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Docket No. 92971-Agenda 30-September 2002.

KNOLLS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. MARY E. HARMS, Appellee.

Opinion filed November 21, 2002.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

The issue in this case is whether a condominium unit ownercan assert the homestead exemption contained in section 12-901of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/12-901(West 2000)) as an affirmative defense to a condominiumassociation's action in forcible entry and detainer brought becauseof the unit owner's nonpayment of maintenance assessments. Thecircuit court of Du Page County answered this question in thenegative and entered judgment for possession in favor of thecondominium association. The appellate court reversed, with onejustice dissenting. 326 Ill. App. 3d 18. We granted leave to appeal(177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now reverse the judgment of theappellate court.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Knolls Condominium Association, filed acomplaint in forcible entry and detainer against the defendant,Mary E. Harms. The complaint alleged that plaintiff was entitledto possession of a certain condominium unit owned by defendantin Willowbrook, Illinois, because defendant failed to pay plaintiff$2,326.40 in maintenance assessments, plus costs and attorneyfees, as required by the condominium declaration. The complaintfurther alleged that defendant was unlawfully withholdingpossession of the premises from plaintiff.

Defendant answered the complaint by denying that plaintiffwas entitled to possession of the property or that she wasunlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff. Additionally,defendant asserted as an affirmative defense that she owned andoccupied the property and, therefore, was entitled to an estate ofhomestead to the extent of $7,500 in the property.

At the hearing on the matter, the parties stipulated thatdefendant owed plaintiff past-due maintenance assessments of$2,326.40. Defendant then argued that an estate of homestead wasa proper defense to plaintiff's action for possession. In response,plaintiff argued that various provisions of the CondominiumProperty Act (765 ILCS 605/1 et seq. (West 2000)), and of articleIX of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, the Code or theforcible entry and detainer statute) (735 ILCS 5/9-101 et seq.(West 2000)), specifically afford a condominium association theright to maintain an action for possession against a unit owner fornonpayment of assessments. The trial court agreed with plaintiffand found that the specific language of the statutory authorityrelied upon by plaintiff controlled over the more general languageof the homestead exemption relied upon by defendant.

A divided appellate court reversed the judgment of the trialcourt. In so doing, the appellate court majority relied upon theprinciple of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the enumerationof certain exceptions in a statute is construed as an exclusion of allothers. The appellate court majority found that section 12-903 ofthe Code (735 ILCS 5/12-903 (West 2000)) specified its ownexceptions to the homestead exemption of section 12-901 (735ILCS 5/12-901 (West 2000)). It concluded that because anexception for a forcible entry and detainer action brought by acondominium association was not listed in section 12-903, thelegislature did not intend to make an exception to the homesteadexemption in such cases.

The dissenting justice argued that the majority's analysisproduced a statutory disharmony that was not intended by thelegislature. The dissent maintained that section 9-102(a)(7) of theCode (735 ILCS 5/9-102(a)(7) (West 2000)), and section 9.2 ofthe Condominium Property Act (765 ILCS 605/9.2 (West 2000)),both of which specifically allow an action for possession broughtby a condominium association against a unit owner fornonpayment of assessments, should be read harmoniously with thehomestead statute so as not to render any of the statutoryprovisions meaningless.

We allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. Wesubsequently granted leave to the Association of Condominiumand Townhome Associations to file an amicus curiae brief insupport of plaintiff's appeal.

ANALYSIS

On appeal to this court, plaintiff argues that the specificstatutory provisions allowing a condominium association to obtainpossession of a condominium unit for the owner's failure to paymaintenance assessments control over the general language of thehomestead exemption. Because the question of the properinterpretation to be afforded statutory provisions is a question oflaw, our standard of review is de novo. People v. Maggette, 195Ill. 2d 336, 348 (2001); County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. TheHighlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 551 (1999).

We begin our analysis by examining the relevant statutoryframework. Section 12-901 of the Code provides, inter alia, asfollows:

"Amount. Every individual is entitled to an estate ofhomestead to the extent in value of $7,500 of his or herinterest in a farm or lot of land and buildings thereon, acondominium, or personal property, owned or rightlypossessed by lease or otherwise and occupied by him orher as a residence ***. That homestead and all right inand title to that homestead is exempt from attachment,judgment, levy, or judgment sale for the payment of his orher debts or other purposes and from the laws ofconveyance, descent, and legacy, except as provided inthis Code ***." 735 ILCS 5/12-901 (West 2000).

Section 12-904 of the Code states, generally, that only a writtenrelease, waiver, or conveyance of the exempted homestead estateis valid. 735 ILCS 5/12-904 (West 2000). Section 12-903provides a few exceptions to the homestead exemption, which areapplicable in the context of a sale:

"No property shall, by virtue of Part 9 of Article XII ofthis Act, be exempt from sale for nonpayment of taxes orassessments, or for a debt or liability incurred for thepurchase or improvement thereof, or for enforcement ofa lien thereon for nonpayment of common expensespursuant to the 'Condominium Property Act' ***." 735ILCS 5/12-903 (West 2000).

We now turn to the specific provisions of the CondominiumProperty Act and the forcible entry and detainer statute, which setforth the appropriate procedure available to a condominiumassociation for remedying a default in the obligations of a unitowner. Sections 9(g)(1) and 9(h) of the Condominium PropertyAct provide that if a unit owner fails to make timely payment ofcommon expenses, the amount due shall constitute a lien on theinterest of the unit owner in the property, which may be foreclosedupon by the board of managers of the condominium association.765 ILCS 605/9(g)(1), (h) (West 2000). Section 9.2 of the Actspecifically provides for further remedies as follows:

"Other remedies. (a) In the event of any default by anyunit owner, his tenant, invitee or guest in the performanceof his obligations under this Act or under the declaration,bylaws, or the rules and regulations of the board ofmanagers, the board of managers or its agents shall havesuch rights and remedies as provided in the Act or thecondominium instruments including the right to maintainan action for possession against such defaulting unitowner or his tenant for the benefit of all the other unitowners in the manner prescribed by Article IX of theCode of Civil Procedure.

(b) Any attorneys' fees incurred by the Associationarising out of a default by any unit owner, his tenant,invitee or guest in the performance of any of theprovisions of the condominium instruments, rules andregulations or any applicable statute or ordinance shall beadded to, and deemed a part of, his respective share of thecommon expense." (Emphases added.) 765 ILCS 605/9.2(West 2000).

Section 9-102(a)(7) of the Code gives the board of managers of acondominium association the authority to maintain a forcible entryand detainer action against a defaulting unit owner as follows:

"(a) The person entitled to the possession of lands ortenements may be restored thereto under any of thefollowing circumstances:

* * *

(7) When any property is subject to the provisions ofthe Condominium Property Act, the owner of a unitfails or refuses to pay when due his or her proportionateshare of the common expenses of such property, or ofany other expenses lawfully agreed upon or any unpaidfine, the Board of Managers or its agents have servedthe demand set forth in Section 9-104.1 of this Articlein the manner provided for in that Section and the unitowner has failed to pay the amount claimed within thetime prescribed in the demand ***." 735 ILCS5/9-102(a)(7) (West 2000).

Defendant argues that plaintiff does not have standing to bringan action under the forcible entry and detainer statute because it isnot "a person entitled to possession." Defendant's contention,however, is contradicted by the clear statutory language and mustbe rejected. Section 9.2 of the Property Condominium Act plainlyprovides that the board of managers of a condominium associationis entitled to maintain a cause of action for possession against adefaulting unit owner under the forcible entry and detainer statute.Additionally, section 9-102(a)(7) of the forcible entry and detainerstatute intimates that the board of managers is "a person entitledto possession" within the meaning of the statute when the propertyis subject to the Condominium Property Act, the unit owner failsto pay his proportionate share of common expenses, the unit owneris served with a demand, and the unit owner fails to pay within thetime prescribed in the demand. Defendant does not contend thatthese criteria were not satisfied here.

Additional support for plaintiff's right to maintain a cause ofaction for possession is found in section 9-111(a) of the forcibleentry and detainer statute (735 ILCS 5/9-111(a) (West 2000)).That section provides in relevant part as follows:

"As to property subject to the provisions of the'Condominium Property Act' *** when the action isbased upon the failure of an owner of a unit therein to paywhen due his or her proportionate share of the commonexpenses of the property, *** and if the court finds thatthe expenses *** are due to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shallbe entitled to the possession of the whole of the premisesclaimed, and judgment in favor of the plaintiff shall beentered for the possession thereof and for the amountfound due ***." 735 ILCS 5/9-111(a) (West 2000).

Other provisions of the statutory scheme allow the board ofmanagers to rent the condominium unit of which it has gainedpossession under the Code and to collect the rental fundstherefrom until the amount owed by the unit owner is satisfied,with possession eventually returning to the unit owner. See 735ILCS 5/9-111(a), 9-111.1 (West 2000). The historical andpractice notes for section 9.2 of the Condominium Property Actnote that this statutory procedure for collecting assessments hasbeen in force for over 30 years and has provided an efficientcollection method. Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 30, par. 309.2, Historical &Practice Notes, at 179-80 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991). The historicaland practice notes for that section further state in relevant part:

"This section was added by P.A. 77-1760, effectiveJuly 1, 1972, as part of a legislative package which alsoincluded P.A. 77-1759, which added the proceduresapplicable to condominiums to the Forcible Entry andDetainer Act [authorizing condominium associations touse the forcible procedures to collect unpaid assessmentsfrom unit owners] ***.

P.A. 83-645, effective January 1, 1984, *** deleted therequirement that the declaration or by-laws containauthorization to maintain an action, thereby extending theforcible remedy to all associations in Illinois, regardlessof when created. Prior to the adoption of P.A. 83-645,there was a question as to whether a condominiumassociation could use the forcible procedures if such aremedy was not expressly provided for in the associationdeclaration or by-laws. [Citation.]

This section makes Illinois unique in allowing acondominium association to evict a unit owner for failureto pay assessments. When such action occurs, the unitowner maintains title to the unit and the association hasthe right to possession of the unit until the judgment forpossession is vacated after the amount owed is paid.

* * *

This section was adopted to provide a constitutionallypermissible, quick method for collection of assessmentarrearages in condominium associations, and it hasprovided one of the better collection procedures found inany state." Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 30, par. 309.2, Historical &Practice Notes, at 179-80 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991).

Defendant acknowledges the general applicability of theabove-quoted statutes, which would allow a condominiumassociation to maintain a forcible entry and detainer action wherethe unit owner fails to pay his or her proportionate share ofcondominium expenses. Defendant argues, however, that thehomestead provisions of article XII of the Code control theoutcome of this case by providing a defense to the unit owner forplaintiff's cause of action for possession. We disagree.

The controlling principles of statutory construction are wellsettled. In construing a legislative enactment, a court shouldascertain and give effect to the overall intent of the drafters.Villegas v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 167 Ill. 2d 108,123 (1995). A court presumes that the legislature intended that twoor more statutes which relate to the same subject are to be readharmoniously so that no provisions are rendered inoperative.Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 391-92(1998). Statutes relating to the same subject must be compared andconstrued with reference to each other so that effect may be givento all of the provisions of each if possible. Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d at392. Even when an apparent conflict between statutes exists, theymust be construed in harmony with one another if reasonablypossible. United Citizens of Chicago & Illinois v. Coalition to Letthe People Decide in 1989, 125 Ill. 2d 332, 339 (1988), quotingPeople v. Maya, 105 Ill. 2d 281, 287 (1985). It is also afundamental rule of statutory construction that where there existsa general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision,either in the same or in another act, both relating to the samesubject the specific provision controls and should be applied.People v. Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d 368, 379 (1992); People ex rel.Kempiners v. Draper, 113 Ill. 2d 318, 321 (1986).

Applying the above-mentioned principles, we find that theappellate court majority placed undue emphasis upon the rule ofconstruction that the inclusion of one item in a statute is intendedas the exclusion of other possible items that were not included.See Villegas, 167 Ill. 2d at 122. We instead emphasize that theoverall intent of the legislature is of paramount importance, andstatutes must be construed in harmony if possible. United Citizensof Chicago & Illinois v. Coalition to Let the People Decide in1989, 125 Ill. 2d at 338-39. We believe that the dissenting justicewas correct in his conclusion that the forcible entry and detainerstatute and the Condominium Property Act more specificallyaddress what is at issue in this case-a remedy when a unit ownerfails to pay condominium assessments-and therefore the morespecific provisions of those statutes should control over the moregeneral provisions of the homestead statute.

The forcible entry and detainer statute and the homesteadstatute relate to the same subject matter and provide a statutoryscheme. Section 12-901 of the homestead statute states thatcondominium property occupied as a residence by the owner isexempt from judgment "except as provided in this Code."(Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/12-901 (West 2000). Section9-102(a)(7) of the Code, otherwise known as the forcible entryand detainer statute, is a part of "this Code" referred to in section12-901. Thus, by specifically allowing for possession of a unitunder the circumstances here, section 9-102(a)(7) provides anexception to the homestead right of section 12-901. From ourreview of the statutory scheme, we conclude that the legislaturespecifically provided for a procedure for the temporary eviction ofa unit owner who fails to pay assessments, and it did not intend toeliminate this remedy by failing to list it in section 12-903 as oneof the exceptions to the applicability of the homestead estate.

Our interpretation of the statutory scheme harmonizes thehomestead statute with the forcible entry and detainer statute andthe Condominium Property Act and avoids rendering any of theprovisions inoperative. We do not find it to be inconsistent withthe purpose of the homestead statute to allow an action by acondominium association in forcible entry and detainer against aunit owner for purposes of recovering past due assessments.Section 12-903 of the Code relates to exceptions to an estate ofhomestead when a sale of the property is involved. As previouslynoted, plaintiff here did not seek the sale of defendant's property,but only sought possession of it until it recovered the amount ofpast due assessments and other related sums. Section 9-111.1 ofthe Code makes it clear that when a judgement for possession isentered on behalf of the condominium association against the unitowner, the unit owner maintains title to the unit and thecondominium association has the right of possession only until theassessments and related amounts that are owed are paid. It istherefore not surprising that the legislature did not list a forcibleentry and detainer action brought to recover past-duecondominium assessments as one of the exceptions of section12-903, as section 12-903 is concerned with sales of homesteadproperty. The forcible entry and detainer statute, by contrast,specifically addresses possession of condominium property wheretitle is not transferred. Accordingly, we do not find that plaintiff'scause of action in the instant case is subject to a homesteaddefense simply because of the legislature's failure to specificallylist an exception in section 12-903 of the Code mentioning thecondominium association's right to maintain an action fortemporary possession.

Our analysis resolving the foregoing issue is supported by theGeneral Assembly's recent amendments to the applicable statutoryprovisions. The amendments were made in the aftermath of theappellate court's decision and make it clear that the legislature hadintended to give a condominium association the right to maintainan action for possession against a unit owner under the forcibleentry and detainer statute without interference from the right ofhomestead. Pub. Act 92-540,