that hisprincipal notified him of his impending layoff. We must view therecord in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 735ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000).

Section 34-18(31) authorizes the Board to promulgate "rulesestablishing procedures" for layoffs. 105 ILCS 5/34-18(31) (West1998). A procedure is a "specific method or course of action."Black's Law Dictionary 1221 (7th ed. 1999). A policy states the"general principles by which a government is guided in itsmanagement of public affairs." Black's Law Dictionary 1178 (7thed. 1999). Both the title and the content of the documentpromulgated by the Board reveal it to be a policy, not a procedure.

The policy specifies events that may trigger layoffs, but doesnot reveal who will determine whether a triggering event hasoccurred and whether, as a result of that event, layoffs arenecessary. The policy adopts a strict rule of seniority as the basisfor layoffs, thus removing all discretion at this stage, but does notidentify the person or office responsible for making the senioritydetermination. The policy also contains a notice provision, butdoes not reveal who issues the layoff notice, or who decides whensuch notice will issue. In fact, almost the entire policy is written inthe passive voice: a program "is closed"; an educational focus "ischanged"; teachers "are selected" for layoff based on seniority; ifunable to secure a permanent position, the teacher "shall be laidoff" and "shall be notified" of the layoff at least 14 days inadvance.

In sum, the Board's bare assertion that it followed its ownpolicy does not resolve the question of whether the layoff authoritywas delegated and, if so, to whom. Plaintiffs have producedevidence that the layoff notices were issued by the director of thedepartment of human resources and that at least one schoolprincipal was aware of an impending layoff before written noticewas given, but have not produced evidence that the layoffauthority was delegated improperly. Such information, if it exists,is in the possession of the Board. Viewing the record in the lightmost favorable to the plaintiffs, summary judgment for the Boardis inappropriate. We remand this matter to the circuit court forfurther fact finding to determine whether the Board properlydelegated responsibility for making any or all of thedeterminations required by its policy and, if so, whether the partyto whom authority was delegated acted in accordance with thepolicy.

Appellate court judgment affirmed

in part and reversed in part;

circuit court judgment reversed;

cause remanded.