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Docket No. 91894-Agenda 14-March 2002.

LUANN JOHNSON, Surviving Spouse and Court-AppointedAdm'r of the Estate of William E. Johnson, Deceased, et al., v.UNITED AIRLINES et al. (Raytheon Aircraft Company,

Appellant; City of Quincy, Appellee).

Opinion filed January 24, 2003.

CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Over the objection of Raytheon Aircraft Company(Raytheon), the circuit court of St. Clair County ruled that asettlement agreement entered into by the administrators of theestates of Johnson, Carlson, Fries, Berger, Beville, DeSalle,Hefflebower and Reed (plaintiffs herein) and the City of Quincy(Quincy) was made in good faith within the meaning of the JointTortfeasor Contribution Act (Contribution Act). 740 ILCS100/0.01 et seq. (West 1996). That determination was affirmed bythe appellate court. No. 5-98-0719 (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23). Raytheon now appeals the finding ofgood faith before this court, arguing that the circuit court abusedits discretion when it refused to allow discovery or to conduct anevidentiary hearing regarding Quincy's relative culpability beforedeciding that the settlement and release were made in good faith.Raytheon also asks this court to decide whether a nonsettlingtortfeasor who challenges the good faith of a settlement has theburden of proving the absence of good faith by a preponderance ofthe evidence or by the higher "clear and convincing" standard.

For reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate courtjudgment upholding the circuit court's finding of good faith.

BACKGROUND

On November 19, 1996, United Express Flight 5925, carrying10 passengers and a crew of two, attempted to land on runway 13at Baldwin Field, a towerless municipal airport owned andoperated by the City of Quincy in Adams County, Illinois. Runway13 runs northwest and southeast. As United Express Flight 5925was attempting to land, a small privately owned aircraft,Beechcraft A-90 King Air, Registration No. N1127D, piloted byNeil Reinwald and Laura Brooks Winkleman, attempted to takeoff at Baldwin Field on runway 4, which runs northeast andsouthwest. The two aircrafts collided at the intersection of the tworunways, killing everyone aboard both aircrafts.

Representatives⁽¹⁾ of eight of the passengers aboard the UnitedExpress aircraft filed wrongful death and survival suits in St. ClairCounty, naming as defendants: United Airlines, Inc., and GreatLakes Aviation, Ltd., alleged to have operated United ExpressFlight 5925 as a joint enterprise; Katherine Gathje and DarinMcCombs, the pilot and copilot of the United Express plane; NeilReinwald and Laura Brooks Winkleman, the pilot and allegedcopilot of the King Air aircraft; Robert Clarkson and HarveyImber, co-owners of the King Air private aircraft; and RaytheonAircraft Company, successor to Beech Aircraft Corporation, themanufacturer of the United Express aircraft. None of the plaintiffsfiled suit against the City of Quincy.

Raytheon filed third-party contribution claims against Quincy,alleging that Quincy was subject to liability in tort for thewrongful deaths of plaintiffs' deceaseds. The gravamen of thethird-party complaints was that Quincy negligently failed todischarge its duty to business invitees to use ordinary care toprovide reasonably safe ingress and egress from the airport. Morespecifically, Raytheon alleged that United Express Flight 5925attempted to land at Baldwin Field using a straight-in approach,which violated standard traffic pattern procedure for towerlessairports, that Quincy had been informed by the NationalTransportation Safety Board that commercial aircraft were landingat Baldwin Field using a straight-in approach, and that Quincynegligently failed to give appropriate or effective notice to allcommercial airlines that they were required to conform theirlandings with standard traffic pattern procedures. Raytheon alsomoved to transfer venue in all of the cases to Adams County ongrounds of forum non conveniens.

Quincy moved for the dismissal of the third-party actions.Quincy first argued that dismissal was required because St. ClairCounty was not the proper venue. Suit could only be broughtagainst Quincy in Adams County because "[a]ctions must bebrought against a *** municipal *** corporation in the county inwhich its principal office is located or in the county in which thetransaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the causeof action arose." 735 ILCS 5/2-103 (West 1998). As an alternativeargument, Quincy contended that the third-party contributionactions could not be maintained against it because it is absolutelyimmune from liability in tort pursuant to the Local Governmentaland Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS10/1-101 et seq. (West 1996)).

Before the trial court ruled on Quincy's motion to dismiss orRaytheon's motion to transfer venue, Quincy settled with each ofthe eight plaintiffs for a sum of $1,000 plus costs, conditioned onthe plaintiffs' release of Quincy from all claims. Plaintiffs werealso required to obtain a court ruling on the good faith of thesettlement agreements and a dismissal of all third-party claims.

As required by the settlements, each plaintiff filed a motionseeking a good-faith ruling. The motions brought by plaintiffsJohnson, Carlson, and Fries were argued at a hearing before circuitcourt Judge Lloyd A. Cueto. The motions brought by theremaining five plaintiffs-Berger, Beville, DeSalle, Hefflebowerand Reed-were argued at a hearing before circuit court JudgeMichael J. O'Malley. Arguments presented at both hearings weresubstantially similar. Raytheon opposed the plaintiffs' motions,arguing that the settlements were not made in good faith or,alternatively, that a good-faith ruling would be premature at thisjuncture. Raytheon asked both judges to allow discovery and toconduct an evidentiary hearing to develop a factual basis fordeciding whether the settlements were made in good faith.

Ruling independently, both circuit court judges denied therequest for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Both judges heldthat, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, the settlingparties had established that the settlements were made in goodfaith and that Raytheon had not presented any evidence toovercome the presumption of good faith. The settlements wereapproved and Raytheon's third-party claims against Quincy weredismissed. The circuit court orders contained an express finding,pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)),that the judgment dismissing Quincy from all claims was final andappealable. Raytheon appealed and the cases were consolidated forreview.

The Fifth District of our appellate court affirmed the circuitcourt's good-faith ruling. The appellate court agreed that thesettling parties had made a sufficient preliminary showing that thesettlements had been made in good faith. The court also held thatRaytheon had not met its burden of proving the absence of goodfaith by clear and convincing evidence. The appellate courtrejected Raytheon's argument that a good-faith finding could notbe made without determining the relative liability of the settlingparty and, consequently, held that the circuit court did not abuseits discretion by refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing beforedeciding the good faith of the settlements.

Raytheon petitioned for leave to appeal and we granted thepetition. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

Raytheon raises two issues for our consideration. First,Raytheon asks this court to resolve a split among the lower courtsas to the burden of proof imposed upon a nonsettling tortfeasorwho challenges a settlement on the grounds that the transactionwas not executed in good faith within the meaning of theContribution Act. Raytheon contends that when challenging thegood faith of a settlement, a nonsettling party has the burden ofproving the absence of good faith by a preponderance of theevidence instead of the higher "clear and convincing" standard.Second, Raytheon asks this court to reverse the circuit court'sruling that the settlement between plaintiffs and Quincy was madein good faith. Raytheon contends that the settlement constitutesbad faith because the settlement amount of $1,000 per plaintiff isgrossly disproportionate to the overall damages claimed by eachplaintiff. Raytheon also contends that the circuit court could nothave determined whether the settlement was made in good faithwithin the meaning of the Contribution Act without determiningQuincy's relative culpability. Thus, Raytheon argues that thecircuit court should have allowed discovery and conducted anevidentiary hearing so that a factual basis for determiningQuincy's relative culpability could have been developed before agood-faith determination was made.

ANALYSIS

The Contribution Act was enacted by our legislature in 1979as a codification of this court's decision in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1 (1977). SeeIn re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153 (1994). TheContribution Act creates a statutory right of contribution in actions"where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising outof the same injury to person or property, or the same wrongfuldeath" (740 ILCS 100/1, 2(a) (West 1996)), to the extent that atortfeasor pays more than his pro rata share of the commonliability (740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 1996)).

The Act provides in section 2(c):

"(c) When a release or covenant not to sue or not toenforce judgment is given in good faith to one or morepersons liable in tort arising out of the same injury or thesame wrongful death, it does not discharge any of theother tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongfuldeath unless its terms so provide but it reduces therecovery on any claim against the others to the extent ofany amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in theamount of the consideration actually paid for it,whichever is greater." 740 ILCS 100/2(c) (West 1996).

The "good faith" of a settlement is the only limitation whichthe Act places on the right to settle and it is the good-faith natureof a settlement that extinguishes the contribution liability of thesettling tortfeasor. 740 ILCS 100/2(d) (West 1996); Dubina v.Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 185, 191 (2001); Inre Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d at 161. The Act, however,does not define the term "good faith," nor does it provide anyprocedural guidelines as to when or how a good-faithdetermination is to be made.

Burden of Proof

In the case at bar, Raytheon asks this court to resolve aconflict which has arisen with regard to the burden of proofimposed on a nonsettling tortfeasor to show that a settlement wasnot made in good faith within the meaning of the ContributionAct. Raytheon contends that the preponderance of the evidencestandard should be imposed, rather than the stricter "clear andconvincing" evidence standard. We agree.

In Barreto v. City of Waukegan, 133 Ill. App. 3d 119 (1985),one of the first cases in this state to consider the issue of good faithwithin the context of the Contribution Act, the court, relying onFisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 447, 163 Cal.Rptr. 47, 56 (1980), formulated a basic procedure for deciding theissue of good faith. Rejecting the notion that a jury or bench trialwas required to determine whether a settlement was made in goodfaith, the Barreto court held that, when a trial court is notified thata settlement has been reached and a good-faith ruling is sought,the trial court should rule on the good faith of the settlement assoon as practicable, apart from and in advance of any trial on thetort issues. Barreto, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 128. Further, the Barretocourt held that the settling parties seeking discharge fromcontribution liability should bear the initial burden of making apreliminary showing of good faith, but that once a preliminaryshowing is made, the "burden of proof on the issue of good faithof the settlor shifts to the party who claims that the settlement wasnot made in good faith or is collusive." Barreto, 133 Ill. App. 3dat 128.

This has been the basic scheme employed by courts of thisstate when deciding the issue of good faith. See Wilson v. TheHoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 308, 318-19 (1989). However,this court has never articulated what quantum of evidence must beproduced, either by the settling parties to establish a preliminaryshowing of good faith, or by the nonsettling challengers of thesettlement to prove the absence of good faith. There are, however,a number of appellate court decisions which have spoken to theseissues.

In Wasmund v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of GreaterChicago, 135 Ill. App. 3d 926, 928 (1985), the court held that,because public policy strongly favors the peaceful and voluntaryresolution of claims, "[w]here there is a resolution of a claim byvirtue of a release or covenant, a presumption of validity iscreated" and the party challenging the release must carry theburden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.Subsequently, courts, citing Wasmund and its progeny, haveapplied these same standards when deciding the good faith ofsettlements. See Warsing v. Material Handling Services, Inc., 271Ill. App. 3d 556, 560 (1995) (after a preliminary showing of goodfaith by the settling parties, the burden shifts to the challengingparty to prove the settlement invalid by clear and convincingevidence); Higginbottom v. Pillsbury Co., 232 Ill. App. 3d 240,249 (1992) (after a preliminary showing has been made, the partyopposing the settlement must prove by clear and convincingevidence that the settlement is invalid); Pritchard v.SwedishAmerican Hospital, 199 Ill. App. 3d 990, 996-97 (1990)(when settling parties represent to the court that they have reacheda good-faith settlement, identify the terms and show thatconsideration was given, a presumption of validity arises, whichmust be overcome by the party challenging the settlement by clearand convincing evidence); Melzer v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,193 Ill.App. 3d 59, 62 (1989) (once a preliminary showing of good-faithsettlement has been made, the burden shifts to the partychallenging the settlement to establish that it was not made ingood faith by presenting clear and convincing evidence of fraud ormutual mistake); Ruffino v. Hinze, 181 Ill. App. 3d 827, 829(1989) (where a preliminary showing of good faith is made, apresumption of validity arises which must be overcome by clearand convincing evidence); McKanna v. Duo-Fast Corp., 161 Ill.App. 3d 518, 525 (1987) (assertion that an agreement is invalidmust be proved by clear and convincing evidence); BituminousInsurance Cos. v. Ruppenstein, 150 Ill. App. 3d 402 (1986)(presumption of validity arises when a claim is settled by releaseor covenant and, thereafter, one challenging the release bears theburden of proving invalidity); O'Connor v. Pinto TruckingService, Inc., 149 Ill. App. 3d 911, 915 (1986) (the partychallenging the settlement has the burden of producing clear andconvincing evidence to establish the invalidity of the settlement).

In general, for a "preliminary showing" of good faith, courtshave required only that the settling parties prove the existence ofa legally valid settlement agreement. In some instances, thisincluded the obligation to prove that consideration was given andreceived. Proof of consideration was then held to be prima facieevidence of validity, which gave rise to a presumption that thesettlement was in good faith. See Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc.,317 Ill. App. 3d 628, 633 (2000); Solimini v. Thomas, 293 Ill.App. 3d 430, 437 (1997); McDermott v. Metropolitan SanitaryDistrict, 240 Ill. App. 3d 1, 44 (1992).

With regard to the standard of proof imposed on thenonsettling tortfeasor challenging the good faith of the settlement,"clear and convincing" evidence was generally recognized as theappropriate standard. That standard, however, was called intoquestion in Bowers v. Murphy & Miller, Inc., 272 Ill. App. 3d 606(1995). In Bowers, the court held that, because of the competingpolicy considerations which must be weighed when deciding goodfaith within the meaning of the Contribution Act, it would be moreappropriate to require nonsettling tortfeasors to prove the bad faithof a settlement by a preponderance of the evidence. FollowingBowers, other panels of the First District have adopted thepreponderance standard. See Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 317 Ill.App. 3d at 633; Stickler v. American Augers, Inc., 303 Ill. App. 3d689 (1999); Evans v. Tabernacle No. 1 God's Church of Holinessin Christ, 283 Ill. App. 3d 101, 107 (1996) (the burden of proofrests on the nonsettling tortfeasor to establish a lack of good faithby a preponderance of the evidence).

Having reviewed the relevant case law, we conclude that,when a court determines whether a settlement was negotiated ingood faith within the meaning of the Contribution Act, the settlingparties carry the initial burden of making a preliminary showing ofgood faith. At a minimum, the settling parties must show theexistence of a legally valid settlement agreement. However, not alllegally valid settlements satisfy the good-faith requirements of theContribution Act. See Stickler v. American Augers, Inc., 325 Ill.App. 3d 506, 511 (2001); Stickler v. American Augers, Inc., 303Ill. App. 3d 689, 693 (1999); Bowers, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 610-11.Therefore, other factual evidence may be necessary before thecourt may determine, as an initial matter, whether the settlementis fair and reasonable in light of the policies underlying theContribution Act.

Further, we are persuaded by the well-reasoned decision inBowers that, once a preliminary showing of good faith has beenmade by the settling parties, the party challenging the good faithof the settlement need prove the absence of good faith by apreponderance of the evidence. The "clear and convincing"standard, when traced back to its genesis in Wasmund, rests on abody of law where the burden was on a party to a settlementattempting to set aside the settlement upon a claim of fraud,misrepresentation, or mistake of fact. See McComb v. Seestadt, 93Ill. App. 3d 705 (1981); Martin v. Po-Jo, Inc., 104 Ill. App. 2d 462(1969). The Bowers court concluded:

"When we address setting aside a release on theapplication of a party to the agreement, we take intoconsideration the rights of the contracting partiestempered by a public policy favoring settlement.Nonsettling defendants in a contribution setting are notparties to the settlements entered into between a plaintiffand a settling tortfeasor, yet they have rights that areaffected by those settlements. The Contribution Actpromotes not only the policy favoring settlement, it alsopromotes the policy favoring the equitable apportionmentof damages among tortfeasors. [Citation.] The policyfavoring settlement is more than accommodated byshifting the burden of proof to a nonsettling defendant toestablish that a settlement is not in good faith once apreliminary showing of good faith has been made. By notonly shifting the burden of proof to a nonsettlingdefendant, but also elevating that burden to proof by clearand convincing evidence, a distinct priority is given to thepolicy favoring settlement over the policy favoring theequitable apportionment of damages. Both policies areimportant [citation], and we fail to see any reason whyone should be favored over the other. In our opinion,shifting the burden of proof to a nonsettling defendant toestablish a lack of good faith and fixing that burden at thetraditional preponderance of the evidence standardprotects both policies promoted by the Contribution Actwhile favoring neither." Bowers, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 610.

This court has previously recognized that the Contribution Actseeks to promote two important public policies-theencouragement of settlements and the equitable apportionment ofdamages among tortfeasors. See Dubina v. Mesirow RealtyDevelopment, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d at 193-94; In re Guardianship ofBabb, 162 Ill. 2d at 171. When a court decides whether asettlement was negotiated in "good faith," it must strike a balancebetween these two policy considerations. We agree with Bowersthat the balance of these two policies is best struck by placing theburden of proving the absence of good faith on the partychallenging the settlement, but by sustaining the challenge to thesettlement when a preponderance of the evidence indicates a lackof good faith.

In the case at bar, the appellate court held that the properstandard to be imposed on a party attempting to overcome apreliminary showing of good faith was proof by clear andconvincing evidence. Nevertheless, the appellate court ruled thatRaytheon had produced no evidence of bad faith and, for thatreason, upheld the trial court's finding of good faith. The trialcourt⁽²⁾ also ruled that, regardless of the burden imposed, Raytheonhad not supported its claim with any evidence. Consequently, it isnot necessary that we remand this cause to the trial court or theappellate court for further consideration under the preponderancestandard announced today. Instead, we shall review the findingthat the settlements reached by the plaintiffs and Quincy weremade in good faith.

Good Faith

As noted earlier, "good faith" is not defined by theContribution Act. Nor can there be a single, precise formula fordetermining what constitutes "good faith" within the meaning ofthe Contribution Act that would be applicable in every case. Asettlement will not be found to be in good faith if it is shown thatthe settling parties engaged in wrongful conduct, collusion, orfraud. In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d at 161; Lowe v.Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. 124 Ill. App. 3d 80, 94 (1984). Norwill a settlement agreement satisfy the good-faith requirement ifit conflicts with the terms of the Act or is inconsistent with thepolicies underlying the Act. Dubina v. Mesirow RealtyDevelopment, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d at 192 (assignment of plaintiffs'claims against nonsettling tortfeasors to settling tortfeasors wascontrary to the terms of and policies underlying the Act); In reGuardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153 (1994) (settlementcontaining loan-receipt provision conflicted with the terms of theAct and did not promote settlements or the equitableapportionment of damages). Ultimately, however, whether asettlement satisfies the good-faith requirement as contemplated bythe Contribution Act is a matter left to the discretion of the trialcourt based upon the court's consideration of the totality of thecircumstances. Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 197Ill. 2d at 191-92; In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d at 162.A good-faith determination is reviewed on appeal for an abuse ofdiscretion. Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 197 Ill.2d at 192; In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d at 162.

In the case at bar, the trial court, ruling on the good faith ofthe settlement between plaintiffs and Quincy, first required thesettling parties to make a preliminary showing of good faith.Quincy represented to the court that, although it believed itself tobe immune from all tort liability, it agreed to settle with plaintiffsfor the nominal amount of $1,000 per plaintiff so that it couldavoid the time and expense of additional litigation. Plaintiffs'counsel then advised the trial court that, after extensive research,it had determined that the likelihood of success in a tort suitagainst Quincy was marginal. Therefore, plaintiffs decided that thelimited amount of litigation dollars were better spent pursuingother sources. The settlement money from Quincy would be usedfor the on-going litigation.

The trial court found that the representations made by thesettling parties were a sufficient preliminary showing of good faithand shifted the burden to Raytheon to show that the settlementswere made in bad faith. The court then found that Raytheon failedto show any evidence of bad faith and ruled that, based on thetotality of the circumstances, the settlement was made in goodfaith.

Raytheon now contends that the trial court abused itsdiscretion when it decided that the settlements between Quincyand the plaintiffs were made in good faith without first conductingan evidentiary hearing to determine Quincy's relative culpability.Raytheon contends that where, as here, the amount tendered insettlement is nominal and there is a gross disparity between thesettlement amount and the ad damnum in the complaints, thenonsettling party should be given an opportunity to show that thesettlement amount bears no reasonable relationship to the settlingparty's relative culpability. We disagree.

At the outset we find Raytheon's premise to be faulty. Thefact that the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, asRaytheon requested, does not mean that the trial court did notconsider whether the settlement amount bore a reasonablerelationship to the settling party's relative culpability. At thehearing on plaintiffs' motion for a good-faith finding, the trialcourt had before it the pleadings, memoranda and other filings inthe case. The trial court also heard extensive argument by counseland, after hearing argument, took the matter under advisement andinvited the parties to submit any additional materials in support oftheir positions. There is no reason to believe that the trial courtwas unable to determine, from the facts before it, the parties'relative culpability. The trial court is in the best position to decidewhat type of hearing is necessary to fully adjudicate the issue ofgood faith. See Barreto v. City of Waukegan, 133 Ill. App. 3d 119.

We are also unpersuaded that the amount of the settlementhere is an indication of bad faith. It is true that plaintiffs'complaints sought damages in the millions of dollars and that thesettlements with Quincy were for the nominal figure of $1,000 perplaintiff. However, the disparity between the settlement amountand the ad damnum in the complaint is not an accurate measure ofthe good faith of a settlement. See Pritchard v. SwedishAmericanHospital, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 998. Nor does the small amount ofthe settlement, alone, require a finding of bad faith. See Pritchardv. SwedishAmerican Hospital, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 998. The amountof a settlement must be viewed in relation to the probability ofrecovery, the defenses raised, and the settling party's potentiallegal liability. See Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 232 Ill. App. 3d 463(1992); O'Connor v. Pinto Trucking Service, Inc., 149 Ill. App. 3d911, 916 (1986).

In the case at bar, Quincy claimed absolute immunity from alltort liability by operation of the Tort Immunity Act. Quincy hadpreviously asserted this immunity defense in response toRaytheon's third-party contribution claims and both Quincy andRaytheon had submitted memoranda to the court on the issue.Raytheon does not deny that, if Quincy were immune from directtort liability, the third-party contribution claims would be barred.See Board of Trustees of Community College, District No. 508 v.Coopers & Lybrand LLP, 296 Ill. App. 3d 538 (1998) (publicpolicy considerations supporting public officials' immunityrequires that the immunity be applied to bar contribution actionsas well as direct actions); Buell v. Oakland Fire ProtectionDistrict Board, 237 Ill. App. 3d 940 (1992); Martin v. LionUniform Co., 180 Ill. App. 3d 955 (1989); Lietsch v. Allen, 173 Ill.App. 3d 516 (1988). If Quincy was immune, it could not beculpable for any damages sought by plaintiffs.

At the time that plaintiffs settled with Quincy, plaintiffsrecognized that Quincy had a viable defense against tort claims. Infact, plaintiffs never sued Quincy directly and plaintiffs' counselrepresented to the trial court that the decision not to sue Quincywas formed after extensive research on the matter indicated that asuit against Quincy had little likelihood of success. Thus, here,unlike the situation in Warsing v. Material Handling Services,Inc., 271 Ill. App. 3d 556, 561 (1995), there is no evidence thatplaintiffs' settlement with Quincy was motivated by a desire toimpede a legitimate claim for contribution. Raytheon has offerednothing to show that the settlement between Quincy and plaintiffswas anything but an arms' length agreement. We conclude, then,that the nominal amount of the settlement, viewed in light of thecircumstances surrounding this case, is not an indication that thesettlement was made in bad faith.

Raytheon's main argument against the finding of good faithis that Quincy's immunity defense is not a viable one. Raytheoncontends that the trial court should not have ruled on the goodfaith of the settlement without conducting an evidentiary hearingto "ascertain the validity" of Raytheon's third-party claims anddecide "whether the $1000 bore any reasonable relationship toQuincy's relative culpability for the accident." Raytheon alsoargues that Quincy's continued presence in the lawsuit would haveincreased the likelihood that the entire matter would be transferredout of St. Clair County, which is plaintiffs' chosen forum. Thus,Raytheon suggests that plaintiffs' decision to settle with Quincywas motivated by the desire to prevent a change of venue.

Even if plaintiffs' decision to settle with Quincy wasinfluenced by matters of venue, we are not persuaded that thatconstitutes evidence of bad faith. The fact that a settlement isadvantageous to a party is not necessarily an indication of badfaith. See O'Connor v. Pinto Trucking Service, Inc., 149 Ill. App.3d at 916. Although plaintiffs' settlement with Quincy may haveimproved plaintiffs' chances of success in defeating Raytheon'sforum non conveniens motion and, thereby, would have allowedplaintiffs to remain in the forum of their choice, this falls short ofbeing evidence of collusion or wrongdoing. Furthermore, the trialcourt was aware of the venue issue and its possible influence onplaintiffs' decision to settle. It was one factor in the totality of thecircumstances which the trial court considered when decidingwhether the settlement was made in good faith. Emphasis shouldnot be placed on any single factor. In re Guardianship of Babb,162 Ill. 2d at 162; Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 114 Ill. 2d 107(1986).

We also find no merit to Raytheon's claim that a good-faithdetermination could not be made unless there was an evidentiaryhearing to determine the validity of the third-party complaints andQuincy's relative culpability. Raytheon denies in its brief that it isasking for a trial on the merits. It claims that it "seeks onlydiscovery and an evidentiary hearing sufficient to determinewhether there is a viable theory of recovery against Quincy."However, in the context of this case, a determination that there is"a viable theory of recovery" can only be interpreted as a ruling onthe merits of Quincy's immunity defense. Courts have repeatedlyand consistently held that a separate evidentiary hearing is notrequired and that a trial court need not decide the merits of the tortcase or rule on the relative liabilities of the parties before makinga good-faith determination. See Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 232 Ill. App.3d at 471; Ruffino v. Hinze, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 832; Barreto v. Cityof Waukegan, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 128. A court is capable of rulingon "good faith" without a precise determination of the overalldamages suffered by the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor'sproportionate liability. See McDermott v. Metropolitan SanitaryDistrict, 240 Ill. App. 3d 1, 46 (1992) (courts have repeatedlyrejected the "proportionality" or "reasonable range" test fordetermining the good faith of a settlement); Pritchard v.SwedishAmerican Hospital, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 998 (doctor'ssettlement contribution of $10,000 in a medical malpractice suitwhere plaintiff sought several millions of dollars in damages wasreasonable because plaintiff might not be able to prove proximatecause).

We see no purpose for an evidentiary hearing. When the trialcourt made its good-faith ruling, the record contained Raytheon'sresponse to Quincy's motion for dismissal of the third-partyclaims. Raytheon disputed Quincy's claim of immunity, both in itslegal filings and in its argument at the good-faith hearing.Raytheon was given the opportunity to supplement the record andpresent additional argument even after the good-faith hearing washeld. Raytheon has made no offer of proof, nor has Raytheon evensuggested what additional evidence concerning the issue ofQuincy's immunity might be revealed by an evidentiary hearing.The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Raytheon'srequest for an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION

We agree with the trial court that the settling parties provideda sufficient preliminary showing of good faith, which Raytheonfailed to overcome. Applying the totality of the circumstances testto the facts of this case, we find that the trial court did not abuseits discretion when it found the settlement between plaintiffs andQuincy satisfied the good-faith requirement of the ContributionAct. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellatecourt upholding the good-faith ruling made by the trial court.

Affirmed.

JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration ordecision of this case.

1. ¹Although representatives of all 10 United Express passengers andthe estate of copilot McCombs filed wrongful death and survivalactions, the representatives of eight United Express passengers are thenamed plaintiffs in this appeal.

2. ²As noted above, two judges in the circuit court, after receiving thesame evidence and hearing substantially similar arguments, ruled thatthe settlements were made in good faith and denied Raytheon's requestfor an evidentiary hearing. References to "the trial court" encompass therulings of both judges.