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Docket No. 94112-Agenda 14-January 2003.

BILL KROHE, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, Appellant.

Opinion filed March 20, 2003.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

The sole issue in this appeal is whether, under section 10(a)of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) (820 ILCS320/10 (West 2000)), the phrase "catastrophic injury" issynonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disabilityunder section 4-110 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS5/4-110 (West 2000)). We hold that it is.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Bill Krohe, was a firefighter employed by defendant,the City of Bloomington. In June 2000, and pursuant to section4-110 of the Code, the City's pension board awarded plaintiff aline-of-duty disability pension for injuries sustained in the line ofduty.⁽¹⁾ Shortly thereafter, plaintiff asked the City to continuepaying his and his family's health insurance premiums, as requiredby section 10(a). Insisting that section 10(a) did not mandate suchpayment, the City declined plaintiff's request. Plaintiff then fileda complaint for declaratory relief. The circuit court of McLeanCounty ruled in plaintiff's favor and ordered the City to continuepaying plaintiff's health insurance premiums. The City appealed,and, with one justice dissenting, the appellate court affirmed. 329Ill. App. 3d 1133. We granted the City's petition for leave toappeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertainand give effect to the legislature's intent. Michigan AvenueNational Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000).The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language,given its plain and ordinary meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v.Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994). Where the language is clearand unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resort tofurther aids of statutory construction. Davis v. Toshiba MachineCo., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999). If the statutorylanguage is ambiguous, however, we may look to other sources toascertain the legislature's intent. People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347,352 (1995). The construction of a statute is a question of law thatis reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330(2000).

Section 10(a) provides:

"(a) An employer who employs a full-time ***firefighter, who *** suffers a catastrophic injury or iskilled in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium ofthe employer's health insurance plan for the injuredemployee, the injured employee's spouse, and for eachdependent child of the injured employee until the childreaches the age of majority ***." 820 ILCS 320/10(a)(West 2000).

The problem in this case arises from the fact that, although thelegislature made section 10(a)'s application contingent upon theexistence of a "catastrophic injury," the Act nowhere defines"catastrophic injury." The City maintains that the absence of adefinition is of no consequence, however, as the phrase"catastrophic injury" unambiguously encompasses only thoseinjuries that "severely limit the earning power of the affectedemployee."⁽²⁾ Plaintiff counters that the phrase is "ambiguous,uncertain, and subjective" and that its meaning is ascertainableonly by examining the Act's legislative history.

We agree with plaintiff. As used in section 10(a), the phrase"catastrophic injury" is ambiguous. A statute is ambiguous if it iscapable of being understood by reasonably well-informed personsin two or more different ways. People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282,288 (1994). In this case, "reasonably well-informed persons" havetendered no less than six distinct definitions of "catastrophicinjury," all of which purport to vindicate the legislature's intent.

As mentioned above, the City initially argues that the phrase"catastrophic injury" encompasses only those injuries that"severely limit the earning power of the affected employee."(Emphasis added.) Elsewhere in its brief, the City contends that "areasonable interpretation of [section 10(a)] is that the catastrophicinjury be of such a nature that the firefighter is precluded, as aresult of a line-of-duty injury, from obtaining gainful employmentelsewhere which provides a salary comparable to that of afirefighter." (Emphasis added.) The City then endorses yet a thirdconstruction of "catastrophic injury," that articulated by theappellate court in Villarreal v. Village of Schaumburg, 325 Ill.App. 3d 1157 (2001). In Villarreal, the court held that a"catastrophic injury" is one that is "financially ruinous," renderinga firefighter "incapable of engaging in any gainful employment."(Emphasis in original.) Villarreal, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 1163. In hisdissent below, Justice Steigmann posits that "whatever it means,it means something more than a duty-related injury which qualifiesa firefighter for a line-of-duty disability pension." (Emphasisadded.) 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1141 (Steigmann, J., dissenting). TheVillages of Schaumburg and Skokie, as amicus in this appeal,maintain that catastrophic injuries are those "that approach a life-threatening status and/or that interfere with an individual's earningcapacity." (Emphasis added.) Finally, both plaintiff and theAssociated Firefighters of Illinois, as amicus, insist that any injurythat renders a person permanently unable to engage in his or herchosen profession is, by definition, "catastrophic."

Significantly, not one of the six definitions set forth aboverelies exclusively upon section 10(a)'s plain language. On thecontrary, the definitions advanced by or in support of the Cityderive from four distinct dictionary definitions of "catastrophe,"as well as from statutory definitions borrowed from otherjurisdictions. Similarly, the definitions advanced by or in supportof plaintiff come not from section 10(a) itself but from section10(a)'s legislative history. And while all of these definitions are tosome degree "reasonable," none of them are either compelled orforeclosed by the statute's plain language. We therefore hold thatthe phrase "catastrophic injury," as used in section 10(a), isambiguous.

In reaching this result, we note that even the definitionsproffered by the City do nothing to resolve section 10's ambiguity,as they fail to identify with any degree of certainty or predictabilitywhat types of injuries qualify as "catastrophic." Indeed, one pointon which plaintiff and the City agree is that blindness and loss oflimb are textbook examples of "catastrophic" injuries undersection 10(a). Yet neither blindness nor loss of limb renders afirefighter "incapable of engaging in any gainful employment,"which the City at one point insists is the sine qua non of a"catastrophic injury." Nor do these injuries necessarily preclude afirefighter from "obtaining gainful employment elsewhere whichprovides a salary comparable to that of a firefighter," the City'salternative standard for evaluating whether an injury is"catastrophic." At the same time, however, both blindness and lossof limb instantly terminate a firefighter's ability to pursue hischosen profession, a definition of "catastrophic" that plaintiffendorses but the City categorically rejects. Thus, even as definedby the City, "catastrophic injury" remains steadfastly ambiguous.

Because the phrase "catastrophic injury" is ambiguous, wemay look beyond the Act's language to ascertain its meaning. Inre D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 419 (2001). To this end, a statute'slegislative history and debates are "[v]aluable construction aids ininterpreting an ambiguous statute." Advincula v. United BloodServices, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 19 (1996).

Here, the legislative history and debates could not be clearer.On November 14, 1997, the Illinois Senate debated whether tooverride Governor Edgar's veto of House Bill 1347, which soughtto enact the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act. Immediatelyprior to the vote, the bill's sponsor, Senator Laura Kent Donahue,delivered the following remarks:

"I'd like to say for the sake of the record what we meanby catastrophically injured. What it means is that it is ourintent to define 'catastrophically injured' as a policeofficer or firefighter who, due to injuries, has been forcedto take a line of duty disability." 90th Ill. Gen. Assem.,Senate Proceedings, November 14, 1997, at 136(statements of Senator Donahue).

At the conclusion of Senator Donahue's remarks, the Senateoverrode the Governor's veto of House Bill 1347 by a vote of 58to 1.

In light of Senator Donahue's remarks, which were deliveredfor the sole purpose of defining for the record "catastrophicinjury," plaintiff urges us to likewise construe "catastrophicinjury" as any injury that results in a line-of-duty disability undersection 4-110 of the Code. Unfortunately, it is not that simple.While Senator Donahue's statement of legislative intent could notbe clearer, it alone cannot control the outcome of this case. As theCity correctly points out, Senator Donahue's statement was madeonly after the Governor vetoed House Bill 1347 and thereforeplayed no role in the General Assembly's initial decision to enactsection 10(a). By itself, then, Senator Donahue's statement is ofonly limited value in ascertaining the legislature's intent.

That said, the legislative history of House Bill 1347, bothprior to and following the Governor's veto, is replete withstatements of legislative intent that fully comport with SenatorDonahue's November 14, 1997, remarks. Immediately prior to theHouse of Representatives' initial vote on House Bill 1347, theBill's sponsor, Representative Art Tenhouse, advised hiscolleagues as follows:

"1347 is a simple Bill. It simply provides that full-timelaw enforcement officers and firefighters that are killed ordisabled in the line of duty, we're going to continue thehealth benefits for the officer's children and spouse."(Emphasis added.) 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., HouseProceedings, April 14, 1997, at 180 (statements ofRepresentative Tenhouse).

Following the conclusion of these remarks, House Bill 1347passed by a vote of 113 to 4. Similarly, immediately prior theSenate's initial vote on House Bill 1347, Senator Donahue advisedher colleagues:

"And what this does is that it provides that for full-timelaw enforcement officers and firefighters that are killed ordisabled in the line of duty shall continue the healthbenefits for the officer or the firefighter, their spouses andtheir children." (Emphasis added.) 90th Ill. Gen. Assem.,Senate Proceedings, May 16, 1997, at 192 (statements ofSenator Donahue).

Following these remarks, the Senate passed House Bill 1347 by avote of 53 to 1. Finally, immediately prior the House's vote tooverride Governor Edgar's veto of House Bill 1347,Representative Tenhouse reminded the chamber:

"House Bill 1347 *** [p]rovides that employers of full-time law enforcement and firefighters who are killed ordisabled in the line of duty, shall continue health benefitsfor the officer or firefighter and the spouse and childrenthereof." (Emphasis added.) 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., HouseProceedings, October 28, 1997, at 16 (statements ofRepresentative Tenhouse).

Following these remarks, House Bill 1347 once again was passed,this time by a vote of 115 to 1.

Thus, contrary to the City's position, Senator Donahue'sannouncement that a "catastrophically injured" firefighter issynonymous with a "firefighter who, due to injuries, has beenforced to take a line of duty disability" is not an isolated "eleventhhour" statement. Rather, as the foregoing account demonstrates,both of the Bill's sponsors were concerned from the outset withline-of-duty disabilities, explicitly informing their colleagues ofthe Bill's focus immediately prior to every vote. In light of thisunambiguous legislative history, and in light of section 10(a)'sfacial ambiguity, we will defer to the legislature's judgment.Accordingly, like the appellate and circuit courts below, weconstrue the phrase "catastrophic injury" as synonymous with aninjury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under section 4-110 ofthe Code.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate courtis affirmed.

Affirmed.

1. ¹Line of duty disability pensions are paid to firefighters who "as theresult of sickness, accident or injury incurred in or resulting from theperformance of an act of duty or from the cumulative effects of acts ofduty, [are] found *** to be physically or mentally permanently disabledfor service in the fire department." 40 ILCS 5/4-110 (West 2000).

2. ²As discussed further below, this is but one of several definitionstendered by the City.