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Docket No. 92162-Agenda 11-May 2002.

KINGBROOK, INC., Appellant, v. JOHN A. PUPURS et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed October 18, 2002.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The subject of this appeal is appellate jurisdiction. The circuitcourt of Boone County entered summary judgment againstplaintiff Kingbrook, Inc. (Kingbrook), and denied Kingbrook'smotion to reconsider. Kingbrook appealed, but the appellate courtfound that Kingbrook's motion to reconsider was ineffective totoll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Accordingly, theappellate court found the notice of appeal to be untimely anddismissed Kingbrook's appeal. The question before us is: In anonjury case, what degree of detail must be included in a motionto reconsider for such a motion to qualify as a "post-judgmentmotion" within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure (see735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 1998)) and the rules of this court (see155 Ill. 2d R. 301(a)), such that the motion will toll the time forfiling a notice of appeal until its disposition?

BACKGROUND

Kingbrook sued John A. Pupurs and Rockford Manufacturing,Inc. (Rockford), based on a theory of unjust enrichment, and suedR&D Thiel, Inc. (Thiel), for unjust enrichment and breach ofcontract. Although the issues before this court are solelyprocedural, we briefly note that according to the allegations of thecomplaint, Kingbrook is a commercial real estate agent whichshowed a specific property to Thiel. Thiel placed multiple offers onthe property, but never completed a purchase from the originalseller. Instead, the property was sold to Rockford, a corporation ofwhich Pupurs is the sole shareholder. Rockford then sold theproperty to Thiel for $500,000 more than Rockford had paid theoriginal seller. Kingbrook, characterizing Rockford's profit as acommission, sued Rockford, Pupurs and Thiel on the above-notedtheories.

Rockford, Pupurs and Thiel (collectively, defendants) movedto dismiss Kingbrook's complaint for failure to state a claim, andthe circuit court granted that motion. However, this judgment wasreversed on appeal and the cause was remanded to the circuit courtfor further proceedings. Kingbrook, Inc. v. Pupurs, Nos.2-98-1120, 2-98-0550 cons. (2001) (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23).

It is at this time that the proceedings pertinent to this appealbegan. On remand, defendants moved for summary judgment. Thecircuit court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants onJanuary 21, 2000. On February 17, 2000, Kingbrook filed adocument titled "Motion For Reconsideration." The body of thatdocument read, in its entirety, as follows:

"N[ow comes] the plaintiff, K[ingbrook, Inc.], an Illinoiscorporation, by and through its attorneys, B[arrick],S[witzer], L[ong], B[alsey] & V[anavera], and herebymoves the Court to reconsider its decision grantingsevering [sic] judgment in favor of the Defendants."

No additional materials in support of or opposition to the motionwere filed by any party or requested by the circuit court. Kingbrooknoticed up the motion within the time allowed by the circuit courtrules, and the circuit court denied the motion on April 28, 2000.

On May 30, 2000, Kingbrook filed a notice of appeal. In theappellate court, defendants moved to dismiss the appeal for wantof jurisdiction, arguing that Kingbrook's notice of appeal was latebecause the motion to reconsider was not a proper post-judgmentmotion. The appellate court agreed with defendants and dismissedthe appeal. No. 2-00-0611 (unpublished order under SupremeCourt Rule 23). We granted Kingbrook leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2dR. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

Before this court there is but one central issue. The partiesagree that the filing of a timely notice of appeal is mandatory andjurisdictional. R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill.2d 153, 159 (1998). The parties also agree that the notice of appealwas timely if and only if Kingbrook's motion to reconsider tolledthe 30-day filing period.⁽¹⁾ The sole question is whether Kingbrook'smotion did toll the filing period. The parties' arguments may bebriefly summarized as follows. Kingbrook contends that neither theCode of Civil Procedure nor the rules of this court demand anyspecificity in post-judgment motions in cases decided without ajury, whereas the Code does explicitly require specificity in post-judgment motions in cases decided by a jury. Thus, Kingbrookargues, the motion filed in this case was sufficient because it wastimely filed, was in proper form, and requested the appropriate typeof relief. Defendants respond that a bare motion with no specifics,such as the motion in this case, cannot serve the purpose of aproper post-judgment motion and is nothing more than a subterfugeto delay the time for filing the notice of appeal. Such chicanery,defendants argue, should not be countenanced. Some detail, someargument, they contend, must be presented for a post-judgmentmotion to toll the time for filing the notice of appeal.

The pertinent portions of the Code and our rules read asfollows. Our Rule 303(a)(1) governs when a notice of appeal mustbe filed in civil cases. It states that

"Except as provided in paragraph (b) below, the noticeof appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit courtwithin 30 days after the entry of the final judgmentappealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directedagainst the judgment is filed, whether in a jury or anonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of the orderdisposing of the last pending post-judgment motion." 155Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1).

Section 2-1203(a) of the Code, which governs post-judgmentmotions in cases decided without a jury, provides that

"In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within30 days after the entry of the judgment or within anyfurther time the court may allow within the 30 days or anyextensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or aretrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate thejudgment or for other relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West1998).

Kingbrook also calls our attention to section 2-1202 of theCode, which governs post-trial motions in cases decided by a jury.Section 2-1202(b) provides in part that

"Relief desired after trial in jury cases, heretofore soughtby reserved motions for directed verdict or motions forjudgment notwithstanding the verdict, in arrest ofjudgment or for new trial, must be sought in a single post-trial motion. *** The post-trial motion must contain thepoints relied upon, particularly specifying the grounds insupport thereof, and must state the relief desired, as forexample, the entry of a judgment, the granting of a newtrial or other appropriate relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1202(b)(West 1998).

Our primary job in interpreting statutes is to ascertain and giveeffect to the intent of the legislature. Michigan Avenue NationalBank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). The plainlanguage of a statute provides the most reliable indicator oflegislative intent, and " '[w]e must not depart from the plainlanguage of [a statute] by reading into it exceptions, limitations, orconditions that conflict with the express legislative intent.' "Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 56 (1998), quotingBarnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 389 (1996).Moreover, if the meaning is not unmistakable from the face of thestatute, our civil appeals rules are to be interpreted liberally, inorder that lawsuits may be decided on the merits. Parks v.McWhorter, 106 Ill. 2d 181, 185 (1985); 735 ILCS 5/1-106 (West1998).

Each side claims support for its position in previous decisionsof this court. Defendants rely on Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d 232(1991), and Andersen v. Resource Economics Corp., 133 Ill. 2d342 (1990), both of which involved the same basic question as thecase at bar: whether a particular document constituted a post-judgment motion within the meaning of section 2-1203(a) of theCode. Defendants note that in those cases, this court explicitlystated that specificity is required in post-judgment motions. SeeBeck, 144 Ill. 2d at 241; Andersen, 133 Ill. 2d at 347. They suggestthat this precedent is conclusive.⁽²⁾

Kingbrook contends that Beck and Andersen are notcontrolling. Kingbrook argues that in both cases the court hadalready concluded that the documents in question were not post-judgment motions for other reasons than the lack of specificity andthus that the mention of specificity was dictum. Moreover,Kingbrook notes that when mentioning the specificity requirement,Beck merely cited Andersen, and the only authority cited inAndersen was Brown v. Decatur Memorial Hospital, 83 Ill. 2d 344(1980). Kingbrook contends that this chain of precedent castsdoubt on the validity of the statements in Beck and Andersen,because Brown involved a post-judgment motion after a juryverdict. As Kingbrook points out, sections 2-1202 and 2-1203 ofthe Code differ, in that the former-which governs post-judgmentmotions after a jury verdict-explicitly requires specificity and thelatter does not. See Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., Chicago, 297 Ill.App. 3d 891, 894-97 (1998), vacated & dismissed on othergrounds, 193 Ill. 2d 186 (2000). Moreover, even in Brown thiscourt did not hold that the nonspecific post-judgment motion didnot qualify as a post-judgment motion at all. Rather, we stated thatthe motion was insufficient to preserve specific issues for appeal,and affirmed the appellate court's judgment affirming the judgmententered on the jury verdict. We did not find a lack of appellatejurisdiction in Brown.

For Kingbrook's part, it relies on Berg v. Allied Security, Inc.,193 Ill. 2d 186 (2000). Kingbrook notes that after consideringvarious contentions as to why specificity should be required ofpost-judgment motions under section 2-1203, the statement wasmade that such arguments were only

" 'reason[s] for denying the motion or granting counsel anadditional opportunity to respond after the initial hearingis concluded. It is not a reason for holding that the motiondoes not even qualify as a motion. A lame horse, after all,is still a horse.' " Berg, 193 Ill. 2d at 200 (Harrison, C.J.,dissenting).

However, as Kingbrook admits, the language on which it relies iscontained in a dissent; it does not represent a holding of this court.The majority did not address whether the motion sufficed to toll thetime for filing the notice of appeal. Berg, 193 Ill. 2d at 188.

Nevertheless, we find that the plain language of the Code andrules supports Kingbrook's position. Rule 303(a) makes nomention of the contents of any post-judgment motion. It merelystates that if a motion is filed, a notice of appeal must be filedwithin 30 days after the order disposing thereof. Nor does section2-1203(a) of the Code speak to the contents of any such motion-indirect contradistinction to section 2-1202(b) of the Code,governing post-judgment motions in cases decided by a jury.Compare 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 1998) with 735 ILCS5/2-1202(b) (West 1998) (post-trial motions after a jury verdict"must contain the points relied upon, particularly specifying thegrounds in support thereof"). There simply is no basis in the plainlanguage of the Code or our rules for a specificity requirement.

There are practical difficulties as well with the notion ofholding that a timely, properly filed post-judgment motion whichrequests appropriate relief might not qualify as a motion becauseof a lack of specificity. For instance, although it may seemunlikely, it is not difficult to imagine a circumstance in which acircuit court might wish to grant such a motion. A judge could takecross-motions for summary judgment under advisement, then signthe wrong order. Upon presentation of even a cursory motion forreconsideration, the court could realize its error and enter thejudgment it had intended to enter. But if the cursory motion wasnot even a motion, as defendants argue, the court would be withoutjurisdiction to enter such an order if 30 days had elapsed from theentry of the mistaken judgment.⁽³⁾ Indeed, the court would losejurisdiction to enter any order, even an order denying or strikingthe purported post-judgment motion.

On the other hand, the burdens on a victorious litigant bytolling the time for filing a notice of appeal until disposition of allproperly formed and filed motions are relatively slight. Suchmotions must be brought within 30 days of judgment or suchextension of time as the trial court might grant within 30 days afterthe entry of judgment. Local rules of court generally will requiremotions to be noticed up for hearing within a fairly short time aftertheir filing-in this case, two months. This delay is aninconvenience, to be sure, but we cannot help but note that motionsfor extensions of time are fairly routinely granted in the appellatecourt and this court; a three-month delay is hardly withoutprecedent. It does not, at any rate, persuade us to ignore the plainlanguage of the Code and rules and to muddy the waters ofjurisdiction.

Defendants protest that a nonspecific post-judgment motioncannot serve the purpose of a post-judgment motion-giving thecircuit court the opportunity to correct its errors before a case isbrought up on appeal. Kingbrook rejoins that especially in a casesuch as the instant one, which was decided on a motion forsummary judgment, the arguments of the losing party would havebeen presented to the court quite recently, in the briefing inopposition to the motion for summary judgment. Kingbrook arguesthat there would be no point in requiring a party to reiterate thesame arguments to avoid risking its right to an appeal.

We decline to hold that post-judgment motions in nonjurycases must contain some undefined degree of detail, lest the filerrisk that the reviewing court hold that the motion is not a motionat all. It is not clear that a nonspecific motion could not fulfill itsrole, and there is no reason to require the filer to guess how muchdetail is enough.

Defendants also argue that we should uphold the dismissal ofthe appeal because of certain conduct by Kingbrook in the circuitcourt. Defendants contend that counsel for Kingbrook did not evenprepare a draft order by the entry of which the circuit court couldhave granted the motion, but prepared only the order entered in thiscase, which denied its motion. Further, they refer to a letter fromcounsel for Kingbrook to counsel for defendants in which theauthor stated that he "intend[ed] to present [the draft order denyingthe motion] to the Judge on the scheduled date so that the mattercould be concluded." Defendants contend that these facts evincethat the motion was not made in good faith. Kingbrook objects thatthere is no evidence of record that Kingbrook prepared only thedraft order denying its motion, and also argues that the letter towhich defendants refer is not properly of record and should not beconsidered.

These contentions are irrelevant to our analysis. The issuebefore us is the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Defendants'argument is, at its heart, that the appeal was properly dismissedbecause the motion to reconsider was brought solely as a delayingtactic-in other words, that dismissal was proper because ofKingbrook's motives for bringing the motion. But defendants citeno authority, nor are we aware of any, that suggests thatjurisdiction should depend on the perceived intent or mind-set ofthe litigants. Reviewing courts are generally unsuited to fact-finding; appellate jurisdiction is not and should not be based oninferences the reviewing court draws from a cold record regardingthe motives of the parties in making filings before the circuit court.If the litigant satisfies the requirements of the Code and rules,jurisdiction vests in the appellate court; otherwise, not. The goodor bad faith of the parties does not enter into the equation.

There are procedures in place to resolve contentions of bad-faith litigation. Our Rule 137 specifically allows a party to requestsanctions against a party and its counsel for filings "interposed forany improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessarydelay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." (Emphasisadded.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. We believe that accusations andimputations of bad-faith litigation must be dealt with as such,within the channels established for resolution of such issues, ratherthan requiring reviewing courts to make factual determinations inthe first instance, in the context of deciding their jurisdiction toreview the merits of the case. We of course intimate no opinion asto whether any conduct in the instant case might be sanctionable.In this case, as in general, that fact-based determination should bemade initially by the circuit court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the order of the appellate courtdismissing the appeal is reversed and the cause is remanded to theappellate court for consideration of the merits of the appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration ordecision of this case.

JUSTICE GARMAN, specially concurring:

I agree with the majority's conclusion that the motion inquestion was permissible under the current language of section2-1203(a). I write separately to express serious concerns regardingthe practical effects of the statute in its current form.

As the majority states, section 2-1203(a) of the Code makesmention of the contents of any post-judgment motion. As such, themajority correctly concludes that the plain language of the Codeprovides no basis for a specificity requirement. However, thecurrent requirements raise the specter that a motion need benothing more than an empty shell in order to be effective.Permitting skeletal motions invites sloppiness and will only createmore confusion for reviewing courts. A motion that is devoid ofdetail does not meaningfully inform the trial court, or reviewingcourts, of what objections or points have been raised. A partycould, theoretically, file a motion that says nothing more than, "Werequest a do over."

Furthermore, it is not difficult to envision abuse of therequirements as currently written. The lack of a specificityrequirement encourages spurious pleadings or blatant attempts toextend the time for leave to appeal through the filing of an empty,meaningless motion to reconsider.

While I agree with the majority that the filer of a motionshould not have to guess how much detail is enough (slip op. at 8),there is a difference between insufficient detail and no detail at all.I believe that a motion containing absolutely no identification andarticulation of objections or points does not contribute to fair andinformed decisionmaking. The law demands some specificity to beadministered effectively and consistently. To that end, I sincerelyhope that the legislature addresses the lack of any contentrequirements for motions to reconsider in nonjury cases.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this special concurrence.

1. ¹The motion for reconsideration was denied on April 28. Thethirtieth day after April 28 was a Sunday, and the next day wasMemorial Day, a court holiday. The notice of appeal was filed the nextday, and thus was timely if the petition was effective to toll the 30-dayperiod for filing the notice.

2. ²Defendants also cite several appellate court cases for the propositionthat some degree of specificity is required for a post-judgment motionto qualify as such. See Town of Sugar Loaf v. Environmental ProtectionAgency, 305 Ill. App. 3d 483 (1999); Robertson v. Winnebago CountyForest Preserve District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 520, 522-23 (1998); Sho-Deen, Inc. v. Michel, 263 Ill. App. 3d 288 (1994). Contra Berg v. AlliedSecurity, Inc., Chicago, 297 Ill. App. 3d 891 (1998), vacated &dismissed on other grounds, 193 Ill. 2d 186 (2000). As Kingbrooknotes, however, all of the appellate authority on which defendants relystems from Beck and Andersen.

3. ³It is possible, of course, that the court might be able to enter anorder nunc pro tunc to correct such an error even after losingjurisdiction. Beck, 144 Ill. 2d at 238. However, nunc pro tunc orderscannot be entered unless they are "based upon definite and preciseevidence in the record," and their accuracy cannot rest "upon thememory of the judge or any other person." (Emphasis added.) Beck, 144Ill. 2d at 239. So, while in some cases the court could properly correctan error nunc pro tunc after having lost jurisdiction, certainly in othercases it could not do so. Indeed, we found the circuit court's nunc protunc modification of its earlier order to be improper in Beck because ofa lack of record evidence showing that the initial order was a mistake.Beck, 144 Ill. 2d at 239.